Organizational behaviour – “action as output”

Beach and Connolly (2005: 126) refer to this as the structural model, where constraints on information are felt to be compensated by structuring the organisation such that task and expertise are matched. Division of labour can lead to organisations being able to perform tasks that individuals cannot do alone (Allison & Zelikow, 1999). Such activity develops organisational policy, leading to ―efficient, but inflexible‖ behaviour, which is predictable and stereotypical (Beach & Connolly, 2005: 139). Rule based action will also constrain the organisation at the same time as it constructs a ―unique identity‖.

The organisation performs to a logic of appropriateness rather than that of consequence observed in the rational model (Allison & Zelikow, 1999: 154), where ―neither preferences as normally conceived nor expectations of future consequence enter directly into the calculus‖ (March & Heath, 1994: 57). Rule following is a form of systematic reasoning based upon recognising the decision situation, comparing it with the identity of the individual and organisation making the decision¹¹⁵ and questioning the normal rules of behaviour, that is standard operating procedures (Ibid.). At the same time open systems models later proposed that organisations will be constrained by their environment and must adapt to change, leading to a propensity to homogeneity via isomorphic behaviour (Allison & Zelikow, 1999; DiMaggio & Powell, 1982). An example might be that QA systems generally are much the same. This recognition needs of course to be tempered by the knowledge that there are varying and shifting demands outside of that in relation to different impact / funding demands. The great challenge is to design organisations that operate efficiently with a minimum of information, in order to avoid overload.

However, where organisations exhibit looser control change often tends to be incremental (Beach & Connolly, 2005). Incremental theories have affected the

115 March and Heath recognise that actors have multiple identities, while organisations can exhibit tighter and looser forms, where learning cycles are often incomplete (reflected also in Scott‘s (2003) idea of rational, natural and open systems). This is further outlined below in relation to ambiguity models.

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evaluation field more than any other decision making approach, seen primarily through the work of Lindblom and Weiss. Weiss refers to decision accretion, the

―build-up of small choices… the gradual narrowing of available alternatives‖

(Weiss, 1976 in Alkin & Christie, 2004: 29). This is similar to Lindblom‘s (1988) description of ‗muddling through‘, where in complex processes there is little possibility to derive a single utility function, the impact is too hard to measure, information about consequence is limited, and options are often unknown (Beach & Connolly, 2005). Administrators must often act without clarification and subsequent knowledge of objectives (DeYoung & Conner, 1982). This contributes to the assumption that ―rational evaluation based on normative theory is impossible‖, and policy is built more by ‗incremental‘

change of failures in the status quo, where policy is shaped more out of what is to be discarded than what is to be attained (Beach & Connolly, 2005: 148ff).

Ignorance of these processes may offer a more negative tinge to Patton et al.‘s reflections that ―program development is a process of ‗muddling through‘ and evaluation is part of the muddling‖ (in Hofstetter & Alkin, 2003: 205). The model was also developed to outline a focus on action and implementation as well as on thought (Beach & Connolly, 2005). Connolly observes this taking place within a decision cycle, a combination of the cognitive and emotive schema of a decision maker that intermingles with the perceptual environmental schema to ―dictate goal-directed action‖ forming ‗consequences‘ (Beach and Connolly, 2005). Thus decision-making is observed to take place in and be affected by the environment or context. This appears to bridge the perceived gap between incremental evaluation and implementation. Such recognition would also strengthen the need for more descriptive and naturalistic forms of research that recognise the role of the individual within their organisation and environment.

These theories were adapted by Allison (1969, 1971; & Zelikow, 1999) into a second decision making model. The model‘s ―explanatory power is achieved by uncovering the organizational routines and repertoires that produced the outputs that comprise the puzzling occurrence¹¹⁶‖ (Allison, 1969: 702). Thus decision is explained as the ―by-product of organisational behaviour‖ where ―capacities and constraints [are emphasised] both in choice and implementation‖ (Allison &

Zelikow, 1999: 386). The basic unit of analysis observes action in relation to output resulting from organisational routine, which is visible within previously established standard operating procedures (SOPs) which provide cues and where

―existing organizational capacities‖ denote the range of options and define and confine decisions (Ibid.: 164ff). Actors are perceived as being loosely coupled groups within a larger organisational setting, operating to an organisational mission statement that defines the area of activity and objectives to accomplish¹¹⁷. Allison‘s model has been challenged for its explanatory power,

116 My italics

117 This is close to Halperin‘s organisational ‗essence‘ where the viewpoint of the dominant group guides the mission and capabilities (1974, in Ibid.)

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which should be taken into account when used in analysis. For example, Peterson (1976) saw this second of the ‗unitary‘ models more tightly knitted to the rational decision model than Allison, despite agreeing on its basic assumptions. Bendor (2003; Bendor & Hammond, 1992), however, considers the link between rules and behaviour to be rather more subtle than Allison suggests, resulting in more complex activity. Bendor also considers that Allison has misunderstood and ―inverted‖ Simon‘s model, where the use of decision rules may be rather more complex than just ―simple, unsophisticated, or predictable‖ behaviour, especially when activated by a ―random shock‖ (1992:

309). As such behaviour may not be as constrained as Allison reflects.

Organisations may be smarter than the individuals comprising them and less sluggish, by specialisation and division of labour (Ibid.: 312). Routine may thus be more positive. Organisations learning from the past may have therefore gained a greater grasp of the rules and operating procedures they employ (Pfeffer, 1981b: 22). Pfeffer agrees with Simon‘s (1964) consideration that

―goals operate as systems of constraints… which decisions must satisfy‖ (ibid.) and through which they ―learn and adapt‖ through these rules and SOPs (1981:

23). Pfeffer does though consider, as was noted above, that these are less deliberate choices and more evolutionary developments from policy and procedure based on more limited information search and precedent (1981: 23-24). Dahler-Larsen also considers this from a learning perspective exemplifying the opportunity to use evaluation for incremental improvement of specific activity and enlightenment for future action (1998: 33-35). Dahler-Larsen also draws on March and Olsen‘s (1976) concept of the learning cycle, which is interrupted under complex decision processes. I will return to these reactions more briefly below when discussing decision process models and ambiguity theories, including the garbage can model of choice.

Debates about the incrementalist understanding of decision processes also led Etzioni (1967, 1986, 1989) to offer ―mixed scanning‖ as an alternative model to both rationalist and incrementalist models of decision making. Whilst limiting the detail required in making ―fundamental decisions‖ as outlined by rationalist models, the approach allows for exploration of ―longer-run alternatives‖

underplayed by incremental approaches (Etzioni, 1967: 385). Rather than only focusing like the incremental model upon the ―smallest possible units of change‖, Etzioni claims that mixed scanning, or the humble decision making model, offers an overview of the decision situation that is rather more like ―an entire library of encyclopedias under perpetual revision‖(Etzioni, 1989).

Drawing on the development of the mixed scanning approach (Etzioni, 1986) it might be fair to say that, if organisations evaluate their programmes separately and on their own merits they are acting incrementally. If however they first develop and adopt guidelines that will enable them to assess the quality of their programmes they are using mixed scanning. This search for a ―nestling relationship‖ is how Etzioni draws distinction between fundamental and incremental decisions (Etzioni, 1986: 10). The criticisms offered by Etzioni are

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linked to the theoretical developments outlined in section 5.5.3, through the political model.

As was noted above, Hardy combined the rational and bureaucratic models, focused upon substantive rationality, where ―decisions reflect attempts to find solutions to maximise effectiveness‖, assuming clear goals, information use, selection of optimum outcome and sufficient resources following (1990b: 212).

As has been seen, though, Allison (1971) chose to hold these models separate.

One might therefore ask if it is correct to split these models. A closer reading of Scott‘s analysis suggests the problem might be a misinterpretation of Weber‘s definition of bureaucracy, and a failure to recognise his distinction between technical and formal rationality, where the former ―emphasizes means-ends rationality‖ and the latter ―the orientation of action to formal rules and laws‖

(2003: 49)¹¹⁸. In rational models there is an emphasis on technical rationality of decisions, whereas bureaucratic models often emphasise formal rationality and matching choices to existing patterns, procedures and rules within organisations.

Adler and Borys (1996) also outline a more nuanced view of bureaucracy away from the ―pejorative connotations‖ often attributed it, pointing rather to the existence of both enabling and coercive types of formalization in organizations.

The authors recognise the importance of goal congruence to develop an enabling form. Formalization has positive impact when employees are enabled to manage tasks, without merely simplifying routines. This involves building in organisational learning from experience of best practice. This avoids bureaucracy being viewed merely as ―rigidity, goal displacement, and authoritarian command and control‖ (1996: 84). It is also noted that despite recognising his rational focus, interpreters also failed to recognise the importance Weber placed upon context with assumptions regarding open systems, which would influence institutional models (Evan, 1993: 5; W. R.

Scott, 2003: 50), which are to be outlined in section 5.5.4.

Decision process models and ambiguity

Pfeffer notes that ―decision process models‖ suggest greater randomness and less rationality than bureaucratic models, combined with a lack of known goal preference and maximisation (1981b: 25). At the same time, unlike the political models that will be discussed in the next section, behaviour cannot be attributed to power relationships and bargaining amongst different groups within the organisation. Decisions are related to processes rather than preferences. As has already been noted, the rational and bureaucratic models in their purest forms can fail to address the issues of complexity and ambiguity thought to influence decision making. March and Heath note that theorists attempt to treat ambiguity as the exception rather than the rule, hoping to eradicate rather than embrace, seeing it as disorder rather than something ordered and a part of the decision

118 Scott builds on the work of Kalberg (1980) in relation to interpretations of Weber.

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process that needs to be controlled (March & Heath, 1994: 192-3). Instead the idea is introduced that organisations can be loosely coupled¹¹⁹ characterised by

―structural looseness‖ (Lutz, 1982), noted particularly in relation to educational organisations, with their unclear goals, preferences and technologies and fluidity. With regard to the suggestion that organisations either act by logic of consequence or appropriateness, in situations of growing complexity belief is constructed in an organizational setting, which in turn is affected by environmental ambiguity (March et al., 1976). As Scott outlines, the normative pillar is stressed, and social context is important (2001: 67). Concurrently, the

‗complete cycle of choice‘ is limited and breakable and complications arise in the process of individual belief and decision making (Ibid). March and Olsen identify 4 sources of ambiguity: ill-defined intentions; imperfect understanding of actions and consequences; multiple views of history and variable patterns of organisation. They conclude that they:

―remain in the tradition of viewing organizational participants as problem-solvers and decision-makers…(but) assume that individuals find themselves in a more complex, less stable, and less understood world than that described by standard theories of organizational choice;

they are placed in a world over which they often have only modest control. Nevertheless, we assume organizational participants will try to understand what is going on, to activate themselves and their resources in order to solve their problems and move the world in desired directions‖ (March, Olsen, & Christensen, 1979: 21).

Despite hierarchical control systems and standard operating procedures, organisations still struggle with the problem of ―decision coherence‖ (March &

Heath, 1994: 192-3). In such organisations, decentralisation and delegation will often loosen links among the subunits, which can then lead to inconsistency of action over time as well as internally (Ibid.: 194) and decision and implementation become loosely coupled (Ibid.: 196). Although, as Gamoran and Dreeben point out, two issues are often ignored, firstly that ―not every connection… is a loose coupling [and these vary] from one context to another‖, and secondly that there is too often a lack of identification of the mechanisms that hold the particular system under investigation together (Gamoran &

Dreeben, 1986: 613). As such one must not ignore the controlling nature of regulation and resource constraints as well as custom and situational wisdom.

Pfeffer (1981b) included such recognitions within the political model.

Against the backdrop of ambiguity theory and challenges to organisational choice, attention and learning, Cohen, March and Olsen outlined the garbage can model of decision making. This they described to fit the context of ―organized anarchies [which] are characterised by problematic preferences, unclear technology and fluid participation‖ (1972: 1). One of the major propositions of

119 An idea originally perceived by Weick (1976, 1989)

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the model is the ―partial uncoupling of problems and solutions‖, where decision making departs from a purely problem solving activity, and depends rather on a fortuitous alignment of problem, solution and decision maker (1972: 16). The important factor when ascertaining organised anarchy is ―intention‖, the lack of

―conscious choice or planning‖ (Pfeffer, 1981b: 27). This is also combined against a backdrop of temporal sorting, whereby alternative claims on attention are modified by the time available to make decisions which can bring some kind of order (March & Heath, 1994: 199). The authors argue that the symbolic effects of decision-making can be as important as any decision that appears to be made, signalling values and beliefs in the organisation as well as acting as a socialising process for newer members (Ibid.: 212ff). HEIs are considered to lack cohesion in relation to goals, aims and objectives, and neither do they exhibit hierarchal tightness in structure, leading to more complex decision processes. This was considered particularly evident in the period leading up to the 1980s when HEIs were seen to be administrated but not managed, with a lack of collective definition of goals and performance control (Paradeise et al., 2009). These ideas are further developed within the Institutional perspective, outlined in section 5.5.4.

The model outlined above does, however, raise some difficult issues. Hardy agrees with Musselin‘s perception that the Garbage can model relies on a situation of slack resources, which both consider to be fairly removed from the experience of most universities, especially in more recent times (Hardy, 1990a:

400ff). However, it appears hard to argue against the wide disparity of goals within such complex institutions (Patterson, 2001) and the fact that the authors recognised that under times of pressure and clear external demands there would be less flux in patterns of participation and restriction of potential solutions (Cohen et al., 1972). In addition, it was noted that problems identified as important would be dealt with first, finding a context in which they can be decided and attaching solutions to them, relative to organisational constraints like structure and time, and degree of temporal sorting (March & Heath, 1994:

201ff). Questions are further raised as to balancing between focus on the interpretation of decisions and the likelihood of implementation. March recognises, along with Brunsson (1982)¹²⁰, that managing such processes raises a challenge when attempting to align talk and action. The authors suggest embracing ambiguity rather than attempting to eradicate it (March & Heath, 1994). As discussion turns towards the idea of managing organised anarchies, Hardy suggests a move towards, or integration with, political models (1990a:

401). These will be dealt with in the next section.

120 See also (Brunsson, 2002, 2007).

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In document Demands, designs and decisions about evaluation: On the evaluation of postgraduate programmes for school leadership development in Norway and England (sider 153-159)