Concerns about participation?

As argued by Downs et al. (1996: 399), the number of instances of non-compliance (and hence, the costs of verification and enforcement) might be reduced by limiting membership of the treaty to those states which can comply under normal

circumstances. However, while non-compliance is a concern of the United States, it does not appear that restricting FMCT membership would be a viable option.

Integrating the de facto Nuclear Weapons states – India, Pakistan and Israel – has

“always” (at least since the Clinton administration) been the main rationale

underlying the FMCT; without them, the United States would probably see little to be gained by negotiating it. Further, the United States would be highly unlikely to agree to a legal ban on its own nuclear weapons material production if its old adversaries, China and Russia, did not follow suit .

We will take a moment to review these points below: Do India, Pakistan, Israel, China and Russia seem ready to negotiate an FMCT? If not, how does this affect the U.S. decision?

India and Pakistan

India and Pakistan are still producing fissile material for their nuclear weapons programmes, and Washington has been forging new ties with these countries in an effort to adapt to the new post-Cold War security environment. After 9/11, Pakistan has become an important ally in the battle against terrorists, and the United States recently agreed to supply it with F16 fighter jets, once again waiving important amendments to its weapons export control act.⁷⁵

75 The 1976 Symington amendment stipulates that any Non-Nuclear Weapon State importing or exporting unsafeguarded enrichment materials, equipment, or technology would be prohibited from receiving U.S. economic or military assistance under the Foreign Assistance Act or the Arms Export Control Act. Pakistan’s importation of unsafeguarded nuclear materials and equipment for its Kahuta enrichment facility triggered the immediate cutoff of U.S. assistance in 1976.

However, according to Weiss (2005), the United States soon turned a “blind eye” to violations of the Symington

amendment and other amendments when Pakistan became an important ally against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan during most of the 1980s, and, again, in the battle against terrorism after 9/11. For three decades now, cooperation with Pakistan to accomplish other strategic goals has been deemed more important than non-proliferation goals, according to Weiss.

India is considered of perhaps even greater importance, at least judging by the recent steps taken under the new strategic partnership. Under the “New Steps in the

Strategic Partnership (NSSP), the United States is committed to a liberalization of its weapons export policies towards India and is willing to supply advanced weapons systems – including F16 or F18 fighter jets, command and control systems, early warning systems and missile defence systems. It is also committed to holding a series of high-level dialogues on various contentious issues of strategic, energy-policy and economic interest. The energy dialogue has already made concrete results, as the United States has agreed to take the steps necessary to remove U.S. and international barriers to peaceful nuclear cooperation with India –another major turning point in U.S. policy,⁷⁶ and of great concern to Pakistan.⁷⁷

The Bush administration evidently sees a significant strategic interest in maintaining good bilateral relations with both India and Pakistan. According to Jean du Preez (2005), U.S. policy has shifted from trying to prevent proliferation to India and Pakistan to prevention of proliferation from India and Pakistan to rogue states and terrorist groups, and the FMCT is not relevant for this purpose.⁷⁸

Israel

The case of Israel is difficult because this country has always been ambiguous about its nuclear weapons programme, not admitting that it has nuclear weapons, but not denying this either. Assumedly, under the right conditions, Israel could agree to an

76 The fuel supply agreement is significant because the Tarapur reactor was originally delivered and built with U.S.

assistance. In 1974, when the United States discovered that India had achieved nuclear weapon capability, it imposed a ban on all nuclear cooperation. The fuel supply arrangement for Tarapur was suspended even though the reactor was not linked to the military programme and was under safeguards of the IAEA. On 17 July 2005 President Bush declared that nuclear trade would be reopened and fuel supply for Tarapur “expeditiously considered” (Boese 2005c).

77 Pakistan is now the only Nuclear-Weapon State not to have received some recognition by the United States, according to one Pakistani analyst (Hussain 2005). Pakistani authorities are “terrified” by the deepened strategic partnership between the United States and India, according to Maria Sultan at Bradford University. – Personal communication with Maria Sultan, 2005.

78 The last sentence is arguable since the more fissile material a country produces, the greater are the chances, at least from a purely statistical point of view, that some of it will be diverted to rogue states or terrorists. I owe this point to Fred McGoldrick.

FMCT because it probably has already produced enough fissile material for its national security needs. However, this would have to be an agreement that did not address any past production (stocks) in order to for the Israelis to retain the doctrine of nuclear ambiguity, and it would be in the context of peace negotiations in the Middle East. At the moment, Israel does not seem ready to bring up the nuclear issue, and the Bush administration will certainly not put any pressure to bear.

China

China has repeatedly expressed concerns about U.S. intentions to build a missile defence system⁷⁹ and might feel compelled to increase its deterrent capacity by producing more missiles (and fissile material).

For China, the U.S. decision to develop missile defence systems is of great concern, and mainly for three reasons: First, it further reinforces the Chinese perception that Washington is seeking absolute security at the expense of others, and at the expense of international strategic stability.⁸⁰ Second, it would reduce the deterrent capability of the Chinese nuclear arsenal: China possesses only some 20 Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) capable of reaching the United States and thus having a deterrent effect (Yuan 2003: 75). This would clearly be insufficient against the kind of advanced missile defence systems which the United States is planning. Third, missile defence systems will be deployed not only on U.S. territory but also abroad to protect U.S. forces and allied states. “Theatre Missile Defence systems” (TMD) are likely to be deployed in Japan, India and perhaps Taiwan. The latter is of particular

79Even before taking office, G.W. Bush pledged that his administration would develop missile defence capabilities in order to protect the United States against missile threats. In May 2001, President Bush announced the administration’s decision to deploy a ballistic missile defence. In December 2001, he announced the U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM), the sole international treaty banning missile defences. By June 2002, the ABM had become history (Yuan 2003: 76)

80Sha Zukang, a former Director General of Arms Control and Disarmament in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, has stated that “what it [the United States] wants is absolute security, because it is only from a position of absolute security that it can enjoy complete freedom of action in dealing with other countries. The U.S. Government and Congress have found in NMD [National Missile Defence] the best means to deliver this.” Quoted by Yuan (2003:80)

concern for China because in recent years the United States has shown signs of

deviating from its “One China” principle (that Taiwan belongs to and will be reunited with China) by strengthening diplomatic ties with Taiwan, selling arms and

suggesting that defence cooperation between the two countries should be

strengthened even further (Yuan 2003: 84). China fears that all this, especially if followed by missile defence deployment on Taiwan, may boost demands for independence on the island, leading to instability across the Taiwan Strait and perhaps throughout the region.⁸¹

While Chinese diplomats in recent years have become more moderate in their criticism of the U.S. decision, Chinese leaders have also made it clear that they will not return to a situation where they are vulnerable to U.S. nuclear blackmail (Yuan 2003: 88).⁸² A likely response would be a significant increase in the Chinese ICBM and MRBM (Medium-Range Ballistic Missile) forces, which would require

production of more fissile material. U.S. intelligence predicts that, with the addition of these new strategic ballistic missiles, China’s arsenal of some 20 ballistic missiles capable of targeting North America could expand fivefold. The United States deploys several thousand strategic nuclear weapons capable of striking China.

Thus, China has little to gain from negotiating an FMCT at the moment. That is why it has been holding it hostage for a treaty Preventing an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS), as the United States is well aware. The United States also knows that the recent steps towards a U.S.–Indo strategic partnership might be seen as provocative to Beijing, further reducing the chances of FMCT negotiations.

81 Chinese Ambassador Sha has stated that “China’s opposition to U.S. transfer of TMD [Theater Missile Defence] to Taiwan is also based on … its adverse impact on China’s reunification. TMD in Taiwan will give the pro-independence forces in Taiwan a false sense of security, which may incite them to reckless moves. This can only lead to instability across the Taiwan Strait or even in the entire North-East Asian region.” Quoted by Yuan 2003: 85

82 Cf. the U.S.–Chinese conflict over the Pacific islands Quemoy and Matsu in the 1950s, which spurred the Chinese nuclear weapons programme. Chairman Mao stated afterwards: “If we are not to be bullied with in the present-day world, we cannot do without the bomb. See Chapter 2.2.7

Russia

Initially, Russia was also highly critical to the U.S. decision to develop missile defences, but this criticism has faded. According to Yuan (2003: 79) this is because Russia acknowledged that missile defences would not significantly reduce its deterrent capacity in the foreseeable future, since the country would still possess an overwhelming number of missiles under the Moscow Treaty.⁸³ The Russians also acknowledged that there was little they could do to prevent the U.S. decision and that they had more to gain from cooperation with the United States under a strategic relationship. The United States knows this, and from this point of view Russia should not have any problems with acceding to an FMCT, especially since they also possess more than enough fissile material. However, the United States also knows that

verification might be a particular challenge for Russia, since Russian enrichment and reprocessing facilities were not physically designed for verification.⁸⁴

To summarize: reduced participation in an FMCT is not an option for the United States. It knows that it cannot pressure India, Pakistan or Israel into joining the FMCT, and that it is better to work with these countries to secure other strategic interests in the regions. It also believes that China will not agree to FMCT

negotiations without getting some concessions by the United States, which it is not willing to give. All in all, negotiating the FMCT is for many reasons a not very favourable option to the United States. As one analyst put it; “It is simply too much hassle and too little gain for the United States to really bother. Besides, the Bush administration does not really believe in arms control, so why should it try to convince other states otherwise?”⁸⁵

83 Under the Moscow Treaty (or SORT) of 2002 Russia is obliged to reduce the number of its strategic nuclear warheads to 2,200 by the end of 2012.

84 Personal email communication with Fred McGoldrick.

85 Personal communication with Daryl Kimball, 2004

4.4 Summary

In this chapter I have analysed U.S. policy on the FMCT using a pattern of reasons that a state may have for avoiding a deep agreement. To some degree this pattern has coincided with the empirical material examined: First, the United States does appear to be concerned about other states’ compliance, and it is concerned about the costs of verifying these states. Further, it does not believe that verification will deter non-compliance, only that it will be very costly for its contributors. Enforcement is likely to be very difficult given the incentives involved and the difficulty of applying moderate sanctions. With regard to its own ability to comply, the United States does not seem to have any reason for concern. However, it is worried about intrusive verification.

Thus, clearly there is some support to the hypothesis of Downs et al. However, as pointed out in the previous section, the main reason why the United States is

currently reluctant to FMCT negotiations is the unlikelihood that all the target states would participate fully. The United States has good reason to believe that India, Pakistan, Israel and, perhaps, China are not ready to end production of fissile material for weapons purposes, and it has little to gain from pressing for an FMCT.