The de-development of occupied Palestine

The aforementioned formal and informal institutional problems had negative ramifications for the development in the occupied Palestinian territories. In addition, a number of interrelated political events and processes that took place throughout the 1990s further exacerbated the problems. First, even if the intifada had officially ended, the violence between Palestinian liberation movements and the Israelis continued. Second, the 1996 election in Israel was won by Benjamin Nethanyahu from the right-wing Likud party. And third, the 1990s were marked by the “de-development of Palestine,” i.e., “economic decline, social regression, and political 265 For thorough analyses of the Palestinian security services under Arafat, see Lia (2006a, 2006b).

266 The West Bank inherited laws from Jordan, the Gaza Strip from Egypt, while Emergency Laws from the British Mandate period were in effect in the areas where Israel upheld their occupation (Hilal and Khan 2004, 86). There are also laws regulating the occupied territories both from Israel and the PA, as well as the numerous regimes of customary law still enforced at the local level, including Islamic laws.

267 See also Robinson (1997, 174–88).

repression” (Roy 1999, 64). In sum, these factors undermined the peace process, worked to further de-institutionalize the PA, and produced political, economic, and social conditions in the occupied territories void of any positive developments. Naturally, these developments—or de-developments—posed serious strategic, ideological, and organizational challenges for the institutionalization of Hamas.

Continued violence

One prioritized task of the PA as stipulated in the Oslo agreements was to stop Palestinian militants from perpetrating attacks in Israel (Mustaq Husain Khan 2004, 1; Usher 1995a, 19).

The president of the PA was in essence asked to secure Israel from Palestinian militants. The task was hard to fulfill partly because the Palestinian security services controlled only a limited portion of the Palestinian territories. In addition, providing security for Israel meant persecuting Palestinians who were fighting for the liberation of Palestine. This, of course, was unpopular among many Palestinians, as it essentially meant that it now was the task of Palestinians themselves to imprison those that were fighting for a free Palestine.²⁶⁸ And the task was made even harder as a number of Palestinian liberation movements were intent on continuing the intifada.

For, despite the popularity of the Oslo process in the occupied territories, Hamas and nine other factions banded together in a coalition named the Alliance of Palestinian Forces (APF), determined to subvert the peace process and continue their armed struggle against the occupation (Strindberg 2000).²⁶⁹

During the first half of 1993, in the lead up to the signing of the DOP, Hamas carried out a number of militant operations, attempting to derail the incipient peace process. The attacks included seven shootings, two knife attacks, and the first ever suicide operation carried out by a Palestinian liberation movement (Singh 2011, 1, 55 and note 14 on page 154).²⁷⁰ Following the signing of the DOP, Hamas continued its shooting and stabbing operations, but refrained 268 The developing situation highlighted the fact that the PA was not a state, as it could not effectively

monopolize the means of legitimate violence within the occupied territories.

269 In addition to Hamas the APF was made up of the PFLP, DFLP, PFLP-GC, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Fatah-Uprising, Sa’iqa, Palestinian Revolutionary Communist Party (PRCP), Palestinian Liberation Front (PLF), and the Palestinian Popular Struggle Front. See Strindberg (2000) for an overview of the APF and its members.

270 This first suicide attack was initially believed to have been a regular suicide, as only the perpetrator himself and a Palestinian bystander were killed. But Hamas later claimed responsibility for the operation, which apparently was a collaborative effort with Islamic Jihad. At the time, “suicide attacks were ‘not yet the policy of the movement’” (al-Qassam commander quoted in Milton-Edwards and Farrell 2010, 122).

from suicide attacks. This, it has been argued, allowed Hamas to “project itself as the standard bearer for Palestinian rights” without attracting “too much attention, and thereby public hostility” (Singh 2011, 56). By not carrying out the most spectacular terrorist operations, Hamas managed to retain its position as the most important opposition movement against the PLO-led negotiations, without provoking too harsh reprisals from the PA and Israel.

This uneasy coexistence and relative calm came to an abrupt halt in early 1994. On February 25 of that year, an Israeli settler named Baruch Goldstein entered the Ibrahimi Mosque in Hebron on the West Bank and shot dead 29 unarmed, praying Palestinians and injured some 125 others.²⁷¹ Sparking an outrage of unprecedented proportions in the occupied territories, the so-called Hebron Massacre prompted Hamas to carry out its first effective suicide attack inside Israel, killing eight and injuring 44 Israelis on April 16. Hamas carried out three more suicide operations inside Israel in 1994, killing an additional 27 Israelis and injuring 89 (Singh 2011, 56, 138).²⁷²

Israel put pressure on the PA to crack down on the terrorists, a request the newly formed PA and its leader Arafat had some difficulties complying with, as the Hamas operations proved popular among Palestinians as a response to the atrocity in Hebron (Singh 2011, 57). The PA eventually folded under pressure, however,²⁷³ first in August of 1994 when it imprisoned some 20 Hamas activists (Usher 1995a, 68–9), and later, in October, when Palestinian security forces rounded up and arrested some 400 Hamas activists in the Gaza Strip (Kristianasen 1999, 24). But the PA was unwilling or unable to keep the prisoners for long. In effect, the PA was caught between two contradictory interests. On the one hand, it was forced to persecute Palestinians to appease the Israelis so that the peace process could continue. But on the other hand, the PA felt obliged to release these same prisoners so as not to alienate its own constituents. In an attempt to solve this predicament, the PA implemented a “revolving door policy,” first imprisoning Hamas cadres to give Israel the impression that they did something 271 The Ibrahim Mosque in Hebron is situated on top of the Cave of Patriarchs, in which the patriarchs Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, as well as the matriarchs Sarah, Rebecca, and Leah, are buried according to both Jewish and Islamic tradition. Because of this, the mosque is religiously important for Muslims, and second only to the Temple Mount in Jerusalem in the Jewish religion.

272 There are some discrepancies in the literature regarding the number of suicide operations carried out by Hamas in 1994. Kristianasen, for example, arrives at the same number killed (35) but cites a higher number of operations (five) and injured Israelis (“more than 135”) (1999, 23). This is probably due to uncertainties regarding which group carried out which operation.

273 It is difficult to pin down exactly who decided what and when in the PA, but it seems clear that there was infighting between different fractions, with some of the so-called returnees (i.e., Arafat and his compatriots from the external leadership) being opposed by a young guard who had operated from within the occupied territories (see e.g., Jamal 2005 for an in-depth analysis of these dynamics).

to stop the violence, and then releasing the prisoners to appease its constituents after serving only a short stint in jail (Kristianasen 1999, 25).

This policy allowed Hamas to retain its military capability throughout much of the 1990s.²⁷⁴ Consequently, the Israelis soon lost their patience with Arafat and the PA’s apparent inability or unwillingness to halt the operations. Taking matters into their own hands, Israel therefore returned to its tactic of targeted assassinations (Honig 2007), and arrested, imprisoned, and deported hundreds of suspected Hamas activists in the mid-1990s (Tamimi 2007, 194–95). In particular, the reprisals for Hamas’s 1996 bombings were harsh. In themselves a response to the Israeli assassination of Hamas bomb-maker Yahya Ayyash on January 5 1996, the attacks carried out in February and March killed over 46 Israelis and injured 86 (Singh 2011, 139).²⁷⁵ Israel responded by suspending the peace talks, closing down the occupied territories, and forcing the PA to take action. And the action the PA took against Hamas was devastating;

Together with the IDF, the Palestinian security forces in effect dismantled the military wing of Hamas, arresting hundreds of al-Qassam members, many of whom were tortured, some to death.²⁷⁶

Following the crackdown on its military wing, there was a hiatus in the violence for over a year. This was probably due to Hamas losing its capacity to carry out suicide operations, and further because such operations had become increasingly unpopular among Palestinians.

Responsive to popular opinion, Hamas saw no reason to carry out suicide bombings that provoked harsh responses from the Israelis and the PA and alienated the Palestinians. The calm ended, however, when Hamas carried out three suicide operations in 1997, first in late March, followed by another one in July, and a third in September.²⁷⁷

Then another year of calm followed before Hamas again returned to violence, carrying out a suicide operation in October 1998. This operation coincided with the signing of the Wye River Memorandum, an agreement between Israel and the PLO aimed at implementing previous peace Accords. As such, it seems as if the bombing was an attempt to derail the peace process. Failing that, and responding to the declining popularity of suicide operations 274 See Appendix B in Singh (2011, 138–39) for a list of suicide operations carried out by Hamas.

275 Again, figures vary somewhat, with Kristianasen offering that the bombings claimed 58 lives. Interestingly, she also argues that at least some of these bombings were carried out without the blessing of the political leadership of Hamas (1999, 29).

276 See Amnesty International (1998) for details regarding the treatment of prisoners in PA and Israeli prisons.

277 Singh (2011, 59) speculates that the attacks in 1997 were a way for Hamas to gauge the popularity of suicide missions among Palestinians.

among Palestinians, Hamas all but halted its military operations for the remainder of the 1990s (Singh 2011, 60).²⁷⁸

The rise of Likud in Israel

As in the occupied territories, the Oslo Accords also divided public opinion in Israel. The promise of lasting peace was an easy political sell, but there was also strong opposition to the peace process. In brief, the public opinion in Israel was divided into two blocs: those against Oslo, represented by the right and religious parties, and those in favor of Oslo, largely congruent with the left, which had initiated the peace process in the first place (Hermann and Yuchtman-Yaar 2002). The intensity of the conflict between these blocs ebbed and flowed in tandem with the rise and fall in terrorism, and the progress or regress of the peace process.

In late 1995, the anti-Oslo camp was on the rise. They organized huge protests demanding the resignation of the Labor government led by PM Yitzak Rabin and Oslo I signatory and foreign minister Shimon Peres. In the aftermath of one such huge protest against the government, in the evening on November 4 in Tel Aviv, a lone gunman and religious extremist named Yigal Amir managed to get past the bodyguards and kill PM Rabin. The assassination initially led to a backlash against the anti-Oslo protestors, and acting PM Shimon Peres called for early elections in the hopes of gaining renewed confidence in the peace process.

However, the run-up to the May 1996 elections coincided with the string of suicide bombings that Hamas carried out in revenge for the assassination of Yahya Ayyash. As a result, the Israeli anti-Oslo camp again gained in strength. The increased violence was taken as proof of the futility of making peace with the Palestinians (Bloom 2004). Consequently, Shimon Peres’

initially promising lead in the polls diminished dramatically, and in the end he lost the premiership to Benjamin Nethanyahu from the right-wing Likud party (Peretz and Doron 1996).

It is noteworthy that the victory of Nethanyahu took place under quite distinctive electoral rules. The Israeli Basic Law of 1992 introduced a unique electoral system in which the PM was elected directly (Hazan 1996). In the PM elections, Benjamin Nethanyahu won against Shimon Peres by the smallest margin possible; he received just under 30 000 more votes than Peres, less than 1 percent of the votes cast. And in the elections to the Knesset, the Israeli parliament, it was the pro-Oslo Labor party led by Peres that won the plurality, winning 34 278 According to Singh (2011, 60), Hamas only carried out four low-casualty operations from then to

December 2000.

seats against Likud’s 32.²⁷⁹

Regardless of the peculiarities of the electoral system and the narrow margin by which Benjamin Nethanyahu won, his mandate as PM was not disputed (Peretz and Doron 1996).

And although the parliament was rather fragmented,²⁸⁰ he managed to form a majority coalition government with four parties in addition to his own Likud. Although these parties differed in terms of ideology, all were opposed to the peace process to varying degrees. Some opposed only the way in which the agreements with the PLO had been negotiated, but the coalition included parties and parliamentarians opposed to anything from the division of Jerusalem and the removal of the Israeli settlements from the occupied territories (which are illegal according to international law), to those opposed to the establishment of a Palestinian state and the withdrawal of the so-called “outposts” built in the Palestinian territories (which are deemed illegal even by Israeli law) (Peretz and Doron 1996, 545–56).

Himself a staunch opponent of the Oslo Accords, the rise to power of Nethanyahu and his anti-Oslo coalition government proved disastrous for the peace process and the overall conditions in the occupied territories. The positions adopted by the Nethanyahu government and the policies it implemented effectively and efficiently worked to revert any positive developments and undermined the chances for any solution to come about.²⁸¹

De-development

The continued violence and the ascendance of Nethanyahu worked to obstruct the peace process, and thus had indirect implications for conditions in the occupied territories. Both factors, however, also had direct consequences for the situation there. For one, the violence provoked the Israelis to adopt a policy of widespread closure of the territories. And second, Nethanyahu and his right-wing coalition allowed and enabled the settler movement in Israel to intensify the expansion of old and establishment of new illegal settlements. Combined, the closures and the building of settlements led in turn to a de-development of the occupied territories (Roy 1999, 2002).

279 With 120 seats in the Knesset, 61 are needed for a majority. The Labor and Likud parties were by far the largest parties, with the third largest party, the religious Shas party, winning ten seats (Peretz and Doron 1996, 534).

280 Eleven parties were represented in the parliament following the 1996 elections.

281 Note, however, that the policies of the Nethanyahu government vis-à-vis the Palestinians by and large were continued after the left leaning electoral alliance led by Ehud Barak won the 1999 elections.

The Israeli closure policy is divided into three levels of intensity. General closure refers to the restrictions of movement between the West Bank and Gaza, and between the occupied territories and Israel; total closure is the complete prohibition of any movement at all; and internal closure restricts movement within the West Bank (Roy 1999, 69). As a response to real or anticipated attacks from Palestinian liberation movements, the occupied territories were under total closure for almost a third of the period from 1993 to 1996. For most of the remaining time, general or internal closure were in effect (Roy 2002, 13).

The closures obviously had negative consequences for the economic development in the occupied territories—to say nothing of the human costs.²⁸² During the supposed heydays of the Oslo years (1993 to 1996) the World Bank estimated that the closure policy led to a loss in the Palestinian gross national product of between 20 to 70 percent (1999, 51). Employment figures also suffered greatly, as the number of unemployed Palestinians inside the occupied territories increased from around 3 percent in 1992, to almost 30 percent in 1996 (Roy 2002, 13; World Bank 1999, 53).

Israel also expanded its illegal settlements in the occupied territories during Nethanyahu’s rule. Whereas there were 115 000 settlers living throughout the West Bank in 1993, that figure increased to almost 200 000 by the end of 1999. In addition, Israel continued its “Judaization”

program of occupied East Jerusalem, increasing the number of settlers in the Arab quarters of the city by 30 000 people, to a total of 173 000 in 1999 (Roy 2002, 9; Usher 2003, 22).

The expansion of settlements exacerbated the already difficult infrastructure and communication situation on the West Bank. To accommodate the rising settler population, Israel built over 400 km of new roads, reserved for Israeli citizens. Built on confiscated Palestinian land, the roads crisscross around Palestinian villages and further disconnect the different regions of the West Bank. In short, rather than pulling out of the would-be territories of a future Palestinian state as stipulated in the Oslo Accords, the Israelis instead spent the interim years intensifying its confiscation of Palestinian land, making it increasingly difficult to find a solution to the conflict and rendering the everyday life of ordinary Palestinians ever harder.

The continued violence, the election of Benjamin Nethanyahu, and the de-development of the occupied territories all worked to undermined the peace process and led to deteriorating political, economic, and social conditions in the occupied territories. Added to this was the 282 See Human Rights Watch (HRW 1996) for details on the human costs of the closure policy.

lackluster performance of the PA, whose defining characteristics had become administrative mismanagement, political repression, and endemic corruption. Instead of developing and institutionalizing a state-like bureaucracy, the PA was exposed as a mere security and repression tool of Israel (Moussalli 1996, 56; Rabbani 1996, 6). In sum, the overall situation deteriorated dramatically throughout the latter half of the 1990s, and as a result, hope for peace, development, and a sovereign state faded among the Palestinians (Roy 1999, 64, and 2002, 9, 13).