to the population living near the territories contaminated with RW. The main reason for this situation was the lack of a clear legal basis for planning and organizing work on the management of RW and, as a result, the lack of institutional control and long-term radiological monitoring after the completion of remediation works.
In the case of improper remediation of uranium legacy sites, there is a high risk of isotopes migrating outside the monitoring zone, and entering livestock grazing areas where they then enter food products.
Given the fact that such facilities are dangerous for a long time, it is necessary at the legislative level to determine the requirements for long-term safety assessment and institutional control, including when long-term monitoring of such facilities is needed. In addition, it is necessary to consider risks from underground leaching at uranium mining sites, as well as risks from natural radionuclides released to the environment during the extraction of other minerals. Kazakhstan has since adopted a new regulation
“Rules of remediation during the exploration and production of hydrocarbons and uranium mining (Order of the Minister of Energy Republic of Kazakhstan on May 22, 2018 number 200)” [21], but this does not contain enough details to support knowledgeable decision-making by operators or regulators.
2.6.7 Management of contaminated areas
In Kazakhstan, there are not currently regulations that are detailed enough to support remediation of contaminated areas, including exploration and production sites for naturally occurring radioactive materials (NORM) and sites of former nuclear explosions and dirty bomb testing. This subject is regulated by some provisions of Ecology Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan [16] and Sanitary rules on Radiation safety [12], but these provisions are not considered sufficient by CAESC as to support effective regulation and decision-making.
26], operating organizations and licensees define facility-level design-basis threats and establish and maintain physical protection systems for facilities and materials. Thus, the physical protection regime is maintained at a facility level. In order to meet the demand for highly skilled experts in physical protection, a state system of professional training, retraining and skill improvement for experts on physical protection, accounting for and control of nuclear materials was established.
2.7.2 CAESC Functions and Tasks in SPPS
The CAESC is the competent body within the SPPS as granted by legislation. As such, CAESC:
participates in developing state policy in the field of physical protection and develops a mechanism for its implementation
inspects activities of system entities when they perform system tasks, including activities to form and ensure functioning of the unified system of secure communication
participates in the functioning of the state system for professional training, retraining and skill improvement
participates in assessing the threat of sabotage, theft or any other illegal seizure of radioactive materials, as well as in defining the design-basis threat
arranges scientific and technical studies in the area of physical protection
coordinates activities of entities on improving the level of security culture and participates in ensuring security of facilities
establishes requirements for quality management systems of physical protection of facilities
receives information from relevant government agencies on threats to facilities and informs licensees of such threats
develops and approves standards and rules on physical protection of facilities, makes proposals on physical protection legislation to the government and agrees regulatory documents on physical protection, from ministries and other central executive bodies
develops conclusions on the state of physical protection in case of export/import and transit of radioactive materials through the territory of Kazakhstan
establishes the minimum allowable operational characteristics for physical protection systems of facilities, and permissible risk of sabotage against facilities depending on their categories and possible radiation consequences of sabotage
licenses activities on ensuring physical protection and participates in licensing activities in the field of atomic energy use
performs state reviews of the projects for establishment, reconstruction and technical re-equipment of physical protection systems of facilities including systems for transport of radioactive materials
performs state oversight of compliance with the requirements of the legislation on physical protection systems and fulfilling licensing conditions
conducts state inspection of physical protection systems of facilities and plans of interaction in case of sabotage and takes enforcement measures against licensees in case of incompliance with the requirements of the legislation on physical protection and licensing conditions
cooperates with the IAEA, other international organizations and relevant bodies of foreign states in the field of physical protection and informs relevant state authorities on the state of providing physical protection of facilities and
is a participant of the state plan on the interaction of central and local executive authorities in the event of sabotage.
2.7.3 CAESC Activities within SPPS
According to the Law on Permits and Notifications [7], it is mandatory for activities relating to the physical protection of nuclear installations and nuclear materials to be licensed by CAESC. During the licensing procedure, CAESC reviews and analyzes information presented by the operating organizations on the state and efficiency of physical protection systems of their facilities. The physical protection systems (PPS) of nuclear facilities and nuclear materials have recently been upgraded in accordance with established procedures under projects approved by the CAESC. PPS projects for new facilities are developed before their construction. All projects for establishment, upgrade or reconstruction of PPS are subject to state review of nuclear and radiation safety and physical protection. Review is performed by the CAESC and involves other members of the SPPS. The state supervision of compliance with physical protection requirements is implemented according to the Provision of the "Committee of Atomic and Energy Supervision and Control of the Ministry of Energy of the Republic of Kazakhstan" [32] and regulations on physical protection [25, 26]. CAESC conducts both scheduled inspections envisaged in annual plans and unscheduled inspections.
CAESC, as the central executive State body in the field of atomic energy use, has organized and conducted IAEA events on physical protection in Kazakhstan, including two international physical
protection advisory service missions in 2004 and 2006. During 2012 – 2017, CAESC conducted work of the Kazakhstan interdepartmental commission and IAEA experts on upgrading of the nuclear security system of the International LEU Bank in Ust-Kamanogorsk city in Eastern Kazakhstan. The building of the LEU Bank with a modern PPS was opened in Kazakhstan on August 29, 2017.
The CAESC has also organized international and national training on physical protection for staff and personnel of nuclear installations and organizations involved in activity on physical protection and, in May 2017, the Nuclear Safety Training Center, based at the RSE INP, was opened. The main directions of training in the center are:
1. Physical protection of nuclear materials and nuclear facilities 2. Accounting and control of nuclear materials
3. Combating illicit trafficking in nuclear materials 4. Radiation safety and radiation monitoring 5. Information security.
The center has specially equipped rooms for conducting lectures and practical exercises. In the course of training, an educational transport checkpoint, a landfill installed with equipment used at real facilities, full-scale simulators, and the various models and presentation stands installed in physical protection and nuclear materials accounting and control class are used. The training programs are intended to be representatives of nuclear facilities, government agencies, border and customs services, ensuring the implementation of the non-proliferation regime and countering the illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials. This is the only specialized training center for such specialists in Kazakhstan.