Implications of the Language Policy in the Diaspora

In this section, an attempt is made to answer whether the language policy in the homeland has impacted the cross-border socio-political engagement of Eritrean Muslims in Norway. As I have stated earlier in the introduction, it is essential to analyze the policies and practices of the Eritrean government inside Eritrea to better understand the transnational political engagement of diaspora Eritreans. This is because transnational political practices can be prompted as a response to the political attitude of homeland governments (Østegaard-Nielsen, 2003, p.762), or constrained by the long-standing oppressive policies of homeland governments. In the case of Eritrean diaspora, regardless of their negative or positive impact in the politics of their homelands is to a larger degree ‘a function of the nature of the government in place’ (Kibreab, 2007, p111). Kibreab’s observation is helpful to illustrate the relationship between the

behavior of the Eritrean government and diaspora political engagement.

The findings of this research reveal that homeland-originated policies can cross borders and perpetuate exclusion and alienation among some members of the diaspora community. Four of my informants disclose that the mother language policy in Eritrea has shaped the political disengagement of those who are largely unilingual, where their ability to understand the dominant languages of the political mobilization is either limited or absent. Participant 1 says:

‘(…) there is no existence of languages in the social media. There is no one who writes by the mother language in the social media. I only observe that people communicate in two

languages. People may either write in Arabic or Tigrigna – or someone might write in English – according to the language he studied in schools’ (Participant 1)

23 These three regions are located in the Eritrean highlands, they are predominantly inhabited by the Tigrigna speakers. After independence of Eritrea, the government has changed the names of the regions into two regions, Debub and Ma’ekel.

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The comments of Participant 1 show that the NTS who have obtained their education by their mother tongue could be compelled to disengage from transnational political practices due to language barriers. The languages that are predominantly used for political mobilization in the diaspora are Tigrigna, Arabic, and English; this could be in the websites, political forums, and the social media. The rest of the Eritrean languages have not yet appeared in the political sphere, and even if they emerge in the media, they will be restricted to their respective linguistic groups²⁴. In agreement with this, Participant 2 points out:

‘Some people cannot be motivated or engaged; their engagement is limited because of their language. Maybe, some people can be unilingual. Also, the policy back in Eritrea still reflects in the diaspora also’ (Participant 2)

It is no surprise that unilingual people are the ones who face most exclusion from the diasporic socio-political life. Thus, the communication gap between those who are

multilingual and the unilingual becomes bigger, and ideas would not intersect. Consequently, the possibility of collective mobilization narrows, and people might engage in a dissected manner, as Participant 4 outlines:

‘(…) when they come here, I have been following [activism] of the youth, I have also been involved in the activities of the youth, when I see it, people are divided – mainly they are divided along linguistic lines (…) (Participant 4)

The linguistic divisions in the diaspora can be in one hand interpreted as the outcome of the language policy in the homeland. However, linguistic divisions could also be established deliberately due to the rejection of the Tigrigna language by the NTS, points out Participant 4.

Their rejection of the Tigrigna language in the diaspora could be due to the oppression and grievances they may have experienced while they were in Eritrea. As a result, they may disassociate themselves from the Tigrigna speakers in the diaspora to avoid further domination.

Another interesting issue that many informants share is the reaction they get from some of the TS in their diasporic socio-political engagement in Norway. Participant 4 puts it this way:

‘(…) those people who have arrived from Eritrea, they are dominantly Tigrigna, and they say to you “why don’t you speak in Tigrigna?” If you cannot speak Tigrigna, you are not

24 For a list of some Eritrean websites of opposition parties, civic organizations and others, see Mohammad and Tronvoll (2015, p.5), and http://awate.com/links-welcome-page/. The websites predominantly use Arabic, Tigrigna and English for publication.

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considered as Eritrean by their eyes. Because the entire mobilization is in Tigrigna; and they never imagine that there are people who cannot speak Tigrigna, hence, this has certainly reflections on the [activism]. [This kind of approach] distances people’ (Participant 4) Interestingly, Participant 4 has mentioned one of the core issues related to the problem statement of this research – namely, the equation of the Tigrigna language with Eritrean identity. The assumption that every Eritrean speaks Tigrigna, if not, ‘he/she is not Eritrean,’

reflects not only the dominance of the Tigrigna language in Eritrea but also signals

subordination and linguistic intolerance toward the NTS. As a result, it fosters mistrust and exclusion; it could be self-exclusion of the NTS or exclusion prompted by the TS. This attitude is the product of the language policy in Eritrea that allowed institutionalized Tigrigna language supremacy and domination at the cost of the diverse Eritrean languages.

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6. Language Diversity and Transnational Socio-Political Practices