Hamas’s level of institutionalization at the end of the 1990s Based on the findings from the above analyses and supplemented by data gleaned from the

5.4 Hamas’s level of institutionalization at the end of the 1990s

indicative of systemness. For, even if the powerful position and crucial role played by of the Political Bureau was in breach of the formal structure, it suggests routinization of the informal structure. In short, although the state of Hamas’s formal structure deteriorated somewhat throughout the Oslo era, all of what it lost in terms of systemness was compensated for by the routinization of its informal structure and behavior. Hamas’s level of systemness is therefore considered to have increased to a medium level by the end of the 1990s.

5.4.2 Decisional autonomy

The degree of decisional autonomy can be measured by examining whether the organization in question depends on external sponsors to such an extent that it would forgo its own interests to the benefit of one or more of its benefactors. For Hamas, two main groups of external actors are expected to have had the possibility to influence its decision-making, namely the network of auxiliary religious welfare institutions, and its international sponsors, such as Iran and the Jordanian Brotherhood.

With regard to the former, it should be noted that while Hamas apparently relied on the services provided by the Islamic charitable organizations to increase its popular support throughout the Oslo years, the ties between Hamas and these organizations were never formalized. Although some overlap in personnel have been documented, e.g., with board members from certain Islamic charities also serving as leaders in Hamas (Gunning 2008, 115), there were no indications that these organizations had any effect on decision-making in Hamas (Roy 2011, 141–42).³¹⁹

The various international donors had a somewhat similar relationship with Hamas, i.e., one of ideological affinity and overlapping strategic and tactical interests, but without obvious signs of interference. Hamas certainly capitalized on its ties to the Jordanian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, as it for long enabled the Political Bureau residing in Amman to procure weapons and transport these to the West Bank (Tamimi 2007, 73–74). However, and as discussed in chapter 4,³²⁰ the Brotherhood itself relied on the acceptance of the Jordanian regime to operate freely. This chain of delicate relations led Hamas to carefully consider the consequences of its decisions for the Jordanian Brotherhood, limiting its decisional autonomy.

Other international sponsors include Iran and various Gulf states. These traditionally 319 Nor, for that matter, were there any indications that Hamas exercised any undue influence on the decision-making in these organizations. See S. Roy (2011) for a thorough and comprehensive analysis of the relationship between Hamas and Islami charitable organizations.

320 See section 4.4.2 on page 140.

supported the PLO, but after Yasser Arafat sided with Saddam Hussein in the First Gulf War, support for the Palestinian cause was channeled to Hamas instead (Roy 2011, 138). There was nothing to indicate that this financial and political support came with any strings attached apart from Hamas’s persistent resistance to the Israeli occupation—something Hamas was set on doing regardless.

It is concluded that Hamas had a medium level of decisional autonomy throughout the Oslo years. While Hamas was relatively free to determine its own policies and strategies, its close ties to the Jordanian Brotherhood made it sensitive to the priorities of the Jordanian regime, thus limiting its level of decisional autonomy.

5.4.3 Value infusion

Two interrelated factors suggest that Hamas only to a limited degree had become infused with value by the end of the Oslo era. For one, both its old and new members remained committed to the goals of Hamas, seeing it as a vehicle to resist Israel and Islamize occupied Palestine.

For example, and as discussed, Hamas experienced an influx of new recruits throughout the Oslo years,³²¹ who, by and large, joined Hamas to resist the occupation (Robinson 1997, 170–

71). As such, their motivation to join can be said to have been instrumental, thus strongly suggesting that they saw membership in Hamas as a way to resist the occupation, and not a goal in itself.³²²

Second, a number of those in the rank-and-file who disagreed with the strategies and tactics Hamas adopted to achieve its goals defected. Mainly, such defections were in protest of the use of suicide operations as a tactic from 1994 and onward.³²³ As the degree to which the rank-and-file remain loyal and disciplined when the leadership alters or replaces ideological elements and adopts new and controversial strategies is a good litmus test of value infusion, the above is taken to indicate that Hamas had not become infused with value by the end of the Oslo years.³²⁴

321 See section A new composition: persecution, recruitment, and defection on pp. 171ff.

322 As mentioned, not all those who joined necessarily agreed with Hamas’s Islamist project. However, this just further underlines the instrumental nature of their motivation to join, thus strengthening the argument that Hamas was not infused with value.

323 For example, after Hamas retaliated to the assassination of its bomb-maker Yahya Ayyash in 1996 with a string of suicide operations inside Israel, one of its co-founders on the West Bank, Sheikh Jamil Hamami, left the organization in protest (Caridi 2010, 123).

324 This point should not be overstated, however, as most Hamas members remained loyal and did not opt for the exit strategy.

In sum, the instrumental motivation of Hamas’s new recruits, and the defections of some of its old members, are both taken to indicate that the organization was still seen a means toward an end, and not an end in itself, and thus was still infused with value only to a low degree.

5.4.4 Reification

As most relevant indicators point in the positive direction, Hamas’s level of reification at the end of the Oslo years is considered to be high. For one, Hamas was the second most popular faction in occupied Palestine throughout the period in question.³²⁵ This is taken to indicate that Hamas was highly reified in the public imagination. Second, and despite the fact that support for Hamas declined, it arguably managed to monopolize the identity as the Islamic alternative in Palestinian politics, thus entrenching its position in the public imagination. And third, given the attention granted to Hamas from both Israel and the PA-PLO-Fatah nexus throughout the 1990s, it seems safe to conclude it was recognized as a force to be reckoned with. In short, Hamas was highly reified at the end of the Oslo years, in the public imagination, among its domestic competitors, and by its enemy.

Summarized, Hamas scored low on value infusion, medium on both systemness and decisional autonomy, and high on reification. Hamas was recognized both by its supporters and by its competitors as a force to be reckoned with, and enjoyed a medium degree of autonomy from its environment. However, it remained underdeveloped organizationally, and had to rely on informal routines and improvisation simply to survive the ordeal of the 1990s.

Furthermore, as its new and old members still saw it as a means toward an end, it is argued that Hamas was only infused with value to a low degree. Overall, it is concluded that Hamas had reached a medium level of institutionalization at the end of the Oslo years.

325 See Figure 5: Factional support in the occupied territories, 1994–1999 on page 160.