Political model (bargaining) – “action as political resultant”

This model is the most complex of those outlined by Allison and appears to resemble participation models of decision-making. Although building on decision making research generally, this framework also explores and accounts for ―advantages and disadvantages of member participation‖ in decision making (Beach & Connolly, 2005: 128). Allison‘s model, however, also draws heavily upon his political theory background but at the same time is an attempt to show the role of the individual in organisational decision-making. The model is focused upon viewing ―action as political resultant‖, where ―outcomes are formed, and deformed, by the interaction of competing preferences‖ via a multiplicity of ‗players‘, those ―actually engaged in the interaction‖ (Allison &

Zelikow, 1999: 225). In this section then I begin with a brief outline of Allison‘s (1969, 1971; & Zelikow, 1999) third model, comparing it to a revision made by Peterson (1976), which is thought to be of particular interest to this study.

Allison‘s model accounts for power structures within the organisation.

Individuals are more active and strategic, and affected by their epistemic community as much as their organisational background (Allison & Zelikow, 1999). This is interesting in terms of the impact of programme group cohesion, and also whether they are academic members of staff. In less formal, more established organisational decision making processes there is often ―deference for seniority‖ and for ―recognised domains of interest or expertise‖, and where there are smaller groups the aim is often for consensus. Pfeffer considered that some of these processes reflected control mechanisms within bureaucratic models, the difference being that their use was more divisive, not producing coherent goals (1981b: 28). Framing of the issue is important to its outcome, as is identification of ―games and players‖, because knowledge of leadership preferences is not sufficient to explain agency (Allison & Zelikow, 1999: 257ff).

Explanation of the process at hand is observed to be complete when the pattern of ‗bargaining‘ and those responsible for the decision and enacting are acknowledged and their patterns of behaviour and outcomes of their action are identified. The results of bargaining will ―seldom perfectly [reflect] the preferences of any group or subunit within the organisation‖ (Pfeffer, 1981b:

28). Hardy also draws on the political model developed by Baldridge associated with HEIs (Baldridge, 1971), considering it as a ―counterpoint‖ to the idea of consensus in decision making (1990b: 211). Greater focus is placed upon self-interest, bargaining and influence. At the same time it is an open systems model, recognising the influence from the external environment (Dornbusch & Scott, 1975; Pfeffer, 1981b; W. R. Scott, 2003).

When applying this model, Peterson (1976) saw a distinction between pluralist and ideological bargaining, while recognising that these are neither mutually exclusive nor exhaustive. The pluralist model appears to be incremental in

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form¹²¹ and primarily concerned with preserving ―immediate electoral or organisational interests‖ (1976: xi) by maximising support, while compromising group demands. The ideological model was motivated by ―broader, more diffuse interests… [which are] deeply, ideologically, committed to…‖ (1976: xii).

Where power is shared a decision will often result from a political process, which appears more chaotic and parochially oriented than is evident in the preceding models. This often results in unintended outcomes where power comes through the ability to persuade, but is not random¹²² (Allison & Zelikow, 1999: 256). The ideological decision-making model appears to exhibit some characteristics of image theory‘s screening process considered the most important part of decision-making (Potter & Beach, 1994). This overlaps with the discussion of bounded rationality in section 5.5.2.

Pfeffer pointed out the weaknesses in the rational and bureaucratic models that disregarded divergent interests and goals within organisations (1981b: 27) and at the same time failing to recognise decision processes that were not concerned with maximising goal attainment (1981b: 29). In addition, if preferences could be ascertained to be consistent, ambiguity models would be seen to have fewer efficacies. Pfeffer goes on to suggest that it is power relationships rather than goals that account for outcomes. Pfeffer and Salancik had noted that organisations, while containing elements of bureaucratic models, often operate as coalitions, as described in the political perspective models of Baldridge and Cyert, Simon and Trow (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1974: 137). However, predicting whether decisions will represent one or the other was considered by Pfeffer and Salancik to be an important area of study. This activity is clearly framed within a resource dependency perspective. Within the power research programme there is a clear division between functionalist, critical and post-modern approaches.

Slovic and Lichtenstein (1971) consider that the models here mainly represent developments within functionalist research. Dahler-Larsen warns against considering that interests and preferences can explain everything, and avoiding the question of where they come from, relying too heavily on following the logic of consequentiality (1998: 45). In terms of evaluation, the model might assume that evaluations are always implemented strategically, with a preconceived end in mind or tactically to avoid some imposed action (Dahler-Larsen, 1998: 44).

The development of the political model has, however, been criticised as both underdeveloped and overcomplicated (Witt, Andrews, & Kacmar, 2000). Witt et al. define it as a grounded in ―phenomena in which organizational members attempt either directly or indirectly to influence other members by means not sanctioned by formal standard operating procedures or informal norms, in an attempt to achieve personal or group objectives‖ (2000: 342).

121 Extending Lindblom‘s muddling through model

122 This model borrows heavily from the political theory of Neustadt concerning presidential power.

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Collegiality

It should once again be reiterated that these models are thought of as ideal types.

They are interesting as they have been developed within a similar context to that currently under study. While Allison‘s models were developed from a macro-political perspective, the propositions from Hardy are based upon research within Higher Education Institutions. These findings can be compared to the writings of Dahler-Larsen (1998, 2001) who has considered the evaluation process itself from organisational-theoretical perspective. These models draw on the same theoretical frameworks. The model of particular interest within Hardy‘s work is based on an understanding of collegial decision making processes (Hardy, 1990a, 1990b, 1991; Hardy et al., 1983). According to Hardy it is based on the traditional idea of consensus based decision making within an academic community, which is competence related rather than positional (Hardy, 1990b: 210). Hence challenge is made to traditionally understood concepts of power.

While Childers (1981) had found the structurally focused bureaucratic and collegial models to load on similar factors, separate from the process driven political model, Hardy considered the collegial model to be more closely related to the political model. The distinctions between collegial and political processes were thought to relate to actor interest. Collegiality is perceived as more likely, under conditions of commonly accepted ideology, mission (Hardy et al., 1983) or saga (Hardy, 1990b). Hardy notes how Clark‘s idea of organisational saga (B.

R. Clark, 1972), was developed from data which revealed how organisational members were bound to the wider goals of the organisation through their loyalty and commitment. The model ―presupposes shared norms, values and premises about organisational purpose, and a commitment to institutional objectives which often seems to revolve around excellence‖ (Hardy 1990b: 211). The conditions under which this is thought to occur are ―small prestigious units or departments with charismatic leaders, or when there is sufficient slack to accommodate disparate goals‖ (Hardy et al., 1983: 419). Hardy et al. contrast these conditions with those expected to cultivate political decision models, that is, ―conflicting goals‖ and interdependence of interest groups, scarce resources and critical issues to explore (ibid.). The underlying difference between the two models is that in the collegial model participants are guided by common interest and focused upon consensus, whilst in the political model they ―seek to serve their self-interest‖. These are, again, ideal types, and the authors speak of trying to ascertain underlying motivation rather than observing behaviour when attempting to draw distinctions between the two models. At any rate they are expected to be found in combination in organisations. However, according to Hardy a ―collegial‖ approach is not an ―inevitable, or even normal, state of affairs in a university… [it] is not automatic – it has to be created‖ (1991: 137).

Recognising this, power should be used to ―avoid overt conflict where possible or, if not, to secure agreement and elicit collaboration when differences of opinion do occur‖ (Ibid: 139).The concept of underlying motivation might be considered to be important when considering this behaviour. With regard to the

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collegial model one might also perceive of the ideological conviction to proceed consensually when forming decisions, at least in principle. The latter reflection is important, as Hardy et al., recognise that those promoting collegiality might overstate consensus levels, and those promoting political models might overstate the degree of conflict. It might be better to consider some form of continuum against which to consider decision activity.

5.5.4 An institutional approach - action as ritual decisions with constitutive