Hamas after Oslo—still more movement than party

The above sections have detailed the development of Hamas during the Oslo years, indicating that it responded both ideologically and organizationally to the various environmental changes and challenges, but fell short of completing its transmutation from movement to party.

As argued in the preamble to the above analyses of Hamas’s ideological and organizational development throughout the Oslo years,³¹⁷ its dual legacy as a conventional religious social movement and a militant revolutionary movement would influence its transmutation toward a political party in contradictory directions. Following the path of a conventional social movement organization, Hamas could be expected to turn into a mass-based, organizationally broad, electorally oriented, and ideologically flexible party. However, depending on the influence of its militant legacy, Hamas would probably remain ideologically rigid, retain its revolutionary ideology and totalitarian strategy, with a top-down command structure, and an exclusive membership.

As will be further demonstrated in the coming sections, this dual legacy exacerbated the already challenging situation in which Hamas found itself, in essence obstructing its transmutation from movement to party. In short, Hamas remained more of a movement than a party at the end of the Oslo years, although it had also come to share qualities of the latter.

5.3.1 Partial ideological moderation

Ideologically, Hamas entered the period in question still committed to its original goals, pushing a maximalist agenda at the cost of internal legitimacy and domestic popularity. This is taken to indicate that its identity initially remained that of a religious and militant liberation movement, with aims more akin to that of a revolutionary movement than that of the incremental changes associated with political parties.

From around 1996, elements within the Hamas leadership attempted to push the organization in a moderating direction, however, for example by offering Israel a long-term cease-fire, the 317 See section 5.2 Arrested development—Hamas in the new system on pp. 155ff.

hudna, along the 1967 borders. In later communiqués, Hamas even opened for future negotiations with Israel, although without admitting that such negotiations would lead to a final solution to the conflict (Tamimi 2007, 269–70).

Despite such moderating tendencies, Hamas’s militant legacy and ideological rigidity remained dominant, and powerful sections within its leadership stayed committed to its revolutionary goals. In short, Hamas’s dual legacies meant that its ideological development took on a somewhat contradictory quality throughout the Oslo period. On the one hand, it remained committed to its initial goals of establishing an Islamic state throughout all of historic Palestine, by violent means if necessary. But on the other hand, it tried to maneuver in an ever-changing and increasingly hostile political landscape, moderating its rhetoric and adopting pragmatic positions to ensure continued survival.

In sum, it is argued that while Hamas did become more ideologically flexible throughout the Oslo years, its legacy as a militant liberation movement remained too influential for it to fully discard its maximalist and revolutionary outlook. The result was an uneasy combination of ideological rigidity and flexibility. As such, it is concluded that Hamas emerged as an ideologically inconsistent organization at the end of the period in question, qualifying neither as a pure movement nor as a proper political party.

5.3.2 Patchy organizational development

With regard to the development of Hamas’s organizational structure and order throughout the Oslo years, the picture that emerged in the above analyses also points in contradictory directions. At the beginning of the period, Hamas was still very much a militant liberation movement. It kept with its strict requirements and comprehensive indoctrination of new recruits, which provided a disciplined and committed rank-and-file suitable for a militant organization. Combined with Hamas’s federated and stratified structure, these organizational characteristics arguably helped the organization to survive the sustained and intense persecution it suffered at the hands of the PA and Israel. Furthermore, its centripetal advancement procedures ensured a homogeneous leadership, which for a while seemed to be united behind a common message and strategy. Finally, the leadership apparently retained the capability to enforce organizational discipline and issue orders down the command line.

Nevertheless, the increasingly effective persecution of Hamas cadres eventually forced the organization to ease its recruitment procedures to compensate for the shortfall of militants.

And the ensuing influx of new members—many of which were motivated to join solely to fight Israel, not to establish an Islamist state—had negative ramifications for the rank-and-file’s discipline. As a result, and in a short time span, Hamas lost much of its characteristics as a disciplined militant movement. Instead, it developed into a more mass-based, less cohesive movement with a heterogeneous membership base.

Added to this, the federated structure that initially helped Hamas to retain its operational capabilities increasingly turned into a liability toward the end of the 1990s. Despite the homogenizing effect of Hamas’s centripetal advancement procedures, its geographic branches operated under widely different conditions.³¹⁸ This, in turn, explains part of the reason why its various leadership circles disagreed on crucial strategic decisions. Consequently, Hamas suffered a heightened degree of factionalism at its topmost levels, as various leadership branches vied for organizational influence.

This factionalism, in turn, had ramifications for Hamas’s behavior. As argued, Hamas’s decision not to contest the 1996 PLC elections can largely be attributed to the dominant position of the Amman-based Political Bureau and the al-Qassam Brigades, both of which favored boycott over participation. The process leading up to this decision also revealed reduced organizational cohesion; different leaders publicly discussed the pros and cons of participation, openly expressing their differences. While disagreements are to be expected in any political movement, some high-ranking Hamas members not only publicly expressed their discord with the decision to boycott, but even broke line by putting forward their candidacy in the elections. Although these were forced to withdraw their candidacy, such behavior strongly suggests that Hamas no longer had a cohesive and united leadership (Caridi 2010, 120–22).

In sum, it is argued here that Hamas lost much of the organizational characteristics of a militant movement by the end of the 1990s, such as its committed and disciplined rank-and-file and cohesive leadership. However, it did not fully replace its old organizational logic with a new one; rather than transmuting into a mass-based political party, Hamas retained its cell-based organizational structure. Furthermore, Hamas only reluctantly and partly adapted to the new political realities in occupied Palestine. Its militant legacy seemingly remained too influential for Hamas to be able or willing to restructure its organization and take the leap from movement to party.

318 Cf. section The formal structure and intra-party democracy on pp. 167ff.

5.3.3 Still movement, not yet party

To summarize, Hamas seemed rather ill-prepared and ill-equipped to cope with the developments of the 1990s. Although the organization survived intense persecution and a host of environmental challenges, Hamas emerged at the end of the 1990s still more of a movement than a political party. But, given the circumstances, such an arrested development was unsurprising. The immense pressure put on Hamas by both the PA and Israel forced it to prioritize survival over politics. Combined with its dual legacies as a militant movement and a religious movement, such a prioritization prompted Hamas to become reactive rather than proactive with regard to both ideological and organizational development. In short, Hamas struggled to retain its identity as a religiously motivated liberation movement as the Palestinian political system developed toward a logic of party politics.

Although a tendency toward ideological moderation could be detected, the indicators were not conclusive. Despite downplaying its most radical goals and opening up for increased pragmatism, partly in an attempt to increase its public appeal, Hamas simultaneously remained committed to the establishment of an Islamist state in the whole of historic Palestine. Hamas’s unclear ideological commitments were in turn partly explained by its poor organizational state; persecution of its rank-and-file combined with its federated and stratified structure led to intensified factionalism, which in turn undermined its organizational cohesion and decision-making procedures. Such a state of affairs led to public infighting among its various leadership branches. This was especially evident when Hamas decided to boycott the 1996 PLC elections, and in discussions regarding its interim aims, allowing for a temporary solution along the 1967 borders, and the long-term goal of erecting an Islamist state in the whole of historic Palestine.

In conclusion, Hamas did take steps both ideologically and organizationally on its transmutation from movement to party during the Oslo years, but the combined effect of the listed exogenous (various environmental challenges and shocks) and endogenous (its dual legacies) factors account for why it did not complete this process. By boycotting the 1996 PLC elections, and failing both to develop its organization and to unite behind a consistent ideological message, Hamas remained more of a movement than a political party at the end of the 1990s.

5.4 Hamas’s level of institutionalization at the end of the 1990s