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Index
Anthropologists 3, 18, 19, 28, 29, 35, 38, 62, 94, 95, 99
Artisanal fisheries 35, (defined) 42,
44, 45, 54
Cattle complex 69, 99
Coase theorem 21 the firm 21, 102
transaction costs 4, 9-11, 21, 22,
41, 54, 66, 71, 95, 96 Coercion 3, 14, 66, 71, 96, 103 Commoditization 81, 82
Conservation 3, 28, 31, 39, 45, 54,
67, 71, 72, 81, 89, 98, 102,
and garnes 12, 14, 16 and pastoralism 62, 63, 69
Equity 3, 4, 19, 27, 29, 30, 66, 97,
99, 100 Excludability 5
Extemalties (defined) 16, 17
Formal regulations 31, 49, 53-55, 57
Functionalisrn 25
Garnes 10, (defined) 11, 13,26,50, 99
assuranee problem 11, 14, 15
cooperative garnes 9, 11, 12, 14, 15, 39-41, 47, 50, 57, 97 evolutionary garnes 15, 16, 18,
99
free riding 12, 15, 18
isolation paradox 14, 15
repeated garnes 11, 13, 26, 51
tit-for-tat 13
Goods 6, 43 private goods 6 public goods 6
Gordon, H. Scott 36-39,42, 50, 54, 60, 61, 71, 78, 94, 99
common property theory 19,35, 36, 50, 54, 78, 94
maximum economic yield 36, 61 maximum sustainable yield 36,
harbour gangs 51, 52, 54, 56 territoriality 45,51, 52, 54, 99 Hierarchy 10, 29-31, 66, 97 Historical
-evidence 9, 29, 30, 47, 57 -perspective 31-34,75-76,98
-proeess 83, 86
Indigenous
-labellng 27-28 -people 47-49, 98
-range management 30, 59, 62, 66, 76
Informal regulations 7, 40, 49-51,
53, 54, 57, 94, 99
guest fishing 32, 33, 35, 51, 99
territories 32, 33, 49-52, 91, 97 Innovation 4, 22, 23, 43, 44, 96,
102
Institutions 2-4, 6- 10, (defined) 8, 15, 19-22, 27, 31, 33, 41, 43, 44, 46, 48, 55, 62, 71, 74, 86, 93-96, 100- 1 03
and change 4, 7-9, 19-23, 65,
66, 90, 95, 96, 100
and conservation 72- 7 4, 103
local institutions (defined) 4, 7, 10, 19, 25, 54, 63, 64, 66, 81,
and exchange 20, 21, 35
and integration 4, 7, 44 and rationality 42-44
Nationalization 77, 78, 86, 88, 89, 92
Neoc1assical economics 20-24, 99,
103
Neoinstitutional economics (NEI)
11, 20-23, 65, 66, 95, 96, 103
critique of NEI 9, 22-23
North, D. 8-10, 20-23, 41, 54,
95, 100, 103
Oakerson framework 2, 19, 20 Organizations 8, 41
Overcapitalization 26, 37, 40, 42,
54
Privatization 4, 33, 34, 39, 60, 66-69, 75, 76, 82, 90, 96, 100,
103
enc10sures 28, 29, 67, 68, 73,
92, 100
group ranches 60, 67-69, 74,
101
Property regimes 1-3, (defined) 5,
7, 10, 18-20, 23, 29-37, 55,
63,67,77,83,87,93,94-100,
102-104
co-management 49,54, 101
communal property 18, 28, 29, 32, 48, 54, 83, 99
open-access 5, 7, 19, 37, 46, 78
private property 5,7, 17-20,29,
33, 34, 38, 55, 66, 71, 82, 83,
95, 96, 99
state property 5, 56, 86, 87
Property rights 5,6, 8-11, (defined) 16, 16-18, 28, 29, 33, 34, 38,
property rights theory 21, 67,
100
Rationality 1, 3, 13, 16, 23-27, 42,
52, 103
and asymmetrical externalities 78
and discounting 26, 27 and intentionality 23, 25
and rational choice 21-23, 103 Revisionist approach 10, 18 Sacred groves 86
Sedentarization 65, 70, 71, 76
Small-scale
-communities 10, 98 -fisheries 42
Stinting 12, 71
Stratification 29-31, 97, 100
Subtractability 5
Tragedy of the commons (defined)
1, 12, 18, 23, 30, 42, 54, 60, 70, 71, 76, 80, 92, 93, 99, 103
Hardin, G. 1-3, 5, 10, 19, 33, 94 success of the commons 99
Utilty 3, 23, 24, 43, 94
Value
and discounting 26 and externalties 16
and resource rent 36
and privatization 67, 82 intrinsic 2
use-value 42, 101
. exchange-value 42, 101
net present value (NPV) 36,
78
V oluntaristic 7, 103