Sensemaking – links to Institutional theory?

Another approach to decision processes in organisations that is important to consider is the sensemaking perspective. Sensemaking in organisations primarily concerns understanding ―[how] does something come to be an event for organizational members‖, followed closely by interest in what an event might mean to those participating and how they respond by ―bringing meaning into existence‖ (Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 2005: 410). Weick considers that as an interpretive perspective the sensemaking paradigm is not fully represented by any theory of organizations, despite recognising the ―nature of organization‖

(1995: 69). By organising, this perspective considers how order is brought recurrently through agency, constituting rules and meaning, where organisation emerges from sensemaking (1995: 82). Weick (2001) considers sensemaking to be different from decision making, applying Daft and Macintosh‘s (1981) view of decision making considering it to be about ―strategic rationality‖, where the aim is to ―remove ignorance‖ by finding ―clear answers‖ to ―clear questions‖

(2001: 107-8). Sensemaking is focused on ―contextual rationality‖, ―where vague questions, muddy answers, and negotiated agreements… attempt to reduce confusion‖ (2001: 108). Sensemaking is therefore considered to be the framework that enables decisions to be made (Weick, 2001: 460). Therefore less focus is placed on the decision as an event, rather as a sequential process moving from chaos to some kind of order, via notions of noticing, bracketing, labelling, retrospective reflection over current and prior events, culminating in agency based on presumption – occurring interactively across a social setting (Weick et al., 2005: 410-13). The idea of order does not however suggest

―getting it right‖ or finding the truth, reiterating the recursive notion underlying the concept, thus moving away from the rational perspectives on decision behaviour and accepting the notion of plausibility rather than accuracy (2005:

415). Members will attempt to influence others‘ sensemaking towards a particular meaning through a process of ―sensegiving‖ (2005: 416). This is the attempt to influence others‘ ―sensemaking and meaning construction… towards a preferred redefinition of organizational reality‖ (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991:

442). Following up these reflections, sensegiving has been found to be

―triggered‖, at both leader and stakeholder levels, by ―the perception or anticipation of a gap in organisational sensemaking‖ (Maitlis & Lawrence, 2007: 57). At stakeholder levels, members feel a sense of bounded responsibility to act upon issues thought important for the organisation and where leaders are thought to lack competence. The authors found sensegiving to be ―enabled‖ by the presence of discursive ability, where actors ―construct and articulate persuasive accounts‖ and by process facilitators; the ―routines, practices and structures‖ that allow such behaviour (ibid). Collective sensemaking is therefore something more than ―shared values‖, highlighting the constructive process of enactment, whereby individuals adjust to their environment by acting upon it (Weick, 2003: 185). Weick also recognises that ―shared‖ is an

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ambiguous concept which can imply ―domination or codetermination‖ (Weick, 1995: 136). This refers back to aspects of collegiality, recognising that investigation is required beyond the level of agreement, to the understanding and framing of decision alternatives. However, Weick considers that the incidental nature of decision making, and the collective process of enactment links sensemaking and the process of organising, noting that ―people are in a complex reciprocal relationship with their environments‖ (Weick, 2003: 186). As such, enactment should be seen as a change mechanism (Jennings & Greenwood, 2003).

Despite not being represented in any particular theory of organisations, Weick sees links to Scott‘s concept of organisation, outlined in the section above, where sensemaking would be most prevalent in organisations thought to be more loosely coupled, open systems (1995: 69 - 70). Weick et al. (2005) recognise that sensemaking perspectives have rarely been combined with Institutional theory, despite both reflecting on organisations as open, natural systems. This is mainly due to the focus upon different levels of analysis. Scott considers sensemaking research to be at the socio-psychological level, while Institutional theory has been more focused at the ecological level (W. R. Scott, 2003: 122). However, opportunity for combination exists, for example, studies applying the former should lead to the provision of ―micromechanisms‖ that reveal ―cognitive structures associated with mimetic processes, agency [etc]‖

and could link micro levels of analysis to macro levels normally focused upon within studies applying the latter (Weick et al., 2005: 417). Weick considers there to be no ontological difference between these levels (Weick, 2003: 190).

However, Weick et al. in turn recognise that sensemaking perspectives on organisations can benefit from the understanding of wider ―social and cultural context‖ as noted by Scott to be explored by Institutional theory (1995: 151, in Ibid.). In addition, in sensemaking perspectives agency may both be ―over exaggerated‖ and in relation to institutional influence and enactment might be over-individualised (Weick, 2003; Weick et al., 2005). At the same time, micro studies focused more upon the cognitive measures of the degree of institutionalisation can hinder over-exaggeration of the ―sanctioning capacity of the external environment‖, avoiding confusion with resource dependence perspectives (Zucker, 1991: 104). Zucker also recognises that micro studies can help distinguish variation to external demands, revealing differentiation of responses rather than isomorphism (1991: 105). It would seem that the perspectives are complimentary rather than commensurate. Despite these issues, the sensemaking perspective and issues of enactment offer an interesting framework for understanding evaluation and the decision processes related to it.

These are briefly discussed in the next section.

Evaluation as sensemaking and assisted sensemaking

Evaluation has been viewed as a sensemaking activity from the ―simple and somewhat naïve argument‖ that it is the very purpose of it; to identify and assess

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processes and assign value to them (Van der Meer, 2007: 169). However, despite such simplicity at the outset Van der Meer recognises the complexity that develops as different actors ―attach meaning to the evaluation process and its outcomes‖ (ibid.). Van der Meer outlines how the ―interplay‖ of these processes determines ―the shape, outcome and the impact of evaluations‖ (2007:

170). The former, initiation stage, is of most interest in this study, despite restating the belief that the processes are perceived to be interlinked and recursive. During initiation substantive, methodological and organisational choices are made by both commissioners and evaluators, in what will form the evaluative ―script‖. Van der Meer considers that such choices are based on the existing meaning frames and practice patterns, or ―repertoires‖, of the different actors involved where the sensemaking interactions shape the evaluation. The intermingling of repertoires becomes more complex as the process develops and more actors become involved. Van der Meer recognises that these ―third actors‖

challenge the principal-agent perception of evaluation decision processes that has prevailed, raising a question of who really initiates an evaluation and at what juncture in the course of action (2007: 172 -3). Understanding actors‘ repertoires is therefore thought to be important here.

Dahler-Larsen (2005a, 2007) also considers evaluation processes from a sensemaking perspective. Following Mark et al (2000), he adopts the view, that evaluation is a form of ―assisted sensemaking‖, implying that the nature of the purpose of an evaluation can change the approach of the evaluators as they may reconsider the content and purpose of their programmes within the light of the indicators set (Dahler-Larsen, 2007: 25). Viewing evaluation as assisted sensemaking affords the possibility to consider how the process takes place, particularly the decisions made (Mark et al., 2000). The authors‘ concept of sensemaking is drawn from the work of Weick, (1995) yet departing from his attention on organisational management and focusing more upon representational and valuative natural sensemaking (Mark et al., 2000). The authors consider that in Weick‘s focus, aside from the everyday types of sensemaking that people engage in to make sense of the world around them, consideration is placed upon the process within organisations that seek to illuminate and overcome bias and improve judgement and decision making.

Mark et al recognise that humans attempt to represent the world around them and make value-based judgments about quality (2000: 6). It is to these processes that evaluators attempt to offer models for explanation, but the authors see their approach as combining the two rather than focusing on one or the other.

However, they recognise that there is always an underlying purpose to any evaluation, which in their case is the idea of social betterment. The different models of evaluation (as noted in Chapter 4) have influenced decisions about design (2000: 11), which will include understanding the purpose of them, and lead to different inquiry modes (2000: 12).

Evaluation therefore is considered to assist interested stakeholders in their making sense of programme design and implementation, by undertaking

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focused, systematic inquiry. Mark et al therefore set out to offer a ―sensible‖

model of evaluation that will enable ―evaluators and others think through the most important decisions that must be made in planning an evaluation‖ (2000:

viii - ix). This approach seeks to disentangle the various purposes of evaluation.

Mark et al consider that such an approach offers a better insight into how evaluations will be used than judging the effectiveness of an evaluation upon its use (2000: 22). Their model though is based on a principle of utilising evaluation for the purposes of social betterment. This principle leads to a broader definition of evaluation, when compared with the often noted alternative of ―evaluation as the determinant of merit and worth‖ (2000: 3). Mark et al see the latter as only one of the ―legitimate‖ purposes of evaluation, the others being program and organisational improvement, oversight and compliance and knowledge development. According to the choices over which purpose is in focus will differ depending upon context, but should be implemented to further social betterment, or as they refer to it, ―betterment-driven evaluation‖ (2000:

12). However, their model, appearing normative, pays only a little attention to other ―motives‖ that might drive an evaluation, including requirement by legislation or an external mandator or even those ―less than pure‖, even though they maintain that focus on their model can overcome ―political‖ tactics (2000:

50). But it is for these reasons that this study is considered important, understanding how evaluators respond in such situations and develop their model will hopefully enlighten the decision processes and enable groups to make sense of their role. In that regard it would seem to offer further assistance to the aims of Mark et al and enlighten another part of the process.