The team drew on a range of existing literature and reviews when establishing the methodology and the analytical framework for this evaluation, including development of interview forms, field methodology and in the final analysis of findings.
In our approach to the first question we were asked to address – to what extent the incentives offered by IRRINI influenced Iraqis’ decision to return – we drew on a wealth of recent literature probing motivations for voluntary return. Of particular relevance is the 2004 British Home Office report (Black et al. 2004) titled “Understanding Voluntary Return.” The evaluation of a similar return programme to Afghanistan (IRRANA – Information, Return and Reintegration of Afghani Nationals to Afghanistan) (Strand et al. 2008) was also helpful in defining our analytic framework.
The Black report, evaluating a number of Assisted Voluntary Return Schemes in the UK, suggests three key factors affecting refugees’ propensity for return: 1) structural conditions in the host country and country of origin, disaggregated into political, social and economic factors; 2) family and individual circumstances; and 3) policy incentives to return. The report attributes some primacy to conditions in country of origin, and indicates a certain level of scepticism towards the extent to which policy interventions can facilitate voluntary return in the absence of such conditions improving. It also stresses that some migrants may need to make special considerations, e.g. to childcare, and have special goals, e.g. accumulating capital or taking a higher education.
There is rarely a single determinant of return but rather a complex of issues that all seem relevant, to various degrees, to the decision to return or not. The study did not find particular trends related to age and gender, but noted a certain fear among female returnees of gender-based persecution.
Findings from the evaluation of the IRRANA voluntary return and reintegration programme to Afghanistan suggest that many Afghan returnees did not find information about the return programme relevant at the time when it was given (Strand et al. 2008). Brekke (2008) has reached a similar conclusion in more general terms, in his evaluation of the cooperation between UDI and the Norwegian Refugee Council on disseminating information about return and repatriation (INCOR).
This brings us to the second question that the UDI poses for the evaluation: how does the programme – both as a whole and in each of its constitutive parts – contribute to sustained return and reintegration in the country of origin?
There is no set definition of sustainable return. The Home Office Report (Black et. al 2004:38) explores proxies for physical sustainability of return (whether or not returnees expressed a firm intention to re-emigrate), as well as for socio-economic and political sustainability (for instance, whether returnees had found a job and whether they expressed security concerns). Evolving standards emphasize the importance of safety, including physical, legal and material security (UNHCR 2004). A lasting return from conflict-generated migration rests on structures and mechanisms that can act as confidence-building measures and promote co-existence in the country of origin.
The abovementioned Home Office report distinguishes between “individual” and “aggregate”
sustainability. Return migration is seen as sustainable for individuals if returnees’ socioeconomic status and fear of violence or persecution is no worse, relative to the population in the place of origin, one year after their return. In contrast, aggregate sustainability implies that return migration may be sustainable for the home country or region if socioeconomic conditions and levels of violence and persecution are not significantly worsened by return, as measured one year after the return process is complete.2
2 For a further discussion of these definitions, see Black & Gent (2006).
In both these cases, the desire to re-emigrate is perhaps a useful proxy indicator for whether a return process has been sustainable. The report furthermore distinguishes subjective and
objective perspectives, and discusses measurement in relation to physical location, socio-economic conditions or political-security circumstances (see table 1). Based on experiences from the IRRANA evaluation, the degree of reintegration into family networks and support from family networks may be another indicator.
Table 1: Elements and potential measures of the sustainability of return (Black et al 2004)
Physical Socio-economic Political-security
Subjective
Drawing further on the IRRANA study, our working hypothesis at the outset was that given continued security improvements the return to Iraq would be more sustainable than the one to Afghanistan. The security situation in Iraq, with the exception of Baghdad and some other areas, is thought to be better than the one in large parts of Afghanistan. Economic development is more promising and offers more opportunity for entrepreneurship and income-generating activities. The IRRINI project also puts greater emphasis on entrepreneurial activities. Another assumption from our side was that returnees to Iraq are expected to have higher education than those who returned to Afghanistan, facilitating, among other things, procurement of employment and reintegration. Finally, we expected less negative attitudes among Iraqis in Norway towards voluntary return than what was the case for Afghans considering returning, potentially facilitating information work in Norway and encouraging potential returnees to accept the offer.
2.1 Cash v. In-kind: Available knowledge
It is somewhat surprising that we know so little about the respective effects of cash-grants and in-kind assistance on the sustainability of return, given that VARRPs are increasingly popular among European host states, and often considered as an alternative to forced return. Whereas much attention has hitherto been paid to the pre-return components of VARRPs (such as information dissemination, country of origin information and counselling) and the transportation phase, the European Migration Network reports that several European states are now shifting their focus towards the post-return reintegration phase.3 Hopefully, this implies an increased attentiveness to the need for careful monitoring of these programmes, as there is a dearth of evidence on the reintegration outcomes of VARRP beneficiaries – a knowledge gap that was already identified in 2004 but still persists today.4
3 European Migration Network (2011). ”Programmes and Strategies in the EU Member States Fostering Assisted Return to and Reintegration in Third Countries”. Synthesis Report.
Pending rigorous comparative research on cash grants and in-kind assistance, there are still some observations to be derived from the literature. It is for instance relevant that an internal IOM
4 See for instance IOM (2004). “Compilation of Best Practice in Return Management in Selected EU Countries and Romania.
“ Vienna: IOM; Thiel, Darren and Gillan, Kirsten (2010). ”Factors Affecting Participation in Assisted Voluntary Return Programmes and Successful Reintegration: A Review of the Evidence.” Home Office Research Report No. 29; Statskontoret (2010). ”Uppföljning av Återetableringssödet”; and Council of Europe (2010). ”Voluntary Return Programmes: An Effective, Human and Cost Effective Mechanism for Returning Irregular Migrants”. Parliamentary Assembly. Doc. 12277.
Committee on Migration, Refugees and Population.
evaluation of return to Iraqi Kurdistan from the UK found that ”(...) many returnees remarked that the most valuable component of the IOM assistance was the £500 fund allocation at the beginning of the assistance package.” 5
A challenge facing the return and reintegration programmes for Iraqi nationals are the general return and reintegration programmes implemented in most countries, for which Iraqis are eligible, and which provide different types of assistance, mainly cash assistance. This can be viewed as an obstacle as many countries with options for Iraqi returnees to choose return under a general programme with cash assistance or return under a specific programme for Iraq with in kind assistance, saw their Iraqi returnees numbers’ [sic] grow, but merely under the general return programmes.
Another IOM paper finds that in a cross-country analysis of different VARRPs to Iraq, Iraqis who are free to choose to receive reintegration assistance as a cash grant prefers this to the alternative in-kind reintegration assistance (authors’ emphasis):
6
Whether this should in fact be regarded as a challenge or not depends on whether one believes that in-kind assistance better contributes to the sustainability of return than cash-based assistance, or whether one believes more in demand-driven reintegration assistance. In the field of humanitarian assistance, however, has there been a growing interest in recent years in cash grants as a humanitarian assistance and social protection tool, complementing or even replacing in-kind assistance.7 Haver et al. (2009) notes that positive experiences from repatriation operations ”would suggest that cash grants have earned their place as a standard instrument in the tool box for UNHCR-assisted voluntary repatriation operations.”8 While not uncontroversial, cash-based interventions are according to Troger and Trennant (2008) likely to become an increasingly important component of the humanitarian response portfolio.9 According to these authors, one key question will go a long way in determining whether a cash-based intervention is appropriate: can people buy what they need in local markets?10 This concern is also noted in a recent mapping study on the use of cash transfers commissioned by the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad), though one of their key lessons identified is that “cash-based mechanisms are a credible and preferred alternative to in-kind assistance.”11
The study by Norad takes into account the use of cash support in humanitarian emergencies, recovery situations, protracted emergencies and development situation, and for return and integration programmes. There are three results achieved with cash transfer that the study highlights that appear to be of particular relevance for the IRRINI study (Norad, p.12):
• Beneficiaries are highly receptive to the cash-instruments, where goods are available.
The preference is systematically verified through evaluation. There is strong evidence that cash is directed to meeting basic needs, and is not more prone to misuse or anti-social use than other forms of assistance. Cash allows people to diversify their income sources and
consumption. It provides greater flexibility to beneficiaries, based on need and conditions, than in-kind assistance. Literature also finds an increase in dignity comes with increased
5 IOM Iraq (2010). ”Internal Evaluation of Returnees from the UK to Kurdistan Regional Government: Movement and Assisted Migration (MAM) Report.” p. 9.
6 Zadel, Esther Van; Kakushadze, Anna & Tongeren, Bart Van (2010). ”Assisted Voluntary Return & Reintegration of Iraqi Nationals from Selected European Countries”. Hague: IOM. p. 25.
7 Haver, Katherine; Hatungimana, Felicien & Tennant, Vicky (2009). “Money Matters: An Evaluation of the Use of Cash Grants in UNHCR’s Voluntary Repatriation And Reintegration Programme in Burundi”. UNHCR Policy Development and Evaluation Service. Geneva: UNHCR.
8 Ibid, p. 43.
9 Troger, Franziska & Trennant, Vicky (2008). ”The Use of Cash Grants in UNHCR Voluntary Repatriation Operations.
Report of a ’Lessons Learned’ Workshop”. UNHCR Policy Development and Evaluation Service And Division of Operational Services. Geneva: UNHCR. p. 2.
10 Ibid, p. 2.
11 Norad (2011) ”We Accept Cash: Mapping Study on the Use of Cash Transfers in Humanitarian, Recovery and Transitional Response”. Oslo, Norad Report 10/2011 Discussion
choices and control over resources, which has had a positive impact on long term development prospects.
• Evaluations indicate that the cash-based approach has been effective in targeting vulnerable groups. The approach can also have a broader impact reducing vulnerability.
Examples given in the evaluation literature include building up household asset, using cash to pay down debt to increase credit worthiness later, providing access to banks and financial services for the first time, and generally allowing vulnerable groups to participate in what the literature describes as ”monetary society”.
• Cash can be more cost-effective than in-kind assistance. Several studies have documented whether a cash approach is more cost-effective than commodity-based alternatives.
Assessment is complicated by the many variables, and brings in elements of barter cost, the quality and origin of products (internationally procured vs. locally produced), and effect on local markets, among others.
Evidence on cost-efficiency and cost – effectiveness is context specific. There is no evidence that cash is always more efficient than in- kind assistance or vice versa. Focus should be in cost-effectiveness though, since one transfer might be more efficient but less effective and, therefore, delivering less benefit. Regardless, the overall conclusion is that, with the right enabling conditions, a cash-approach is more cost-effective than in-kind.
Three additional results found in the literature (ibid. p.13) is that 1) cash transfer can allow programmes to kick off a lot quicker than traditional in-kind delivery; 2) that it can be combined with saving and loans mechanisms, to expand access to capital; and 3) that it can enable the entire community of beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries’ need to be addressed in the pre-implementation phase, so that they are in possession of adequate information.
The main finding is that there is little evidence that (ibid. p.17):” systematically, the use of cash creates inequality, that resources have been diverted by male households members for non-priority or
’anti-social’ use, or that cash-based mechanisms have contributed to increased domestic tension or violence. Rather the evidence indicates that cash has mainly been spent according to intentions, by men and women, and perceived risks have not materialised”.
Altogether, the initial findings on the use of cash support are positive and do seem applicable for a reintegration programme as IRRINI.