The committees

The organisation of the political life in Norwegian municipalities differs from one to another on a lot of variables (see Johnsen 1996; Gravdahl and Hagen 1997). However, most of the municipalities have standing committees, each responsible for specific

17 The presidential - or apolitical - role of the mayor can be illustrated by the fact that political groups receive financial support from local authorities, while only the mayor is provided with an office (Norton 1994:87).

policy areas. An example of a common form of organisation is the «main committee model» («Hovedutvalgsmodellen»), where the committees are organised by purpose (for instance committees for education, technical services, health and social matters, and culture). Another principle is to organise by function (for instance committees for management and for development). The organisational models also differ with regard to whether or not the committees have the right to make decisions as regards the municipal administration, and whether or not they have the right to make proposals to the executive board and/or the municipal council, respectively. Regardless of these differences, however, it seems reasonable to assume that the chairs of these committees are important positions of influence for the parties, from the aspects of specialisation, information and agenda-setting power.

The representatives’ membership of these committees is decided by elections in the municipal council. Separate elections are held in the mayoral coalitions for the chairman and vice-chairman of every committee. Thus, it is possible for a party or group of parties representing a majority of the representatives to achieve control of all the chairs of the standing committees. The same goes for the vice-chairs too.

The assumed importance of the committees is open to some debate. Traditionally, the executive board - chaired by the mayor, and party-proportionally composed - has been the most important committee under the municipal council. Since the election of 1995, there are indications in many municipalities that the executive board is becoming an even more strategically important body in the municipality (Gravdahl and Hagen 1997). This applies especially to matters connected with budgeting and planning. On the other hand, the other committees can become more important as agenda setters in their own specific sectors, thus securing greater opportunities to influence decisions in the municipal council. And not to forget, despite these tendencies, the «main

committee model» is still the dominant principle of municipal organisation.

The importance of the control committee is somewhat dubious, compared with the other standing committees of the municipal council. First, it does not include the mayor, the vice-mayor or members of the executive board or the standing committees with decisional powers, who are often regarded as some of the most influential local politicians. Second, its responsibility of control removes it somewhat from the daily political matters of the municipal council, which also implies a more distant status in relation to the existing conflictual patterns. Third, the fact that non-politicians can also become members may tend to decrease its importance.

3 Theory

The studies of coalitions have been dominated by two traditions (Laver and Schofield 1990:7-11). On the one hand, there is the deductive formal approach built on game-theoretical assumptions and arguments. On the other hand, there is an inductive,

empirically based approach, which tries to fit actual experiences of coalition formation to the theory, often modifying the theory to make it coincide more with reality.

The differing assumptions about motives are crucial for understanding the difference between the various coalition theories. All coalition theories contain some fundamental assumptions about the motivations of the relevant political actors involved in coalition-related behaviour (Laver and Schofield 1990; Laver and Budge 1992). These different motivational assumptions affect the predictions and explanations these theories

produce concerning coalition formation (Laver and Schofield 1990; Schlesinger 1991).

Initially, the basic motivation was assumed to be purely related to office and position.

More recently, theories have been developed which emphasise policy-maximising as a fundamental motivating force. A third motivating force is assumed to be

vote-maximising, i.e. theories that regard the actors as acting with the coming election(s) in mind. More recently, approaches have appeared which try to take into account more than one motivating force (Narud 1996:16). Strøm (e.g., 1994) models bargaining between parties that have multiple goals. Here, the motives of office, policy and votes (in later elections) are seen as independent and mutually conflicting.

The motives can also be differentiated into intrinsic and instrumental goals (Laver and Schofield 1990; Bergman 1995). Office may be an end in itself, or a means of

promoting a certain policy. This analytical distinction is easily blurred, however, in

practice (Laver and Schofield 1990:58). Likewise, policy may be valued for its own sake, or as a means of getting into office. Based on the assumptions of actors’

motivations, I shall do what Laver and Schofield (1990) have done, and divide deductively based theories which deal with coalition formation into two broad types:

office-seeking and policy-seeking theories. I choose not to include theories based on vote-maximising.

I shall now present some general assumptions underlying all the coalition theories presented here, and afterwards present two theories of a deductive type and one inductively based model of coalition formation.