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The semi-commercial migration managers‟ policy criticism and

4 Non-state managers of migration. Their view on the state management. . 61

4.2 Ethnic associations; a semi-commercial migration management

4.2.3 The semi-commercial migration managers‟ policy criticism and

In the interview with Natal`ya Zotova from 2006 that I referred to above, Alidzhan Khaĭdarov maintained that it is necessary to ease the legalization procedure for immigrants, “because at present these procedures are only a feeder for the police”. In Khaĭdarov`s opinion there were many contradictions and constraints in the legislation on migration. He mentioned the three days period in order to register as one obstacle, and suggested that the period should be extended to 20 days (Zotova: 2006). As explained in the previous chapter, the period was in 2010 extended to 7 days only. According to A. Khaĭdarov, the Uzbek migrants are ready to get legalized and pay taxes, but they are prevented from doing so by a poorly thought-out legislation (Ibid).

When I asked Valisher Khaĭdarov about his opinion on Russia‟s migration policy, he offered clear proposals for how the Russian state ought to manage migration. As a philologist and former teacher of Russian language in Uzbekistan, he criticized the Russian state for not making knowledge of Russian language the main criterion for granting immigrants work permission (Khaĭdarov: 20.04.11). “The FMS should introduce a compulsory Russian language test with a grading system which allowed only candidates with a certain score to acquire a work permit” (Ibid). This, he said, would already be a sufficient mechanism for regulating the migration flows because the knowledge of Russian also tells something about the person‟s ability to learn; his motivation and efforts to get a job in Russia. The second criterion should be the migrant‟s type of profession and professional skills. “Also in Russia one should select people with qualifications. Not just legalize the whole bunch” (Khaĭdarov:

20.10.11). The third criterion should be the migrant‟s intention to remain in Russia. In Khaĭdarov‟s opinion it is clear that Russia ought to prioritize migrants who plan to settle permanently in the country or at least plan to reside in the country for a long period of time.

“Such strict policies of acceptance will motivate Uzbek citizens to study Russian language at home and to gain professional skills before they come to Russia”(Ibid). Khaĭdarov illustrates his point with the following little story:

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“Two Uzbeks want to build a house for themselves and go to Russia to earn enough money, as the wages in Uzbekistan are so small. One of them knows Russian. He is accepted and after a year he returns to Uzbekistan and builds his house. The other one is rejected [does not get a work permit]. He is forced to return back home where his wife will scold at him. The rejection is the impulse he needs: he will send his children to Russian schools, he himself will take Russian classes and courses to raise his qualification so that next time he will succeed” (Khaĭdarov: 20.10.11).

Kharomat Sharipov is very critical to the state management of migration, and when I asked him how he looked at Russia‟s migration policy he said that “There is no such thing. It is slavery…” (Sharipov: 29.04.11) “But a migration policy is in the process of being developed”, I argued. But no:

“Nothing is developing. It is all lies. 100 m from the Moscow Ring Road people live like animals. There they live worse than migrants...only drunkards.... The villages are emptying. Migrants should be living there. Russia ought to attract citizens – especially from Uzbekistan, Tajikistan. They should make them come – register them properly and give them Russian passports. They are needed! The villages are emptying. Let people work! There (in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan) there is no work” (Sharipov: 29.04.11).

Sharipov claims that 99% of all Tajiks who come to Russia are interested in gaining Russian citizenship, and that they are even willing to serve in the Russian army if that is a way to obtain it. In his opinion “the Tajik government ought to sell workers to Russia for a certain fee, just like Russia sells oil and gas” (Sharipov: 29.04.11). The fee then should secure pension and health insurance for the migrants. “In this way the states should organize the exchange of labour force between themselves“(Ibid). Sharipov says that there ought to be ready-made dormitories in Russia to welcome the labour migrants, and also courses for untrained workers so that they may become specialists. “Young people learn fast” (Ibid). His approach is quite different from the restrictive policies that Khaĭdarov from the Umid was opting for. They are both, however, very critical of the present state management.

Khaĭdarov sees clear insufficiencies in the state‟s policies and in the implementation of such. Last year about 135,000 Uzbek migrants worked in St. Petersburg legally, he said.

Altogether, though, the number of Uzbek workers amounted to 300,000. This shows that less than half have worked legally (Khaĭdarov: 20.10.11). When I asked about the state institutions and the FMS in particular, Khaĭdarov confirmed that corruption is widespread along their lines, and that it is common to bribe to get faster access to their services (Khaĭdarov:

20.10.11). Sharipov is no milder in his characterization of the FMS when I ask if the TTM is cooperating with them:

“Yes, I know all of them. And who are they? They are corruption. They are corrupt officials. They know it themselves. How can they not be corrupted when they make the migrants pay 20,000 for the work permit. And in addition the migrants need to pay for their flight 20,000 and 5,000 for registration for one year..[..].and the police one needs to pay bribes... We – the migrants are providing for their (the

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policemen‟s`) living. A person who works here (in Russia) first and foremost brings benefits to Russia”

(Sharipov: 29.04.11).

Sharipov is clearly dissatisfied with the present conditions for Tajiks labour migrants. Under normal conditions a labour migrant would be able to travel back home to see his children and wife once every six months. But today “that will not happen, because the migrants are not even paid their wage on time”. Despite the difficulties in Russia, Sharipov sees no other alternative recipient country for Tajik labour migrants. “We cannot go to Europe to work...We will not be accepted there. Russia is like our older brother. We are far from the West. And Russia is also far for us, but our soul has a stronger pull towards Russia” (Sharipov:

29.04.11).

Sharipov is questioning the recent law amendments and is following the further developments closely:

“Now they are saying that the quota system will be liquidated this year. We do not need quotas. For what? Registrations we are ready to help making, but we do not need the quotas. The Patent-system is also not needed. For what? If I come and register on time, then you know where I am. Citizenship should be given beyond doubt. If a Tajik citizen wants a Russian citizenship –give it to him. He is not an enemy or a terrorist, just a normal person, with a good soul. This way there would be less crime (in Russia) because when we gain citizenship there will be far less crime committed by police officers. It is the police officers who commit the crimes. He (the police officer) sees a migrant without documents and starts to hit him while accusing him of drug dealing...”

Although Sharipov seems to be in favour of granting Russian citizenship to all, while

Khaĭdarov wants a differentiated selection, both of them seem to agree that it is necessary for the Russian state to accept immigrants. “At the moment Russia is in need of millions of people. Whether they want it or not, soon big parts of the country will be ours. If we do not take it, then the Chinese will. In 10 – 15 years we will see here the “Khaĭdarov region etc..”, said Khaĭdarov, indicating that at the Vasily island in St.Petersburg, where the Umid office is situated, Uzbeks will be – if not in majority, then large in numbers in the years to come.

Before my second meeting with Valisher Khaĭdarov, the Umid had moved to a new office in the same area. Khaĭdarov explained that they were starting to cooperate with a Russian labour union which is connected to the political party in power, United Russia. He did not want to provide more information since the cooperation was merely getting started, but he confirmed that the labour union had given them the new office. The ethnic associations seem to have a future in Russia. The question is what role they will play in the migration management, and how they accordingly will develop; more in the direction of human rights

83 NGOs, commercial firms, employment offices, labour unions, or cultural-ethnical

associations? Or will they simply maintain their wide-ranging status quo?

4.3 Commercial migration managers: Firms that provide