Why inquiring about features indicative of truth confronts the inquirer with ought-questions inquirer with ought-questions

Thus, one cannot consistently claim both that the sole aim of inquiry is to end up with theories that are significantly true and that theoretical justification can be value-free, because questions of significance are questions of what we value. Consistency requires that one of the claims is given up.⁵⁹ The question is, however, whether the context of justification can be kept free from values (i.e. whether we can uphold this claim), even if we give up the claim that the sole aim of inquiry is to end up with theories that are significantly true, and claim, instead, that it is to end up with theories that are true. In other words, can inquirers investigating state of affairs avoid being confronted with ought-questions? I will argue that they cannot.

i) Is, can and ought

Answers to our questions about state of affairs, have implications for our assessments of what is feasible; of what we can do. If, for example,⁶⁰ investigations show that dogs lack the ability

58 In her defense of gradual, fallible justification, Haack does claim that theories are never completely supported by evidence, and thus that justification in this sense always will be partial. However, it is one thing to say that justification always will be partial despite our best efforts, another to say that we should reduce our efforts in advance (i.e. decide to concentrate only on parts of the theory, and leave other parts uninvestigated).

59 Or that one admits that one’s definition of justification is partial.

60 There are different approaches to the use of examples in philosophical argumentation. My use of examples in the discussion of Haack’s argument is meant to be illustrative. Onora O’Neill writes about this illustrative use of examples (often “hypothetical “ or “ostensive” examples) in philosophy, in a discussion of Kant: “ They [the examples in Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Moral and in Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone] are indeed highly schematic examples. However, no addition of detail could make them fully determinate, and if they were cluttered with detail they would loose their pedagogic usefulness. Good illustrations need to be clear and simplified, even caricatures, if they are to get their point across. They need not, however, be trivial […]. If […] examples are seen as illustrations they may (but needn’t) be trivial; but they must present sparse sketches

to do mathematics, efficient education policies cannot be made on the assumption that dogs possess the ability to do mathematics. It is not a sensible option, given what we know about dogs, to recommend, for example, establishing schools were dogs can cultivate their mathematical skills (when dogs in fact have no skills to cultivate). Or, for example, if our investigations show that global institutions of social redistribution must be based in a strong sense of solidarity among citizens to be stable, and that this strong sense of solidarity does not exist and cannot exist given what we know about how human beings relate to distant strangers, policies aiming at establishing and upholding stable global institutions will not be successful. If, on the other hand, a strong sense of solidarity among distant strangers are in fact present, or can be developed, or do not in fact constitute a necessary condition for upholding stable global institutions, policies aiming to upholding stable global institutions may be successful: It is feasible that such policies could be effective.⁶¹

In short, when we say something about state of affairs, we also say something about what can and cannot be done. When we say something about what can and cannot be done, we have, however, already involved ourselves in discussions about what ought to be done, as questions of what we ought to do and what we can do are related. That one can to something, does not imply that one ought to do it, i.e. ‘can’ does not imply ‘ought’, and that one ought not do something, does not imply that one cannot possibly do it. That it is impossible to act in certain ways, does, however, imply that acting in these ways cannot be prescribed, i.e. ‘cannot’

implies ‘ought not’, and ‘ought’ implies ‘can’. This relationship between ‘ought’ and ‘can’ is a conceptual relationship: It does not make sense to tell someone that she ought to do something, when this is something she cannot to. It is, however, also a normative relationship:

A norm obliging us to do something we cannot do is not a norm we would subscribe to.

Consequently, because investigating state of affairs gives answers to questions of what can be done, investigations of state of affairs confronts us, at the same time, with ought-questions.

That is: If investigations show that what we consider as something we ought to do is not feasible, this implies that we claim something about what ought to be, i.e. we claim that what is considered as something we ought to do is not something we ought to do, because we cannot do it.

rather than deep or nuanced pictures” (1989: 168). O’Neill contrasts this way of using examples in philosophy, with the Wittgensteinian approach to examples and examples in problem-centered ethics.

61 For a discussion of this example, see Holst (forthcoming c).

ii) The value of theoretical virtues

A second reason why assessing propositions about state of affairs confronts the inquirer with ought-questions is the value-laden character of “theoretical virtues” (Longino 1994: 477).

Haack mentions intellectual integrity, general carefulness and honesty in inquiry as theoretical virtues; virtues functional for genuine truth-seeking.⁶² Theoretical virtues may, however, also be value-functional; functional for achieving certain values.⁶³ From the perspective of a feminist commitment, Helen Longino emphasizes the significance of two theoretical virtues in particular; “the virtue of ontological heterogeneity” and “the virtue of complexity of relationship” (op.cit.: 477-478). The virtue of ontological heterogeneity involves, Longino says, a commitment both to ensuring that a theory’s conceptual scheme makes room for human potentialities and to representing these potentialities as normal variations, not as deviance or defect. The virtue of complexity of relationship involves a commitment to represent human beings’ potentiality for flexible behavior in response to altered understandings of themselves and others. These two virtues are theoretical virtues, but they are also value-laden virtues: They are at the same time truth-functional and bearers of feminist values.

Haack would probably argue that what possibly makes Longino’s virtues into theoretical virtues, is that they are truth-functional, not that they are functional for certain values. The point is, however, that they are truth-functional virtues which are more functional for some values than for others. For example, in a situation where women are defined as not flexible, autonomous and creative, as in a patriarchal society, the virtues of heterogeneity and complexity will serve those who wish that women were flexible, autonomous and creative beings better than those who wish that women were not flexible, autonomous and creative beings. To this, Haack would probably respond that protecting definitions that are dear to us

62 Even Haack regards, however, for example, intellectual integrity as a moral virtue (not only as an epistemological and instrumental virtue (see. 2.4.2).

63 This is not to deny that there are in fact “cognitive values” (Habermas 2003: 223). Habermas’ talk of cognitive values such as “coherence, simplicity and elegance”, “preservation of otherwise well-confirmed theories”,

“predictive power” and “instrumental power” as “characterized by the fact that they are functionally related to truth, a feature that all other values lack” (2003: 223, 226). Haack would admit values of this sort in the context of justification. There might, however, be values involved when we single out what are to count as cognitive values, when we order them, articulate them and interpret them. Habermas are right when he claims that there are values not “functionally related to truth” and that there are values that are (ibid.). The latter values are, however, not necessarily neutral with respect to ought-questions (consider for example the value of instrumental power – to achieve what?), just as they are not necessarily neutral with respect to aesthetic values (consider for example the value of simplicity).

from investigation, is not what her crossword puzzle model of inquiry prescribes. When we investigate something, there are, however, always background beliefs⁶⁴ that are left uninvestigated. We do not investigate all the propositions we rely on in our studies. We concentrate on some of them at the expense of others. Certain values inspire certain investigations, other values other investigations. Feminist values have, for example, inspired scientists to replace patriarchal definitions of women with other definitions, and definitions of what women are capable of with unprejudiced investigation into what their capabilities are.

Longino’s proposal of feminist theoretical virtues is linked to the latter ambition. They are thus truth-functional, but at the same time value-laden.

iii) Value-laden concepts and distinctions in factual propositions

A third reason why investigating state of affairs confronts us with ought-questions, is the value-laden character of the concepts and distinctions on which factual propositions may rely.

Even if it could be consistently argued that significant theories consist of propositions about state of affairs only, this does not rule out the possibility that concepts and distinctions used in these propositions are value-laden. Consider, for example, Haack’s claim that “it isn’t true”

that there is significant “systematic underevaluation of women’s abilities” in present-day academia; her “nasty suspicion” that “sexism” in recruitment hardly constitutes a considerable problem (1998: 172). The belief that there is sexism in recruitment in present-day academia, in terms of a significant systematic underevaluation of women’s abilities, is a belief that can be considered more or less true or false after proper investigation: What we are discussing is a proposition about state of affairs. But, clearly, at least two of the concepts included in this proposition are value-laden. When Haack talks about underevaluation of women’s abilities, she presupposes a standard of evaluation: Women are underevaluated relative to a fair or just evaluation; to say that they are underevaluated, is to say that their abilities are not fairly or justly valued according to some standard. Sexism is also not a value-neutral term: It refers to unjust or unfair treatment of the sexes.⁶⁵

Haack simply takes it for granted that propositions involving value-laden descriptions of this sort can be properly assessed in the context of justification. She suspects that there is less sexism and underevaluation of women than is often assumed, and considers this a proposition

64 To use Haack’s own term.

65 Certain kind of concepts and distinctions are inevitably value-laden. Consider Hilary Putnam’s explication of descriptions that are unavoidably “beyond the fact/value-dichotomy” (1990: 135-178). Consider also Ånund Haga’s notion of “critical descriptions” in the social sciences (1991: 252-281).

that can be considered more or less warranted after proper investigations. To prescribe justification of propositions containing value-laden descriptions is, however, inconsistent with her doctrine of value-freedom. To be consistent, she would either have to exclude value-laden descriptions from inquiry, or find a way of dealing with the values of such descriptions in the context of discovery and the context of practical application, leaving only stripped bare value-free descriptions for scrutiny in the context of justification. The latter option would imply replacing the ambition of theoretical justification with the ambition of partial theoretical justification. A stripped bare value-laden residue would be excluded from justification, even if it was part of the theory under scrutiny. It is, however, not possible to remove and isolate the value-component from all value-laden concepts and distinctions.⁶⁶ Behaviorists have tried.

Behavioristic descriptions of, for example, slavery are, however, hardly value-free.

“Representation” in an “Orwellian” fashion “describing whipping as a labor mobilization technique” expresses rather other values than a description of whipping as a violent means to control and humiliate (Anderson 1995a: 39).

To wholly exclude value-laden concepts and distinctions from inquiry would imply that Haack could no longer study sexism, and that historians could no longer study slavery. Social scientists could no longer study unemployment, because there is no value-stripped definition of unemployment; a definition beyond value-laden considerations on what is and what is not employment. Medical researchers could no longer study human illnesses, because there are no value-free classifications of human illnesses. It is impossible to classify “organisms living in the human body” into “pathogenic and nonpathogenic” without in any way “track[ing] human interests in health” (Anderson 1995a: 44).

Hence, a limitation of this kind, to allow for investigations of propositions constructed exclusively on the basis of value-free concepts and distinctions, seems to be too restrictive: It

66 Consider Putnam’s argument (based on readings of Iris Murdoch, Bernhard Williams and John McDowell):

“Murdoch was the first to emphasize that language has two very different sorts of ethical concepts: abstract ethical concepts (Williams calls them ‘thin’ ethical concepts), such as ‘good’ and ‘right’, and more descriptive, less abstract concepts (Williams calls them ‘thick’ ethical concepts) such as, for example, cruel, pert,

inconsiderate, chaste. Murdoch (and later, and in a more spelled-out way, McDowell) argued that there is no way of saying that the ‘descriptive component’ of the meaning of a word like cruel and inconsiderate is without using a word of the same kind; as McDowell puts the argument, a word has to be connected to a certain set of

‘evaluative interests’ in order to function in the way such a thick ethical word functions; and the speaker has to be aware of those interests and be able to identify imaginatively with them if he is to apply the word to novel cases or circumstances in the way a sophisticated speaker of the language would. The attempt of non-cognitivists to split such words into a ‘descriptive meaning component’ and a ‘prescriptive meaning component’ founders on the impossibility of saying that the ‘descriptive meaning’ of, say, cruel is without using the word cruel itself, or a synonym” (original emphasis, 1990: 166).

is not difficult to come up with examples of areas of inquiry in the human, social and medical sciences that could no longer be investigated were we to take this limitation seriously. It may be the case that these areas of inquiry cannot in fact be genuinely investigated. This would, however, not be Haack’s argument. Her general assumption is, as her reflections on whether sexism “is true” exemplify, that “social institutions and social categories”, such as slavery, unemployment and human illnesses, can be genuinely investigated (1998: 113, 172). Haack, once more, denies the implications of her own doctrine of value-freedom.⁶⁷

iv) Burdens of judgment

A fourth reason why investigating state of affairs confronts us with ought-questions, is what John Rawls refers to as “the burdens of judgment”; “the sources, or causes, of disagreement between reasonable persons” (1996: 55). Rawls introduces the burdens of judgment to explain why “reasonable disagreement or disagreement between reasonable persons” occurs (ibid.).⁶⁸ Four of the burdens on Rawls’ “not complete list” of “the hazards involved in the correct exercise of our powers of reason and judgment”, “apply mainly to the theoretical uses of reason” (op.cit.: 56), when state of affairs are investigated. One of them is the burden of different “total experience”:⁶⁹

To some extent (how great we cannot tell) the way we assess evidence […] is shaped by our total experience, our whole course of life up to now; and our total experiences must always differ. Thus, in a modern society with its numerous offices and positions, its various divisions of labor, its many social groups and their ethnic variety, citizens’ total experiences are disparate enough for their judgments to diverge, at least to some degree, on many if not most cases of any significant complexity (op.cit.: 56-57).

Our unique total experience as concrete persons shape our personality, our bodies, our values and idiocyncracies, and influence our judgment, for example when we “assess evidence”

(ibid.). Hence, this burden of judgment, a source of reasonable disagreement, is incompatible

67 Can we rule out that concepts and distinctions are value-laden in for example theoretical physics and mathematics? I will return to this question in 2.4.4.

68 Reasonable disagreement is disagreement between “persons who have realized their two moral powers [they have a capacity for a sense of justice and a capacity for a conception of the good] to a degree sufficient to be free and equal citizens in a constitutional regime, and who have an enduring desire to honor fair terms of cooperation and to be fully cooperating members of society. Given their moral powers, they share a common human reason, similar powers of thought and judgment: they can draw inferences, weigh evidence, and balancing competing considerations” (Rawls 1996: 52, 55).

69 The other three are listed in Rawls (1996: 56).

with the idea of value-freedom in theoretical justification. Genuine inquirers cannot abstract themselves from their “whole course of life” (ibid.).⁷⁰

v) Significance – a question of values

Thus, inquirers investigating state of affairs are confronted with ought-questions. Even if one considers the sole aim of inquiry to be to end up with theories that are simply true (and not significantly true), theoretical justification will be influenced by values. If this was not the case; if value-freedom in theoretical justification was in fact possible, Haack could, however, have made a consistent argument where she defended truth as the aim of inquiry and value-free theoretical justification at the same time. But the sole aim of inquiry, in her view, is to end up with theories that are significantly true. And this claim is only consistent with the claim that theoretical justification is value-free, if it can be argued that questions of significance can be answered in a value-free way.⁷¹

In The Advancement of Science (1993) Philip Kitcher argues that “science aims at the significant truths, and that significance is a matter of identifying natural kinds, formulating unifying general principles, and so forth” (original emphasis, quoted in Kitcher 2002: 552).

Kitcher now considers this idea to be “suspect” (ibid.), because “significance is determined by us and our evolving interests”, i. e. there are no natural kinds (op.cit.: 555). There is no sharp boundary between “epistemic” and “practical”: “[…] there is no context-independent notion of significance, and epistemic significance is intertwined with past and present practical projects” (Kitcher 2001: 148). Generally speaking, Haack tends to agree with the latter position. She acknowledges that questions of significance, at least in most cases, confront us with practical, non-epistemic concerns,⁷² confident that one can argue for value-freedom without denying this point: In genuine inquiry the question of a theory’s significance, whether value-laden or not, is not to be dealt with in the context of justification anyway, according to her prescriptions. Haack suggests, however, that significant research questions in the natural

70 Rawls suggests, however, that the burdens of judgment do not apply in natural science: “It [our attempt to reason with one another] seems to do so [lead to reasonable agreement] in natural science, at least in the long run (1996: 55). Rawls does not advance this suggestion.

71 Or if one admits that one’s definition of theoretical justification is partial.

72 Even if she at times seems to deny it. Consider her comparison between science and law in a recent article. In contrast to science, “the quest for truth in the courtroom” is a “kind of inquiry” that is “constrained not only by

72 Even if she at times seems to deny it. Consider her comparison between science and law in a recent article. In contrast to science, “the quest for truth in the courtroom” is a “kind of inquiry” that is “constrained not only by