The Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood

the Palestinian Brotherhood. In general, the Egyptian regime enforced a harsh and strict rule of the Gaza Strip; in particular, following the ousting of the Egyptian King Farouk in 1952 by the Free Officers Movement, political activities in Gaza were brutally suppressed (Milton-Edwards 1996, 49; Shadid 1988, 660).¹⁷¹

The persecution of the Brotherhood by the Egyptian regime seriously and negatively affected the operational capabilities of the Gaza branch; whereas the Brotherhood operated an estimated eleven branches throughout the Gaza Strip with some 1 000 active members prior to the clampdown in 1952, the severity of the suppression essentially forced the Brotherhood underground (Milton-Edwards 1996, 48). The incipient organizational structure developed in the late 1940s was obliterated in the next decade and a half, and by the time the Six-Day War broke out in 1967, the Brotherhood had no impact on politics in Gaza, operating only a clandestine network of independent but largely defunct cells (Milton-Edwards 1996, 55).

Despite this sorry state of affairs, the Brotherhood in Gaza survived the ordeal of Egyptian rule. And by outlawing the Brotherhood, Egypt inadvertently provided “its activists in the Gaza Strip experience in building decentralized and clandestine organizations” (Robinson 2004, 120). As will be demonstrated in the coming chapters, this experience where the Gaza branch ran a clandestine network of operative cells under persecution later proved invaluable for the survival of Hamas.

On the Jordanian-ruled West Bank, the situation was rather more relaxed (Shadid 1988, 661).¹⁷² From the nakba onward, the West Bank branches of the Brotherhood became closely aligned with the Jordanian Brotherhood.¹⁷³ Crucially, the Jordanian Brotherhood had pledged allegiance to the monarchy, and did not constitute a subservient force such as in Egypt.¹⁷⁴ Rather, as Islam “served as one of the building blocks of regime legitimacy and of nation-building” in Jordan, the Brotherhood there was given ample room for political mobilization (Bar 1998, 5). Because it enjoyed a rather amicable relationship with the King,¹⁷⁵ 171 See Milton-Edwards (1996, 49–55) for details of the Egyptian rule of Gaza and the consequences for the

Muslim Brotherhood there.

172 Consult Milton-Edwards (1996, 55–64) for an account of Palestinian Islamist politics on the West Bank under Jordanian rule.

173 This claim—often found in the literature on the Muslim Brotherhood—was supported by Sheikh Hassan Yousef, a former Brother and current Hamas leader on the West Bank, when he was interviewed during one of his short hiatuses from Israeli prison, October 16, 2011, in Ramallah.

174 As summed up by Burgat, the “Hashemite kingdom of Jordan relied upon the support of members of the very Muslim Brotherhood organisation that Egypt imprisoned in their thousands” (2003, 51).

175 See Boulby (1999) for a history of the Muslim Brotherhood and its relationship with the various kings of Jordan.

the Brotherhood in Jordan was one of the few parties not outlawed on the West Bank (A.

Cohen 1982, 146). And as part of a legal party, the Brotherhood branches on the West Bank participated in multiple elections while under Jordanian rule.¹⁷⁶

While the organizational structure of the Jordanian Brotherhood was partly inspired by the Egyptian Brotherhood, it developed according to the localized needs and possibilities in Jordan. And unlike in Egypt and on the Gaza Strip, there was no need for the Brotherhood in Jordan to rely on small and secret cells as the basic organizational unit. Rather, the basic unit was the local branch, just as had been the case in Egypt until the Brotherhood there had been outlawed and forced underground (Bar 1998, 15).¹⁷⁷

These divergent experiences of the Gaza and West Bank branches of the Muslim Brotherhood help explain their different ideological outlooks and political priorities later on.¹⁷⁸ Whereas the Gaza branch barely survived as a clandestine movement during the two decades of Egyptian rule, the Jordanian branch was allowed to operate legally,¹⁷⁹ gained crucial electoral experience, and expanded its organization.

The Israeli occupation (1967–1987)

The Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip following the Six-Day War in 1967 fundamentally altered the political, economic, social, and cultural nature of Palestinian society (Milton-Edwards 1996, 79).¹⁸⁰ Simultaneously, the years following the Arab defeat saw the ascendance of the Palestinian secular nationalist movement, most saliently indicated by the rise of Fatah and its control of the PLO. Combined, the Israeli occupation and the dominance of the PLO weakened the Palestinian Brotherhood, prompting Milton-Edwards to conclude that in the first decade after the Six-Day War, it “played almost no role in politics in the West 176 First in 1956, when they became the largest faction in parliament (Bar 1998, 26), next in 1961 (Bar 1998,

29), then in 1962 (A. Cohen 1982, 147), and finally in early 1967 (Bar 1998, 30).

177 Operating legally, the Brotherhood in Jordan and on the West Bank expanded rather than contracted in the years between 1948 and 1967. According to Bar, by 1955 there were “approximately 6,000 members in at least 19 branches in Jordan; on the East Bank, in Amman, Irbid, Salt, Zarqa, Jarash, Karak, and the refugee camps of Karama and Jabal Hussein, and on the West Bank, in Jerusalem, Hebron, Nablus, Jenin, Tulkarem, and the refugee camps in Jericho” (1998, 15–16).

178 See discussions of factionalism within Hamas in later chapters, in particular the section Decision-making in chapter 4, pp. 133ff., and the sections The dominance of the Bureau and the Brigades—electoral boycott and violence on pp. 173ff., and Gaza obtains factional dominance—renewed moderation on pp. 177ff., both in chapter 5.

179 It should be noted, however, that while the Brotherhood was allowed to operate rather freely in Jordan, the regime discriminated against the Palestinians on the West Bank. Although the two Brotherhood branches had merged completely, the King remained reluctant to give the Palestinians the same free reins as were granted to the Jordanians (Bar 1998, 16).

180 See section From occupation to the intifada (1967–1987) pp. 86ff.

Bank and Gaza Strip” (1996, 79).¹⁸¹

In Gaza, the Brotherhood was almost nonexistent following two decades of Egyptian persecution. In addition, the Israeli occupation meant that whatever clandestine links the Brotherhood there had to its Egyptian counterpart were severed, further weakening whatever organizational presence it had (Milton-Edwards 1996, 91–92). Yet its weakness turned out to be a blessing in disguise; whereas the Israeli occupation spent a lot of resources attempting to pacify the different nationalist resistance movements, it largely ignored the Brotherhood. In the words of Filiu, “[a]s the nationalist forces were bled dry, Shaykh Yasin was patiently constructing … a whole network of interlocking activities subsumed under the name Al-Mujamma’ al-Islami” (2012, 63).¹⁸²

On the West Bank, the Palestinian Brotherhood branches faced a dual challenge in the wake of the Israeli occupation. For one, and as in Gaza, their ties with the Jordanian Brotherhood were disrupted (Shadid 1988, 664–65),¹⁸³ forcing many of the already struggling local branches to close down. Second, and in contrast to their Gaza brethren, those on the West Bank proved incapable or unwilling to continue their religious and social work, instead winding down their activities and allowing the ascending Palestinian nationalist movement to take on an increasingly important political and social role (Milton-Edwards 1996, 89–90). In sum, the two Palestinian Brotherhood branches had negligible political impact and played only a marginal role as a religious and social movement in the occupied territories during the first decade of the Israeli occupation (Milton-Edwards 1996, 102; Shadid 1988, 662).

In the latter part of the 1970s, however, the Brotherhood in Gaza came to play an increasingly important role. Although it kept out of the political game, it experienced an increased social influence and popularity in the years following the establishment of the Islamic Center in Gaza in 1973. Under the auspices of Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, the Brotherhood in Gaza developed an extensive network of health and medical facilities, sports clubs, kindergartens, and schools (Abu-Amr 1993, 6–8). Through its highly successful welfare work, the Brotherhood gained followers and supporters, in particular in Gaza (Shadid 1988, 663).

181 Or as Shadid observed, “[d]uring the first ten years of occupation the Muslim Brotherhood [on the West Bank and in Gaza] maintained a low profile” (1988, 662).

182 Roughly translating to “Islamic Center” and known locally only as the Mujamma, this religio-social center is considered the forerunner to Hamas.

183 For analyses of Palestinian politics on the East and West Bank of River Jordan following the Israeli occupation, see Jamal (2005, 55–102).

Added to this, Islam became increasingly popular and politicized throughout the 1980s. Often seen as part of a larger regional trend beginning with the Iranian revolution in 1979 (Aburaiya 2009; Hroub 2010, 170),¹⁸⁴ indicators of this rise of Islam in the occupied territories are found in the available polling data, election results to the student councils at Palestinian universities, and in the number of mosques built in the occupied territories. With regard to the latter, the number of mosques in the West Bank nearly doubled in the decades from 1967 to 1987, from 400 to 750. In the same period, the number of mosques in Gaza tripled, from 200 to 600 (Abu-Amr 1994a, 15–16).

In terms of public opinion, three polls were carried out in the occupied territories (in 1982, 1984, and 1986). Although all indicated that there was no real challenge—religious or otherwise—to the secular nationalism pursued by Fatah and the PLO,¹⁸⁵ the results from the polls also suggested that religion was making inroads into Palestinian politics throughout the 1980s, and could come to produce a “cleavage within Palestinian society … between those advocating secularism and those who advocate religious alternatives” (Shadid and Seltzer 1988a, 24). For one, the 1982 poll found that 35 percent of respondents indeed preferred an Islamic Palestinian state to a secular-democratic one (Smith 1982).¹⁸⁶ And while the results between the polls are not directly comparable because of differences in sampling and questionnaires, 56 percent of respondents in the 1986 poll supported either a Palestinian state governed according to Islamic Law (26 percent) or a state based on Arab nationalism and Islam (30 percent) (Shadid and Seltzer 1988a, 24).

Another trend indicating that Islam was becoming increasingly popular and politicized throughout the 1980s is found in the election results to the student councils at Palestinian universities. For while Fatah and various other secular PLO factions fared well in elections in the West Bank universities, by and large winning majorities and the most powerful positions, the Islamist blocs consistently obtained around one third of the votes (Robinson 1997, 19–

184 Note, however, that a number of scholars have labored to nuance this picture, arguing that to conflate the rise of Islamic revivalism in the occupied territories with the regional trend is an insufficient explanation.

See e.g., Lybarger (2007, 8–9), who points out that the Palestinian case differs because the occupation is still on-going, and Milton-Edwards (1996, 8–9), who lists a number of additional factors, for example the failure of the secular PLO and interference by Israel.

185 In the 1982 poll, 56 percent of West Bank respondents stated that they “wanted a ‘secular-democratic’

Palestinian state,” thus underlining the strong position of Fatah’s secular-nationalist project (Smith 1982).

186 That the poll was carried out on the West Bank makes these findings particularly interesting, as it is documented that Palestinians on the Gaza Strip are more religious than those residing on the West Bank (Shadid 1988, 681; Shadid and Seltzer 1989, 295).

27).¹⁸⁷ Combined, these election results from the universities and the available polling data indicate that the hegemonic position of Fatah and its secular-nationalist project came increasingly at odds with large parts of the Palestinian grass roots throughout the 1980s.¹⁸⁸ Shadid and Seltzer thus cautioned that if Fatah failed to “produce tangible [political] results”

one could expect their support to be transferred to the Islamic movement, which in turn

“undoubtedly would shift its strategy to armed struggle and violent confrontation with Israel”

(1989, 297–98).¹⁸⁹ And as will be demonstrated in the next chapter, Shadid and Seltzer’s prediction proved correct in late 1987, when Sheikh Ahmed Yassin and other Brothers from Gaza decided to establish Hamas as the armed and political wing of the Muslim Brotherhood.

To summarize, the organizational and ideological legacy of Hamas goes back to the Society of the Muslim Brothers founded in Egypt in the late 1920s. While the two Palestinian Brotherhood branches for some time operated under disparate conditions, the anti-colonial and Islamist ideology remained largely intact, as did the preferred bottom-up modus operandi

—even if both were adjusted to better suit the local conditions in Palestine. Also, the organizational learning experience, first from the Egyptian Brotherhood and later from divergent conditions on the West Bank and Gaza Strip, has influenced the way in which Hamas later came to be organized. As will become clear, Hamas adopted the Brotherhood’s hierarchical, federated, and stratified structure, as well as its consultative decision-making procedures, recruitment requirements and membership indoctrination, and routines for advancement.

187 The exceptions to this trend are the Islamic University in Gaza where the Islamists won the majority (Filiu 2012, 65), and the Christian Bethlehem University where the Islamists naturally fared quite badly (Robinson 1997, 26).

188 As Shamir and Shikaki point out, these results “probably do not mirror the actual factional balance of power in public opinion, since they are too small and too particular to reflect the mood and interests of the general public” (2010, 132).

189 An important strategic dimension relates to the discussion on whether the Palestinians supported a two-state solution or still wanted to liberate the whole of Palestine. Also here, the gap between the strategy pursued by Fatah and the opinions in the Palestinian population widened following the PLO’s 1974 decision to accept a two-state solution as an interim step toward complete liberation of Palestine.