What if the IEA’s demands were met?

The IEA seems to have taken an uncompromising stance when it comes to the conditions for negotiating: It has stated, on a number of occasions, that all foreign troops must withdraw from Afghanistan first. The IEA’s official attitude towards the next stage in the process is more blurred. If foreign forces withdrew, then what? Would they be interested in power-sharing or local autonomy? Would they cease fighting if only the Afghan government implements Sharia law? Or would they continue fighting until the Emirate themselves took power in all of Afghanistan?

Overall, it is unlikely that the withdrawal of foreign troops would open the door to power-sharing with the Afghan government. The IEA’s ultimate goal is the establishment of Sharia in

Afghanistan, over which there can be no compromise. Sheikh Muhammad Yasir said in 2008:

“There is nothing to discuss with the Kabul government until all aggressing forces pull out from all areas of Afghanistan, and until Islamic rule is established in Afghanistan, a cause for which our blood has been spilt for more than thirty-five years.”³⁰²

As discussed previously, the IEA has increasingly sought to defame Karzai, and have promised to punish him according to Sharia law, should they come to power. There have also been repeated attempts to assassinate him. Mullah Baradir stated in an interview in April 2008 that the Emirate would not negotiate with Karzai, neither before or after a U.S. troop withdrawal – again stressing that the IEA would not accept any form of power-sharing with the Karzai government or any other government perceived as being agents of the West.³⁰³ On the other hand they might be willing to share power with other groups they have previously reached out to, such as former mujahidin and former members of the Taliban government. This would be in line with what the Taliban government did in the 1990s, when government and army positions were not restricted to madrasa-educated rural Pashtuns, but a variety of groups including former Communists.

This situation might change, however, should the IEA’s leaders find themselves in a position of weakness. As for now, proposing negotiations with the Taliban leadership only seems to strengthen them – not only does it boost the status of the Islamic Emirate, but it is also used as

“proof” that the Afghan government and the NATO alliance are in a weak and desperate position.

10 Conclusion

The aim of this report has been to provide a better understanding of the Taliban movement and its role in the Afghan insurgency post-2001. The approach to this has been three-fold: The first part of the report summarized the nature of the Afghan insurgency as described by already existing literature. The second part looked at the organizational characteristics of the largest and most

302 Quoted in Mustafa Abu al-Yazid (Sheikh Abdullah Saeed), “The signs of victory looming over Afghanistan [in Arabic],” Global Islamic Media Front, May 2009. Accessed via Ansar al-Jihad,

303 “Interview with Mullah Baradir,” al-Sumud 2, no.22 (April 2008).

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well-known insurgent group in Afghanistan: the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan led by Mullah Omar. The third and longest part of the report analysed the Islamic Emirate’s ideology and worldview, based on the official statements of its organization and leaders.

The intention of this report is not to compete with, but rather supplement, already existing studies of the Afghan insurgency. It cannot be stressed often enough that the primary purpose of the IEA’s propaganda is not to represent reality on the ground; they merely represent an image the IEA seeks to project of itself, with the purpose of increasing its chances to win the war in the long run. The Emirate’s leaders are well aware that they are fighting a “media war” with its

adversaries, in addition to the physical struggle on the ground. The information found in its propaganda cannot be compared with the “hard facts” on the ground. At the same time, however, databases of insurgent attacks can hardly explain why a particular target was attacked, or what the insurgents think about the future. It is these and similar questions that have been examined in this report.

One of the findings of the study is that the Islamic Emirate sees itself as a nationalist-religious movement fighting to resurrect the Taliban regime of the 1990s and to bring the various ethnic groups of Afghanistan under its rule. The Taliban-led insurgency is primarily a Pashtun

movement, and tribal and ethnic factors have direct influence on its recruitment and mobilization patterns. Its political agenda, however, is different than that of Pashtun separatists who advocate a separate Pashtun state.³⁰⁴ The IEA’s agenda also differs from that of its foreign allies (al-Qaida and Pakistani Taliban) because its primary concern is re-taking power in Afghanistan and implementing their interpretation of Islamic law in Afghanistan.

However, the IEA appears to have a closer relationship with its foreign allies than with the other major insurgent leader in Afghanistan, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. In spite of their fighting for the same broad goals, their relationship can be described as pragmatic at best. The main fault line in the IEA’s relationship with its various allies appears to be centred on power and authority:

Hekmatyar’s group, the Hizb-e-Islami, is seen as a challenge to the IEA’s power, while al-Qaida’s fighters are not, because they have taken on the role as advisors and supporters. Here probably lies some of al-Qaida’s key to success in the region, and the reason why they have not suffered the same destiny as al-Qaida in Iraq (in addition to the fact that al-Qaida in Afghanistan has access to numerous sanctuaries in neighbouring countries, primarily Pakistan, which al-Qaida in Iraq had not).

The IEA’s attitude to its adversaries strengthens the impression that the IEA is a local insurgent movement whose main enemy is the Afghan government, rather than the international coalition forces. The IEA spends considerable time and resources on attacking Afghan targets, and on justifying these attacks through their propaganda. This report argues that this is not merely a pragmatic choice (because Afghan targets are easier to attack than coalition targets) – it is a deliberate strategy on part of the IEA because their primary concern is to contest for power locally, not to kill foreigners in itself or to wage jihad for jihad’s sake. Outside actors such as

304 Selig S. Harrison, “The Pashtun time bomb,” New York Times, 1 Aug 2007,

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NATO, the United States, Pakistan or even al-Qaida may play important, but nevertheless secondary, roles.

Lastly, the report discussed the IEA’s attitudes towards negotiations and power-sharing. For the time being, it looks like any attempt to negotiate with the IEA’s leaders directly would serve to strengthen the insurgent movement, rather than putting an end to the violent campaign in

Afghanistan. A more realistic approach is probably to try to weaken the IEA’s coherence through negotiating with low-level commanders and tribal leaders inside Afghanistan. The insurgent movement consists of a wide variety of actors, which may be seen as proof of its strength – but it could also constitute weakness if properly and systematically exploited.

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