As observed by Elizabeth Anderson, Haack conceptualizes ethical-political considerations as subjective and “arbitrary” judgments; as expressing “idle wishes or desires” (1995a: 35).
Indicative is Haack’s presentation of the “tacit oath” that we presume on the part of “those who follow any scientific vocation, […] never to subordinate the objective truth-seeking to any subjective preference or inclination or any expediency or opportunistic consideration”
(my emphasis, Haack 1998: 7). To disregard this oath of objective truth-seeking is considered equivalent to allowing justification of theories to be value-laden, which in turn is to subordinate objective truth-seeking to individual preferences, random inclinations and opportunistic considerations, because values are nothing but subjective wishes or desires.
Accordingly, value-oriented action is simply the instrumentally oriented actor’s attempt to fulfill her wishes or desires as efficiently as possible. Haack embeds her idea of what it means to orient oneself with reference to values, in a rational-choice theory of action, where actions are conceived as motivated by desires, and explained with reference to the actor’s strategic means-end calculations given her beliefs and desires. Thus, in principle, our desires can be of any kind – they are presented precisely as arbitrary, random and unpredictable. In general, however, “human nature being what it is”, our desires are of a selfish kind. Indicative is Haack’s recommendation to reward the “egos” that choose to pursue the truth (op.cit.: 12):
“All the same, human nature being what it is, people do mind who gets the credit; so putting ego in the service of creativity and respect for evidence is no bad thing” (original emphasis, ibid.). To reward the ego means, typically, to secure the advancement of individual “utility”
or “ambition”, “fame or fortune” (op.cit: 8-9). Hence, desires and their ethical and political expressions, reflect arbitrary subjective preferences or inclinations, but are only arbitrary within the natural motivational horizon of human beings which is egoism.
Moreover, as the term desire indicates, Haack assumes that our values express our emotional states. When an inquirer lets her values influence justification of theories, she gives in to what she is “temperamentally disposed to” (op.cit.: 10),34 to what she finds “emotionally
34 The expression is taken from a passage on the “impartial” and “genuine” inquirer not being “motivated by the desire to arrive at a certain conclusion”, in opposition to the “intellectually dishonest person” who “is given to
appealing” to the extent that it is “befogging” her (op.cit.: 113).35 The fact that our subscription to values has an emotional basis, does not imply, however, that the inquirer, giving in to her emotions, avoids individual responsibility. If she allows values to influence justification of theories, she is not in a position to blame her sentimental constitution, because she could have resisted her inclinations and decided to pursue genuine inquiry: The hazards of value interference are “something for which you can be held responsible” (op.cit.: 15).
In addition to this elaboration of values as expressions of subjective wishes or desires, the essays of Manifesto also contain drafts of a conception of values as virtues and of values as justified moral standards, partly in accordance with, partly modifying premise 4):
i) Values as virtues
Haack distinguishes between “epistemological virtues”; “dispositions” that are epistemologically valuable, “instrumental virtues”; dispositions that are instrumentally valuable, and “moral virtues”; dispositions that are morally valuable (op.cit.: 7-21). The typology is introduced in her discussion of “intellectual integrity” as “a disposition to honesty in inquiry: to do your best to extend your evidential reach, to scrutinize your evidence with care and patience, to stretch your imaginative powers” (op.cit.: 13). Intellectual integrity is an epistemological virtue, because it advances genuine inquiry, not the fake and sham reasoning of pseudo-inquiry. It is an instrumental virtue because the genuine inquiry it advances serves the survival of the human species; it is valuable from an evolutionary perspective. And it is a moral virtue because it makes you a “decent” academic and a “good” person, i.e. it is a value-laden virtue (op.cit.: 14, 15).
Haack’s notion of virtues is related, however, to her notion of values as subjective wishes or desires. The virtue of intellectual integrity is introduced as a disposition to which you have to be “motivated”, the outcome of a “desire”, something you are “ready for” or “inclined to”
(op.cit.: 11). And, just as value commitments that lead you astray from genuine inquiry are ones for which you can be blamed, to choose in favor of intellectual integrity is something for
deceiving himself about where evidence points, temperamentally disposed to wishful and fearful thinking”
(1998: 10-11).
35 The expression is taken from the following passage: “Democracy is a political value, and would be apropos if theory-choice in science were a matter of ‘social negotiation’ pure and simple. But it isn’t; it is a matter of seeking out, checking, and assessing the worth of evidence. Unless you are befogged by the emotional appeal of the word ‘democratic’, it is clear the idea is ludicrous […]” (1998: 113).
which you can be held “responsible” (op.cit.: 15): To be a virtuous inquirer is an individual achievement for which you deserve “honor” and “praise” (ibid.).36
Virtues such as intellectual integrity, honesty in inquiry, “creativity” and “carefulness”
(op.cit.: 97, 1993: 199), are, however, different from other value-laden wishes or desires in one crucial respect: Justification of theories directed by (some of)37 these virtues does in fact advance genuine inquiry even if they are value-laden (i.e. even if they are also moral virtues).
ii) Values as justified moral standards
Haack’s notion of genuine inquiry rests fundamentally on the premise that there are epistemological standards that are more or less warranted. Truth is even given a universal status as the most prominent of epistemological standards. The universal and superior epistemological status of truth is irrefutable:38 “Terms of epistemic appraisal, unlike moral oughts, carry no presupposition of voluntariness”, because the “internal connection between the concepts of beliefs and truth” implies that you cannot simply “believe at will” if believe is what you do – if you believe that p, you believe that p is true (1998: 18). This is not to deny that some inquirers disregard at will evidence and philosophical argument and give in to subjective inclinations, for instance ethical sympathies or political interests, which thus lead them astray; the wishful and fearful thinking of sham reasoning is a problem “precisely because the will can get in the way of our judgment of evidence” (original emphasis, ibid.).
Oughts do, however, carry a presupposition of voluntariness. Questions about “good” and
“bad” express our subjective, and most often selfish, wishes or desires, which we choose to pursue – or not pursue (op.cit.: 119). Nevertheless, there are standards, “moral” standards that are more justified than others (op.cit.: 14, 167); standards we should decide in favor of, and bring our motives in accordance with. However, in contradistinction to the epistemological standard of truth, Haack’s moral standards are neither explicated, analyzed, nor thoroughly justified. Apart from some general reflections connecting the requirement of “justice” to a recognition of our “common humanity”, Haack is silent on the topic of moral justification (op.cit.: 123). And, most important for her argument for value-freedom: Not even justified moral standards are allowed to play a role in theoretical justification: “Politicization of
36 Although Haack admits that the disposition towards intellectual integrity also depends on “an environment that encourages it” (1998: 11).
37 Creativity is, for example, a virtue only outside the context of justification (“creativity in hypothesis”), whereas carefulness is a virtue of theoretical justification (“care in seeking out and assessing the worth of evidence” (1998: 97).
38 Although under the condition of fallibility.
inquiry” is indefensible in the interest of any values, i.e. also values that can be given the status of warranted moral standards (op.cit.: 119).
Haack is somewhat ambivalent on this point, however. On one occasion she emphasizes that
“freedom of thought and information is vital to the scientific enterprise” (op.cit.: 97):
“Freedom of thought and speech” are “important conditions for scientific inquiry to flourish”
(op.cit.: 113). On another occasion she expresses concern for “the possibility that inquiry by a madman bent on destroying the planet might succeed – and bring further inquiry to an end”
(op.cit.: 13). These passages suggest that there are standards that have to be respected if inquiry is to take place at all. If inquiry was pursued as though destroying the planet and freedom of thought and information did not matter, if inquirers when justifying theories disregarded the standards that are conditions for scientific activity to flourish, there would be a risk that inquiry itself would contribute to ruining the prerequisites for continued inquiry.
But this concern does not prompt Haack to modify her general defense of value-freedom.
In any case, Haack’s reluctance to destroy the planet and to disregard freedom of thought and speech, together with her general dismissal of “morally objectionable ends” (op.cit.: 14), as well as her considerations on justice as a “moral issue” (op.cit.: 167), exemplify a distinction that seems to be assumed in Manifesto, between moral standards which, in Haack’s view, are justified because they respect our common humanity, and other preferences and inclinations that people might give in to.
The distinction plays a role, it seems, in the context of discovery and in the context of practical application, if not in the context of justification. In the context of practical application there is a set of morally objectionable ends that should not be pursued. Apart from avoiding “destroy[ing] the planet”, Haack links the morally objectionable to illegality, as when “the crook [is] paid to find out where the sewer runs so the gang can get into the vault”
(op.cit.: 14). A third example of inquiry for morally objectionable ends, is inquiry in the service of totalitarian regimes. This was exactly “the disaster of Nazi or Soviet science”
(op.cit.: 131). Finally, there are moral issues of justice – for example of gender justice – connected with the “application of scientific discoveries” (op.cit.: 119).
In the context of discovery there are legitimate moral issues of “justice and opportunity”
(op.cit.: 123). Freedom of thought and speech for all discoverers is obviously an essential
moral concern. Haack suspects in fact “that some who favor democratic epistemology have confused the concept of democracy with the concept of freedom of thought” (op.cit.: 113).
The subtext of this passage seems to be that democracy might be a “good” value with a clear
“emotional appeal” (ibid.), but that it does not have the superior moral status of the commitment to free thought and speech. On other occasions, however, democracy among discoverers is conceptualized as right and just – not simply as emotionally appealing:
But perhaps, when it is said that science ought to be ‘more democratic’, the point intended is only that no one should be excluded from a scientific career on the basis of irrelevant considerations such as race, sex, or eye color. This seems right, […] morally (it is a bad thing if, for irrelevant reasons, people are excluded or discouraged from work for which they have talent) (op.cit.: 114).
This link between justice in inquiry and equality of opportunity in the context of discovery is considered, however, to be more “meritocratic than democratic in its thrust” (ibid.). Hence, Haack seems to be uncomfortable with including the term democracy in normative discussions on epistemology, even when restricted to a discussion on recruitment in the context of discovery, because it contributes in a slippery-slope-like manner to the idea that
“theory-choice” should somehow be “put to a vote”, when in fact “seeking out, checking, and assessing the worth of evidence” adequately, in science especially, ought to be done by the talented and properly qualified, with the “appropriate expertise” and competence, respecting
“the institutionalized authority of well-warranted results” produced by “earlier generations”
(op.cit.: 113, 114). This is the main reason why “a systematic underevaluation of women’s abilities” in academia is a problem (op.cit.: 172) – not because “appointing women contributes to a desirable diversity”, not because women are needed as role models, not because women bring special insights (op.cit. 169) – not even primarily because it is unjust and equality of opportunity is a moral standard that recognizes our common humanity – but rather because finding “the best person appointed despite her sex” will facilitate genuine inquiry, and sexism, possibly excluding a talented woman because she is a woman, will not (op.cit.: 172).
Haack doubts, however, that sexism is a significant problem in academia (ibid.). The greatest obstacles to “genuine meritocracy” in present day academia, are not sexism (or racism), but rather the “disgracefully corrupt” hiring process driven more by “greed and fear” than by “the wish to identify the best candidate”, and what Haack refers to as “preposterism”; the mistaken belief that the “explosion of publications represents a significant contribution to knowledge”
(ibid.: 176, 177, 179, 192). And, as far as sexism in fact is a problem, Haack insists that we should stick to “procedural-fairness policies” (op.cit.: 169); “rules ensuring formal, procedural equality – “equal-opportunity” or “antidiscrimination” policies (op.cit.: 170), because affirmative action; “preferential hiring policies” (op.cit.: 169), are unfair and inefficient.
Again, however, what is more important to Haack is not the moral concern that antidiscrimination is just, and that preferential hiring policies might discriminate (white) talented men illegitimately (op.cit.: 179),39 but rather that such policies are inefficient as means of having the most talented applicant appointed, and so will not inspire genuine inquiry.40