Other Actors

Besides the migration managers presented above there are other actors who do not fit completely into my categories. The International Organization of Migration, an

intergovernmental organization with a Moscow office, is present as an informational resource for other actors, while it at the same time is running its own projects. The IOM has world-wide taken on a consultant role in migration issues for states, NGOs, and migrants. Similarly to “Migration and Law”, the IOM in Russia has a call centre for labour migrants which has been operating since 2007 on a project basis. As expected, as representatives of an

intergovernmental organization the IOM staffs that I spoke with were less harsh than the representatives of non-governmental organizations in their criticism of the state‟s

management of migration in Russia. When I asked how the IOM is relating to the recent changes in the migration legislation, they answered; “Positively. We adapt all our material to these changes, to spread the information. […] Mostly we are providing information on how things are functioning here (in Russia) and what possibilities there are” (Pavlovskaya:

08.06.11).

The IOM Moscow is in contact with the state structures for migration management on a daily basis, and the IOM representatives could tell that the Labour Department at the time (June 2011) was in the process of developing an information centre for migrants

(Pavlovskaya: 08.06.11). According to the IOM, the Russian state was hoping that migrants would come to this centre with their questions. ” But so far the centre is not functioning. The NGOs are more popular - the ones that have opened similar (information) centres. People have more trust in them probably” (Ibid). “The IOM representative stressed the importance for informational centres to have employees who speak in the migrants‟ languages, suggesting that as a possible failure of the state initiative. “We have one co-worker who speaks Tajik. We are lucky that she came to us. Migration and Law have more such workers.” (Pavlovskaya:

08.06.11).

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The IOM Moscow is familiar with other organizations working with migration issues in Russia. Among these a labour union for labour migrants especially captured my interests.

According to Renat Karimov, chairman of the central committee of this labour union, the organization⁵⁹ has been working since 2006 when it was initiated by a group of migrants. He further said that he knows of no other labour union of this kind in Russia (10.06.11). Karimov is neither encouraging a proliferation of this type of labour unions particular for migrants.

“We keep telling the migrants: you have come to Russia, if there is a labour union at your workplace, join that one! You will be better defended together with the Russian workers”

(Karimov: 10.06.11). Many migrants, however, have no access to labour unions through the place where they work (Karimov: 10.06.11), and several of the Russian labour units have taken a stand against migration as defenders of the local worker (Denisova: 12.10.11).

Karimov thinks it is unfortunate that a particular labour union for migrants is needed, but under the present conditions he believes that it is good that they can provide this opportunity.

“It is good as well that this labour union is not divided by national criteria such as the different Diasporas are, but that both Ukrainians, Armenians, Tajik and Kyrgyz etc. are members” (Karimov: 10.06.11).

The labour union for labour migrants does not exclude illegal workers from membership, and much of its co-workers‟ efforts are put into trying to help immigrants without work contracts to receive the payment that the employers refuse to pay them.

“Without a work permit one cannot ask for an employment contract” (Karimov: 10.06.11), and, as explained above, with the reduction of the quotas the work permits are hard to get.

However, despite the absence of an employment contract, the labour union‟s efforts in many cases “pay off” and they successfully manage to obtain the migrants‟ payment.

“Often the employers try to deny that the person has ever worked for him. Then our lawyers find evidence that he did. By talking to other workers on the spot... The lawyers then ask the employer to show humanity, mercy, and law-abidingness and to pay the worker. 50 percent of the employers understand that they are no longer facing just one individual, but lawyers and a whole organization that stands behind and supports the individual. They then find it easier to pay in order not to be troubled further. In 20 percent of the cases when the employer still does not want to pay, our lawyers starts to talk about opening a criminal case, and the possible fines that follows“ (Karimov: 10.06.11).

What the employers do not know is that these are empty threats. “One can report such cases because the fact that the work took place is evidence itself. However, the courts do not agree to open cases when there were no employment contracts. But we do not tell this to the

59 профсоюз трудящихся мигрантов занятых в строительстве, Жилищно-коммунальном хозяйстве и

смежных отраслях, More on the Labour Union for Labour migrants at http://www.profmigr.com/

91 employers and they have poor knowledge about the legal code” (Karimov: 10.06.11). Despite of these strategies Karimov estimates that 20 percent of the employers do not pay no matter what. “Then we tell the migrants not to agree to work without an employment contract”

(Ibid).

In sum, this chapter has dealt with very different actors stretching from human rights activists to commercial enterprises. It is probably rather unorthodox to present human rights NGOs and commercial firms under the same headline as I have done above. In this context, however, I believe that this approach has illustrated well the variety of actors which have emerged as a result of state‟s insufficiency and state policies that fail to achieve their initial aims. Human rights activists have involved due to the troublesome situation for the (actual) labour migrants. Commercial actors have discovered a business niche of migration services for which there is an evident demand. The ethnic associations see the need for services that they are able to provide to their compatriots, and whether or not they do it for their own profit remains unanswered here. What is interesting is that the state seems to have given room for a partial commercialization of migration services. From the descriptions of state institutions above it is reasonable to believe that this commercialization has not been a conscious state choice, but rather a development deriving from state inefficiency. Bribery is a common way of communicating with state organs, and restrictions and regulations for how and who should be involved in transactions of, in this case - work permits, are absent. The result is a situation of arbitrary arrangements that often involve corrupt practices between state organs and intermediary actors. The losers in this system are clearly the labour migrants, as well as employers who are interested in using foreign workers in a legal way. An evident loser is also the state itself if its aim has been to reduce illegal migration. Under its current management of migration it seems as if the state continuously will have to share the management role with both illicit and legal non-state actors.

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