6.3 What academics can comment on
6.3.4 Academic freedom of expression
Health Research Ethics, the protection of privacy service provided by Sikt – the Norwegian Agency for Shared Services, must also be clear in their communication and in their roles.
Several research communities have noted that the current regulations for the processing of per-sonal data, especially in connection with medical and health research, make it difficult to do research on the pandemic and the measures that have been implemented in an attempt to control it.
The Commission is aware that work is underway under the auspices of several ministries (includ-ing the Ministry of Education and Research and the Ministry of Health and Care Services) and government agencies (including the Norwegian Institute of Public Health – FHI, Statistics Norway – SSB, and the Research Council of Norway – NFR) to look at access to data to improve the knowledge base in times of crisis.29 The goal is to investigate how research on measures can be initi-ated promptly, without violating requirements concerning data protection or sensitive data. They will also look at infrastructure for sharing and using data.
This is of fundamental importance. The pan-demic provides a good example of the dilemmas that can arise at the intersection of data protec-tion/research ethics and freedom of information:
Measures that interfere with fundamental rights – such as bans on receiving visitors in private homes, mandatory quarantine and travel restric-tions – not only require a valid basis to be legal, they must also be appropriate, necessary and pro-portionate. Otherwise, they can easily entail both constitutional and human rights violations. In the absence of research on whether the various meas-ures even work, and how they work, it is difficult to argue that they are appropriate and necessary.
In this case, can we continue to use them?
Some of the consultative statements point out that journalists can gather personal data without the same kinds of restrictions that researchers face. Article 85 of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) obliges member states to pro-vide for exemptions or derogations from the provi-sions in a number of chapters of the Regulation for the processing of personal data that takes place for journalistic purposes and for the purposes of academic, artistic or literary expression to the
extent necessary to reconcile the right to the pro-tection of personal data with the right to freedom of expression and information. This exception has most recently been discussed in the bill Proposi-tion no. 158 to the Storting (2020–2021) on amendments to the Personal Data Act and Free-dom of Information Act (freeFree-dom of expression and information, etc.),30 as well as in the prepara-tory works from 2018.31 The Commission will not go into this in any further detail, but recommends that greater attention be paid to these issues throughout the entire sector.
6.3.4 Academic freedom of expression in a
tance through the international Scholars at Risk (SAR) scheme and the Norwegian Students at Risk (StAR) scheme (see the discussion in section 4.5). These individuals are given the opportunity to continue their research or studies and finish their degree at Norwegian universities and uni-versity colleges. The schemes also help Norwe-gian institutions gain a broader perspective on the situation in other countries. Scholars at Risk encourages universities and university colleges to invite the persecuted researchers and students to speak on campus. The most important channel for disseminating research is through education and teaching, and encounters with SAR colleagues or StAR students adds invaluable content to the stu-dents’ learning.33
Second, international research collaboration is often hampered by migration policy, restrictions on labour immigration and visa restrictions.34 This has an impact in both directions: Norwegian institutions may have difficulty recruiting skilled researchers to Norway, and Norwegian research-ers may experience problems getting a visa to visit other countries – or will only be granted a visa on the condition that they refrain from criti-cising the regime.
Third, Norwegian researchers collaborating with researchers in certain countries may experi-ence restrictions due to the Norwegian authori-ties wanting to prevent the transfer of certain types of knowledge and expertise for security pol-icy reasons. The openness and transparency on which knowledge institutions are based and depend also render universities and university col-leges vulnerable. The stricter export control rules that are going to be introduced in Norway may severely restrict Norwegian institutions’ interna-tional research collaboration on grounds of secu-rity policy considerations. Norway is a leader in research, technology development and industry in areas that countries like Russia and China are also trying to develop. Within the natural sciences and technology, research and development related to defence, health, maritime technology, petroleum and space are especially at risk.35 There are also particular challenges associated
with collaboration and knowledge transfer in sen-sitive disciplines in some parts of the social sciences. The new regulations will probably entail that research projects and collaborations that have previously been covered by academic free-dom will in the future be subject to approval from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.36
Fourth, openness and transparency also make institutions vulnerable to foreign intelligence, espionage and data breaches. Electronic surveil-lance or hacking can occur when Norwegian researchers are staying in partner countries or through cyber attacks in Norway against institu-tions or individual researchers. For example, in 2021 a German–Iranian researcher at a Norwe-gian university was charged with contributing to the hacking of the university’s computer system that contained information that is subject to export control. He has been charged with sharing information about Norwegian defence materiel with a group of Iranian guest researchers and giv-ing them access to the university’s laboratories. In their national threat assessments for 2022, both the Norwegian Police Security Service (PST) and the Norwegian Intelligence Service issued strong warnings about Chinese and Russian intelligence in Norwegian research and educational institu-tions, which experience data breaches with sur-prising regularity.37 Both Russia and China are priority partner countries for Norway in the fields of research and education.
Fifth, some foreign nations may exert influ-ence or put pressure on researchers and students in Western countries. Influence may also take the form of the establishment of institutions or pro-grammes that promote certain national or political interests. In Norway, there has been debate about
33 Summarised from the 10th anniversary conference for Scholars at Risk, University of Oslo, 21 September 2021.
34 Norske myndigheter stopper allerede mange internasjon-ale prosjekter. Hva når de nå får tusenvis av flere søknader?
[The Norwegian authorities are already stopping many international projects. What will happen when they receive thousands more applications?] (khrono.no) https://
khrono.no/norske-myndigheter-stopper-allerede-mange- internasjonale-prosjekter-hva-nar-de-na-far-tusenvis-av-flere-soknader/660189
35 The publicly available threat and risk assessments pro-duced by the Norwegian Intelligence Service, the Norwe-gian Police Security Service and the NorweNorwe-gian National Security Authority indicate that academia, companies and research are particularly vulnerable; cf. Focus – the Nor-wegian Armed Forces (https://www.forsvaret.no/aktuelt-og-presse/publikasjoner/fokus), the Norwegian Police Security Service (PST)’s National Threat Assessment for 2022 (https://www.pst.no/alle-artikler/trussel-vurderinger/ntv-2022/), and the Norwegian National Secu-rity AuthoSecu-rity (NSM)’s report (https://nsm.no/get- file.php/137798-1644424185/Filer/Dokumenter/Rap-porter/NSM_rapport_final_online_enekeltsider.pdf) 36 « … sikkerhet vil kunne veie tyngre enn akademisk frihet»
[«… national security may well outweigh academic free-dom»] (khrono.no) https://khrono.no/sikkerhet-vil-kunne-veie-tyngre-enn-akademisk-frihet/658672
37 Slår alarm om trusselen fra Kina og Russland [Sounding the alarm about the threat from China and Russia].
(khrono.no) https://khrono.no/slar-alarm-om-trusselen-fra-kina-og-russland-tar-seg-inn-pa-heimekontoret/660690
the now discontinued Confucius Institute at the University of Bergen38 and the Fudan-European Centre for China Studies at the University of Oslo.39 To date, there is little known evidence of direct pressure on students or researchers in Nor-way of the type described in section 4.2.3; how-ever, by way of an example, the head of the Nor-wegian Intelligence Service has pointed out that the Chinese Security Act obliges all Chinese citi-zens, including those in academia, to contribute to Chinese intelligence work if asked to do so.40 In its National Threat Assessment for 2022, the Nor-wegian Police Security Service (PST) states that Russian intelligence services in particular priori-tise the recruitment of human sources in Norway, and this often takes place in professional settings such as seminars, conferences and trade fairs.
Partner countries with which Norway does not have an agreement on security policy cooperation
The challenges in connection with international collaboration are discussed in the government’s Panorama strategy (2021–2027).41 Panorama is the Norwegian government’s long-term plan to strengthen cooperation on higher education, research and innovation with nine strategically relevant partner countries outside the EU and EEA: Brazil, Canada, India, Japan, China, Russia, South Africa, South Korea and the USA. The pur-pose of cooperation with these countries is to enhance the quality and relevance of the Norwe-gian knowledge sector, with links to trade and industry partnerships, building on reciprocity and accountability.
The strategy states that the government, in consultation with the higher education and
research sector, will draw up national guidelines for responsible international cooperation in order to contribute to increased knowledge and aware-ness among Norwegian higher education and research institutions on the opportunities, chal-lenges and dilemmas related to international cooperation. The challenges largely apply to aca-demic cooperation with countries with which Nor-way does not have an agreement on security pol-icy cooperation. In recent years, there has been growing focus in the media and in the sector itself on the delicate balancing act between continued openness in Norwegian higher education and research and national security considerations.
The proposal to develop separate guidelines for responsible international cooperation has been inspired by similar initiatives in other countries in recent years, including Sweden, the Netherlands, Germany, the UK and Australia. Denmark and Finland are also currently working on measures in this area.
Since autumn 2020, the Ministry of Education and Research, in collaboration with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Justice and Public Security and the Ministry of Defence, has conducted regular meetings to discuss coopera-tion with China (the China roundtable). A number of issues are discussed at these meetings with the sector, such as guidelines for responsible aca-demic cooperation with China, for example. In addition, the Research Council of Norway (NFR) and the Directorate for Higher Education and Skills (HK-dir) have established Meeting Place China for the institutions, which in recent years has itself developed a number of resources linked to collaboration with China in particular.42 The EU has recently published an advisory guide to reduce foreign interference in research and inno-vation cooperation.43
The export control rules also apply to research collaboration and in connection with admission and appointment of foreign persons in sensitive areas (see section 5.1.4). The Danish intelligence service has recently released a report on espionage threats, and like the Norwegian Intelligence Service has noted that students and
38 Legger ned omstridt Kina-samarbeid i Bergen [Discontinu-ing controversial China collaboration in Bergen]
(khrono.no) https://khrono.no/legger-ned-omstridt-kina-samarbeid-i-bergen/552103
39 Kritisk til senter ved Universitetet i Oslo: – Et brohode for kinesisk propaganda [Critical of the Centre at the Univer-sity of Oslo: «A bridgehead for Chinese propaganda»]
(khrono.no) https://khrono.no/kritisk-til-senter-ved-uni-versitetet-i-oslo--et-brohode-for-kinesisk-propaganda/
559676
40 Slår alarm om trusselen fra Kina og Russland [Sounding the alarm about the threat from China and Russia].
(khrono.no) https://khrono.no/slar-alarm-om-trusselen-fra-kina-og-russland-tar-seg-inn-pa-heimekontoret/660690 41 Panorama. The Norwegian government’s strategy for
coope-ration on research and higher education with Brazil, Canada, China, India, Japan, Russia, South Africa, South Korea and the USA (2021–2027), https://www.regjerin-gen.no/contentassets/
13e7862e6c064321af97fe0c58a8f7cb/f-4462-b_pano-rama_strategi.pdf.
42 For example, the University of Bergen’s Guide in conne-ction with collaboration with China https://www.uib.no/
fia/135701/samarbeid-med-kinesiske-institusjoner-kon-tekst-og-refleksjoner and the University of Oslo’s online resources on China aimed at its own students and employ-ees
43 European Commission, Directorate-General for Research and Innovation, Tackling R&I foreign interference 2022 https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2777/513746
researchers in particular are targets for foreign intelligence services’ attempts to gain access to research on artificial intelligence, quantum tech-nology and biotechtech-nology.44
Nationally, there has been a focus on strength-ening preventive security work related to informa-tion security, protecinforma-tion of personal data and export control, and the security perspective has become more explicit in research coordination.
Clear guidelines for cooperation that address intelligence threats, academic freedom and ethical issues are a high priority for the Norwegian authorities. The EU and OECD have also placed these issues high on the agenda. For Norway, it will be natural to coordinate positions and prac-tices with like-minded countries within these organisations.
6.4 Institutional and structural prerequisites
6.4.1 New forms of governance and management in academia
Higher education and research have experienced significant growth in recent decades and have undergone a number of major reforms. Chapter 3 of the OsloMet report «Et ytringsklima under press?» [A climate of expression under pressure?]
provides an account of these changes,45 some of which we will describe here.
Some of the new forms of governance and management at universities and university leges may have come at the expense of more col-legial forms of governance. This has an impact on the conditions for academic autonomy, and means academic staff are regarded more like ordinary employees.
The professionalisation and bureaucratisation of the sector has also blurred some of the dividing lines between academic and administrative issues, which may challenge academic freedom.
Furthermore, academia is now governed by a system of management by objectives and results, with funding schemes partially linked to the results achieved in research and education.46 By not including dissemination as an indicator, the
governance system may be further undermining