The escalation of labour migration and Russia‟s response

The late 90s and the beginning of the 2000s mark the start of the flow of temporary labour migrants to the Russian Federation. The forced migration came to an end as the political and social situation in the other CIS counties became more stabile, and repatriation was also largely replaced by labour migration (Vitkovskaya: 2009). It was at the beginning of the new millennium that Russia begun to recover economically, and thus became an attractive

destination for workers from the former Soviet republics, which were doing considerably worse in this respect (Ivakhnyuk: 2009, 31). From the middle of the 2000s, migration from Central Asia grew especially fast, and in 2007 Uzbekistan and Tajikistan had become the leading labour migrant donors, replacing China and Ukraine, which earlier had been in the lead. The Central Asian share of the migration flow then constituted 41% (Tyuryukanova:

2009, 3), and continued to increase in 2008, according to FMS statistics (Zaĭonchkovskaya, Tyuryukanova: 2010, 22). Russia was available to employment-driven migrants, not only through the visa-free regime, but because of the common past which made Russia culturally familiar to CIS migrants, not least due to the widespread knowledge of theRussian language.

The increased flow of labour migrants required changes in the legal system and the overall relationship with the former Soviet citizens, now citizens of independent states, needed to be further clarified (Gradirovsky: 2010, 4).Were these to have prerogatives to immigrants coming from “the far abroad”, countries like China, Korea and Vietnam, beside the visa-free entrance? Russia signed bilateral agreements on labour migration with many CIS countries, but these existed merely on paper and did not contribute much to an effective regulation (Ivakhnyuk: 2009, 31).

In 1996 –1997 the government brought a federal law project to the State Duma on the

“attraction of foreign citizens to labour activity” (привлечение к трудовой деятельности иностранных граждан) (Gradirovskiĭ: 2010). This law draft introduced quotas as a possible constraint on the use of foreign labour power (Ibid). The law was not adopted, however, which according to the scholar Sergeĭ Gradirovskiĭ had to do with the state‟s need for a new migration policy that dealt with not only labour migration, but the whole legal system concerning the arrival of foreigners in the RF. A governmental commission on migration policy was established in 1998, but this did not result in any significant changes (Ibid). With

35 Putin coming to power, however, overall revisions started to take place also in the sphere of migration.

In the beginning of the 2000s, the Putin administration attempted to further develop the institutional foundations of migration policy, its legal infrastructure as well as the executive mechanisms for implementing new policy (Korobkov: 2007, 78). These developments were coloured by a negative, official attitude towards migration. Large

numbers of illegal migrants, and state‟s inability to counteract it, put illegal migration on the government`s list of national security issues (Ivakhnyuk, 2009, 37). Fighting illegal migration became a main priority for the migration policy (Mukomel`: 2008, 2).

From the mid 90s the main discussions on migration had centred around two laws which were under development (Mukomel`: 2005, 118). These included the laws “on

citizenship”, which will not be elaborated on in the following, and the one “on the legal status of foreign citizens in the RF”, which is central not only for labour migrants, but for all

foreigners entering the Russian Federation. For the first 11 years after the fall of the Soviet Union, the old legislation “on the legal status of foreign citizens in the USSR” remained in force. (Mukomel`: 2005, 118) This law did not apply to citizens of CIS countries, and there was therefore no limitation on the period of time a CIS citizen could spend in Russia.

(Osipov: 2004, 20) The incompatibility of the law within the new reality was obvious, and lawmakers were to bring the legislation in accordance with the present situation.

In June 1997 the Duma adopted a law project which in July was rejected by the Federal Council. Once again, in February 1998, the Federal Council rejected the law project that was ratified by the Duma. A conciliation commission from both chambers then worked on a redaction which led to the ratification of the law “On the legal status of foreign citizens in the RF” by both chambers in June 1998. The president, however, did not approve this draft, and the law was still not implemented (Mukomel`: 2005, 118-119).

An interagency task force (межведомственная рабочая группа) on the improvement of the migration legislation was formed in 2001, and led by the head of the presidential administration‟s deputy, it presented already in 2002 their policy suggestions. And finally in May 2002 the Federal Law `On the Legal Status of Foreign Citizens in the Russian Federation was approved (NO.115-FZ of July 25, 2002)(Mukomel`: 2005).This became the main law on governing relations between the state authorities and foreign citizens concerning the latter‟s status of residence, employment etc (Ivakhnyuk, 2009, 39). Initially it hardly distinguished

36

between former Soviet citizens and all other foreign citizens, and the procedures which it introduced were complicated. This governmental attempt to tighten control over the migration management would soon turn out to be as inadequately worked through as specialists and human rights activist at the time had pointed out (Mukomel`: 2005, 118-119).

Aleksandr Osipov states that the law “is mainly devoted to the procedures of

registration and control, limitations and sanctions, but it does not fully determinate the legal status of foreign citizens, their rights and obligations” (2004, 31). Some of the main obstacles for the migrants were connected with the registration procedures. Any foreign citizen had to register within 3 days. The registration, which was carried out by the police, was done based on the place of residence. Accommodation, thus, had to be provided prior to registering (Ivakhnyuk, 2009, 40). Stating the actual address of your residence was not enough, though.

According to the procedures, the owner or renter of the residence, and all its residents had to meet personally at the police station to confirm their acceptance (Zaĭonchkovskaya: 2008).

The temporary stay of citizens who came to Russia from the visa-free regime was limited to 90 days. (Chapter 1, article 5.1, N 115-F3, 2002) This stay could be prolonged up to one year, that is, if a work contract was signed under the conditions which the law stipulated and a work permit was given. Article 13 on “Conditions for the labour activity of foreign citizens” made it clear that recruitment of foreign employees is possible for licensed employees. Not only was it the employers‟ responsibility to get a license (regulated by

quotas) in order to attract foreign workers, it was also the employer who should see to that the migrant worker acquired a work permit, who presented the necessary documents for

registration of the migrant worker, and informed the local tax organs that he employed immigrant workers. (Ibid, Chapter 2, article 18.8) As such, according to this law the legal status of the migrant was completely at the employers‟ mercy. Moreover, when the law speaks of licenses to attract foreign workers, it seems to be relating to a reality where migrant workers back in their homelands are awaiting invitations to come to Russia - as merchandise which is to be delivered according to demand. In this way the law completely disregarded the fact that migrants from the CIS enter Russia legally without any work invitation, and that most of them search for jobs in Russia after arrival, and not prior to departure from their country of origin. Thus, the foreign work force was already available on the labour market, and many employers chose simply to avoid the time-consuming efforts of bureaucratized procedures since job seekers were plentiful and willing to work regardless of formalities (Ivakhnyuk2009, 32). Referring to experts‟ general estimation, Gradirovskiĭ writes that no

37 more than 10 – 15 % of all labour migrants worked within the legal frames of the 2002

legislation (Gradirovskiĭ: 2010, 8). Vitkovskaya operates with similar numbers, as she estimates that around 90% of the labour migrants in Russia were illegals; lacking either registration or a work permit, or both. (Vitkovskaya: 2009) The policies facilitated rather than prevented illegal migration.

The registration procedures were complicated, with long lines, multiple visits to authorities, and problems with finding an eligible address for registration. One out of two migrants were said to be unable to legalize their employment, because the registration was not obtained (Ivakhnyuk: 2009, 41). The ruling bureaucratic system led to growing corruption and the establishment of an illicit immigration industry where permits and registrations were issued unofficially, and where authorities accepted bribes for validating documents (Ibid).

Osipov wrote in 2004 that: “The mechanism of the legislative regulations is not enforced, because people lack the incentive and the possibility to be law-abiding” (Osipov: 2004, 33).

Who else but the state can facilitate conditions which encourage rather than complicate obedience to the law?