A rational approach- “action as choice” 109

A rational theory of choice is generally characterised as ―instrumental behavior taken in order to achieve desired ends‖ (W.R. Scott, 1995:138), where organizations are regarded as ―instruments designed to attain specified goals by organizing a series of actions in such ways that they lead to predetermined goals with maximum efficiency” (Mathieu et al., 1992:33). This is based on the assumption that human behaviour is rational, and that decision-makers are assumed to enter decision situations with clear and known objectives, enabling them to make thorough analysis of the external environment (Allison, 1971; Das

& Teng, 1999; Pfeffer, 1981b). Theoretically, rationality has been emphasised as the most essential condition in making decisions, in what is seen as a comprehensive, normative process in which individuals gather information, develop alternatives, and then objectively select the optimal alternative.

Problems are evaluated in relation to stable goals and optimal courses of action chosen from a set of alternatives (Pfeffer, 1981b; Weick, 1976). Decision-makers strive to do what is best for themselves or their organization (Beach &

Connolly, 2005). It is assumed that decision processes are consequential and preference-based (March & Heath, 1994); in the sense that action depends on anticipating effects of current actions and that consequences are evaluated in terms of personal preferences. The ―economic man‖ operates within the rational organization making optimal choices in a highly specified and clearly defined environment, simultaneously ranking all sets of consequences from the most preferred to the least, and finally selecting the alternative leading to the preferred set of consequences with value-maximizing effects (March, Guetzkow,

& Simon, 1993; March & Heath, 1994; Newell & Simon, 1972).

As research on organizations developed it became clear that rational models needed moderation. Research on decision-making was initially carried out to prescribe what should be done, rather than to ascertain what decision-makers actually do; as was also noted by Scriven (1991) concerning evaluation. In spite of their utility for predictions, pure versions of rational choice are hard to accept as credible descriptions of actual individual or organizational agency. Second generation research began to focus more upon how decisions are actually made in organisations (Beach & Connolly, 2005). Expected utility became tempered by the belief that people hold irrational preferences, and that they behave inconsistently across similar situations (March, Guetzkow, & Simon, 1958), where not all alternatives are known, nor all consequences considered, nor all preferences evoked at the same time (March & Heath, 1994). The core idea of this ‗bounded rationality‘¹¹⁰ (March et al., 1958) is that individuals are

―intendedly rational… [but] constrained by limited cognitive capabilities and incomplete information‖ (March & Heath, 1994: 9), but also stemming from the

109 The section titles 5.5.1, 5.5.2 and 5.5.3 are drawn from Allison (1999).

110 For a fuller description of bounded rationality see Simon (1997) and Gigerenzer and Selten (2001).

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external constraints and limitations of allocated time and resources in the individual‘s environment (Das & Teng, 1999)¹¹¹. As a result actors tend to

‗satisfice‘, or reduce the information-processing load by selecting the first alternative option that meets the minimum standards of the decision maker.

These are discovered sequentially and result in ―repertoires of action programs‖

which operate as alternatives in ―recurrent situations‖ (March et al., 1993: 191).

It is also considered though that due to the division of labour in organisations with regard to decision making, that greater rationality can be achieved by increasing participation and delegating with regard to specialism (Hall &

Tolbert, 2005: 128). In the case of evaluation it might be thought that division of labour throughout the organisation would lead to the design of models suitable to produce answers to means-goals questions. It is also suggested within the discipline of HRD that bounded rationality is a little understood phenomenon, especially when considering the complexity of the decision making setting and processes (Herling, 2003). Modern naturalistic decision making theorists have developed Image theory, in which the process of screening for decision alternatives is thought similar to the concept of satisficing (Beach & Connolly, 2005: 165). This adjustment of formally rational models, and particularly Simon‘s (1976) work on decision processes which recognised distinct sub-processes, has been criticised as continuing a linear understanding of decision processes (Langley, Mintzberg, Pitcher, Posada, & Saint-Macary, 1995). Simon refutes these criticisms, considering that sub-processes like agenda setting, problem representation and alternative searching are identifiable but do not form any particular set order and are most often recursive (1997: 127). A question is raised about how one can aggregate further to link to this evaluation purposes.

There might be many reasons why evaluations are not used in organisations. Of course the point here is to try and understand how decision making about evaluations might be affected by the way the organisation collects and uses information.

Rational theories were adapted into an organisational decision making model by Allison (1969, 1971; & Zelikow 1999). The ‗rational actor‘ model focuses on action as deliberate choice, assuming a logic of consequence, focused upon a unified actor¹¹² acting rationally with one set of preferences, perceived choices¹¹³ and a single estimate of resultant consequences (1999: 24). The response to an action will therefore be to question why the actor acted like they did, drawing inference from the macro context at hand. Within this model, analysis will often focus on the context, judging whether the behaviour was truly

111 Bounded rationality connects with rather than opposes rational and psychological models but offers a description of the decision process rather than merely the outcome of it (Gigerenzer & Selten, 2001).

112 Albeit in Allison and Zelikow‘s model a ‗national‘ one.

113 Peterson (1976) views this statement as problematic, and illustrative of a confusion over the nature of rational behaviour that led Allison (1971) to reject rational models too quickly.

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value maximising or not. In its simplest form, which Allison has been criticised for focusing too heavily upon, the model links purpose to action, and behaviour is considered to be a consistent, value maximising choice within specified constraints. Pfeffer argues that in order to determine whether organisations are

―best described in terms of the rational model‖ processes must be investigated, rather than observing decision outcomes which will be ―consistent with rational choice, if the appropriate goals and preferences are assumed‖ (1981b: 21).

Therefore this study will focus on perceptions and descriptions of decision processes by organisational members rather than describing particular outcomes and attempting to trace goals set. Allison did not consider this model to offer the best explanatory power, but he appears to have applied much of the theory on bounded rationality and satisficing in his second model, outlined in the next model explanation.

Dahler-Larsen considers the approach to evaluation within organisations adopting the rational model, recognising an instrumental use focused upon gathering information in relation to the ―continuance, discontinuance or adjustment of particular activities¹¹⁴‖ (1998: 31). In the rational model the information gathered from evaluations can be followed up with certainty, or as Dahler-Larsen considers, mechanically. The author recognises, however, limitations to information gathering, dealt with more fully below. Dahler-Larsen notes that classical approaches to evaluation have often built upon a rationally based model with its emphasis on following up clearly defined preferences (1998, 2005b, 2006b) and measuring quality (2007, 2008), but interestingly there has been increasing attention in recent years to such models following the growth of the evidence movement. Hardy (1990b: 211) notes that ―the bureaucratic features to be found in universities reflect administrative rationality‖ and the attempt to maximise effectiveness, which are more related to the ideas of administrative fiat within a closed system. To some extent Hardy combined rational and bureaucratic models; however these do not address the same issues, the latter dealing more with rule-based behaviour and incremental change. The bureaucratic model is outlined in section 5.5.2 and would seem to fit more closely to Hardy‘s idea of administrative fiat.

A particular challenge to rational models: information in organisations

One limitation of rationality could be that available information in an organisation is systematically incorrect (Feldman & March, 1981). Information might not be gathered for making decisions, but rather as a flow that enables organisational members to make meaning of their surroundings. Organisations gather more information than they use, and they do not systematically use all the information gathered when making decisions. Organisations tend to credit information gathering, and therefore the status of the gatherer is increased and decisions are legitimated, even if they are not properly based upon perfect

114 My translation from Danish.

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information. Information might be gathered in an instrumentalist perspective, as a means to increase the legitimacy of an individual‘s role and activity (Feldman

& March, 1981). In these cases, decision making becomes as much based upon intuition as it does on cognition (Beach, 1990: 25). Representations of the decision process are reduced to only the most necessary information, upon which the final decision is then based (Beach & Connolly, 2005), or the chooser‘s ―definition of the situation‖ (March et al., 1958).

Greve (1995) recognises that although the gathering of information can have symbolic value, the process itself can be considered important and can encourage the involvement of people across the organisation. While this appears to apply generically to decision making, one can see links to the evaluation process. Evaluation appears to a lesser extent to the reflect the rational, evidence obtaining activity that it can be purported to be and yet organisations continue to demand it and members continue to contribute to it. The mere act of doing it appears to gain some symbolic value. The fact that it should encompass both quantitative and qualitative methodology creates further interest in the process.

As Feldman and March (1981) noted, the production and focus on statistical data often underlies the demand for evidence of objectivity. The authors note that there is often misunderstanding regarding the nature and purpose of information (1981: 175). Organisations cannot process the information they have; the organisation, as well as those working in it, is limited. The authors also claim that the types of information gathered are often just those that are available, and may not serve the purpose to which they are used. Another part of their argument is that the information that is gathered is done so in a

―surveillance mode rather than in a decision mode‖ (1981: 175), the idea being that it does not appear to have any ―apparent immediate decision consequences‖, but rather monitors the environment for the existence of any surprises, or lack of them (1981: 176). This activity is not necessarily deemed to be formal, based on explicit calculation, but rather operates more haphazardly as the gathering of gossip. There is a sense in which it would appear to reflect the way evaluation systems develop within organisations, with an eye on the demands of the watching world and an eye on the internal responses of participants.

The possibility that evaluation may be used as information to provide evidence of rationality and good management has come under increasing interest (Weiss, 1998b). Greene and McClintock (1985) report on a study into the nature and role of information used in program development of adult and community education.

The study is reported as focusing upon whether ―information gathering, exchange, interpretation and reporting met needs for program decision making and accountability‖, a framework which the authors say was drawn from literature on evaluation utilization and organizational decision making (1985:

528). The authors noted how the information needs of stakeholders might be influenced by ―perceived and actual models of decision making models in the organization‖ (1985: 529); in this they drew upon Allison‘s model. They also drew upon Feldman and March to consider how information was used in the

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organisation and Maynard-Moody and McClintock‘s (1981) framework for considering the degree of certainty towards programme goals and their attainment. There are interesting similarities to this study; the main purpose of their approach was to look at how information was used in program development and decision making focused across a sample of stakeholders, but in this current study focus is specifically placed on how the models of evaluation are developed and how the groups implementing the evaluation respond to their context, which includes internal and external demands as well as their own approach. The question though remains, how do groups make sense of these demands in a complex environment? This question will be dealt with more in relation to the subsequent models presented, but first I turn to the organisational behaviour model another closed system model.