General views

All the humanitarian NGOs claim that presence generally has mitigative and preventive effects on violence, if not the underlying sources of the conflct.

However, the only evidence cited in support of this claim was aneedotaL.

Systematic evaluations/assessments on the subject had not be u ndertaken , or

were not known to exist.

According to the NCA, the protectïve effect of humanitarian presence is somewhat mythicaL. Yet the organizatïon maintains that the most efficient protection does not stem from active reporting to external paries, but from makng it clear within the conflct area that human rights violations are not tolerated. The NCA sees a need to develop more conscious strategies for the protection of civilans as a function of INGO presence. When the authorities or the paries to the conflct limit the operational field of NGOs, the organizations have to develop strategies to counteract these limitations. There is a need for more active strategies also to communIcate visibilty. Presenee may limit violence, for instance, if NGOs move their headquarers to an area where violence is known to take place, or by simply being more visible. This can easily be done for instance by driving cars marked with NGO emblems.

The NP A maintains that presence per se has an important preventive effect on the level of violence and on the overall conflct. The presence of international delegates, for instance, makes the Iocal employees feel safer. The NP A cites Kurdistan is an example of this, where the presence of Norwegian relief workers "guaranteed" the safety of local personnel who received threats from the regime.

The Norwegian Refugee Council is convinced that presence means prevention, and exemplifies this by pointing to the presence of NGOs in Bosnia. The NRC moved had 30 000 convoys of relIef materiel into Bosnia, and the organization assumes that the visible presence this entailed did have a positive effect on the level of violence. The NRC also emphasizes that presenee is a precondition for reporting, and thus to achieve the preventive effects associated with reporting.

The NRC questions the relation between resources and impact, however, and

asks if a better, more formalized reporting necessarily leads to increased

impact.

The Norwegian Red Cross points to the experience of the ICRC, which suggests numerous mitigative and preventive effects (see section 3).

Norwegian Save the Children beIIeves the presence of NGOs has several positive preventive effects. However, these can be indirect as well as direct, and are difficult to estimate. In Sri Lanka for instance, many local civilians have been involved in SC work, and this has apparently been important for their survivaL. Moreover, the presence of the SC in conflcts helps prevent the recruitment of child soldiers. The general psychological effect on the civilian population of international presence is also very important. ff the SC develops into a strong international allance like the Red Cross movement, the impact of their presence wil increase. At present, the alliance is working toward this objective through better coordination of the alliance's relief work, stronger alliance structure, etc.

The se recognizes possible negative effects of presence, such as the so-called CNN-effect. This can be negative if NGOs use crises and tragedies in order to

sell their "product" - emergency aid. This question touches the ethical

dimension of relief work. SC has a code of conduct for all situations, but what is needed is an ongoing debate on these issues. NSC also works through other partners: ministries, other NGO etc. NSC has established a stand-by task force (in co-operation with Swedish Se) that can be used to assist UNHCR in complex emergencies.

4.2.2 Rellef assistance

All the humanitarian organizations noted that the level of consciousness

concerning the different effects of humanitarian aid is much higher than in it was in the 1980s and before. Most respondents focused on food aid and other

forms of relief assistance when discussing the multiple and sometimes

contradictory effects of aid on the conflct and the beneficiar society(ies).Their experiences differ, however, with respect to strategies that may reduce the negative effects of relIef assistance, and the extent to which this is possible.

The NP A experienced in Sudan in 1980s that food deliveries made the local population waIt for aid in delivery areas instead of harvesting their crops. As a result, the need for further deliveries was maintained and even increased. The

NP A believes that a similar situation is unlikely today, but notes that

emergency relIef can stil create passivity. This risk must be balanced against the acute needs of the population in question. While humanItarIan aid and

supplies can prolong the conflct, lack of resources is of ten the main reason for

conflet, and food shortages can obviously lead to violence.

The Norwegian Red Cross points out that the Red Cross Movement offers protection and medical assistance in conflicts. Protection is only for non-combatants and soldiers hors de combat (wounded or deserters). Stil, there are

cases where soldiers have been fed and protected by humanitarian

organizations. In East Zaire, to mention only one example, it is well-known that medical help and food deliveries have kept and soldiers and militia

members alive in the refugee camps. This has probably also happened

elsewhere.

The delivery of food in conflct sItuations has been criticized since some of it wil go to the warring parties. But the armed parties wil get food anyhow, by taking it from civilans etc. Food is aresource which can be exchanged for other resources when food is scarce, e.g. sold to buy weapons. In the Somalia famine in the early 1990s, food was handed out as ready-made meals in order

to reduce the stealing and trading of food. There are ways of separating

civilians from soldiers when handing out food, but in many situations it is preferable to supply as much food as possible. Creating an abundance or surplus of food wil reduce the potential for conflct, according the Norwegian Red Cross.

The NPA also acknowledges that food supplies can end up feeding the soldiers and thus prolong or increase the conflet, but has found that NGOs can do little or nothing to disarm soldiers or militia-members in the camps. The armed forces wil always get "their share". An informal objective is that no more than one-third of the supplies should go to the armed forces, but there are cases where they get/take virtually all. There are also cases where food aid turns up at the local market even before the donor has finished distributing it.

Another potential negative function of emergency relief noted by the NPA experience, is that creation of new economic structures that are kept alive artificially through continuous deliveries, and thus underrnning traditional and otherwise viable structures.

The Norwegian Refugee Council notes that there are possible negative effects of humanitarian aid, but believes that the positive effects by far exceed the

negative. It is naive to exclude the possibilty that food deliverIes may prolong

a conflct, but the humanitarian imperative is always more important. The

organizations should not stop bringing in deliveries to civilians even if it keeps the warring parties going.

The NCA cites cases where humanitarian action has worsened the human rights

situation (Srebrenica). This may happen also in remote are as where food

deliveries attract large number of people, thereby increasing local tension (Keren in Ethiopia).

4.2.3 Ne utra li

y and impartiality

The organizations have found that humanitarian aid generally have political consequences, but that policies of "impariality" - whIch most distinguish from

"neutrality" - stil are possible. Approaches to the impariality/neutrality question differ, however.

In the NCA experience, humanitarian aid has had political consequences even thought the NCA did not have specifically political objectives. In Ethiopia, for instance, NCA aid helped people to take control of their own lives; this again had political implications by contributing to the development of a civil society which supported a political opposition. Hence, humanitarian action cannot be neutral. However, neutrality is distinct from impariality, and the NCA strives for impariality. For instance, cross border deliveries (e.g. in Ethiopia) do not necessarily equal neutrality. NCA was not neutral in Ethiopia even though working on both sides.

The Norwegian Save the Children regards itself as politically neutral. Stil, the organization has found that its work inevitably has a political dimension even

though the main objective is to improve the lives of children. The se of ten

works on both sides of a conflct. In Sri Lanka, the se is probably considered a pro-Taml organization even though it works on both sides. In Eritrea, however, the se successfully avoiding the label "Eritrean solidarity organization" .

The organization has found that there are ways of regulating/controllng the political consequences of aid. In Sri Lanka, the se provided support to primary schools, but withdrew aid when it was discovered that the schools were used

for propaganda purposes. Strong mechanisms for advice and support of personneI is important, this includes training of staff, regular consultancies

with people coming in from elsewhere (national headquarers and

international), and written guidelines. The SC establishes local/national se organizations and works through these.

The NPA's policy permits parialïty, inter aUa when this facilitates access to certain areas. This is the case in Sudan, where the NP A does not co-operate

withthe Sudanese government and therefore does not wait for its approval, as

do NGOs in Operation Lifeline Sudan. Generally, however, the NPA is

experience is that it is useful to co-operate as far as possible with national

governments and with the UN.

The Norwegian Refugee Council-linds that the current debate on neutrality in the aid community is the same as in the 1960s and 1970s, but there is a need for a new understanding of the question.

The NRC follows a policy of being neutral - i.e. politically non-partisan - in relation to the conflcts where it operates. However, the different paries to a conflct do not necessarily see the NRC as neutral, mainly because of NRC

reporting on the conflct. Moreover, the NRC has found that political neutrality

can only be intended, and not fully achieved, because presence in a conflct

necessarily carries a political dimension. "Impartiality" is thus a better word than "neutrality". The NRC also points out that not takng sides on grounds of

"neutrality" does not always mean being neutral. Not seeing or hearing is not neutrality, buts an indirect support of the stronger par.

In the NRC experience, it is important in such cases to report with reference to conventions/agreements. For instance, the NRC reported that the Serbs were ignoring the UN Convention on refugees in former Yugoslavia.

The Norwegian Red Cross points out that the long experience of the Red Cross movement is based on the principle of neutrality (see section 3).

4.3 Confidence building

Some of the organizations are engaged in activities that can be grouped under the general heading of confidenee building measures (inc1uding reconciliation and negotiations related to a peace proeess), others find that their regular work has confidence building effects. The organizations work at different levels

(state level, community level, individual level) , but all emphasize the

importance of the local leveL. Some have found indirect, low-profile projects most useful; here groups work on concrete projects and "confidence" or

"reconcilation" appears as a positive side-effect.

The Norwegian Red Cross and the IFRC (The International Federation of the

Red Cross) are not actively involved in what might be called "confidence

building measures". V arious Red Cross activities, inc1uding those of the ICRC,

however, are considered to have confidence bu ilding and hence preventive

effects (see section 3).

To exert a preventive effect, the Re Movement has found it is essential to be present at an early stage of a conflct, or even before a conflct stars. Early

warning of potential areas of conflct or naturaldisasters requires institutional networks. The national RC societies can serve this purpose, and are being developed with local branches that cover the entire country.

The idea that local agencies wil have a stronger preventive effect emerged in the 1990s. The establishment of local RC societies is a continuous task, and in

Africa goes back to the 1970s. Until the late 1980s, however, the IFRC

concentrated on strengthening the central agency of the national societies, and

hoped for a cascading effec;t downwards (local branches). As experience

showed that this was rare, institutional strategy shifted to focus on local branches as well as national headquarers.

Similarly, both the ICRC and the IFRC have until recently worked mostly top -down in human rights education. But renewed conflct in Liberia led staff to question this approach. Increasingly, efforts are made to work locally in human rights and tension reduction programs by educating locals, building on local, traditional values, etc.

The NPA undertakes 10cal-Ieve1 confidence building activities in several places.

The NP A supports existing grass root movements as well as the establishment of new local organizations. The organization has found that the most important task is to build or rebuild confidence to "others" and to key social structures.

When supporting local organizations, the NP Aassists with expertise and

provides materiaL. It is seeks to create channels of contact between

organizations and the authorities. In Bosnia, the NP A has provided training and seminars for women over a 3-tmee years period. In Kosovo, the NP A is working with a group called the "post-pessimists". Young people from Serbia,

Kosovo and Bosnia come together to communicate and discuss war

experiences. This project aims at changing the concept of "the enemy" , and

thus contribute to sustain peace. The NP A has also helped establish a local radio station in Bosnia.

While no systematic assessments of impact have been done, the general conclusion in the NP A is that confidence building can work. For instance, in Tuzla, the only remaining multicultural municipality in Bosnia, the presence of NP A and the NCA and other international agencies is considered to have enabled the population to resist ethnic cleansing.

In South Sudan, the NP Ahelps develop local community structures. In South Africa, the NP A is working to change the structures that affect sodal violence

by provide education and human rights information. In Nicaragua and

Zimbabwe, the NPA is doing electoral training. In Rwanda, the NPA has a project that provides on free legal advIce to returning refugees who have

problems recovering their property, and those who are dispossessed by

retumees.' The NP A also works with R wandan authorities to restore the judicial system.

The NCA has several confidence building activities, working on both the local and national leveIs.

Two current "multicultural projects" are underway in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. A 3-year project for persons from the former Yugoslavia seeks to

educate "multicultural" opinion leaders from differentparts of former country.

In Rwanda, the project is aimed at women from different ethnic groups. The women work together to find solutions to common problems. The project has practical focus, but the process of problem-solving is expected to promote communication between the different ethnic groups. A review of the project conc1uded: (i) the project was most successful when building on already existing groups, and (ii) problems experienced were related to insufficient training and knowledge of personnei, as well as lack of clearly defined objectives.

In 1995, the NCA was involved in the peace process in Mali. The civil war created fear among the population, and popular meetings (aranged by the UN and other international organizations) were designed to restore confidence. At these meetings everybody except politicians was allowed to speak out. Various

problems were freely discussed and contacts were established. Fort Y meetings

were held and the general confidence generated was considered an important

reason for the subsequent restoration of norma1cy: markets started to function again, economic activities generally were resumed, and a peace agreement was reached, complete with a ceremony for burning of weapons. The NCA has reviewed the case in a 1995 report Kåre Lode (ed.) Synthese du processus des rencontres intercommunautaires du Nord du Mali. Stavanger:

Misjonshøgskolens forlag). The report concludes that the foundation for peace was a bottom-up socio-political movement, with negotiation at a lower level that the government

The NCA is also involved in peace building in Afghanistan. This work includes

support for local organizations, human rights training, and education in

international humanitarian law, democracy, reconcilation etc. In Guatemala, Mali and the Sudan, the NCA was involved in the negotiations 10 promote a national peace proeess.

The NCA is also Involved in psycho-social work and rehabiltation of war-victims. In Mozambique the NCA works via local partners, one important project is "Weapon for education". where child soldiers are given education. A similar project is going on in Angola.

The Norwegian Refugee Council is not involved in confidence building measures at political leveIs, but works to bringing together people from

different sides of a conflct in various activities. Confidence building is

considered a positive spin-off effect, and not the main objective.

In AserbadjanlArmenia, the NRC has been involved in the process of bringing the two pars together. Local capacity building is an important objective in any

project, this includes public administration, organizations and individual

capacities. In the NRC project, maximum two staff members are Norwegians, the others are locals. The NRC has also tried to combine human rights reporting and local capacity building in Africa. An example of this is the establishment of an African stand-by force for disasters. In another form of

peace-and confidence building measures, the NRC has a human rights

education project in the Caucasus where the use of theater is one component

Save the Children is not involved in explicit reconcilation or confidence

building activities. The organization's experience is that this is an extremely complex area of work. Reconciliation is seen as a private and personal matter, and the SC finds that the work of the international community in this regard is

too mechanic. The staring point for many individuals or societies is a

reluctance to even speak about the war. If one moves into this area at all, community workers must be carefully trained and be able to create confidence at least to themselves as individuals Indirectly this may in turn lead to creating confidenee toward others. Reconcilation works at a slow pace: direct reconcilation work must be avoided, even the word "reconciliation" should not

be flagged.

In conflct areas, considerable aggression is generated towards the international

community, as local people feel they have been neglected. Relief work should therefore have concrete foci were people working together to solve common problems. This type of co-operation (as in Bosnia) may produee a spin-off effects in terms of reconciliation.

community, as local people feel they have been neglected. Relief work should therefore have concrete foci were people working together to solve common problems. This type of co-operation (as in Bosnia) may produee a spin-off effects in terms of reconciliation.

In document A-State-of-the-An Report Humanitarian (sider 69-0)