The Afghan government and security forces

The Afghan government and security forces are the target type most frequently attacked by insurgents in Afghanistan. The IEA’s leaders, on their side, spends considerable effort trying to justify these types of attacks. Undoubtedly, this is rooted in the fact that killing other Muslims is a controversial question among the IEA’s potential followers; it is also rooted in the fact that in order to gain credibility, the IEA must portray itself as different from militant groups and warlords who committed atrocities against the Afghan population in the past.

Shortly after the fall of the Taliban and the start of the insurgency, fatwas appeared that legitimized the killing of anyone who cooperates with the occupation forces, including Afghan Muslims. Several statements have later been issued that seek to defame and de-legitimize

President Hamid Karzai and his administration.²⁴⁹ The basic argument is that Karzai is a lackey of the U.S. who has no power to make independent policy decisions. He is an agent who represents the occupation forces, rather than the Afghan people, and it is therefore legal to target him and members of his administration. A typical such statement reads:

“... Karzai is a tool for the foreigners who appointed him, he has no competent authority, and he failed in his promises to the Afghan people ... If he was free [from American influence] he should stop the killing of Afghans, and stop the occupation of the country.”²⁵⁰

248 Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, “The Shura Council requests neutral investigation commission in Afghanistan,” 18 May 2008.

249 See, for example, Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, “There is nothing new in the meeting between Karzai and Bush, and Karzai’s announcements are amusing,” 7 Aug 2007; “The official spokesman denies Karzai’s claims about the Taliban,” 23 Nov 2007; “The Bonn Agreement and six years old Afghanistan,”

12 Dec 2007.

250 Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, “The official spokesman denies Karzai’s claims about the Taliban,”

23 Nov 2007.

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The Afghan National Army is also a popular target for defamatory statements: Mullah Dadullah said, “Their resistance for us is very fragile. Seventy thousand or fifty thousand, they are like chickens in a chicken farm. This army is composed of drug addicts or thieves, but the real people are not with them.”²⁵¹ Mullah Omar echoed this in 2008, lashing out at both Afghan security forces as well as local and national government representatives. Afghan security forces were described as:

“... the worst creation among mankind, of little faith, tarnished with liquor and impudence, and people who are let out from detention, how can they keep the money, glory, and the purity of the people? ... And the ministers and rulers of provinces are leaders of groups of loot and pillage, international smugglers, deputies of the international mafia, or members of the intelligence agencies of the occupation forces.” ²⁵²

Such defamation of local authorities seems to be a more frequent theme in the IEA’s propaganda now than at the beginning of the insurgency.

While there is little doubt in the IEA’s propaganda that NATO can only be approached by violent means, the Emirate is somewhat vaguer with regards to how the Karzai administration can be approached. The IEA has repeatedly warned Karzai and others who work for the Americans that they must change their ways and repent, or face the consequences. They have warned Afghan

“agents of the U.S.” that the U.S. are only using them for their own benefit, and that the U.S. will probably not save them, should they decided to pull out.²⁵³ But what would the IEA actually do with Karzai and the others, should the IEA come to power in Afghanistan? In one statement from 2007, the IEA’s spokesman Qari Yusuf likened Karzai government to that of the Communist president Najibullah, and stated that when the Americans pull out of Afghanistan, “Karzai will face the same fate [as Najibullah] and will be dragged to justice as soon as possible.”²⁵⁴ It is an ominous parallel given the fact that when the Taliban entered Kabul in 1996, Najibullah was tortured and hanged from a lamp post in Kabul, and pictures of it circulated around the world. On the other hand, it is not clear whether the statement was meant to be taken literally. It is more common for the IEA to say that when the time comes, Karzai’s destiny will be decided upon by an Islamic court. It can be noted that while Mullah Omar offered a “safe passage” for foreign troops to leave the country, such an option is not available for Karzai:

“I say that Karzai, the agent of the aggressors and the invaders, and his followers are looking for ways to escape, but we do not leave for them a way to be saved. By the Will of Allah we shall bring them to the Islamic court and they know the authority of our court.”²⁵⁵

251 “Interview with Mullah Dadullah,” al-Jazeera, Feb 2006.

252 Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, “A message from the Leader of the Faithful, may God preserve him, on the occasion of ‘eid al-fitr,” 29 Sept 2008.

253 Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, “The future of those who eat the American crumbs!” 21 Feb 2008.

254 Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, “Message from the Leader of the Faithful on the Occasion of ‘eid al-fitr,”

11 Oct 2007.

255 Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, “Statement from Mullah Omar threatening attacks of greater intensity,”

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There are statements that show a more pragmatic side of the IEA as well, at least with regards to members of the Afghan parliament. In July 2008, the IEA abducted a member of the Afghan Senate, Dr. Abdul Wali. He did not have to face trial in a religious court, however; in September, the IEA announced that they had released him “in exchange for three imprisoned mujahidin, in accordance with the Islamic Emirate’s demands.”²⁵⁶ The IEA’s “Code of conduct” from 2006 stated that for government employees who wish to change sides the decision must be taken on a higher level: “If members of the opposition or the civil government wish to be loyal to the Taliban, we may take their conditions into consideration. A final decision must be made by the military council.”²⁵⁷ The Taliban leadership seems to open up, at least, for recruitment of Afghan government officials who wish to change sides.

With regards to former Taliban members and mujahidin fighters who have now decided to cooperate with the Afghan government, the IEA’s official line is somewhat unclear. On one hand, the IEA has issued statements to them encouraging them to change sides, but without issuing threats of reprisals. When Mullah Dadullah was asked in 2006 what he thought about the former Taliban officials who are now taking part in elections, he stated:

“Maybe they were mistaken or they had been pressured and Mutawakkil [former Taliban foreign minister, and candidate in the 2004 presidential elections] couldn’t stand it. The election which he participated in was an attempt from the infidels to tarnish the image of Taliban and make people lose faith in the movement. We advise people not to participate in this game in the future.”²⁵⁸

In contrast, Mullah Mansur Dadullah, used a much harsher tone in a statement in 2007, encouraging people to “kill [these former mujahidin] wherever they find them”:

“I don't see that it is appropriate at all to call these people mujahidin. I see that it is an insult to the mujahidin if we relate those deceivers to them. They are not mujahidin, they are apostates, and it is the duty of every Muslim to kill them. They hurt the reputation of the jihad, the mujahidin, Muslims and Afghanistan. We reject them and advice all the mujahidin to kill them wherever they find them because this is an obligatory duty.”²⁵⁹

This is also quite contradictory to a statement by Mullah Omar from September 2008, where he asked former mujahidin to stop their support for the Afghan government and encouraged them to join the IEA. Notably, he does not demand that these figures actively join the IEA’s armed struggle, but at least they should stop opposing the IEA:

23 Oct 2006.

256 Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, “The release of Dr. Abdul Wali, a member of the Senate in the agent administration,” 16 Sept 2008.

257 Quoted in “A new layeha for the Mujahideen,” Signandsight.com, 29 Nov 2006,

258 “Interview with Mullah Dadullah,” al-Jazeera, Feb 2008.

259 “Video interview with the Taliban field commander, Mullah Mansur Dadullah,” al-Sahab, Oct 2007.

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“I ask those leaders who consider themselves mujahidin and still stand by the Americanized administration, for the second time, do not to stand any closer to the foreigners against the mujahid people ... Let them come and stand by their brothers, the mujahidin, and if they cannot do a practical jihad, at least they should stop their opposition and separate themselves from it.”²⁶⁰

Mullah Omar, more than Mansur Dadullah, probably views these figures as potential allies in the future, and therefore sees it as a much wiser policy to seek cooperation rather than threatening to kill them. Comparing Mullah Omar and Mansur Dadullah’s statements, one can perhaps discern some of the background for why Mansur Dadullah was finally sacked from his position by the Taliban leadership in the autumn of 2007, although the direct reasons remain obscure.