The question of values in inquiry: A question beyond values

Haack’s sketchy distinctions between different kind of values, needs to be advanced further, if her argument for value-freedom is to be adequately addressed.

The background consensus of the lifeworld can be disrupted when validity-claims implicit in our speech-acts are questioned. Discussing the role of values in inquiry is essentially a discussion of how to conceive of the relationship between questions of truth and questions of rightness, i.e. the relationship between “is” and “ought”, in Haack’s terms (op.cit.: 129). In her general argument, ought-questions are considered equivalent to questions about what our

“values” are, which in turn are considered equivalent to questions of what we consider “good”

and “bad”; “ethical or political questions” (op.cit.: 118, 119). In a discussions of values and inquiry, it is, however, essential to properly distinguish between what is ethically good and what is morally right; between “the good” and “the right”, the “comprehensive” and the

163 The norm of freedom of thought and speech is a transcendental-pragmatic “certainty” (Apel 2001: 12). And was it not a transcendental-pragmatic certainty is would still be a norm that one reasonably could regard as justified: It is a norm all would agree to in argumentative discourse.

“freestanding” (Rawls 1996, 1999), “values” and “norms”, “ethics” and “morality”

(Habermas 1999).¹⁶⁴

i) Truth and morality¹⁶⁵

When we assert that something is (true), we assume an idealization of context-transcending argumentation that we can approximate; a truth-idealization. When we assert that something is right, we assume an idealization of context-transcending argumentation that we can approximate; a rightness-idealization. The rightness-idealization is “analogous” to the truth-idealization (Habermas 2003: 229). There is an internal connection between justified beliefs and truth, whether we talk of empirical truth or moral (truth-analogous) rightness. In both cases

[t]o make a sincere assertion or to justify a belief would not be what it is if it were not connected with the understanding that the assertion or belief should be acceptable to any sufficiently competent or enlightened person (Wellmer 2001: 15).

When we claim that something is a moral ought (just as when we claim that something is the case), we claim at the same time that it can be justified as right (just as to claim that something is, is to claim that it is true), i.e. that it can be justified to all persons as free and equal in a context-transcending discourse. Furthermore, the regulative idea of an ideal communication community presupposed in committed moral discourse (just as in genuine truth-seeking) has a moral content; the formal and processual properties of argumentation implies a norm of equal respect.

The truth-idealization is, however, also distinct from the rightness-idealization: “Correct moral judgments owe their universal validity not to their corroboration by the objective world like true empirical judgments, but to rationally motivated recognition” (Habermas 2003: 231);

their rational acceptability is independent of “states of affairs that are warranted by the world itself” (op.cit.: 224).¹⁶⁶ In Haack’s terms, whereas discursive justification of what ‘is’ can be

164 I thank readers who have had these distinctions on their mind from when I introduced Haack’s argument in Chapter 1, for their patience. The reason why they have not been introduced until now is that the elaborations of the premises in Haack’s argument for value-freedom have been discussed premise by premise. Discussing now her elaboration of premise 4), it is time to scrutinize her notion of values. Much of what is said in the following sections I have, however, already indicated in the previous discussions of this chapter.

165 See also Chapter 7.

166 This difference between the truth-idealization and the rightness-idealization may be the reason why Haack states, misleadingly, that “moral oughts” unlike “terms of epistemic appraisal” carry a “presupposition of voluntariness” (1998: 18, see Chapter 1).

conceptualized as an “interplay of causal and evaluative aspects”, discursive justification of what ought to be is a question of “evaluation” (1993: 4).

It should, on the one hand, be made a distinction between the moral norm of equal respect (and what may be inferred from it) that can be established through transcendental-pragmatic reflection, and fallible moral norms that are warranted as right, in serious argumentation approximating ideal conditions. On the other hand, what is established through transcendental-pragmatic reflection, can always be questioned. And if and when it is questioned, it must be justified in real discourse approximating ideal conditions. The real justification of morality will thus always depend on fallible processes of justification.¹⁶⁷ How should genuine inquirers relate to moral questions when justifying theories? One option would be to dismiss theories with a moral dimension. However, even if we consider the sole aim of inquiry to be to end up with theories in which only truth-claims are raised, this is impossible because:¹⁶⁸

a) Our answers to is-questions, determine our answers to can-questions, which in turn influence our answers to ought-question (since ought implies can, and cannot implies ought not).

b) Theoretical virtues are virtues that may be more in accordance with certain moral norms than with others.

c) Propositions about what ‘is’ may contain concepts, distinctions and vocabularies with a moral dimension.

167 Apel’s transcendental-pragmatic argument rests on a “Begründungstriade”: “Zuerst pragmatisch rekonstruieren, dann die Rekonstruktionsresultate einzeln in Frage stellen, schliesslich im aktuellen Dialog den Zweifel und uno actu die Validität des bezwifelten Resultats prüfen” (original emphasis, Böhler 2003a: 28).

Hence, a defense of moral universalism is, contrary to what Chantal Mouffe (2000) has argued, internally connected to democratic dialogue on moral standards, i.e. to moral discourse – it is also for this reason not anti-democratic to argue for moral universalism (see also Chapters 6 and 9 on the relationship between democracy, the rule of law and morality). In addition citizens may of course participate in other discourses than moral discourses.

168 This is a summing up of the arguments against Haack’s defense of theoretical justification free from ‘values’

qua moral norms, presented so far in this chapter.

d) The burden of judgment referred to as the burden of total experience may introduce morality in theoretical justification.

e) We do not know whether the tacit knowledge we need to rely on when assessing theories, has a moral dimension or not.

f) In discourse on what is true, we presuppose a discourse of an ideal communication community with a moral content.

The sole aim of genuine inquiry is, however, to end up with significantly true theories. Thus:

g) Even if a) to f) were not the case, the fact that the sole aim of genuine inquiry is to end up with theories that are significant, i.e. that are of interest to us, confronts the inquirer with moral questions. Questions of significance are questions of what we assess as significant, and such assessments are attached to morality.

a) to g) imply that theoretical justification is influenced by moral norms. Accordingly, the sole aim of genuine inquiry should be to end up with theories whose claims are justified with reference to the standard of truth as well as to the standard of morality.

ii) Morality and ethics

How should genuine inquirers relate to ethical claims when they justify theories? The answer is linked to what distinguishes “the ethical […] employment of practical reason” from “the moral” (Habermas 1993: 1), claims about what is good from claims about what is right. Moral norms are “deontological”, refer to “obligatory rule-following”, and can be justified to all as free and equal in context-transcending discourse (Habermas 1999: 255): A moral norm is justified when it has survived “a universalization test” (Habermas 1999: 153). This implies that “the ‘oughtness’ of binding norms has the absolute sense of an unconditioned and universal obligation” (op.cit.: 255).

Ethical claims always “compete with” other ethical claims (op.cit.: 153).¹⁶⁹ The

“attractiveness” of “intersubjectively shared values”, as opposed to norms, is that it has […] the relative sense of an estimation of goods that has become established or been adopted in cultures and forms of life: serious value choices or higher-order preferences tell¹⁷⁰ us what is good for us (or for me) overall and in the long run. Different norms must not contradict one another if they claim validity for the same circle of addressees; they must fit together into a coherent complex, that is, form a system. Different values compete for priority from case to case; to the extent that they find intersubjective recognition within a culture or form of life, they form flexible configurations filled with tension (op.cit.: 255).

Hence, “values claim relative validity” (op.cit.: 153): They should be read “teleologically”,

“in terms of the relative preferability of specific values or interests” (original emphasis, ibid.).¹⁷¹ In contrast to the idealization of moral justification, the idealization of ethical justification is, therefore, not truth-analogous: An internal pragmatic connection between justified ethical beliefs and universal rational acceptability cannot be established. Ethical claims may, however, be discussed reasonably: Ethical claims, agreement and disagreement can be more or less reasonable, even if always “indexed to particular communities”

(Habermas 2003: 229).¹⁷² There is an ethical “employment of practical reason”, an ethical

“reflective” approach to the question “What should I do?”, in addition to the “moral” and

“pragmatic” ¹⁷³ approach to practical problems (Habermas 1993: 1). Thus, in contrast to how they are pictured by Haack, values qua claims that are ethical (and that cannot be conceptualized as moral standards), are not simply subjective, unpredictable, irrational wishes or desires.

169 Rawls refers to ethical pluralism as a fact. It is an empirical fact in modern society that there are both

reasonable and unreasonable ethical pluralism. Reasonable ethical pluralism is, however, also an anthropological fact: Reasonable persons will reasonably disagree due to the burdens of judgment (1996: 36-37, 54-66).

170 See Chapter 9 for a brief outline of Charles Taylor’s distinction between weak and strong preferences or evaluations.

171 “Moral norms, of course, embody values or interests, but only such as are universalizable in view of the particular matter at issue” (Habermas 1999: 153).

172 “[…] values have a certain objectivity, but […] this objectivity cannot be understood realistically on the model of the sense in which statements of fact have empirical content. Rather, it relies on the intersubjective recognition of evaluative standards for which we can give good reasons by reference to a corresponding form of life. Conceived as intersubjectivity, the objectivity of value-judgments is always indexed to particular communities” (my emphasis, Habermas 2003: 229). Confronted with “questions of post-traditional justice, evaluative standards come into play that transcend the context of existing communities” (ibid.).

173 The pragmatic task is “making a rational-choice of means in the light of fixed purposes or of the rational assessment of goals in the light of existing preferences” (Habermas 1993: 3). Rational-choice theory should be interpreted as a particular reflection on the pragmatic use of practical reason, not as a general empirical-anthropological theory about human action and motivation, or a normative theory about how we ought to behave, as suggested by Haack. The pragmatic use of practical reason relies intimately on an adequate use of theoretical reason: “As long as the question ‘What should I do?’ has such pragmatic tasks in view, observations, investigations, comparisons, and assessments undertaken on the basis of empirical data with a view to efficiency or with the aid of other decision rules are appropriate” (ibid.).

iii) Ethical claims and theoretical justification

One option for genuine inquirers would be to dismiss theories with an ethical dimension.

However, even if we consider the sole aim of inquiry to be to end up with theories in which only truth-claims are raised, this is impossible because:¹⁷⁴

a) Our answers to is-questions, determine our answers to can-questions, which in turn influence our answers to questions of whether our values are reasonable (i.e. if our goals cannot be achieved it is unreasonable to uphold them).

b) Theoretical virtues are virtues that may be more in accordance with certain values than with others.

c) Propositions about what ‘is’ may contain concepts, distinctions and vocabularies with an ethical dimension.¹⁷⁵

d) The burden of judgment referred to as the burden of total experience may introduce values in theoretical justification.

e) We do not know whether the tacit knowledge we need to rely on when assessing theories has an ethical dimension or not.

f) To institutionalize inquiry is not a value- and interest-neutral endeavor.

The sole aim of genuine inquiry is, however, to end up with significantly true theories. Thus:

g) Even if a) to f) were not the case, the fact that the sole aim of genuine inquiry is to end up with theories that are significant, i.e. that are of interest to us, confronts the inquirer with ethical questions: Questions of significance are questions of what we assess as significant, and such assessments are attached to values.

174 This is a summing up of the arguments against Haack’s defense of theoretical justification free from ‘values’

qua values, presented so far in this chapter.

175 It is possible to think of examples of inquiry in some of the natural sciences, for example in theoretical physics and mathematics, in the humanities, for example in formal linguistics, and in the social sciences, for example in mathematic economics, that do not seem to include concepts and distinctions that are value-laden.

This is, however, a question for investigation, not for assumption.

a) to g) imply that theoretical justification is influenced by values. Accordingly, the sole aim of genuine inquiry should be to end up with theories whose claims are justified with reference to the standard of truth, to the standard of morality – as well as to a standard of ethical reasonableness.

Ethical reasonableness in inquiry requires that inquirers critically deliberate upon their values,¹⁷⁶ and revise them if scrutiny proves them unreasonable. Critical ethical dialogue is facilitated by the presence of participants in deliberation with competing values.

“Impartiality” or “fairness” when confronted with ethical questions “demands attention to all the […] arguments that support or undermine each side’s value-judgments, not a pose of value-neutrality”: All relevant “arguments” should be introduced as far as possible, all “sides”

represented as far as possible (Anderson 1995a: 42). An impartial approach to ethical questions requires dialogue among fellow subjects with different views on the questions in question.

Values can sometimes be redescribed and transformed, after criticism and dialogue, into moral norms. Impartiality or fairness in inquiry when ethical claims are involved, implies “a commitment to pass judgment in relation to a set of evaluative standards that transcends the competing interests of those who advocate rival answers to a question” (Anderson 1995a: 42).

Ethical claims should, if possible, be rediscribed in a way that make them acceptable to those initially defending them, but also acceptable, or at least more acceptable, to those who do not.

Thus, genuine inquirers, with a reasonable approach to ethical questions, should not only seek arguments that both “support” and “undermine each side’s value judgments”, they should try and integrate the different reasonable “sides” by developing synthesized ethical standards

“that transcends the competing interests” (ibid.). This might imply to transform values into norms; claims of competing comprehensive doctrines into obligatory rules.¹⁷⁷ Feminist inquirers, for example, may subscribe to competing values,¹⁷⁸ but share a normative

176 This requires making them explicit. Feminist inquirers’ explicit outlines of their values should be appreciated.

Explicitness makes criticism possible. Value-implicitness makes criticism more difficult.

177 Anderson (along with, for example, Putnam), does not distinguish between values and moral norms.

Anderson thus makes her defense of value-laden theoretical justification more controversial than necessary. She excludes the possibility that some might allow for moral norms to regulate theoretical justification, even if they do not allow theoretical justification to include ethical considerations.

178 See Chapter 5.

commitment that can be distinguished and justified from a moral point of view.¹⁷⁹ Feminist inquirers, or the majority of them, may, also, share certain values; standards “that transcends the[ir] competing interests”, that do not, however, have the universal status of moral norms (ibid.). Moreover, the values of feminist inquirers may be based on truth-claims that can be distinguished and justified relative to the ideal standard of truth.¹⁸⁰

Is the requirement of ethical reasonableness in inquiry compatible with respecting inquirers’

privacy?¹⁸¹ Inquirers are persons with a right to personal autonomy implying that they have no obligation to reveal and justify their private values to others. If, however, inquirers’ values, for example their religious or political views, influence their investigations, and their investigations are institutionalized investigations; inquiry in a public institution, citizens have a right to justification of inquirers’ values, because citizens have a right to justification of the decisions and procedures of public institutions (Rawls 1996, Forst 1999).¹⁸² If inquirers’

religious or political views influence their investigations, these views may in turn influence the content of decisions and the design of procedures of public institutions. Citizens would then have a right to have such influences justified.

As highlighted by Haack, scientific inquiry is not inherently exceptional: “Our standards of what constitutes good, honest, thorough inquiry and what constitutes good, strong, supportive evidence are not internal to science” (Haack 1998: 94).¹⁸³ There are no deep differences between standards of genuine inquiry and standards of genuine scientific inquiry.¹⁸⁴ Scientists are, however, professional inquirers who are expected to make their investigations as genuine as possible.¹⁸⁵ The normative and actual legitimacy of the scientific institution is intimately

179 A feminist proposal of an ethic of care may consist of both values competing with other values, and claims that may be justified from a moral point of view (see Chapter 5 and Chapter 9).

180 A feminist proposal of an ethic of care may rely decisively on claims about state of affairs. If, for example, the care values prescribed are considered to be values inherent in the mother-child relationship, this is a precription based on a claim about the empirical qualities of the mother-child relationship (see Chapter 5).

181 For a discussion of the right to privacy, see Chapter 9.

182 See 2.2.2 and Chapter 9.

183 Or as she puts it in a recent article: “For not all, and not only, scientists are good, reliable inquirers; and there is no […] uniquely rational mode of inference or procedure of inquiry used by all scientists and only by scientists. Rather, as Einstein once put it, scientific inquiry is a refinement of our everyday thinking” (original emphasis, Haack 2004: 22).

184 “Even if the community of inquirers undertakes its cooperative search for truth under the special conditions of an experimental engagement with nature and a communicative engagement with experts, this complex undertaking embodies none other than the very type of intelligence that determines our ordinary practices and everyday communication. There is an internal connection between the practice of inquiry and the contexts of the lifeworld in which it is rooted” (Habermas 2003: 222).

185 And expect of themselves to investigate genuinely (consider, for example, scientists’ collective self-understanding as it is expressed in the scientific ethos, see 2.4.2).

linked to the idea that scientific inquirers are genuine inquirers. Science, moreover, is a public institution,¹⁸⁶ and citizens have a right to justification of the decisions and procedures of public institutions.

In document Feminism, Epistemology & Morality (sider 87-95)