Conciliatory signalling

With this clarification, Mason and Siegfried argue that CBMs are not an end in themselves, but rather a useful step in the ladder to negotiating and implementing peace agreements that addresses the key strategic concerns of the fighting parties (Mason, Siegfried 2013:58). CBMs can be seen as part of a larger set of communications between the fighting parties in a peace negotiation process (Höglund, Svensson 2006:371).

With this definition of CBMs in mind, I assume the pilot project can create trust, improve the relation between the parties, signal positive intentions and avoid escalation. It is a step for turning hostile relationships into something better, and to change the harming view that the parties have of each other, that often stands in the way of seeing beyond labels and understand that both parties wish for the same - an end to the conflict. I will use my empirical findings to see how the pilot project could have been used to change the view of the other party, find common ground and create better conditions for negotiations. Furthermore, with this definition I assume the pilot project can escalate the conflict and create more tension and negativity between the parties if it is not to be successful.

2.3.2 Conciliatory signalling

For CBMs to be successful, you must be able to tell when trust is been given. How do you recognize signs of trust from the other party? How do you know when your enemy is showing willingness to trust? Höglund and Svensson look into why some confidence-building strategies are more successful than others, and explore how a party can send conciliatory signals to the other party that will increase trust by the party exposing itself to three different kinds of political risks. They examine what they call “communicative signalling process” between the parties, a set of conciliatory signalling. The findings of Höglund and Svensson contribute to understand what kind of strategies can be used to build enough confidence between the fighting parties to elicit cooperative behaviour and enable to start serious peace negotiations. They look at how different form of political risk can be taken in the communicative process to transform foes into partners in peacemaking (Höglund, Svensson 2006:368).

After a long period of violence it is not realistic to assume a high level of trust, and confidence building is mainly about reducing the level of mistrust. While cooperation does not require trust, the reduction of mistrust is highly important in these situations because it facilitates

problem solving (Höglund, Svensson 2006:370). For a confidence-building strategy to be successful, a party must be able to show that the party is trustworthy in its claimed willingness to pursue peace negotiations. But after a long and brutal conflict, the characterization of the relationship between the parties are more likely to be dominated by mistrust, fear, hatred and other negative attitudes. In this case, in a bargaining situation, the parties have more incentives to cheat and mislead for tactical reasons. The key question then becomes how the parties, in a credible way, can convey their willingness for peace negotiations, despite this evident presence of cognitive barriers that hinder communication as well as strategic incentives to misrepresent intentions (Höglund, Svensson 2006:371).

Several scholars have suggested a strategy labelled “sticking one’s neck out”, where parties can increase their credibility by taking measures that impose a substantial cost onto themselves (Mitchell 2000:177, in Höglund, Svensson 2006:371). “The trustworthy actor must do something that the untrustworthy actor would hesitate to do” (Kydd 2000a:399 in Höglund, Svensson 2006:371). The cost here will make it possible to distinguish between those parties who are genuinely interested in peace negotiations and those who are negotiating for tactical reasons. In rational choice literature, communication like this is referred to as “costly signalling” - in contrast to “cheap talk” - which may be used to persuade the other party of its their credibility. By taking costly conciliatory initiative like this, the party’s intentions can therefore be credibly communicated (Höglund, Svensson 2006).

“Parties may strategically use potential costs, vulnerabilities, and risk inherent in peace processes as a way of increasing the credibility of the conciliatory communication” (Höglund, Svensson 2006:371). Jeffrey Rubin argue for three different types of such potential costs involved in a de-escalation process (Rubin, Pruitt, Kim 1994); image loss, position loss and information loss. Höglund and Svensson have elaborated further on these three cost and use three slightly different measurement of trust in their analysis of the Sri Lankan peace process:

image costs, security costs and information costs (Höglund, Svensson 2006:372).

Image cost covers the risk of parties losing their image and prestige, and particularly important are measures where the party may be portrayed as weak. The importance of image and status should not be undermined in a negotiation process (Höglund, Svensson 2006). One form of such an image cost can be by recognizing the other party to the conflict. Granting this type of recognition is costly because rebels fight for recognition and legitimacy (Guelke 2003, Zartman

1995, in Höglund, Svensson 2006), and when recognition has been offered once, it is hard to take back. Also, a leader risk being perceived as a traitor when cooperating with the enemy.

Where Rubin argues for position loss - cost related to losing the bargaining position in the negotiations – Höglund and Svensson rather use the concept of security cost. The parties risk incurring security costs when they reduce or give up some of their means to security, like giving up power and positions on ground or open up access to territory (Höglund, Svensson 2006:376). Taking such security risk can be an important form for conciliatory signal, that makes it more likely that mistrust will be reduced and cooperation can be initiated between the parties.

Thirdly, information cost covers the cost related to loss of information regarding strength, commitment, resources and any other type of crucial information in the context of conflict (Höglund, Svensson 2006:372). Höglund and Svensson argue how third-party monitoring and the organizational design of the negotiations are two measures that can increase transparency and reveal important information. Taking these actions of information risk can arguably send conciliatory signalling to the other party and reduce mistrust.

If a party is willing to take these conciliatory actions, the party runs the risk of suffering these types of losses. Most bargainers will only take such conciliatory actions if they trust the other party (Ross, LaCroix 1996:331), however, such actions serve as an important first step to signal trust. Conciliatory signalling is therefore important to show a party’s willingness and readiness for negotiations.

In their research comparing two rounds of peace negotiations in Sri Lanka, Höglund and Svensson found that the second round of negotiations were more successful in initiating substantial negotiations as the conflicting parties showed readiness to counter internal criticism, to expose themselves to increased media attention, and to recognize the other party as an equal. I argue that this conciliatory signalling has also been used in the case of the peace negotiations in Colombia with the use of the pilot project.

I assume that these conciliatory signalling has been important for reducing mistrust between the Colombian government and the FARC, especially through position loss and information loss through the pilot project. When it comes to image loss, I assume that the readiness from

the parties to expose themselves to increased media attention will play an important role not only as a tool to reduce mistrust between the parties, but to portrait the trust building initiative to the Colombian population in general and to show the readiness and commitment from both parties to reach an agreement in the peace negotiations. Losing such an opportunity may fail to address this identity-based approach to a conflict that stretches beyond the negotiation table itself and out to the population in general. Therefore, talking about reduction of mistrust and building of trust between parties should also include the general public. In my analysis, I want to look at the factor of conciliatory signalling between the parties but also at their attitude towards the public; I assume that image loss towards the general public can increase the populations trust in the negotiations.

Research Design and Methodology

In this chapter, I will account for the methodological choices that I have made during my thesis, what sources I have used and how they have contributed to answering my research question. I will also account for the consequences that these choices have had on reliability and validity, as well as some of the challenges that I have faced during my research. To be able to answer my research question I have made use of both secondary literature and consultancy reports, as well as my own data collection during my fieldwork in Colombia.