The Afghan Conflict and its Root Causes

The Afghan conflict has gone through a number of phases, influenced both by internal factors and by changes in the regional and international arenas, in particular the Cold War and lately the War on Terrorism. The country’s historic position as a buffer state between imperial powers, attempts to obtain a neutral and non-aligned role in an unstable and shifting region, poverty and underdevelopment, and

opportunities offered by Afghan and non-Afghan non-state actors owing to the weakness of the Afghan state all increased the country’s vulnerability, and contributed to setting the conflict scene. The unfolding events were strongly influenced by the Great Game, the Cold War, regional transformation and conflict, and lately the War on Terror.

The starting point of the recent conflict can be traced back to 1973 when the King’s cousin, Mohammed Daoud, staged a bloodless coup and appointed himself President (Arnold 1985: 57). Islamic groups opposing his rather oppressive rule fled to

Pakistan, and there started to build up military organisations (Adamec 1991: 284), while in Afghanistan the Soviet-backed People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) staged the Saur revolution in 1978, assassinating Daud before introducing a communist-inspired regime. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan followed on 27 December 1979, leading to a popular uprising inside Afghanistan and massive international condemnation. A combination of Soviet and Afghan Army forces tried to control the countryside, holding a rather firm grip on the cities whereas a

mujahideen movement, drawing on Western and Islamic financial and military support to counter Soviet expansion and ‘world dominance’ (Rais 1994: 67-73), conducted a guerrilla war from rear bases in Pakistan and Iran. The Afghan parties drew for their recruitment largely on the male refugee population, termed the

‘refugee warriors’ by Zolberg, Suhrke et al. (1989), and formed various short-lived coalitions until 1989 when a mujahideen-based Afghan Interim Government (AIG) was established in Pakistan. By that time the Soviet Union had already withdrawn from Afghanistan following the signing of the Geneva Accord in May 1988 (Rais 1994).

42 The opposite is namahram, meaning men that women are not allowed to interact with, and where they are required to be covered by a veil (or burqa) if in the same room or in the public space.

It has been estimated that in the nine years the Soviet invasion lasted, five million Afghans were forced to take refuge in Pakistan and Iran, more than one million Afghans lost their lives, an estimated 700,000 Afghans were left physically and mentally disabled and an unknown number of Afghans were left internally displaced (Sliwinsky 1989; Marsden 1999).

As the cold war ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the suffering of the Afghan population did not, however, come to an end. When the Kabul government under the leadership of President Najibullah imploded in 1992 the new Afghan Islamic Government, drawn from the various mujahideen parties, was not able to mitigate their internal differences and factional fighting erupted (Rais 1994:155-161). Large parts of Kabul were destroyed between 1993 and 1995, half of the city population was forced to migrate and severe human rights abuses were committed (Amnesty International 1995). The countryside was carved up between the various commanders and parties (Olesen 1995: 292), which competed for influence and support from their regional neighbours, particularly Pakistan and Iran but also Saudi Arabia and India and, moreover, non-state actors such as religious groups, drug traffickers, smugglers and what later were to be know as terrorist networks, including Al Qaida.

The Taliban (religious students) emerged out of the southern city of Kandahar in late 1994, initially drawing strong public support when addressing the lawlessness and infighting between the various parties. With Mullah Omar as head of a leadership shura, the movement took control of Herat in September 1995, Kabul a year later and the northern city of Mazar-e-Sharif in 1998 (Rashid 2000: 227-239). They controlled approximately 85% of Afghanistan by late 2000, while an alliance of various ethnic and religious groups, termed the Northern Alliance, held the remaining 15% (Strand, Harpviken et al.

2000). The Taliban’s strict interpretation of Islam, their violations of human rights (particularly the rights of women) and their hosting of Osama bin-Laden’ s network led to the international isolation of the regime. A 1998 US missile attack on Al-Qaida training camps increased the tension between the Taliban and the international community (Strand, Harpviken et al. 2000: 5), which continued to increase when the UN Security Council imposed sanctions on the Taliban in 1999 (UN Security Council 1999), and strengthened these further in 2000 (UN Security Council 2000). The drought did, however, generate a higher degree of displacement than the rather limited military activities that took place up to the year 2000 (Strand, Harpviken et al. 2001).

Although outside the scope of this thesis it should be mentioned that

Afghanistan was again drawn out of isolation to become the main arena for the war on terror following the 11 September 2001 attack in the United States.

Osama bin- Laden and his Al-Qaida network were singled out as the

mastermind and organisers of the terrorist act, and the Taliban implicated in the crime due to their continued housing of this organisation. The Northern Alliance, backed by air campaigns and military advice from the allied forces, defeated the Taliban in November 2001. This lead to a United Nations (UN) sponsored peace agreement signed in Bonn on 5 December 2001 between the 4 largest groups that constituted the opposition to the Taliban, leading to the

Chapter 5: The Afghan Context

establishment of an Afghan Interim Administration (AIA) and a framework for a transitional process to lead Afghanistan towards a more democratically governed statehood (UN Secretary General 2001).

Despite the different stages the Afghan conflict has been through, with varying degrees of regional and international interference and influence, there are a few characteristics of the conflict that might be highlighted. Firstly, it is largely the same groups of persons that were involved in the initial stages of conflict in 1973 that still are contenders for political influence. The elite has mainly survived; the major suffering has been amongst the poorest segments of the population as they have been drafted into military service or have fled to survive.⁴³ Secondly, regional conflicts continue to influence the situation in Afghanistan.⁴⁴ Thirdly, all major

military/political groups have been involved in human rights abuses, drug trafficking and collaboration with terrorist groups. Fourthly, ethnic and religious differences have been actively used for military mobilisation, though these seem to be less of a dividing point among the common population. ⁴⁵ Fifthly, there have been major changes in the military and social power balance within Afghanistan as the Pashtuns have lost their previous unchallenged authority to other ethnic groups who have been able to use the conflict period to build up strong military units, and have thus gained larger political influence. And, finally, until the new Afghan Transitional

Government was approved by summer 2002 all previous governments had been opposed by one or more groups of humanitarian organisations, either on an international solidarity base (like the communist government), or on rights-based grounds, establishing a tradition of NGO opposition to any government steering attempts and a high degree of politicised aid practice.

By the late 1990s Atmar, Barakat et al. (1998) argued that the causes of violent conflict in Afghanistan could be attributed to:

Outside vested interests being able to utilise “conflict entrepreneurs” who are gaining and maintaining personal benefits by drawing upon available professional warriors and a large unemployed youth population. Mobilisation for fighting is increasingly done on ethnic and religious bases, partly enabled by a history of failed development.

Reviewing this analysis in light of developments between 1998 and 2001, one might add that the conflict between the Taliban and the international community has added an element to the wider conflict, and was used for gaining military support by groups opposing the Taliban, though not to the extent that it changed the root causes of the conflict. The major trend is still that a few ‘conflict entrepreneurs’ with international and regional support have enforced their position upon the common Afghans in an attempt to gain further military/political influence or be able to exploit resources for personal gain. The end result has been increased and sustained forced migration, and an assumption that the international community and humanitarian agencies should be

43 Notable here are ex King Zahir Shah, ex President Rabbani and party leaders like Abdul Sayaff and Gulbuddin Hekmatiar, who all were all part of the 1973 events.

44 The conflict between India and Pakistan has a major influence on the situation, but Iran has played a major role over recent years in opposing the Taliban.

45 The common members of the Loya Jirga held in the summer of 2002 exhibited a strong will to set aside past differences and to find common ground for the peaceful development of Afghanistan.

the ones to cater for the humanitarian needs of the common Afghans, not the host state or local governance structures (for further details see appendix 2).