When deriving inductive models the goal is as much to explain as to predict (Narud 1996). Laver (1986:42) points to the danger of being too inductively oriented: «Every practical modification made to the theories in the name of realism distances them a little more from that paradigm, with the attendant danger that they become mere rationalisations of choice rather than rational choice theories». The model put forward in this section seeks to explain one feature of coalition formation often left
unexplained, namely the formation of oversized coalitions. It is based more on empirical observations than on deductive reasoning. Even so, some deductively generated models are drawn upon in the following.
Luebbert (1986, in Laver and Schofield 1990:84-87) argues that oversized coalitions are most probably formed in dominated democracies. «A dominated system is one in which party leaders assume that no majority government that excludes a particular party is possible in the foreseeable future.» (Luebbert 1984:247) The dominant party will try to enlarge the size of the coalition by bargaining simultaneously with more than one of the parties with sufficient representatives to secure a majority, to reduce the possibility of being «black-mailed». Luebbert assumes that the only way for a party to influence on policy in a dominated system is to be a part of coalition cabinet (Laver and Schofield 1990:87). This contrasts with theories of minority governments based on viability. Laver and Schofield conclude that it makes little or no difference whether small parties are in or out of office; they are nevertheless equally weak.
As described above, a common view of municipal politics is based on an assumption of consensus. National politics are de-emphasised, as is the exclusive predominance of the left-right dimension. Local political issues divide the municipal politics across national conflict dimensions. Sørensen (1995a:73-74) argues that the alternative policies proposed in a municipal context are often unclear, and not divisive along national conflict dimensions. This is because the profiles of the local parties differ from those of their respective national parties. When decisions are based to a lesser extent on ideological arguments, the politicians may want to increase the legitimacy of these decisions by maximising support from all the parties. A theoretical account corresponding to this one is presented by Groseclose and Snyder (1996), who model the coalition formation process sequentially, argue that «supermajorities» are likely to form. Minimal coalitions should be formed only rarely, because of the apparent danger of their being attacked by the minority, which may reach rapprochement with one of the parties in the coalition. If the coalition is oversized, such rapprochements are more expensive to carry through.
An alternative view pointing in the same direction is inspired by Tsebelis’ «Nested Games» (1990). Local politics can be looked upon as a constant struggle to build issue-based coalitions, in a political milieu where the conflict dimensions on the different issues vary. Although electing the mayor is but the first of these coalitions, it is
nevertheless of major importance, not least symbolically. It indicates a possible pattern of co-operation in the four-year term to come. In the same way, scattering the
important political positions between more parties than strictly necessary to control a majority could help to improve the conditions for co-operation. Hence, for a potential core coalition, maximising the size of the coalition - being it a mayoral or a committee coalition - could be a means of strengthening the basis for building informal voting-coalitions. Combined with a consensus-orientation in general, this might be plausible when the actors are conceived as being rational in the long term.
To sum up the above arguments is not an easy task: they are based on somewhat different assumptions and should be interpreted in more detail than is done here. For instance, not all municipalities are dominated systems, and it is necessary to discuss the content of a suitable definition of what makes a party dominant. Nor am I able to model the process of coalition forming, and certainly not to model it as consisting of sequential steps. That would have been interesting, but demands analyses at deeper levels in each municipality. What these theories do indicate, however, is that a model predicting the formation of oversized municipal coalitions can be inductively
developed, and «tested».
Thus, conceiving local politics as consensus-oriented decisional activity, supported by a view of informal coalitions based on the notion of long-term rationality, leads me to predict that, as a general rule, oversized coalitions will be formed. Based on a common view of Norwegian local politics, the prediction could be stated as a null hypothesis, with minimal, minimal winning and minority coalitions representing deviations from that norm. I prefer not to formulate this prediction as a formal hypothesis, because of
the inductive way it has been generated. Nevertheless, it will be treated equally to the deductively generated hypotheses when I discuss the results found in the empirical data.
4 Methodology and empirical data
In this chapter, I discuss some general aspects related to the generation and testing of hypothesis and theories as carried out in this thesis. I also describe how the empirical data were obtained, the validity of the operationalisations, and the reliability of the observations.