Being Part of an Integrated Force: The Cooperation in Praxis

A Swede participating in the 2011 NBG admitted: ‘It did cause some amusement as to why Norway wished to participate without being member of the EU. ... but Norway was a country as any other in the Nordic Battle Group, the non-membership in the EU did not cause any difficulties from my point of view’⁶¹ (Interview 7). The agreement on Norway’s participation in the NBG is said to be more ‘positive’ than other agreements between Norway and the EU on foreign and security policy because it gives Norway the ‘right’ to participate (Sjursen 2008: 326-327). However, Sjursen (2014: 186) also argues that: ‘A “no” from Norway could stop the entire operation. Thus, in reality, one could say that this agreement obligates Norway to contribute forces when and where the EU decides’.⁶² In order to find out if the agreement is problematic from a democratic point of view, it is necessary to examine how this cooperation works in praxis, as well as the so-called ‘national veto’, before examining the public and parliamentary debates.

6.3.2.1 Getting Information

In an integrated force as the Nordic Battle Group is, it is important to get relevant information in order to best be prepared for what might happen. Then Minister of Defence, Kristin Krohn Devold said in an exposition to Parliament that: ‘In order to ensure a proper national

decision-making process, we have from the Norwegian perspective preconditioned that we will have access to all relevant information before and during a crisis. This is especially important because the formal decision from the EU is taken in the EU council without our participation.’⁶³ (Devold 2004b: my own italics). From the political point of view, it seems that there should be no problem getting information, because: ‘the Swedes are bound by the agreement to keep us informed when we are on stand-by’⁶⁴ (Interview 6). Once again, Norway is thus relying on the Swedes in order to be informed about what is happening in the EU concerning the Battle Group they are contributing to. On the military side, for those participating in the actual Battle Group, one informant said that all in all there was a good flow of information, but were also was quite clear on the limitations:

Sweden was the framework nation and they did a good job passing on information, but the information travels up through the Swedish system, then over to Norway at the same level, and then down to us. It takes a long time, and not all information gets through. ... I had to search for information and take initiative when I had a feeling that information was “stuck” somewhere. But when I went directly to the Swedish platoon chief, he gave me what I asked for. However, there are also issues with regard to security clearance on the information, often it had to be adjusted to the appropriate security level before it could be handed over, and who knows what got lost on the way.⁶⁵

(Interview 5)

6.3.2.2 Participation

We have seen that when Norway is contributing to an EU-led operation, representatives will participate in the Committee of Contributors. The Battle Group is, as discussed earlier, somewhat different than participation in regular operations and a closer examination of the possibilities for participation is thus warranted. First of all, it is evident from interviews that there is a divide with regard to participation. At the political level:

we would normally not be part of early discussions on whether the Battle Groups on stand-by are to be deployed or not, but we will be kept informed informally about what is being discussed. ... The question is of course if the EU will be quick in informing us, but in this case we can rely on the Swedes and Norway will of course pay extra attention when we are on stand-by. We could also receive information more

formally, through the particular fora for exchange of information with third countries, such as PSC+ and EUMC+, but these meetings do not take place very often. If a possible deployment should be discussed when Norway is part of one of the battle groups on stand-by, we will have to stay in close touch with Sweden, as framework nation.⁶⁶

(Interview 1)

The challenge of not being present at meetings where the EU is discussing whether or not to use the Battle Groups is confirmed by another informant: ‘Chad was mentioned once as a possible EU operation, and it was debated if a Battle Group could be used. But we weren’t there. It is a real challenge not to be part of the Political and Security Committee (PSC)’⁶⁷ (Interview 6). However, when it comes to the military level during the actual training period or stand-by period, there were no experiences of being left out of relevant meetings or fora:

I was invited to all relevant meetings, and I didn’t once feel that we were treated differently than the other participants just because Norway isn’t part of the EU. I had the same rights as everyone else to speak, made proposals, vote and so on. ... There was no situation where I felt that the other’s had privileges which I didn’t due to our non-membership. But we did of course joke in informal settings about what on earth Norway was doing participating in the EU Battle Group.⁶⁸

(Interview 5) This is also confirmed from the Swedish perspective as a framework nation: ’There were no meetings or similar settings where we had to exclude the Norwegians because of their non-membership. They were treated just like any of the other nations’⁶⁹ (Interview 7). In addition, while Norway does not participate in the EU meetings discussing the Battle Groups in general, there are some possibilities to participate in other fora when it comes to the Nordic Battle Group:

We are invited to participate from the very beginning when the stand-by period is drawing closer. It works excellent! We were even invited to join the EU force generating conference just because we have participated in the Nordic Battle Group in

previous stand-by periods, before it is formally decided that we will join the next rotation.⁷⁰

(Interview 6)

6.3.2.3 Possibilities for Influence

At the political level, informants are clear on the fact that there are no real possibilities for influencing the preliminary processes of the Battle Groups in the EU institutions: ‘We depend on the Swedes to promote our points of view. It is far from ideal. That we make the political decision to contribute forces without being part of the organisation is a challenge’⁷¹ (Interview 6). As with the possibilities for participating, we can clearly see a divide between the political and military level: ‘The Battle Group concept has always functioned quite well with regard to training, discussion and influence during the training or stand-by period⁷² (Interview 6).

During the negotiations before the 2011 contribution, an informant underscored this point: ’I did not once feel that Norway was somehow in another position than the EU member states’⁷³ (Interview 2).

During the training period before the 2011 stand-by, one informant said that there were real possibilities of influencing the training: ‘During exercises, one way to train is to run scenarios or cases. I had some experiences from other training exercises which I wanted them to play, and whenever I took initiative to change some aspects of the scenario, this was taken into consideration and added to the training’⁷⁴ (Interview 5). That Norway was sidelined with the other nations, and that there were real ways of exerting influence, was also confirmed from the Swedish perspective: ‘Before the stand-by period, we had several meetings concerning training, education and so on where all participating countries had the possibility to influence the outcome. During the actual stand-by, I also had meetings in Norway in order to discuss the progress’⁷⁵ (Interview 7).

One might argue that the findings show that participation is not a problem at the military level, or in fora discussing the actual contributions or formation of the NBG. However, there are clear limitations concerning the decision to actually use the Battle Group on stand-by. The lack of information, the dependence on Sweden and the limitations on influence on the political level, might have greater consequences when it comes to contribution to the NBG than any regular EU-led operation because it is an integrated unit. A closer examination of the so-called ‘national veto’ is thus necessary.