Haack’s notion of values as subjective wishes or desires

Generally speaking, Haack outlines ought-questions as questions of what we consider

“desirable” and “deplorable” (1998: 129). Values express our subjective, unpredictable, irrational wishes or desires. This elaboration differs significantly from her elaboration of truth-questions. Genuine truth-seeking, is defined as seeking answers to questions of state of affairs warranted in rational intersubjective processes of deliberation. Truth is explicated as the outcome of critical communication in a community of inquirers.

Haack’s crossword puzzle model of inquiry has, however, an implicit subjectivist subtext: Her attempt to elaborate truth-seeking as an intersubjective practice is half-hearted. She explicates, for example, the process in which perceptions are interpreted as a monological process.

Meaning is presented, not as intersubjective, dialogically constituted meaning, but as something separate subjects attribute to what they perceive when they do their investigations (see Haack 1993: 74, 1998: 161). Moreover, her justification of why genuine inquiry is an intersubjective endeavor is primarily instrumentalist. She considers “a real community of imperfect inquirers” to be “a tolerable ersatz of an ideal community”, because “individual idiosyncracies or weaknesses may compensate for each other” in a community, and so make the outcome of inquiry more balanced (1998: 97-98). Understanding (qua precondition for communication and investigation) should, however, be conceived as essentially intersubjective. Understanding is established among fellow subjects, not privately (Apel 1994a: 26). This is the primary reason why inquiry should be regarded as a communal practice (because it always already is). Thus, Haack’s approach to values and her notion of

148 See 2.4.1.

149 Values express subjective wishes or desires.

truth-seeking have, after all, a problematic subjectivism in common, even if, in the latter case, subjectivism is the subtext and not the explicated position.

Haack’s subjectivist approach to values is embedded in a rational-choice theory of action.

Haack’s rational-choice theory may be criticized from several points of view,¹⁵⁰ depending on what kind of theory it is considered to be. Considered as a general empirical theory about human nature and action it is unwarranted.¹⁵¹ People’s values are shaped in intersubjective processes of interpretation and communication, and they are historically and institutionally structured (they are not simply subjective). They may reflect a manifold of concerns (they do not necessarily reflect egoistic concerns), they can be reasonably deliberated upon (they are not simply desires, wishes or inclinations), i.e. we do not regard them simply as given goals, beyond scrutiny, and we do not always go about attempting to maximize their fulfillment; we are not simply strategic actors maximizing goal-fulfillment. Considered as a normative theory about how people ought to behave, prescribing us to behave as strategic egoists, Haack’s rational-choice theory is indefensible: The prescription is incompatible with treating all with equal respect (and not simply as means, if this maximizes goal-fulfillment). Considered as an idealization; if she has “decide[d] to interpret” people’s choices and actions as if her rational-choice theory of action were correct, it “fails” as “explanation” of what in fact is going on (Anderson 2002: 371).¹⁵²

Haack seems to consider her rational-choice theory of action as an empirical theory (not as an idealization). This idea of how people in fact behave, feeds her commitment to

150 I will make a few brief points about the flaws of Haack’s rational-choice theory. Thus, I will not deal systematically with the vast literature on rational-choice theory. This means that I will not discuss developments of this theory that might be more sophisticated and defensible than Haack’s elaboration.

151 “This is a problem internal to the research program of rational-choice theory. Most rational-choice theorists talk as if it were a purely empirical theory of human behavior. It is supposed to provide the [...] microfoundation of economic theory. Academics engaged in the imperialist project of extending the theory to extra-economic domains [...] regard the theory as universally true [...]. The trouble with the empirical, microfoundational interpretation of the theory is that it has been massively falsified” (Anderson 2002: 370-371). One response to this problem has been to interpret rational-choice theory as conceptually true: “Ludwig van Miese argued that the theory is a priori true, because all action is necessarily rational when viewed from the standpoint of the agents themselves” (op.cit.: 371). However, rational-choice theory cannot be the “inevitable framework of practical reasoning”, since we are able “to imagine an alternative system of rational principles”, as outlined, for example, in “Kantian theory” (ibid.).

152 “We can, of course, decide to interpret people’s choices as if they were always the product of some imagined set of consistent beliefs and desires. This is how a self-conscious behaviorist must see the theory, as ‘revealed-preference-theory’ does. But this decision comes at two costs. First, the preferences we impute to people may not correspond to what they actually care about [...]. The theory thus fails as a psychological explanation. Second, the behavioristic, tautological interpretation fails as a causal explanation, since it does not offer any account of underlying causes (real beliefs and desires) at all” (original emphasis, Anderson 2002: 371).

freedom: To allow values to influence theoretical justification, is, given her assumption that her rational-choice theory is a valid empirical theory, to allow for theoretical justification to be shaped by the idiocyncratic, arbitrary, subjective inclinations of egoistic natures. Haack regards “value judgments” as “essentially matters of blind, overbearing assertion, not subject to critical scrutiny or revision in light of arguments” (Anderson 1995: 35).¹⁵³ This view is, as suggested, misleading. First, there is empirical evidence that people in fact make their values

“subject to critical scrutiny or revision in light of argument” (ibid.).¹⁵⁴ Second, when people fail to do so, when they do not make their values into topics of argument when asked by their fellow subjects to do so, this is because people lack the motivation to be rational; because of weakness of will, or because institutions insufficiently motivate them to be rational, not because it is conceptually¹⁵⁵ impossible to defend a rational approach to ought-questions.¹⁵⁶ In other words, Haack might still want to uphold her argument for value-freedom, but a valid argument for doing so is not that “to subordinate […] objective truth-seeking” to values, is to give in “to any subjective preference or inclination or any expediency or opportunistic consideration”, that “befog[s]” our minds (Haack 1998: 7).

A less straightforward question is whether Haack conceives of her rational-choice theory as a normative theory about how people ought to behave. In some passages it seems as though she does; when she assumes that people behave egoistically and strategically, “human nature being what it is” (op.cit.: 12). This is either a defense of a naturalistic approach to values, or a normative defense of her rational-choice theory; she is saying that this is how people ought to behave in order not to contradict their nature. Both options are indefensible. Naturalist

153 According to Anderson, Haack’s notion of “value judgments” represents a “primitive emotivist view [...] no serious moral theorist accepts [...] anymore” (1995a: 35). There are, however, I believe, many who are not moral theorists that would subscribe to such a view. There are also several moral theorists that defend a more

sophisticated emotivist view, such as Anette Baier. Consider Rorty’s reliance on Baier’s notion of sentimental education in his critique of moral universalism (see Chapter 7).

154 The empirical evidence is significant. One illustrative example is Anderson’s empirical critique of Kristin Luker’s classic study of women’s decisions about their sexuality and contraceptive use from a rational-choice perspective (Anderson 2002: 379-389).

155 Consider my earlier note, where Anderson refutes Ludwig van Miese’s conceptual argument for equating practical reason with the rational-choice-theoretical notion of reason, which is a version of reducing reason to theoretical reason. Consider also Christine Korsgaard’s refutation of the view that the fact that reasons fail to motivate us is an argument for skepticism about practical reason: “To the extent that skepticism about pure practical reason is based on the requirement that reasons be capable of motivating us, the correct response is that if someone discovers what are recognizably reasons bearing on conduct and those reasons fail to motivate us, that only shows the limits of our rationality. Motivational skepticism about practical reason depends on, and cannot be the basis of, skepticism about the possible content of rational requirements. The extent to which people are actually moved by rational considerations, either in their conduct or in their credence, is beyond the purview of philosophy. Philosophy can at most tell us what it would be like to be rational” (2001: 122).

156 I initiated such a defense in 2.1.3. I will advance it in a moment.

approaches to values rest either on an idea of evaluative facts or on the idea that ‘ought’ can be derived from ‘is’.¹⁵⁷ Haack’s rational-choice theory as a normative theory is incompatible with the norm of treating all with equal respect (and not simply as means, if this maximizes goal-fulfillment).

In other passages Haack does not seem to defend rational-choice theory as a normative theory, however. Inquirers, for example, are in her view, to be “blamed” if they give in to wishes or desires when justifying theories: They “can be held responsible” (op.cit.: 15). This notion of responsibility is incompatible with a naturalistic approach to values. It is also incompatible with defending Haack’s rational-choice theory as a normative theory. “Human nature being what it is” (op.cit.: 12); so long as we are beings egoistically and strategically striving for

“utility”, “fame and fortune”, why should we be blamed if we pursue pseudo-inquiry, if this, let’s say, makes us rich and famous – and why should we deserve “honor” and “praise” if we were to pursue genuine inquiry, if this, let’s say, did not in fact serve our selfish interests (op.cit.: 8,9,15)? Probably, according to Haack, because genuine inquiry is crucial for the long-term survival of the human species. This response requires, however, a more sophisticated rational-choice theory of action than she provides; a theory elaborating the relationship between our subjective wishes or desires and our objective long-term interests as a species. Moreover, Haack embeds her evolutionary argument for making genuine inquiry in a strong moral vocabulary, talking about blame, praise and honor: When inquirers are led astray by their wishes and desires, they are not simply behaving unwisely strategically. In order to express this view, she is, however, forced to introduce a moral vocabulary which her rational-choice theory cannot provide.