Finding New Solutions

With the St. Malo declaration it became evident that the EU was taking on an increasingly larger role in European security and defence matters and the sentiment in the Norwegian Government was that now was the time to seek a more integrated relationship. Then Minister of Defence Dag Jostein Fjærvoll expressed the growing concern:

We must acknowledge that if the development is heading towards a common European foreign and security policy, Norway will be facing challenges of

considerable dimensions ... only through a very active participation in relevant fora, in NATO and the WEU, can we make sure that our interests are maintained.¹²

(Fjærvoll 1999)

Then Minister of Foreign Affairs Knut Vollebæk went even further in his conclusions on how to protect Norwegian interests: ‘in practice this will have to be ensured by involving Norway in discussions on defence and security policy issues within the EU’ (Vollebæk 1999). This view, as well as the concern for what form this cooperation would take, is also reflected in a white paper: ‘[WEU] will be phased out as an operative organisation as the tasks are transferred to the EU. ... Non-members of the EU must seek association schemes to the new EU cooperation, solutions that will not be equivalent to full participation’¹³ (St.meld. 2000-2001: 50). Transferring the WEU into the EU structures meant that Norway would lose this link into the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), and all efforts were put into trying to secure the best possible association. Again the focus was put on gaining possibilities to influence and participate, as illustrated by the Pro Memoria sent by then Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs Vollebæk to all EU and NATO members before the Helsinki EU summit in December 1999, proposing that:

Norway and other non-EU allies should take part in day-to-day consultations and activities relating to security and defence issues in the proposed Political and Security Committee and in subsidiary working groups ... with the right to speak and make proposals, and have access to all relevant information and documents.

(cited in Græger 2005: 93)⁴ The demand for influence went so far as the Norwegian Government stressing that ‘access to all relevant information about ESDP on a basis going beyond ad hoc cooperation was necessary’ (Græger 2005: 93). The Norwegian optimism, voiced by then Minister of Foreign Affairs Vollebæk, was extensive, if not naïve:

The Government’s point of departure is therefore that Norway’s rights as an Ally, and associated member of the WEU, must be maintained in any future solutions that may change the cooperation between the EU, the WEU and NATO. In practice this will

4 The original document could not be located, and the solution of citing Græger’s reference to the same quote was thus opted for.

have to be ensured by involving Norway in discussions on defence and security policy issues within the EU. ... It is the Government’s impression that key Allies fully acknowledge Norwegian needs and that they welcome Norway’s initiatives. They are prepared to consider solutions that also safeguard Norwegian interests.

(Vollebæk 1999)

This was basically a demand for the same position within the ESDP as Norway had enjoyed in the WEU as an associated member. The demands were turned down by the EU members out of fear that if granted, they could undermine the EU’s decision-making autonomy. There was still hope of achieving ‘satisfactory association for Norway and other allied non-EU countries to the new structures established in the EU. This work has the Government’s highest priority’¹⁴ (Vollebæk 2000). At the Nice EU summit in December 2000 it was decided that there were to be two annual meetings between the Political and Security Committee and the six non-EU NATO countries, so-called PSC+ (EC 2000: annex VI, chapter IV). But as then Minister of Foreign Affairs Thorbjørn Jagland pointed out: ‘The solutions for consultation and cooperation that the EU now seems to have agreed upon for so-called third-countries, are not as good as the Government would have wanted’¹⁵ (Jagland 2000). The result was that Norway was de facto ‘excluded from information and debates about European security and defence policy issues’ (Græger 2005: 94). At the same time, however, the Schengen Agreement was also integrated into the EU. Norway did manage to continue its privileges in the new structure, enjoying a formal role in the decision-shaping process and access to the Council also today (Finstad 2014: 107).

Although the conditions were rejected, this ‘did not lead to a change in Norwegian policy.

Instead of becoming more reluctant to contribute to the ESDP, [it] rather showed an increased willingness to participate’ (Rieker 2006: 284). The focus shifted from trying to obtain a position in the decision-making process to seeking out what Norway could offer the EU in terms of personnel and troops. The increased willingness to participate although requests for influence were denied might illustrate a belief that although membership was not an option, cooperation could still be valuable. Participation in operations could perhaps secure some level of insight as well as some form of consultations, not excluding Norway completely and avoiding the marginalisation feared by some Norwegian officials. The strategy, it appears, concerned how to get a foot inside the door even if full access was denied in the absence of EU membership.