Organisational decision making theory applied to evaluation

It is thought necessary to outline a brief overview of the theories that underlie models about and approaches to decisions in organisations. To investigate decision processes within the context of this study the main models drawn from these different research fields are considered as templates which guide both the data collection and analysis (King, 1998, 2004). This process will be outlined more fully in the next chapter. The rationale behind this approach is that while the study of organisational and decision making theory has been widely applied, there has been less impact on the field of evaluation (Dahler-Larsen, 1998). It is also considered that no single model will offer a complete explanation for the investigation of such a multi-faceted and complex process (W. R. Scott, 2001, 2003), especially when the investigation is based on the perception of those involved in such a process, even though it is recognised that there is a challenge in using multiple models with regard to implications for interpretation (Pfeffer, 1981b: 29). The considered implications of these various theories for this study and a wider view of evaluation are also outlined.

As has already been stated, there are two major issues that are raised by these reflections, firstly that evaluation is itself a rational process and subsequently that decisions about an evaluation will take place within some kind of rational process. As such it is thought important to consider challenges to the concept of rationality. In considering this it is not only the concept of rational decision making that is being challenged, but partly the very concept of a decision itself and whether this can be investigated. This is recognised by Christensen, who proposes that:

―The idea of decision is a theory. It assumes a connection between activities called the decision process, pronouncements called decisions, and actions called decision implementations. The decision process brings together people, problems, and solutions and produces a decision. The process may involve problem-solving; it may involve bargaining, it may involve some system of power. Whatever the mechanism, the process generates an outcome. That decision, in turn, is converted into specific actions through some variation of a bureaucratic system‖ (S. Christensen, 1979: 351).

Christensen frames the decision process as consisting of more than merely a

―decision‖, where problems might be specially constructed or ignored and decisions might never be implemented. At the same time, the process of decision making will be separated from the outcome. Drawing on Olsen‘s work, Christensen notes that decision making can often be seen as a ―ritual act‖ (1979:

383). This can be linked to Dahler-Larsen‘s (1998) idea of evaluation as ritual reflection, where process is little linked to outcome. The life of the programme seems to develop independently of certain structures and coupling is tighter in the lower segments of the organisation. This will be dealt with further in

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subsequent sections. Christensen‘s research additionally noted the importance of ideology and culture as driving the form of decision process (1979: 352).

Brunsson (1982, 1990, 2007) also challenges the perception that decisions are merely about choice, recognising widespread elements of irrationality within the decision process. Brunsson (1990) recognised three additional roles of decision processes in addition to the making of choices: mobilising organizational action, allocation of responsibility and providing legitimacy. Brunsson notes how organisations often struggle to achieve ―collective action‖, and will use decision processes to cement commitment to a desired or planned activity (1990: 48).

The result might be a limited or ―biased‖ set of alternatives to be considered or committed to. Within these irrational processes there is less demand for data than in the rational, predictive designs, the former being more planning oriented (1990: 49). This might conceivably also be a condition imposed upon those further down the system.

Another complexity in assuming decision making to be about making rational choices from alternatives, concerns the allocation of responsibility (Brunsson, 1990: 51). According to Brunsson, rational theories place the responsibility upon decision makers as the cause of events, carrying out an intended action. In such interpretations if decisions are assumed to be about making choices then decision makers can be identified and held responsible. However, decision makers may have less or more influence upon events than is believed or anticipated depending upon how they execute their role and the choices put in front of others (1990: 50). Responsibility can be won as well as shunned, decisions can be made more or less visible and decision makers can attempt to show that they had no choice (1990: 52). One implication of such an approach is the importance of understanding how the ―values, beliefs and perceptions‖ of decision makers inform the choices offered; the type of decision process that unfolds and the responses that ensue (1990: 51). In this study, discussion concerning the purposes of evaluation and premise of the programmes will be under focus in the various subunits, as well as how the evaluation process is thought to be part of the wider organisation and the degree to which the groups have control over the process.

While Brunsson‘s study was focused upon ―decision-oriented‖ organisations, for example councils and boards, the sub-sites under study here are academic programme provider groups, particularly those responsible for their design and evaluation. These groups are considered interesting, as the part of the basic premise of these programmes is to focus upon decision-orientation and evaluation in others, in this case the active reflection over school leadership and the school leader role and associated processes. There is a sense in which programme providers are asked to consider how their own activity reflects the values emphasised within their own programmes.

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Some recent studies have attempted to link evaluation research and decision theory. Hyyryläinen and Viinamäki (2008) attempted to account for eventual evaluation utilisation the ―demand side‖ of evaluation, by considering decision makers views in relation to ―rational‖, ―non-rational‖¹⁰⁷ and ―boundedly‖

rational (sic) decision models. In attempting to consider the different models in relation to utilisation, the authors question the assumptions of rationality related to decision makers, as well as the decision making process. The authors noted that rational models continued to be championed by evaluation theorists and practitioners, accentuating problems and searching for solutions on the ―supply side‖, while non-rational models focused on problems between ―decision makers and other stakeholders‖ (2008: 1236-7). The authors concluded that the

―Boundedly Rational Model‖ offered a solution by ―lowering the expectations of rationality of decision makers‖, while also recognising that not all information will be used by decision makers who are at the ―core of the analysis‖ and who act non-rationally from time to time (2008: 1237). This appears to be a simplification of the process and models, suggesting that information is used, not used or only partly used. With regard to the process, some greater understanding of the recursive and complex interaction within organisations needs to be understood.

Part of the problem is that evaluation methodologies are considered to be more often rooted in education theory rather than organization theory and as a result activities are thought to be rarely framed with improvement of decision-making in mind (Holton III & Naquin, 2005). While the relationship between evaluations and decisions has received attention, much of this research has focused on the subsequent utilization of information. In essence, research has focused on decision maker / stakeholder values and how these might be incorporated into an evaluation to increase the relevance of findings and likelihood of use within the subsequent decision making process. While this is not an unimportant phenomenon, it is argued here that too little focus has been placed on what shapes the decision to evaluate, especially with regard to the underlying values of those deciding how the evaluation will take shape and their intentions for utilization. This may become more evident when programmes are evaluated internally (Love, 1991, 1998), especially when the results are sought after by external mandators. This can also challenge the ―romantic myth‖ that internal self-evaluation is merely a positive, learning focused, democratic process, compared to external evaluation which is negative, control focused and undemocratic (Dahler-Larsen, 2006b: 83). Looking at the purposes of evaluation, the chosen models and the events surrounding implementation are considered of great importance. Questions are raised as to whether there is a mismatch between internal and external demands, and in what way they affect one another and what kind of data fits what demand. Recognising the complexity in the decision process concerning evaluation is thought to offer the field a different vantage point in the search for improved practice. As has

107 Apparently similar to Ambiguity models.

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pointed out in relation to the varied works of Greene (1988; Greene & Walker, 2001) and the ―Danish school‖¹⁰⁸ consisting of Dahler-Larsen (1998, 2001), Hansen (2001, 2005a, 2006) and Krogstrup (2006) such complexity requires insight from the wider field of organisational and decision theory. In the next section I also consider how decision making has been considered within the higher education field.