8 View of adversaries
8.3 Foreign civilians in Afghanistan
Foreign civilians in Afghanistan may be attacked or taken hostage under the pretext that they are
“spies,“ “missionaries,” or in other ways supporting the occupation. The IEA has claimed responsibility for several attacks against foreign diplomatic missions in Kabul, for example the attack against the German Embassy in Kabul in January 2009. That attack was justified by saying that “The Germans have forces in the north of Afghanistan and they are involved in the killing of innocent Afghans.” The IEA threatened that they will target “all those countries that have forces in Afghanistan.”261 Diplomatic missions are attacked because they are seen as representing the occupation forces in Afghanistan.
The IEA has also taken responsibility for attacks targeting Westerns in general. In December 2008, an attack was carried out against the Serena Hotel in Kabul, which is frequented by Western visitors. The Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs was present at the hotel at the time of the attack, but the attackers seemed unaware of this at the time. The attack was afterwards justified by saying that the hotel is host to foreigners who are supporting the Karzai regime.
Mullah Baradir claimed at a later stage that “the attack was carried out because the Norwegian foreign minister was present at the hotel,”262 but this is contradicted by the statements of the arrested attackers, who claimed they had no instructions to target the Norwegian Minister, but just that the purpose of the attack was to kill as many foreigners as possible.263
There are several cases of hostage takings of foreigners, which have been actively used by the IEA to create media attention and promote their cause. In September 2007, al-Sumud published an article listing the positive effects of hostage takings for the IEA: The hostage takings give the IEA media attention, it creates dispute among NATO members, and it forces the enemy to recognize the IEA as a negotiation partner. It has also led to the release of imprisoned mujahidin,
260 Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, “A message from the Leader of the Faithful, may God preserve him, on the occasion of ‘eid al-fitr,” 29 Sept 2008.
261 “Two dead in explosion near German Embassy”, Spiegel Online, 17 Jan 2009,
262 “Interview with Mullah Baradir [in Arabic],” al-Sumud 2, no.22 (April 2008).
263 (In Norwegian) Fredrik Græsvik, Skuddene på Serena hotel (Oslo: Kagge, 2009).
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and some governments have promised the withdrawal of their forces, which is a painful blow to the NATO alliance.264
While there are brutal videos of executions of Afghan hostages, this seems not to be the policy for Western hostages. On the contrary, there have been cases where Western hostages have been released, and the incident used in the IEA’s propaganda to portray the organization as peace-seeking, respecting human rights, and in particular women’s rights. But there are also more pragmatic reasons. In many cases of hostage takings, the IEA’s demands include the release of Taliban members from jail. Ransom has probably also been paid in some cases, but this is denied officially by the IEA. Mullah Dadullah has stated that the purpose of hostage taking is to get mujahidin released from prison. While Dadullah, in his familiar line of rhetoric, has claimed that he wanted to have prisoners released from Guantanamo and Bagram,265 the demand is usually concerned with releasing mujahidin imprisoned in Afghanistan. This demand has also been accommodated on several occasions.266
On 2 April 2007 two French aid workers, Celine Cordelier and Eric Damfreville, were taken hostage in Nimruz. The IEA’s initial demands were release of imprisoned mujahidin, and that all French forces should withdraw from Afghanistan.
Two brief cases will illustrate this further:
267 On 28 April, the IEA issued a statement saying that they had released the female aid worker “without conditions, as a signal from the Islamic Emirate that they only want peace and that they respect the rights of women.”268 The aid worker was given a letter from the IEA addressed to the French people, stating that the IEA only has good intentions, and that the West are carrying out atrocities in Afghanistan, and that French forces must withdraw. They upheld their original demands.269 After the French elections in May, the other French hostage was also released, “because the newly elected French president,
Sarkozy, said that if he was elected he would withdraw all French forces from Afghanistan.”270 This was a claim made by the IEA; the French President never actually took any steps to withdraw French forces from Afghanistan.
In August 2007, 23 Korean aid workers from a Christian charity organization were taken hostage.
The IEA justified this by saying:
264 “The new strategy for the mujahidin against the occupation forces [in Arabic],” al-Sumud 2, no.14 (14 Sept 2007).
265 “PERSONALITY: Mullah Dadullah (shaheed),” The Unjust Media,
266 For example, in 2007, the IEA announced that five of its members had been released from Afghan prisons in return for the IEA’s release of an Italian hostage, Italian journalist Daniele Mastrogiacomo.
“Taliban: Afghan government freed prominent Taliban members to secure release of the Italian hostage,”
Islamist Websites Monitor No.78 (23 March 2007), (accessed 20 Dec 2009).
267 Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, “Demands regarding two French aid workers taken hostage in Nimruz,”
20 Apr 2007.
268 Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, “Statement to the French people regarding the release of the French hostage (Celine),” 28 Apr 2007.
269 Ibid.
270 Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, “Freeing the French worker (Eric) today, Friday, 5/11/2007,” 5 Nov 2007.
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“Your country has supported America and has sent 200 troops to kill our people, but the most dangerous step that your country has taken against us is that it has sent Christians preachers to our homeland to convert Afghans and Afghanistan to Christianity from holy religion Islam. We did this to defend Islam. We do not have any bad intention towards your
government, and we want friendly relations ... We only want from you that you not take part in killing us on our soil and stop every kind of support for the invaders.”271
The IEA later killed two of the (male) hostages and finally released the rest, insisting that their release was due to that a number of their conditions were met. They denied that any ransom was paid, which was also denied by the Korean government. 272 The main condition was that South Korea would pull out a contingent of 200 non-combatant troops from Afghanistan (who were due to be pulled out by the end of the year anyway).
With regards to foreign NGOs and humanitarian organizations, the IEA has expressed a rather hostile attitude, seeing humanitarian work as having a hidden agenda. The IEA’s “Code of conduct” states:
“… those NGOs that come to the country under the rule of the infidels must be treated as the government is treated. They have come under the guise of helping people but in fact are part of the regime. Thus we tolerate none of their activities, whether it be building of streets, bridges, clinics, schools, madrases (schools for Koran study) or other works.”273 Seeking to defame and de-legitimize re-construction efforts carried out by the West, IEA spokesman Muhammad Yusuf stated in May 2008:
“They only conduct the rebuilding that they need in the military field, such as paving roads to Kunar, Uruzgan, and Kandahar provinces. Or, they rebuild the centres of indecency and singing, such as movie theatres, night centres, dance-clubs, and so on and so forth.”274 In sum, the IEA’s attitude to foreign civilians is somewhat ambivalent. In their propaganda, the IEA appears to legitimize attacks on both foreign diplomatic missions and luxury hotels
frequented by foreigners, but also foreign NGOs and humanitarian aid workers. The reality on the ground is different. In some provinces, foreign NGOs are attacked but in other provinces not, reflecting the localized nature of the insurgency. In the capital city of Kabul, there are plenty of ways to target foreign civilians, but attackers have preferred targets of higher symbolic value, such as ISAF and foreign embassies, although these are usually better protected (see Chapter 3.2).
271 Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, “A message to the people of Korea from Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan following the hostage release,” 30 Aug 2007.
272 Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, “Taliban Shura Council insists that no money was paid as ransom for the Korean hostages,” 13 Sept 2007.
273 Quoted in “A new layeha for the Mujahideen,” Signandsight.com, 29 Nov 2006,
274 Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, “Taliban interview with Muhammad Yusuf, spokesman of the Taliban,”
20 May 2008.
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Cases of hostage taking where the IEA has been involved indicates that their goal is not always to kill foreigners in terrorist attacks, but also use hostages to exert political leverage on a national and international level.