B ENEFICIARIES I NVOLVEMENT IN NGO C OORDINATION

Given the high importance placed on beneficiary participation at all levels of needs identification and project implementation, it is interesting to note that, as far as the literature review and examination of field arrangements have been able to establish,

Levels of Co-ordination

this topic has received hardly any attention among coordinating bodies. Jon Bennett confirmed in 1998 that he had not come across any cases through his research where the intended beneficiaries were included in the coordination arrangement, although he did not see any reason why this could not be done (personal communication, 1998). A review of the activities of the coordination arrangements included in this study establishes that none of them have any direct contact with, or a formalised meeting or coordination system with, civil society groups or forced migrants. The closest one gets to this are cases such as the prisoner advocacy group formed by CHA in Sri Lanka, where direct contact was established with a small group of intended beneficiaries, as well as with the coordination body for human rights NGOs which existed in Aceh. In this case, the NGOs involved not only had first hand experience through their direct contact with victims of human rights abuses, but also became targets themselves, and had their staff tortured and killed (personal

communication, 2000).

It might be argued that, even if the coordinating bodies do not take any active steps to consult the forced migrants or see the protection of their rights as an important element of their activities, the forced migrants’ influence on practical and policy matters might still be secured through NGOs working with them that then holds membership in such coordinating bodies. The NGOs might there present the views and concerns of the forced migrants, and thus indirectly represent their interests in any given coordination arrangement. Their ability to do so would, arguably and as earlier documented, depend on their level of contact with the forced migrants and the methods they make use of when interacting with them. Moreover, there would have to be organisational willingness and capacity at all levels of the organisation, including individual employees, to act as spokespersons for the forced migrants.

Interestingly, Oxfam is one of the few NGOs to have brought such issues up for debate; or, as Cummins states, to ‘challenge the NGOs to think creatively about alternative futures’ (Eade 1996: 13), through raising the following two questions:

 How can NGOs most effectively ‘scale up’ from field experience to policy-making and become public voices for the victims of violence?

 How can NGOs ‘scale down’ or redirect their work to be attuned to the communities’ own perceptions of their survival and development needs?

Finally, it could again be mentioned that such a lack of consultation with and representation of forced migrants in coordination arrangements stands in contrast to the expressed policy and guidelines of major institutions, such as the OECD (1997) and the World Bank (2000), which all stress the need to incorporate them into the decision and implementation processes. An illustrative example here is found in a Policy Statement (OECD 1997) of the OECD Development Assistance Committee:

Developing countries are ultimately responsible for their own development.

This cardinal principle of development cooperation must be respected – even in countries in crisis, and even when division is rife and local capacities are severely weakened. The task of international assistance is to help strengthen a country’s indigenous capacities. This must be done in ways that are even-handed and that encourage broad participation throughout society. This also means ensuring that programmes address the special need of women, children and youth who often bear the brunt of the consequences of conflict.

Chapter 3: NGO Coordination: the Lag between Theory and Practice

Arguably then, to follow this line of reasoning, if, or when, a local community or a group of forced migrants are not in a position to present their views, or, possibly, are not invited to do so, the best place for NGOs to share such knowledge with the wider NGO community and thereby shape assistance or secure protection for the forced migrants, would, naturally, be in an NGO coordinating body. If these act in accordance with theory, such a forum could ensure awareness of a particular situation or problem, and thus be in a position to address the challenges in a coordinated manner in order to provide the most effective, cost efficient and sustainable response. This assumption will certainly be examined through the

fieldwork, particularly as regards the interaction between forced migrants and NGOs, which has to be the foundation for NGOs’ ability to represent the views of forced migrants.

3.7. Conclusion

It can be argued that the establishment of an NGO coordination mechanism in complex political emergencies is largely determined by the needs, as judged by NGOs operating in each specific CPE, for an organisation to represent their interests.

The ‘need’ could be brought about by the agencies acknowledging that they can increase their effectiveness and efficiency in aid provision in that given location, or by recognition among the NGOs that they can gain further influence from

establishing a common representative entity to interact with governments, warlords or even the United Nations or external donors. How such coordination bodies are organised, the degree of formality and which activities and services they establish would then depend on the interests of the NGOs involved, rather than being based on a blueprint or any prescribed NGO coordination arrangement. It is the lack of a unified and international NGO coordination superstructure and the diversity of NGOs and their fields of work that seems to ensure the multiplicity of NGO coordination arrangements at a national level.

It seems to be well documented that the NGOs, as a rule, will opt for a horizontal coordination structure and resist attempts to be steered or controlled by one organisation or one coordinator, if this is not done in a way that enhances the capacity of the majority of agencies and is seen to be beneficial for their entire engagement and fund raising. Without these conditions, attempts to control or

dominate will easily lead to a break-up of the coordination arrangement, as was done by the national NGOs in Afghanistan, who established their own coordination body when they felt underrepresented in the larger one. However, even in a

non-authoritative coordination arrangement differences are likely to exist, as some agencies might argue that coordination efforts should be restricted to information exchange to minimise duplication and overlaps, while others might advocate more integrated and commonly planned and executed NGO activities.

NGOs striving for independence, often supported by individual donors, will

ultimately develop resistance to being too tightly governed by a national government or directed by a UN agency or a UN Coordinator. This becomes particularly apparent in complex political emergencies, where there might not be an accepted or

functioning government, and the UN system tends to be fragmented and its role possibly contested by the NGOs. In addition, where the UN is engaged in political

efforts that might be seen as contrary to humanitarian values, or sets to administer UN sanctions, the NGOs might, as pointed out by Reindorp and Wiles (2001: 1),

‘feel forced to distance themselves explicitly from a non-neutral UN.’

Arguably, the distinction between operational and strategic coordination is less useful the closer one comes to the field, while simultaneously, incentives for establishing effective and pragmatic coordination arrangements increase the closer the organisations and their staff get to their intended beneficiaries. One might therefore assume that the coordination arrangements most likely to obtain positive and practical results for the forced migrants would be those based in areas where the forced migrants are likely to return or are permanently or temporarily displaced.

However, to combine this operational advantage with strategic coordination efforts, NGOs would then, on the one hand, have to be able to transform their learning and the ‘voice of the forced migrants’ into strategic policy issues that can be pursued in national or international coordination arrangements or policy-making organs, such as the IASC or UN bodies; while on the other hand, being able to operationalise

international standards in their work at the field level.

They also need to be willing to inform forced migrants of their rights, even if the NGOs themselves might not be in a position to assist them through their own efforts.

One NGO is usually not in a position to deliver everything that a forced migrant is in need of or may be entitled to under international conventions. This can only come from a diversity of views, expertise and implementation strategies within a

coordination arrangement capable of ensuring the widest possibly ability to respond to the diverse needs of different groups, not merely ensure that each forced migrant receives exactly the same assistance. This again leads to the conclusion that a facilitated coordination strategy is likely to be most beneficial in complex political emergencies if built on a set of common norms and standards as well as an

understanding of the complexity of each political emergency situation; and,

moreover, with the necessary flexibility to respond to both the short and longer term needs of the forced migrants the NGOs aim to assist. Such a coordination approach might include and commit larger numbers of agencies and reduce the need for structured coordination in situations of uncertainty, because it would allow for the use of multiple approaches, with greater or lesser degrees of coordination, rather than risking exclusion by insisting on only one method or approach.

As well as the above assumptions, which need to be examined and tested through the fieldwork, there are a number of further questions emerging from a comparison of theory and experience from various coordination arrangements. In this chapter it has been argued that NGO advocacy activities and coordination efforts at the

international level have achieved substantial benefit for forced migrants in establishing their rights to assistance and securing minimum standards of humanitarian assistance. There is, however, a need to see if similar benefits are secured at the national and local level where, in contrast to the international NGO coordination level, which is dominated by a few multinational NGO families, the NGO community is much more diverse and, probably, to a larger extent competing for funding and recognition.

There thus appears a need to review the extent of the influence forced migrants might exercise on NGO coordination bodies or processes, or on single NGOs, either

Chapter 3: NGO Coordination: the Lag between Theory and Practice

directly, through consultation or representation, or indirectly, through the NGO members’ ability to ‘scale up’ field knowledge, as well as their analysis of forced migrants’ needs for assistance and protection. This will then need to include the specific needs of different subgroups of forced migrants, like women, children and minority groups. It will be important here to test the knowledge NGO field staff have of the vulnerability and strengths of groups of forced migrants, and to consider how this knowledge might be transformed into collective knowledge of the NGOs and NGO coordination bodies, to then be acted upon in an efficient and effective manner.

It is assumed that a starting point would be to establish trust and a degree of knowledge of each other, as well as a common understanding between NGOs and forced migrants on the situation they live in and the diverse challenges they confront.

One could then look further, to see if they have been able not only to look into the day to day needs, but also to capture the longer-term needs of the forced migrants and meet these in a way that enhances sustainability and decreases dependency.

Before the NGOs, their activities and the NGO coordination arrangements in Afghanistan are presented and discussed, the next chapter will detail the research methodology established. Especially for Afghanistan was it a challenge to devise a methodology that would be able to control possible biases and challenges posed by conducting research in a complex political emergency and under one of the most repressive and strict groups encountered, the Taliban.