Gaining Influence

In 2000 the focus in Norway shifted from trying to obtain a position in the decision-making process to seeking out what Norway could offer the EU in terms of personnel and troops. For example, at the capability commitment conference in November 2000, ‘Norway proposed that its entire newly established task force should be earmarked for international operations to EU’s military headline goals’ (Rieker 2006: 288). Knowing that membership was not an option, participation in operations would perhaps nevertheless secure some level of insight as well as some form of consultations, not excluding Norway completely and avoiding the

marginalisation feared by some Norwegian officials. The strategy, it appears, concerned how to get a foot inside the door even if full access was denied in the absence of EU membership.

Græger (2005: 94) however, argues that ‘while a “troops-for-influence” strategy has paid back vis-à-vis the US and NATO (cf. The locating of NATO’s Joint Warfare Centre in Norway), it has so far not been an effective way of obtaining political influence upon the ESDP’.

Nevertheless, the strategy, or belief that contributions might create opportunities for influence, is evident from various sources. As MP Høglund (Progress Party) argued during the NBG Parliamentary debate: ‘Our goal has to be to provide Norway with the best possible security and influence. We are therefore choosing a line where we, despite a principled opposition towards the EU defence dimension ... say that we wish to participate in order to get a foot in the door’¹¹¹ (Stortinget 2004: 759). MP Jagland (Labour) agreed, saying that it is

‘important to participate in what is happening, although the arrangement never will be completely satisfactory as long as we are not a member of the EU’¹¹² (Stortinget 2004: 757).

In a white paper, this was voiced even more clearly:

The development of the European security and defence policy and the increased importance of the EU might achieve in international security, implies that continued Norwegian cooperation with the EU can contribute to Norway gaining access to decision-making processes of importance to Norwegian security.¹¹³

(NOU 2007: 15)

A few years later, this perception is still very much prominent. A recent white paper claims that:

Through participation we are make ourselves relevant and are gaining insight and possibilities to influence. This happens in the field where we are present, but also at the higher levels through formal and informal contexts in Brussels. Norway contributed to the EU police operation in Afghanistan from 2007 to 2012 with a larger contingent than any of the EU member states. This gave Norway co-decision in the operational dispositions.¹¹⁴

(St.meld. 2012-2013: 58)

One might argue that the belief that continued contributions might provide possibilities for insight and influence, to a large degree can explain why Norway continues to integrate into the CSDP despite the democratic weaknesses. However, one might also argue that the effect might not have been as intended. Norway is the third country contributing to the most EU-led operations, nevertheless, there does not seem to be clear that this has provided Norway with greater possibilities in the EU. As chapters five and six illustrated, although Norway is treated as any other EU member during an operation or the NGB, the exclusion from relevant meetings, the restricted ways of influencing directly as well as the mixed experiences with the Committee of Contributors paint a much more sombre picture. When asked if contributing led to more influence, one informant said: ‘in the long run it means something for our general standing – that we are being noticed. But I do not believe that we should have an illusion that it will give us any greater influence’¹¹⁵ (Interview 1).

7.3 Summing Up

There are evident democratic weaknesses related to Norway’s cooperation with the EU in security and defence policies, and as this chapter has shown, the two most commonly mentioned ‘solutions’ also fail when subjected to closer scrutiny. A closer examine of what might explain the continued Norwegian will to cooperate is thus warranted. Out of the five motives examined in this chapter, it is evident that public opinion has little explanatory value as there is little public debate combined with a broad majority in the Parliament and thus no fear of government change. Both threat to national interests and identity can to a large degree explain why Norway has contributed to the EU-led operations it has. In addition, the reference to Norway’s traditional role in peace operations was often referenced during the NBG Parliamentary debate. With regard to the NBG, it is also surprising how often alliance value was mentioned, most of all because it was referred to NATO, the UN and the Nordic cooperation much more often than to the EU. The fact that both NATO and the UN supported the Battle Group concept and welcomed Norwegian participation seems to have played a large role. Although both alliance value, threat to national interest, as well as identity seem to explain much of why Norway continues to cooperate with the EU in security and defence, there also seems to be much emphasis on the idea that contributions might lead to influence.

This belief has been voiced quite clearly in several white papers and speeches, but as the findings in chapters five and six illustrated there might be reason to assume that the effect has not been quite as hoped.

Chapter 8 Concluding Remarks

Intentions does not count in politics, only the result

Charles de Gaulle