Participation

‘Norway looks forward to fully participate in the Common Foreign and Security Policy’²⁵ then Minster of Trade Bjørn Tore Godal emphasised in his speech on the opening of the membership negotiations between Norway and the EU in 1993 (Godal 1993). The focus on complete participation in EU security and defence cooperation runs like a red thread through various speeches and official documents in the time leading up to the negotiations, but also afterwards, when the result of the referendum made it clear that alternative solutions had to be found. Then state secretary Gunnar Heløe stressed that the Norwegian Government was doing its best: ‘We are putting great emphasis on securing satisfactory solutions for Norwegian participation when it comes to the development of the ESDP in general, and crisis management in particular’²⁶ (Heløe 2002). However, sometimes that is easier said than done, as then Minister of Defence Devold acknowledged in a speech:

EU is creating its own security and defence dimension among the member states – without complete Norwegian participation. ... In line with the enlargement there is an increased tendency for informal consultations within and between the organisations to have an increased importance. ... Norway is not a part of the EU, and in NATO the processes are increasingly marked by the fact that “someone has been talking together”. Norway is basically not first in line for participation in these conversations.²⁷

(Devold 2002)

Even in more recent years, it is evident that the concern for the lack of participation has not been completely solved. Rather, the continued integration of the EU members is creating new challenges for Norway with regard to participation. Although a white paper points to four annual meetings as the most important forum in the cooperation: ‘The Minister of Defence is invited to meetings with the EU troika four times a year. During these meetings Norway is informed and consulted on important ESDP issues, in addition to put forth Norwegian sentiments’²⁸ (St.meld. 2005-2006: 28), then Minister of Defence Grete Faremo displayed a rather less optimistic note when accounting for the situation to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs:

We are witnessing a changing EU, also in the security and defence policy area. For me it has for example become harder to achieve political contact and dialogue with the EU. The old ‘troika meeting’ where I met with the EU political leadership four times a year has been discontinued and has not been replaced with a solution satisfactory to us.²⁹

(Faremo 2010)

The people working with the political day-to-day cooperation on security and defence between Norway and the EU are also quite frank in their assessment of the situation:

It’s been problematic for many years now. Before the Lisbon Treaty we had these four annual meetings, and although the level of relevance varied, at least we met with the EU in a formal setting and there was always the possibility of informal corridor talks.

They [the EU] promised to replace this forum, but this has not been done to a satisfactory degree and this is something we are still working on.³⁰

(Interview 6)

Almost every day meetings in different working groups take place. You always have to contact other people to get to know what was discussed. This would in principle also be the case if something that may concern us should be on the agenda.³¹

(Interview 9)

One informant points to the PSC+ and EUMC+ meetings as the formal point of access for issues relevant to Norway, but also notes that these most often function as a way for the EU to keep the partner countries informed, not substantial discussions (Interview 3). Participating in meetings or other fora might not be that important as long as one gets hold of the relevant information through other channels, and as the previous section clearly illustrated, other countries’ delegations are willing to pass on this information. However, knowing what information to ask for is drastically limited when one isn’t part of the day-to-day discussion, and as one informant states, there might be other consequences of not being present as well:

‘You often feel like you are a bit behind and always dependent upon someone else’s assessment of a situation or a case ... We are dependent upon other countries good-will’³² (Interview 1). In addition, relying on information assessed by other countries might be problematic. There might be questions of possible ulterior motives and only passing on certain information, or just because one relies on others to determine what is relevant and not.

As one informant argued:

I know from experience from other international organisations that sitting in on relevant meetings provides a very different frame of reference. ... When you have got hold of a document, you can of course read it and assess it based on prior knowledge or through speaking with people. But what happened in that room, during that meeting? How was the atmosphere? Who said what? You won’t get that full picture, and that is an evident drawback. And this is of course the case in most policy areas, but it is perhaps even more apparent in the security and defence area because there are so few points of access. In that sense, we are perhaps more at a disadvantage here than in those policy areas where the EEA agreement gives us a certain access.³³

(Interview 1)

One apparent way of gaining participation would be to take advantage of the system with nation experts. The EEA Agreement leaves Norway with an opportunity to take part in the decision-shaping of the policy concerning the Internal Market. This means that although they do not have any seats in the EU institutions, they still have some influence in the preparatory stage either through the submission of EEA/EFTA comments or national experts in the European Commission committees (Claes 2003). Although security and defence policy is not part of the EEA Agreement, one very clear way of getting more information as well as a possibility for both participation and influence would be to have a national expert stationed at the EEAS. According to informants, this has been discussed in Norway:

It would have been extremely useful for us and we would get a completely different insight. It would of course have been an international civil servant, he would not be there for Norway, but that is the way with the national experts, and it goes without saying that it would in any case be extremely useful.³⁴

(Interview 1)

The Norwegian Government has also tried to place a national expert in DG MARKT⁶ due to the new EU defence directives on the surveillance of the market. This was also turned down by the EU: ‘They said that there was no use for additional staff in the most relevant section as it was fully manned. We believe however, that part of the reason might have been that they weren’t interested in having a non-EU member working in this particular area, because surveillance of the defence market is so sensitive’³⁵ (Interview 1).

Some improvements on the possibilities to participate have nevertheless been made recently.

One informant revealed that the prospect of getting a national expert in the EEAS might actually be within reach (Interview 9). In the semi-annual exposition to Parliament on the EU, then Minister of Foreign Affairs Espen Barth Eide revealed that he had, as the first Norwegian minister ever, been invited to meetings in the Political and Security Committee (PSC) and had the opportunity to present Norwegian viewpoint on the High North and the Middle East (Eide 2013: 3338). Nevertheless, before the European Council meeting on security and defence in

6 The Internal Market and Services Directorate General (DG MARKT) is one of the Directorates General and specialised services which make up the European Commission. Its main role is to coordinate the Commission’s policy on the European Single Market and to seek the removal of unjustified obstacles to trade, in particular in the field of services and financial markets (EC 2014).

December 2013, Norway sent a non-paper⁷ which clearly indicated that the present solutions for participation are not good enough. The document lists several suggestions on ways to strengthen the cooperation through more frequent dialogues and meetings, indicating that there still is discontent concerning the current arrangements (Non-paper 2013). When there clearly are strong limitations on the possibilities to participate, the possibilities to influence becomes even more important, as it is can be seen as the last way of restoring the democratic balance.