The Spaces of Human and Animal Perception
Dag August Schmedling Dramer
Thesis presented for the degree of Master of Philosophy
Supervised by
Sebastian Watzl, Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy, Classics, History of Art and Ideas, Faculty of Humanities
UNIVERSITETET I OSLO
Summer 2018
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The Spaces of Human and Animal Perception
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© Dag August Schmedling Dramer 2018
The Spaces of Human and Animal Perception Dag August Schmedling Dramer
http://www.duo.uio.no/
Trykk: Reprosentralen, Universitetet i Oslo
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Abstract
This thesis is a discussion of the nature of perception with the debate between Hubert Dreyfus and John McDowell as a springboard into an investigation of the perceptual similarities, and differences, between human and animal perception. I criticize Dreyfus’ lack of commitment to the idea that humans and animals share a “space of motivations” through what I call the theory of
“cultural penetration.” It is my claim that when it comes to the nature of human perception, Dreyfus is committed to a Heideggerian holism that deepens the perceptual divide between us and other animals. I then bring in J.J. Gibson, who through his ecological approach comes closer to conceiving of the similarities of human and animal perception through his concept of
“affordances” – a concept that both Dreyfus and McDowell uses, albeit with a different focus than Gibson. However, it turns out that Gibson’s theory has drawbacks of its own, as the generality of “affordances” in Gibson’s conceptual scheme renders them ambiguous. as
“affordances” are ambiguous in Gibson’s conceptual scheme through their generality. The fact that “affordances” are shared between species can, on Gibson’s’ view render the similarities between us and other animals trivial. A philosopher I claim helps open up a discussion of the fundamental similarities, while retaining inherent differences between humans and animals by bringing in much needed animal examples is Alasdair McIntyre, whose views I will discuss at the end of the thesis.
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I would like to thank my supervisor, Sebastian Watzl, without whose consistent, constant and caring follow-up this thesis would not be possible. The supervising lasted more than a year, and increased in intensity as the deadline approached now in June. Thanks to this supervising I managed to find my voice, a fact of which I owe Sebastian the utmost gratitude. I would also like to thank my parents and my brother whose “background care” created the condition of the
possibility of any rational capacity I as a dependent rational animal might be said to possess.
Thanks go to professor Arne Johan Vetlesen, always an inspiring nestor, and to associate
professor Ingvild Torsen for introducing me to phenomenology. I thank my friends on the master program in philosophy for many life-and-philosophy affirming discussions that made it
substantially easier to complete this project. Especially Oda Davanger, Åsne Grøgaard, Hans Robin Solberg and Inger Bakken Pedersen. I would also like to thank my friend “abroad” Carlota Salvador (UiB) for her interested and interesting feedback.
The IFIKK coffee machine is equivalent to the waterhole in the desert, being in its presence affords social interactions of a cathartic nature for the dependent rational animals we humans are.
D.A.S.D.
Oslo, June 2018
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ABSTRACT ………v
Acknowledgements………...vii
I.Introduction: Perspectives on Perception……….1
II. Perception and the Role of Reason: The McDowell-Dreyfus Debate………8
2.1. Perception as Disclosure………..10
2.2. Rational Capacities in Perception………12
2.3. Overintellectualization and A.I………...16
2.4. Skills and Motivations………24
2.5. Lowering the Bar………31
III. The Pervasiveness of Culture………37
3.1. Which Animals? ……… 52
3.2. Different Natures………..53
IV. Affording the Affordances………56
4.1. Anti-Dualism………56
4.2. Responding to the Affordances………58
4.3. Open to the World………66
4.4. Dichotomy Denial………77
V. McIntyre versus Heidegger……….81
5.1. World Poor Animals………...81
5.2. McIntyre's Dolphins………...87
VI. Conclusion……….99
Bibliography………101
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I. Introduction: Perspectives on Perception
“For instance, on the planet Earth, man had always assumed that he was more intelligent than dolphins because he had achieved so much—the wheel, New York, wars and so on—whilst all the dolphins had ever done was muck about in the water having a good time. But conversely, the dolphins had always believed that they were far more intelligent than man—for precisely the same reasons.”
― Douglas Adams, The Hitchhiker's Guide to the Galaxy
My cat and I sit by the kitchen table, a regular morning, nothing hindering our access to the table, and our sensory organs are in their peak condition, as we are well rested and well fed. One of us is feline and the other a descendent of advanced primates from the genus homo and is a homo sapiens sapiens. Both are endowed with excellent visual systems, as exemplified by our large, forward-looking eyes that provide depth vision, along with what neuroscience now tells us are centers in the brain devoted to processing this visual information from the landscape. My cat and I have effective depth vision, capable of separating the foreground from the background, zoning in on objects, be they prey animals or coffee cups. And as we sit by the kitchen table this
morning, we both have perfectly fine access to an uncontroversially continuing object (at least perceptually): the kitchen table.
The cat is capable of using the table, albeit, and obviously, not in the same way as I do. I sit down by it lean against it; she is prone to sit under it, or sit on top of it. I place books and coffee cups there, and she, well, she is not prone to place anything there at all other than herself.
So we simply use the object that is the kitchen table differently. But does that mean that we see it differently? In what way can we say that our perceptions are similar, even if we are different species, separated by tens of millions of years evolutionary speaking? If we cannot say that our perceptions are similar, what is it, then, it that makes human perception human?
In this thesis, I will focus, very generally speaking, on theories of perception that view it as a process that gives us direct, unmediated access to the world. The nature of our access is, as we will see, between the theories presented, a hot topic of debate. Some, like Hubert Dreyfus, uses exegesis and phenomenology, others, like John McDowell, employ transcendental strategies,
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and researchers like J.J. Gibson reconceptualize perception so as to make it all about meaningful movement in an environment. All of these takes on perception have, as I will discuss,
repercussions for the fundamental question of what it is that we share with other animals. Is animal and human perception similar enough for us to say that we share a lot, or are we warranted only in allowing some, very basic overlap in perception?
Let’s follow up on this last question with the ecological psychologist Gibson as example, who would say that my cat and I perceive the table in virtue of what it is that we can do with it, what he termed with the neologism “affordances”. Affordances—one of the central concepts of the ecological approach to perception Gibson introduced—views perception through the lens of action. Since we are moving, active creatures, it is not just important, but essential that we perceive what we can do with things, and how we can move, in order to find our way about.
“The affordances of the environment are what it offers the animal, what it provides or furnishes, either for good or ill.”1 Gibson introduced affordances as perceptually basic. One and the same object affords slightly different possibilities for action for my cat and I, given our different interests. The table affords book-placing-on-top-of and sit-by-next-to for me, whereas for my cat it affords jumping-on-top-of or sitting-underneath. But the affordances can equally well lead to the conclusion that we perceive the table radically differently given our different body-structures, anchored in our separate evolutionary history. Then again, a very general description of an object will for Gibson yield nearly identical affordances for many species, regardless of body types and modes of locomotion. If we move away from a focus on domestic furniture for instance, we can take this quote, the description of which seems to open up for exactly the perceptual overlap I am interested in investigating:
If a terrestrial surface is nearly horizontal (instead of slanted), nearly flat (instead of convex or concave), and sufficiently extended (relative to the size of the animal) and if its substance is rigid (relative to the weight of the animal), then the surface affords support. It is a surface of support, and we call it a substratum, ground, or floor. It is stand-on-able, permitting an upright posture for quadrupeds and bipeds. It is therefore walk-on-able and run-over-able. It is not sink-into-able like a surface of water or a swamp, that is, not for heavy terrestrial animals. Support for water bugs is different.2
1 Gibson, J.J., (1979) The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception, p.127.
2 Ibid.
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Furthermore, my cat and I both perceive each other. I place a bowl of milk on the table, she jumps up; I walk briskly towards the table, she shoots to the side to avoid me. I look at her, she mews loudly. More milk? “The richest and most elaborate affordances of the environment are provided by other animals and, for us, other people.”3 Here Gibson talks about affordances as
“rich”, which is significant, for given that both humans and other animals perceive affordances it opens up the possibility of talking about the perceptions and experiences of our cousins in the animal world as multifaceted and complex. A proposal many ethologists and cognitive scientists, along with lay people talking about their pets, would find intuitively appealing.
Yet this is where it gets difficult, for if I describe objects in the landscape first as tools, furniture, artefacts and equipment, only to then go on to explain them as affording grasping behavior (or similar basic behavior), in the example of say, a coffee cup, then the similarity of perception immediately seems to break down. A coffee cup only affords grasping behavior because I have some sort of understanding of what a coffee cup is. Whenever I grab a coffee cup, I grab it in order to drink coffee from it. Most of the time, I am not grabbing some indeterminate, amorphous, abstractly defined “object”: Indeed, most of the time I deal with things in all their immediate concreteness, and this implies some form of understanding. Whether one wish to talk about “background understanding”4 or “conceptual capacities”5, there seem to be more going on in my perceptions, than the perceptions of my cat. This “understanding” whatever it is taken to be, seems to not be confined to my perceptions of individual things, like tables or coffee cups, but be related to many of my dealings in the world, perhaps even to a form of cultural or rational understanding. Does my cat know that she is currently in the kitchen? This is the room in which she normally feeds, as do I, yet for me as a human, the kitchen is filled with apparati and
equipment of practical import to me, in virtue of me being able to use them to prepare food. My cat hardly relates to knives, forks, napkins, or pots and pans, nor does she know how to turn on the stove, or open the refrigerator. Not that she can do any of the latter things—after all, she’s a cat! But if our perceptions are dependent, not just upon our abilities and bodily constitution, but embeddedness and their related cultural skills, then it would seem that my cat simply does not
3 Ibid., p.135.
4 See the discussion by Mark Wrathall (2017) in the introduction to Background Practices: Essays on the Understanding of the Meaning of Being. p.4.
5 McDowell, J. (2006) Conceptual Capacities in Perception.
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perceive many of the objects as I see them in the kitchen at all, to her perceptual system, they are simply not there!
And it goes deeper: If the kitchen is dependent in its kitchen-ness on what I can do in it (and thus, pragmatically with it) then it would seem that the cat is currently not perceiving herself as in the kitchen, but in the “place-to-feed.” But both me and my cat find ourselves in the kitchen, the same kitchen, paradoxically enough, not perceived qua kitchen for one of us. The point is that the kitchen, at least to me as a human, seems to imply the rest of the house, and the house seems to imply the community in which we deal with this (and other houses) and the community seems to imply the culture out of which the community (of house living, kitchen dwelling people) springs. Many philosophers from Aristotle to Heidegger, and more recently McDowell, McIntyre and Midgley, have stressed this point: the crowning characteristic of us humans, broadly speaking, that we are encultured.6 It is in our nature to have a culture. Without a culture, we are not homo loquens nor Dasein nor rational animals. How is culture involved in our more basic perceptual rapport with the world? Has it little to do with, say, the way I move around a table, or perhaps everything to do with it? Does culture perhaps seep down and pervade even our experience of natural landscapes and simple objects, or does culture, only influence the more higher faculties tied to reasoning, technological skills and social comportment? One problem when it comes to the continuity between humans and animals, is that even though perception can be viewed as “smart” for both humans and animals, in our case, it might be dependent upon its strong embeddedness in a culture, which is one way of stating that the difference between us and other animals is that we inhabit a world, whereas other animals live in environments7.
In the by now well-known debate between John McDowell and Hubert Dreyfus8, which I will briefly review in chapter 2, the role of rationality for understanding perception is discussed.
Perception is for both philosophers, in many ways, a fundamental part of our “unproblematic openness to the world”9: Perception serves to disclose the world to us. McDowell takes
6 Of course, the philosophical debate often revolves around what enculturation means.
7 This distinction is first explicitly brought up at the mid-point in the McDowell-Dreyfus debate. See McDowell’s (2007) response to Dreyfus in What Myth? p.346.
8 The debate began with Dreyfus APA presidential address in 2005, in which he used the occasion to criticize McDowell originally titled “Myth of the Mental: How Philosophers Can Profit from the Phenomenology of Everyday Expertise” Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, Vol. 79, No.
2 (Nov., 2005), pp. 47-65. McDowell responded with What Myth? and thus, the debate was on. 50:4, 338-351, The full original exchange is collected in Inquiry.
9 Dreyfus, H. (2013) The Myth of the Pervasiveness of the Mental in Schear p.15.
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rationality, subtended by conceptual capacities unique to the human animal to “permeate perception”10. Dreyfus, on the other hand, drawing on Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty contends that we are not “full time rational animals”11, since most of the time we find ourselves absorbed in and by our activities in a form of perceptual flow. This is a phenomenon he calls “skillful coping”12. Now, skillful coping is neither in the space of causes, nor in the space of rationality, but in a “space of motivations.” This is a space in which we immediately respond to Gibsonian affordances. We perceive things in virtue of what we can do with them. A central theme of enactivism ever since it was introduced by Varela, Thompson and Rosch in the 1990’s.13
To both McDowell and Dreyfus, perception is in one way basic to their picture of us as animals in direct contact with the world. This general view can be contrasted with views on perception as representational, that is, experience as only indirectly related to the world.
However, McDowell and Dreyfus can be said to share a more general, one might say
phenomenological or existential project of accounting for the fundamentals of our contact with the world.
The reality of the contact with the world is the inescapable fact of human (or animal) life, and can only be imagined away by erroneous philosophical arguments. […] We all have to find our feet within the
boundary conditions of the same world, on the basis of the same kind of bodies, basic capacities, and so on.
Moreover, we all share the same basic needs: food, clothes, shelter, rest, and the like. […] Our first level [of communication] is the universally human, and is closely linked with our similarity as organic beings—
in certain cases, even with what we share with the animals.14
In this thesis I will follow McDowell and Dreyfus in this general outlook concerning our openness or contact with the world and ask the following question: What follows from the debate between the two philosophers for our understanding of not just human perception, but animal experience of their environments? Presumably, they (other animals) too should be seen as directly relating (skilfully coping) with and in their environments. The view of perception as fundamentally speaking a phenomenon that is world-disclosing in nature is compatible with
10 McDowell, J. (2007) What Myth? Inquiry, 50:4, 338-351, p.339.
11 Dreyfus, H. (2007) Return of the Myth of the Mental p.354.
12 This concept is so central to Dreyfus’ oeuvre that the first essay collection, a compilation of his early work published 2014 bears the title Skillful Coping: Essays on the Phenomenology of Everyday Perception and Action.
13 Varela, Thompson & Rosch (1993)
14 Dreyfus & Taylor (2015) p.107
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enactivism, which in recent cognitive science and phenomenology, roughly speaking, is the view that the active organism helps bring forth, or enact its environment. Dreyfus himself has been an influential figure in what has been called “post-cognitivism”15 which is related to enactivism.
Enactivism and “contact theories”16 of perception seems to open up a space within which focus can be provided the deep continuity17 of human and animal experience, as there are some quite fundamental capacities that purportedly are tied to perception. Take for instance the (in)famous four “E’s” of embodied cognition, that perception is embodied, embedded, enacted and
extended.18
However, as I will discuss in chapter 3, Dreyfus can be criticized for not being fully successful in uniting human and animals together in a space of motivation, by constructing a parallel space of human motivation. One explanation for Dreyfus’ failure to unite man and beast in one single basic space is his Heideggerian interpretation of affordances, which have a
tendency to produce only examples of cultural embeddedness. This focus on cultural embeddedness leads to a view I call “cultural penetration” (a term also used by professor Gallagher in his recent book on enactivism19, but used slightly differently by me, as his focus is more on intra-human social and intersubjective factors than on perceptions of the landscape) which views not just some, but most perception as saturated with cultural understanding. This, I argue has the consequence of leaving any discussion of affordances that can be viewed as
“natural” and shared between species, in the periphery. For now it would seem that there is little room for any natural perception in Dreyfus’ ontology. When affordances are viewed as the Heideggerian “Zuhanden” they are less able to account for shared human and animal perception than Dreyfus (and definitively Gibson) initially intended to open us up to. The whole point of affordances was to view them as basic to perception, and as such, possibly shared between many species. It could then help to close the infamous gap between humans and other animals, at least
15 Varela, Thompson & Rosch (1993) p.13.
16 See Dreyfus & Taylor, (2015) chapter four “Contact Theory: The Place of the Preconceptual.” p.71 in which they introduce the preconceptual as that with which we are immediately related as embodied beings, hence the “(direct) contact theory.” The “pre” in “Preconceptual” denotes the way no concepts need be included in a picture of us as animals in direct contact with the world. Importantly, humans and other animals are similar in this basic, unmediated contact with the world, for animals are not (for Dreyfus and Taylor) envisaged as being in possession of conceptual capacities.
17 Thompson, E. (2007). p.157.
18 See Gallagher (2017) section 2., and Wilson, R.A. and Foglia, L., (2017).
19 Gallagher, S. (2017) See section 6.4. “What is it that penetrates perception? Top-down, cognitive assumptions or beliefs? […] Or some broader features of human social life? Moods, affects traits, practices, and skills also can modulate perception (Siegel 2011). Some of these involve cultural factors.”
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as far as perception was concerned. One difficulty, I contend, lies in the concept of affordances:
What is a cultural, as opposed to a natural affordance? Perhaps in one way, there are no natural affordances, if “natural” here is conceived in the more classical, reductivistic sense of instincts, drives and mechanisms.
All animals, according to the theory of affordances, perceive things in virtue of their significances for them. If that is the conclusion, then we get back to the question of how to talk about the perceptions of non-human animals. Gibson, however as I will argue in chapter 4, faces problems as well. In his first iteration of what affordances consist in, they are always referred to in very general ways, as it would seem that the residue of the cognitivist way of speaking still lingers in his language, implicitly shaping his conceptual schemes. Gibson, refreshingly, talks about animals and humans as nearly the same in their response to affordances. However, particular differences in capacities, skills and responses in different species of animals and their respective differences are rarely discussed. Alasdair McIntyre on the other hand, is a philosopher who, more than any of the thinkers above, brings in an acute and sensitive focus to the difference, yet also to the fundamental similarities of one animal in particular, the dolphin, compared with human capacities and perception. He tries to show us how the dolphins are really not that different from us in the way they relate to the world. This focus on the capacities of different animal species is, I argue in chapter 5, a much needed correction to views that purport to separate humans and animals into different spaces, spaces within which their comportment and
perceptions are to be understood.
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II. Perception and the Role of Reason: The McDowell-Dreyfus Debate
Both philosophers Hubert Dreyfus and John McDowell are concerned with construing a positive account of what it is for a human being to be at grips with its world. Following their respective anti-dualistic strands of thinking, they both hold that we are directly20 in contact with the world.21 Thus understanding how perception, intelligence and action (three concepts that are interrelated for both philosophers) is tied to our being in-the-world, is an enterprise they share.
Now, the hyphenation of “being-in-the-world” points to the inherent holistic character of our embeddedness. This way of talking about perceptual, conceptual or rational embeddedness pops up in the phenomenological literature, perhaps to remind the reader that a perspective is always a perspective from somewhere. Take this quote from Gallagher & Zahavi that focuses on the
“insistence” of the world.
The world is experienced, not as a fully formed presence, but as a set of possibilities determined by an ongoing dynamic interplay of environmental opportunities and sensorimotor abilities. This is another way of saying that I am in-the-world, and that my experience is shaped by the insistence of the world as much as it is by my embodied and enactive interests.22
The goal is to overcome, or replace the picture of a mind that is separated from the world that it seeks to know.
The way in which we are in the world (reality) differs for the two philosophers however, as they have both in their respective writings focused on different sorts of capacities for
grounding us in the world we perceive. To illustrate this point, one can take this critical question Dreyfus presents against McDowell.
[A]lthough almost everyone now agrees that knowledge doesn’t require an unshakeable foundation, many questions remain. Can we accept McDowell’s Sellarsian claim that perception is conceptual “all the way out” thereby denying the more basic perceptual capacities we seem to share with prelinguistic infants and higher animals?23
20 As Dreyfus (2005) himself credits McDowell with in the introduction to the first essay in which he criticizes the latter’s conceptualism.
21 As Charles Taylor (2013) discusses in his essay Retrieving Realism dedicated to the McDowell-Dreyfus interchange, a lot of progress has been made in recent decades, as “the discussion which has developed out of the work of these authors has reached unparalleled articulation and sophistication” p.87
22 Gallagher & Zahavi (2012) p.111.
23 Dreyfus, H. (2005) p.47.
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The question in other words is: If it is true that we are directly and non-arbitrarily in contact with the world in which we live out our lives, and with which various objects and things we deal, what fundamental capacities do we need in order to be directly connected to the world the way we specifically are as human beings? Importantly, given our essential embodiment, are our capacities radically different from other animals, or rather similar enough for us to say that we do perceptually share the world with other creatures? It seems that for Dreyfus at least, one important motivation for the project of perceptually grounding us in the world is exactly that of not denying the perceptual capacities “we seem to share with prelinguistic infants and higher animals”. This latter claim is dependent upon a successful critique of McDowell however, a point I will return to later, for one essential question is if McDowell really rejects the
aforementioned basic and shared perceptual capacities shared by human infant, adult rational human, and non-human animal alike. Perhaps there are epistemological reasons contra
phenomenological ones for rejecting the similarity of perception between humans and animals in McDowell’s case?
This chapter is dedicated to account for and explain Dreyfus and McDowell’s views on conceptuality and perception with comments on the implication this has for our understanding of the roles they play in the lives of adult human versus animal perceptual agents.
If we humans are rational animals, then does that mean that even our bodily behavior should be viewed as rationally induced or otherwise dependent on rational capacities? McDowell says
“yes”, Dreyfus says “no”. Joseph Schear has recently gathered some central essays commenting what ended up being their disagreement on the exact nature of the mind’s relation to the world, and although it is not always easy to articulate the central issue at stake in the McDowell- Dreyfus debate, below is Schear’s suggestion, which I think is right:
The central issue at stake between Dreyfus and McDowell is the extent to which conceptual rationality is involved in our skillful embodied rapport with the world. […] McDowell urges that conceptual rationality is, as he puts it, “everywhere in our lives,” including in our skillful embodied comportment. Dreyfus, by contrast seeks to identify and describe forms of “absorbed coping” that do not come within the scope of conceptual rationality. […] We are not, Dreyfus urges, “full-time rational animals.”24
24Schear, J. (2013) p.2.
10 2.1.Perception as Disclosure
Both McDowell and Dreyfus agree that we have an unproblematic openness to the world. In fact, much of their philosophy is geared towards explicating our understanding as grounded in our direct engagement with the world.
Perception gives us access to the world, and is in Dreyfus’ case, at a basic, motivational (body-intentional) level tied to action, and serves the animal in its ongoing skillful coping. “[W]e are, […] always already in a world that is laid out in terms of our bodies and interests, and thus permeated by relevance.”25 For McDowell, on the other hand, even though he maintains that we as perceiving agents are in direct access to the world, in our case as rational animals, perception can be said to be rationally saturated. Perception is tied to our conceptual capacities because it serves not just our bodily comportment (a comportment he acknowledges we share with other animals) but our rationality.
A perceptual experience typically affords multiple opportunities for [acting, and] knowing that things are a certain way. […] Experience discloses the way things are, whether or not its subject has the means to make those aspects of its content explicit in judgement or assertions. And in either case, having it disclosed to one in experience that things are a certain way is already an actualization of capacities that are conceptual in the relevant sense.26
Viewing perception as embodied, directly tied to the world in which we find ourselves, and dependent upon our practices and activities is, regardless of the difference in how they reach this conclusion, something McDowell and Dreyfus share, as it is indeed essential to their project.
The details of what is involved in the connection between mind and world, and indeed what any connection implies, is the topic of the debate between the two collected in Mind, Reason and Being-in-the-World. What I now want to bring to the fore is the importance of the idea they share of our direct contact with the world.
The directness thesis is of utmost importance, for it turns out that the world in which we find ourselves and in which we perceive, is not alien to us, it is perceived as meaningful exactly because our experiences are that of active beings at grips with the world. It is the job of the Kantian and the Existential Phenomenologist to retrieve this implicit knowledge about our
25 Dreyfus, H. (2006) p.44.
26 McDowell in Schear (2013) p.43.
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embodied and embedded nature. Once the retrieval has been done, it then becomes clear that there are certain capacities and abilities that are tied to the disclosing of the (our) world that foster to sustain (subtend, penetrate, pervade etc.) our experiences of it. Investigation into what is included in embodiment and embeddedness then becomes possible.
We need to consider the possibility that embodied beings like us take as input energy from the physical universe and process it in such a way as to open them to a world organized in terms of their needs, interests, and bodily capacities, without their minds needing to impose a meaning on a meaningless Given.27
Both humans and animals perceive the world with the body as mediator, one might say, yet there are certain capacities that should be investigated with extra care, since they are seen as the enabler for disclosing a world in the first place. For McDowell these are rational (conceptual) and unique to us humans, yet for Dreyfus they are “one level down” from the rational plane, and the primary capacity for him is bodily skillful coping; capacities that Dreyfus claims we share with other non-human animals. Since these capacities were always working in the background, enabling us to have a world in the first place, before discussing its ontological or epistemological status, the world is found to be always already there. How do I know how to sit on chairs?
Because chairs are perceived as sittable; a fact that is inextricably tied to my bodily
predisposition to sit on chairs. How do I know that the picture on the wall is crooked? Because my senses inform me of this very fact. Could I be wrong about the crookedness of the picture?
Of course, but only when the lighting is bad, when I am under the influence of a drug, or find myself disoriented by lack of sleep or stress, because I was wrong that one time etc. We are not usually wrong about these things. When illusions, hallucinations and various counterexamples are presented in order to show us how it is that our perceptions about the world might run afoul, they often merely foster to confirm the general rule of perception: that its primary job is
connecting us to our surroundings. Skeptical arguments have a tendency to (in thought and theory) cover up the original fact of our unmediated contact with the world.28
27 Dreyfus, H. (2006) p.45
28 This is the main topic in Charles Taylor and Dreyfus’ (2015) collaborative work, Retrieving Realism.
12 2.2.Rational Capacities and Perception
McDowell’s project in Mind and World and elsewhere is to re-establish the contact of mind and world by avoiding the perilous pitfalls of the Myth of the Given. The critique of the Myth is the departure point, as we want to avoid it. “In taking experience to put their subjects in a position to have knowledge of the kind that is standing in the space of reasons, we risk falling into the Myth of the Given.”29 The myth of the given is the myth of the pure, bare original and un-interpreted fact, that functions as the raw material upon which the mind can bring in its concepts to render that which is given intelligible to perception and understanding. The given would then, given our discovery of it, function as the foundation for our knowledge about the world.
The question is fundamentally speaking what it is that is first given or presented to the knowing (and perceiving) agent in order for it to understand, and thus be open to, a world. What is the first basic building block that is encountered prior to any understanding or grasping of it?
The answer for McDowell is: Nothing. Nothing comes prior to understanding, for understanding is itself a part of the way we relate to the world.30 Upon turning our heads and describing the landscape before us, a kind of understanding has already taken place, as even in unfamiliar situations we are able to describe what we see. “Making the content [of the experience] in question explicit—even if the subject first has to acquire means to do that—does not make the content newly conceptual in any sense that is relevant to my claim. It was conceptual already”.31 Even if we have not yet grasped the full situation, the fact that we can talk about it means that what we see, hear, feel etc. was already linked to what McDowell, following Sellars, linked to
“the space of reasons”.
This is where what I take to be the continuity of human and animal perception faces its greatest challenge for McDowell. As I will later discuss, this space threatens to render even purportedly basic human perceptions, of affordances say, radically different from those experienced by other animals. The term “space of reasons”32 is of utmost importance for McDowell in accounting for the uniquely human mode of being in the world. As he explains “I have argued that rational mindedness pervades the lives of the rational animals we are, informing
29 McDowell, J. in Schear (2013) p.42.
30 McDowell, J. (2013) p.43 and (2007) p.344.
31 McDowell, J. (2013) p.43.
32 Ibid, p.42.
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in particular our perceptual experience and our exercise of agency.”33 Getting it right when it comes to the understanding of genuine human comportment can enable us to discern the difference between us and other animals as seen by this quote:
The idea of the conceptual that I mean to be invoking is to be understood in close connection with the idea of rationality, in the sense that is in play in the traditional separation of mature human beings, as rational animals, from the rest of the animal kingdom.34
But what are the motivations for establishing this space? In order for our perceptual experience about the world to ground our knowledge, to give us evidence and to allow us to produce knowledge claims propositions and conjectures, the experiences themselves must already be endowed with content of such a nature as to be able to be used in speech. Were this not the case, then the rational link to the world would be cut off. We would not be able to be at grips with it in the intuitive way we feel (at least most of the time) we are.
The epistemological significance of the experience of rational subjects is thatwhen our experiencing is perceiving, as it can be, features of the environment are perceptually present to us in a way that provides us with opportunities for knowledge of a kind that is special to rational knowers: knowledge that is, to echo Wilfrid Sellars, as standing in the space of reasons.35
When we for instance move about in our daily environment, be they human (as in an urban or domestic environment) or natural (hiking in the mountains, walking in the woods) we have the ability to talk about things, inform others of what we experience, and justify our claims about them. The fact that our claims about the world we experience can be justified shows that we find ourselves (always already) in the space of reasons.
There is an interesting underlying strategy here on McDowell’s part, and that is the fact that he seems go from the premise that knowledge exists, through the premise that perception informs this knowledge, to the conclusion that perception is rationally endowed. If it weren’t then how could we have knowledge? And knowledge is what we must have if we are to be rational animals in contact with the world. We thus seem to go from the intelligibility of the world out to the perceptual world. This is a Kantian strategy and a strategy that functions in the form of a transcendental argument.36
33 Ibid, p. 41, see also McDowell, J. (2006) Conceptual Capacities in Perception, p.1.
34 McDowell, J., (2007) p.338.
35 McDowell, J. (2013) p.42.
36 Stern, R. (2017) "Transcendental Arguments", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2017/entries/transcendental-arguments/>.
Especially section 1 and 2.
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Transcendental arguments often concern themselves with conditions of possibility, that is, with establishing arguments that purport to present the grounding or enabling conditions for something X to be X. The X in question is then often taken as an accepted claim, say, that we have experiences of the surrounding world. If Y then is taken as a necessary precondition for the possibility of X then Y must also be the case.37 For McDowell the fact that our experiences of the world (X) gives us knowledge about this world means that the necessary precondition (the
condition of possibility) of this fact is that perception is always already rationally endowed, that is, subtended by rational capacities (Y).
Resting content with a dualism of the sensory and the intellectual betrays a failure of imagination about the possibilities for finding the rational intellect integrally involved in the phenomena of human life. We should argue in the other direction. Actualizations of conceptual capacities, capacities that belong to their subject’s rationality, can present things in a sensory way, and that gives the lie to the dualism. 38
Humans then, qua rational animals, find themselves (ourselves) in the space of reasons, the space in which we exercise our rational capacities. But a question that arises then is how do we enter into this space? In whatever way our perceptions and understanding is to be described before we enter the space, we seem to reach a point in our maturation process in which we suddenly, and miraculously, simply enter into the space of reasons. The answer for McDowell is an appeal to what he, inspired by Aristotle, calls “second nature”39. It is second nature for us to acquire a language, and upon acquiring this language, we have, in virtue of having mastered it, been successfully inculcated into a culture. But even though it is an achievement to reach rational maturity, it is a part of the natural maturation process of every individual human being. So becoming rational is part of our nature as humans, but we are not born rational. That is the distinction drawn between “nature” and “second nature”. Importantly McDowell does
not restrict the [the concept of second nature] to operations of rationality, though I appeal to it only in that context. The concept of second nature applies to any responsive propensities that are not inborn or provided for by ordinary biological maturation but acquired through, for instance, training. Obedience to command is second nature to a trained dog, and of course it does not involve rationality.40
Using the expression of second nature is the ingenious way in which McDowell secures human capacities while avoiding the reductivistic tendencies of scientific naturalism, that often relegate
37 Ibid., section 1.
38 McDowell, J. (2006) Conceptual Capacities in Perception, p.11.
39 Ibid., p.4.
40 McDowell, J. (2013) p.51.
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human (and animal) capacities (like spontaneous movement, freedom and perceptual consciousness) to the “space of causes”.41
Human beings are ... initiated into ... the space of reasons by ethical upbringing, which instills the appropriate shape into their lives. The resulting habits of thought and action are second nature.42
Our rationality is thus something we acquire through being brought up in a culture with language.
Upon having learned the language that belongs to the culture in which we are brought up—and of course learning a language is not just acquiring a stock of words that is combined with
grammar, but learning how to use the language in the particular ways our culture allows—we are opened up to the space of reasons. So, McDowell holds that we have an unproblematic openness to the world, we are open, though (and presumably only open) through our rationality, as
understood through our conceptual capacities. But how is the conceptual tied to rationality?
The idea of the conceptual that I mean to be invoking is to be understood in close connection with the idea of rationality, in the sense that is in play in the traditional separation of mature human beings, as rational animals, from the rest of the animal kingdom. Conceptual capacities are capacities that belong to their subject’s rationality. So another way of putting my claim is to say that our perceptual experience is permeated with rationality. I have also suggested, in passing, that something parallel should be said about our agency.43
This way of describing our situation as human beings as that of openness to an already meaningful world is an interesting strategy, as it functions to dissipate certain attack from skepticism and their correspondingly covertly held myths, and not just overcome particular arguments.44 At least, that seems to be the general idea for McDowell, but as we shall see, also Dreyfus.
I mentioned above how the openness to the world for McDowell is achieved through our perceptions, perceptions that are rationally induced through our conceptual capacities.
Transcendentally speaking, that means that what is required for our openness to the world ends up being our inherent rationality, a rationality the perceptual openness cannot be understood without. One question is how conceptually articulated this rationality need be, for it to be the
41 Ibid.
42 McDowell, J. (1994) Mind and World p.84
43 McDowell, J. (2007) pp. 338-339.
44 For instance by, as Dreyfus and Taylor (2015) does in Retrieving Realism purporting to show that there are background “pictures” rather than individual theories and arguments, implicit in our culture, within which certain theories of say, “how the mind reaches the world” are taken to be obvious. See chapter 2, p.27.
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very conceptuality needed to ground judgement. Early McDowell seems to have a strict view concerning conceptuality, as described by Gallagher & Zahavi (2012)
On the position defended in his early work, perception must be conceptual (in a strong propositional sense) if it is to serve as reason to believe. That is, if perceptual information is to serve as a basis for such beliefs, according to McDowell it needs to have the same kind of content as our beliefs, namely conceptual or propositional content.45
One consequence for McDowell in the debate as explained thus far, is that if he really equates conceptual capacity with the ability (either as actualized or as potential) to propositionally articulate experiences, then that seems to lead to the conclusion that non-human animals and pre- lingual human infants, cannot in any way be said to have experiences. If one have too strict a definition on what perception, comportment and action is, then it is easy to deny truly intelligent behavior, rich perceptions, and meaningful experience where one is originally tempted to assign it, i.e. to animals, especially those often classified as “higher”, pets (with which ordinary,
everyday behavior and intentions we are most familiar) and human infants, which clearly display at least proto-intelligent behavior, that perceive the landscape around them, and that only wait to enter the space of reasons, the space in which they finally can bring to the level of articulation what it is that they indeed perceive. Perhaps Dreyfus fares better when it comes to avoiding overintellectualization of the human mind?
2.3. Overintellectualizing and A.I.
Dreyfus’ critique of certain ways of understanding human intelligence and comportment is well known, and bears repeating. Especially since avoiding misunderstandings when it comes to the human mind and its relation to the world can put us in a position to better understand animal minds, as the question of what we perceptually share with them can be brought into view. If we misunderstand the human mind, then we are bound to misunderstand the non-human one.
One of Dreyfus’ early (in)famous critiques was levelled against the emerging research on artificial intelligence (GOFAI: Good, Old Fashioned Artificial Intelligence46) According to Dreyfus the researchers took for granted certain unwarranted yet fundamental and uniquely
45 Gallagher & Zahavi (2012) p.112.
46 Dreyfus, H. (2014)) Part IV. Chapter 12., section 1.
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Western assumptions of how the human mind worked. Crucially, acquiring new skills, and learning novel things is taken to be an essential aspect of the intelligent (human) mind. Yet
Dreyfus (1992) argues that the way skill development has become understood in the past has been wrong.
He argues—using the earlier work of Heidegger in Being and Time—that the classical conception of skill development, going back as far as Plato, assumes that we start with the particular cases and then abstract from these to discover and internalize more and more sophisticated and general rules. Indeed, he argues, this is the model that the early artificial intelligence community uncritically adopted. In opposition to this view he argues, with Heidegger, that what we observe when we learn a new skill in everyday practice is in fact the opposite. We most often start with explicit rules or preformulated approaches and then move to a multiplicity of particular cases, as we become an expert. His argument draws directly on Heidegger’s account in Being and Time of humans as beings that are always already situated in-the-world. As humans
‘in-the-world’ we are already experts at going about everyday life, at dealing with the subtleties of every particular situation—that is why everyday life seems so obvious. Thus, the intricate expertise of everyday activity is forgotten and taken for granted by AI as an assumed starting point.47
The researchers took the mind to be operating intelligently only when it could process discreet, atomistic bits of information that would function as the raw material for thinking, and that, by being successfully processed by the mind/brain/computer, could produce intelligent behavior.
Dreyfus charged the A.I. scientists with overintellectualizing the mind, by relying on this convoluted way of viewing its operations. Why term this over-intellectualizing? Because the researchers took for granted that only through the manipulation of symbolic representations abstracted away from the particulars to which they refer, could the mind reach the world.48
Dreyfus’ critical strategy of utilizing the phenomenology of everyday perception and action to attack the underlying assumptions about intelligent behavior and perception (both in humans, human infants and non-human animals) is always in the background of Dreyfus’ work, and especially, as we shall see, in his critique of McDowell, that is why I will now briefly account for the charge of overintellectualization against A.I.
The idea of the mind-as-computer began as a research program inspired by advances in computer technology, coupled with staunch critique of fundamental tenants of the dominant psychological research programme leading up to behaviorism in the 50s. Behaviorism, though methodologically established and empirically confident, faced problems in the language
47 Stanford, Phenomenological Approaches to Ethics and Information Technology section 2.3.
48 Dreyfus, H. (2006) p.44.
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department.49 It proved difficult to account for the impressive language acquisition of most children; a language acquisition that was spontaneous, creative, fast and also seemingly rule- bound and systematic, when taken into account the poverty of their behavioral input/stimuli.
Behavior (language behavior in particular) seemed to not be enough; necessary perhaps, but far from sufficient for understanding how children acquired the complexities and sophistications of language with such ease. This is what lead linguist Noam Chomsky to formulate ideas such as the Language Acquisition Device (LAD), which was a mechanism internal to the (human) organism, and that ensured that the behavioral-perceptual input could be processed in such a way as to ascertain language acquisition proper, and not just an incidental, arbitrary obtaining.50 This internal turn proved highly potent for the explanatory power of the associated ideas, hypotheses and theories of the mind that ensued. Finally one could talk of the cognitive processes internal to the organism, processes now seen to be necessary for its dealings with the environment.
What is it that computers do? They are machines designed to solve specific problems based on taking in explicit, discrete pieces of information in order to produce a sufficient, often highly determinate, output. The output can vary in kind from numbers displayed on a screen, to the movement of a robotic arm in a way conducive to car-maintenance, to coffee brewing and the increasingly frequent robotic lawnmowers that self-propel through the landscape, eagerly cutting the grass outside university buildings. The problem is not that the analogy between the mind and machine was not consistently taken in and formulated into a research program by, for instance, the evolutionary psychologist51, but that it was taken for granted that the human mind was indeed a computer, through the implied assumption that it always had to work like a computer. Inspired by Charles Taylor we can claim that what the A.I. researchers and evolutionary psychologists did was to ontologize a good method.52 The ontologizing lies in taking a functional method (in-put
processing output, with explicit information as the raw material), essentially a process with clear conditions for success, and ontologizing it, that is, taking the entity that purportedly does the processing (the human mind) and viewing it as solely a thing that processes in order to produce satisfactory behavior. Much like how Descartes reified the thinking process (doubting, ascertaining, contemplating, calculating, ruminating etc.) and made the operations of the system
49 For a review see Laland, K.N. & Brown, G.R. (2011). Sense & Non-Sense: Evolutionary Perspectives on Human Behavior. Oxford University Press, chapter 2.
50 Chomsky’s (1967) influential critique of behaviourism is in his A Review of B. F. Skinner’s Verbal Behavior
51 Laland & Brown (2011), p.112.
52 Taylor, C. (1995) Overcoming Epistemology.
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into the (in)famous “thing that thinks” so did the cognitive scientist get stuck in the information processing metaphor.53
Computers were seen as the next great model for understanding the nature of the mind and its intelligence; this can be seen by the rise of the field of Artificial Intelligence (A.I.) in the 1950s and 60s. Not only could the human mind be seen as a computer, but computers and machines could, given the symmetry of the analogy, soon be seen as intelligent. To make machines intelligent would take time and work of course, but it should, not just in theory, but in principle be possible.54 As Charles Taylor puts it:
The latter is an excellent example of what I called the “over-determination” of the epistemological construal. The plausibility of the computer as a model of thinking comes partly from the fact that it is a machine, hence living “proof” that materialism can accommodate explanations in terms of intelligent performance; but partly too it comes from the widespread faith that our intelligent performances are ultimately to be understood in terms of formal operations.55
The difficulty in creating intelligent machines based on the computationalistic approach to the mind soon became apparent as by 1970 “[c]omputers couldn’t comprehend the simple stories understood by 4-year-olds”, this despite Marvin Minsky’s (head of MIT’s Artificial Intelligence Laboratory at the time) incredibly optimistic outlook just a few years earlier.56
So what was the problem? Hubert Dreyfus harshly (and now famously) criticized the original A.I. research program from the beginning, stating that they got the fundamental background assumptions regarding the mind wrong. In his critique, Dreyfus draws on
phenomenology, especially the phenomenology of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty. Heidegger was much concerned with equipment,57 tools and the practical intelligence and its projects.
Merleau-Ponty was himself concerned with how the body is endowed with its own form of intentionality, as it is non-reflectively directed at the world via absorbed skillful action.58 Dreyfus combines the ideas of the two phenomenologists in order to present his account of the phenomenology of “skillful coping”, which is a fundamental way of being in the world.
Dreyfus’s strategy is showing us that the contemplative mode of thinking, say when you write a
53 As Thompson (2007) states in Mind in Life each major approach to the study of the mind has its “preferred theoretical metaphor.” p.4.
54 Dreyfus, H. (2014) chapter 5, section 1.
55 Taylor, (1995).
56 Dreyfus, H. (2014) chapter 5, section 1.
57 Heidegger, M. (1953, 2010) (trans. Stambaugh, J.), p.68.
58 Merleau-Ponty, M. (2012) part one.
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master thesis or discuss with your philosopher friends, has a tendency to cover up what he presents as the “ground floor” of action and perception.
What Dreyfus highlighted in his critique of AI was the fact that technology (AI algorithms) does not make sense by itself. It is the assumed, and forgotten, horizon of everyday practice that make technological devices and solutions show up as meaningful. If we are to understand technology we need to ‘return’ to the horizon of meaning that made it show up as the artifacts we need, want and desire. We also need to consider how these technologies reveal (or disclose) us. For example the microscope can reveal us as
‘inquisitive’, the gun as ‘aggressive’, or the mobile phone as ‘communicative’, and so forth. The ongoing co-constitution of society and technology, phenomenology’s insight, can help us to understand and make sense of complex information technology, such as AI, but also more mundane technologies such as word processors (Heim 1999).59
When we move around in our daily environments, skillfully dealing and coping with things, we do so on, a largely unarticulated, and un-focused upon background, a background which sets up the meaningful relations of our world. The background itself is qua background not focused on, but recedes so as to allow us to bring our attention to the activity in which we are emerged. It is impossible to focus on everything at once, and since our activities necessarily are performed in contexts (actual places and situations) within which physical objects, people and other animals always plays a role, the background can be seen as the larger whole which allows these contexts to emerge.
A few examples are in order to clarify what this means. When we grab the door handle to enter the house, we do not focus on performing the task at hand, we simply respond in an appropriate way to door handles, i.e. by grabbing it and opening the door. Focusing specifically on the door handle as an object out there in the world simply makes it into a different thing altogether, and this only happens when there is something wrong with the door handle.
Furthermore the “wrong-ness” of the door handle becomes apparent only when we find ourselves unable to grab it in an appropriate way. One might say that we move into the contemplative, objective stance through a breakdown of the embodied luminousness of the situation: An immediate situation we always already find ourselves in. The absorbed mode of dealing with door handles is thus the condition of the possibility of encountering them in thought.
This means that the original situation of dealing appropriately with door handles (and thus doors, and houses in general) is primary, and it is only post hoc that we reify our dealings
59 Introna, L. (2017) Stanford, Phenomenological Approaches to Ethics and Information Technology section 2.2.
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with the world by making “mental maps”, “internal representations” and the like. The famous Heideggerian example is that of the hammer. For the hammer to “do its job” in our world qua hammer, it needs to recede into the background of our pragmatic world of nail-driving, carpentry and house building. If we focus on the hammer, it is much more difficult to drive in the nails.
And unexpectedly, when the hammer breaks down, we are encountering it in a different way, that is, we are encountering it as an entity that is no longer functional; that does not belong to our world of everyday practices and skills. This is the way to understand the background practices:
There are more things that we ignore than focus on, and the world in which we find ourselves and are familiar with is not the world of explicit, discrete information—information that require processing in order to be meaningful – but a world of significations, meaningful relations (manifested and expressed in the bodies of other humans, animals and plants) and manipulable objects and artefacts of our making. As Mark Wrathall succinctly point out in his introduction to Skillful Coping:
Dreyfus sees the world at its most basic level as a rich and fine-grained structure of functionality relationships. What we normally encounter is not a desk, and certainly not an object with properties of shape, dimension, color, hardness, and so on. What we first encounter is an affordance—a “for sitting at and writing on.” As Dreyfus puts it, the world is made up of “for-whats” not “whats”.60
Thus “skillful coping” is a fundamental way of being in the world in which reference to internal mental states are redundant, and “skillful coping” then turns out to be a technical term for Dreyfus. Our perceptions are not those of detached observers, making inferences based on explicit bits of information, rather they are that of engaged skillful copers, dealing with pragmata in an already meaningful world. “The meaningful objects … among which we live are not a model of the world stored in the mind or brain; they are the world itself.”61 A convenient summarization is presented by John Haugeland on Dreyfus’ What Computers Still Can’t Do
“[H]uman intelligence is essentially embodied; […] intelligent bodies are essentially situated (embedded in the world); […] and the relevant situation (world) is essentially human.”62
To wrap up my discussion of the critique of A.I. Dreyfus’ project is to establish a
fundamentally embodied and situated account of how humans are in the world. We perceive the world through what we can do in it, thus what we perceive is dependent upon 1. our bodily
60 Dreyfus, H. (2014), introduction.
61 Dreyfus, H. (2014): chapter 5 part 2
62 Haugeland, J. (1996) p.1.
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constitution and 2. our skills. What we first encounter then, in our essentially un-reflective dealings with the world are affordances for action. That we perceive affordances are important, for conceptually speaking, they play at least three different roles for Dreyfus. 1. they offer (afford) actions that in many cases are directly drawn out of the body, and thus, directly
responded to. 2. they can be thus perceived and responded to without recourse to mental (internal) or symbolic representations and 3. they are perceptually basic, as no higher order thinking (meta cognition) or consciousness need play a role in our fundamental rapport with the world.
Note too that the affordances detected and responded to by active involved beings are situation specific.
This door does not simply afford going in and out but affords going in and out cautiously, and/or quickly, and/or silently, and/or unobtrusively, that is, in whatever way is called for by the whole situation.63
It is important for Dreyfus that we always already find ourselves in a meaningful world, even when we postulate theories about this world.
Only if we stand back from our engaged situation in the world and represent things from a detached theoretical perspective do we confront the frame problem. That is, if you strip away relevance and start with context-free facts, you can’t get relevance back. Happily, however, we are, as Martin Heidegger and Maurice Merleau-Ponty put it, always already in a world that is laid out in terms of our bodies and interests, and thus permeated by relevance.64
As such, our theories and thoughts can cover up, that which we first encounter, which are the “for-whats” that make up our perceptual world. As shown in the door handle example, the affordances we first encounter can later be turned into more clearly articulated objects, that then can serve as not just objects out there in the world we can bring to articulation at the level of language (that we can point to and talk about in situ), but later abstracted away from their concrete situation and made into the objects of thought. Crucial for Dreyfus is the notion that thinking is a secondary activity that only comes in later, an activity that is brought to bear on the aspect of a familiar situation that breaks down into unfamiliarity. Thinking, which for Dreyfus is tied to conceptuality, language use and problem solving, is fundamentally detached from the situation it stands in relation to. And that is exactly the point: When the tools we use breaks down, or when unexpected things happen to us, the flow of activity is disrupted, and the phenomenon of total absorption, in which there were no experiential distinction to be made between us (the subject, agent etc.) and the activity, is turned into a relation between two distinct entities: the agent and the world. For Dreyfus, thinking is an activity unique to humans, as it is an
63 Dreyfus, H. (2005) p.56.
64 Dreyfus, H. (2005) p.49.
