The Quest for Peace in Kawthoolei:

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The Quest for Peace in Kawthoolei:

The Strategies, Outcomes, and Sustainability of

Peacebuilding in Southeastern Myanmar, 2012-2020

Klo Kwe Moo Kham

Master of Arts in Human Geography Dept. of Sociology and Human Geography

University of Oslo, Spring 2021

Word Count: 49 500

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Acknowledgements

Many thanks to my two supervisors for invaluable guidance. To Kristian Stokke, Professor at the University of Oslo (UiO), a heartfelt thanks for all the support throughout this process and since my BA studies. I owe a great intellectual debt to you for having shaped my understanding about complex aspects of society. To Marte Nilsen, Senior Researcher at the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), thank you for your warm welcome to PRIO and help along the way. I am particularly grateful for your advice during the online data collection process and useful inputs after that.

A number of institutions and other individuals deserve to be acknowledged here. I thank PRIO for having hosted me through its PRIO-UiO MA Student Programme. Beyond the excellent research environment, I am especially thankful for the permission to work at the HQ during the Covid-19 lockdowns. The Department of Sociology and Human Geography at UiO, which has been my academic home during the past five years, deserves a thanks for showing understanding when I needed a few more days to complete this thesis. A big thanks, moreover, goes to Ludvig Fæhn and Marianne Mosberg for their careful reading and useful comments on earlier drafts of this thesis.

Finally, my greatest thanks go to my research participants who have trusted and helped me along this process. In representing your lived realities, I hope to have avoided doing injustice. I have kept you in my thoughts while working on this thesis following the military coup that overnight has turned your lives completely upside down. I sincerely hope that one day very soon, you, the people of Kawthoolei, and all the diverse people of Myanmar may be able to live peacefully.

Klo Kwe Moo Kham Oslo, June 2021

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Summary

Amidst the continuing uncertainties that followed the recent military coup in Myanmar, this research takes a step back and critically investigates parts of the peacebuilding efforts of the past decade. More specifically, it looks into the local dynamics of peacebuilding between the State of Myanmar and the Karen National Union (KNU) in the security, governance, and development sectors in southeastern Myanmar, a region locally known to Karen people as Kawthoolei. Drawing on semi-structured interviews with key Karen actors, including military and political leaders of KNU, and on an extensive review of document sources, the research observes that a slow and hidden continuation of war by other means had persisted in Kawthoolei throughout the 2010s.

That is, rather than conflict resolution, it finds that the Burmese military-led peacebuilding has in its fundamental been a process of conflict containment. Among other ways, by waging a silent war in KNU’s last stronghold, by expanding and cementing its civilian state structures into ethnic Karen areas, and by opening the former combat zones to the market forces, the state has sought to achieve hegemonic territorial, political, and economic control over the region. The form of peace achieved has been one of negative character, where the underlying causes of the conflict remained unresolved, but one that has also been constantly contested and reshaped due to the state’s multi- sectoral encroachments on Karen territories. As the “peacebuilding" in this context has come to mean conflict containment, its potential to produce a sustainable peace remains limited.

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1 Introduction

After over six decades of civil war and half a century of military rule, the initiation of reforms in Myanmar in early 2010s came as a surprise to many, including close observers of a country formerly compared to today’s North Korea. Election was held, long-time political prisoners released, freedom of expression restored, democratization process begun, peace negotiations initiated, and more (Lall, 2016). For the first time in many decades, major structural transformations were to take place, or so it seemed. Broadly speaking, three broad processes of change may be identified during the past decade: i) economic liberalization, ii) political democratization, and iii) conflict transformation or peacebuilding. Finally, it was Myanmar’s turn to transform to become a democratic, peaceful, and prosperous country, many people thought.

About a decade later, as I am finalizing this thesis in late May 2021, Myanmar finds itself at yet another critical crossroads in its modern history. The coup d’état staged by the Burmese military, or Tatmadaw, on the 1^st of February has put a halt to the flawed democratization process, stalled the peace processes, and caused havoc to the economy. Hundreds of unarmed protesters have been ruthlessly slaughtered on the streets by the coup makers, as the world community has stood by and watched the events. Key debates center around a few questions, including explanations of why the coup took place, policy advice on how external actors can best assist the country, and predictions of what the outcomes could be. In contrast to the earlier optimism, observers now warn of “Asia’s next failed state” (The Economist, 2021).

Amidst the chaotic situation, this research project takes a step back and looks critically into parts of the reforms of the 2010s. In fact, it began about a year before the coup with the goal to study one of the aforementioned processes of change, namely that of peacebuilding. In light of the uncertainties brought by the recent coup, regardless of its outcomes in relation to democracy, peace, and development, it is in itself important to rigorously study the peacebuilding process of the past decade, as significant amounts of time, energy, and resources have been invested into it.

In addition, and perhaps more importantly, it may also help shed light on the currently unfolding situation in Myanmar and the future prospects of peace and democracy in the country.

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1.1 Research Objectives and Questions

There are two specific objectives of this research project. Whereas one objective is to study the case in its own right by seeking to obtain a clear understanding of parts of the peace process in Myanmar, as an attempt to add to the empirical knowledge about it, another objective is to use the case to engage with the broader literature on peacebuilding, particularly on domestically led peacebuilding. These objectives are important because academic literature on peacebuilding in Myanmar is presently limited. Moreover, although there exist important works assessing the state of the formal peace process and reporting on the changes on the ground, works that engage the case with peace theories and concepts remains limited. Thus, key objectives are to i) add to the empirical understanding and ii) bridge it to broader debates on peacebuilding.

Local Peacebuilding in Kawthoolei

It should be noted from the onset that this project looks specifically at local peacebuilding in southeastern Myanmar, a region that is home to the ethnic Karen nationality and locally known to Karen people as Kawthoolei (Garbani & Walton, 2020). The scope of a master’s thesis naturally requires one to limit the focus in order to make it feasible. Particularly true is it for the case of Myanmar, which is home to one of the world’s most complex intra-state conflicts and which involve about 20 Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) that have been fighting the government since independence over demands of self-rule (Burke et al., 2017). However, the choices to focus on Kawthoolei, instead of other regions in the country, and on local peacebuilding, instead of the national level peace negotiations, are made purposively.

The main reason behind the choice of focusing on Kawthoolei lies in the fact that, in addition to being home to Myanmar’s longest war, it is claimed and represented by Karen National Union (KNU) which is arguably the most important EAO involved in the peace process. Its importance lies not only in its military and civilian size as an EAO, but also in its role as a leader among the EAOs involved in the national peace process. When KNU signed the first preliminary bilateral ceasefire agreement (CFA) in January 2012, it had fought successive governments continuously for 62 years (Keenan, 2012). Three years later, along with seven other EAOs, it

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signed the so-called Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA). Given its staunch position against accepting ceasefire in the 1990s when most other EAOs did, the emergence of KNU ‘from the bush to the capitol’ as a peace advocate makes it important and interesting to study.

The choice of Kawthoolei and KNU is thus based both on the need for research-based knowledge on this important case, and its centrality in the politics of peace after Myanmar’s transition from direct military rule.

The drivers of armed conflict in Myanmar are distinguished between those at the national level where the core causes are i) civil-military relations, ii) state-society relations, and iii) central-local rule, and those at the local level where the proximate causes are i) control over territories, ii) authority over populations, and iii) access to resources (see figure 1).

Peacebuilding during the last decade can similarly be distinguished between national and local negotiation and implementation efforts.

Instead of focusing on KNU’s participation in the national level negotiations that sought to resolve the issues of central-local rule or the question of federalism, this project focus primarily on local peacebuilding on the ground where control over territories (security), authority over population (governance), and access to resources (development) are being contested and renegotiated as a way to build peace. Although the scales of peacebuilding are closely interconnected, with the one directly or indirectly affecting the other, the choice to primarily focus on the local is motivated by a key observation.

The observation is that while the negotiations have made little progress towards reaching a political settlement that could put an end to the conflict in Kawthoolei, significant changes and

Figure 1: Causes of Conflicts (Based on Burke et al., 2017)

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activities have taken place on the ground during the past decade. In fact, empirical evidence on the ground point to both changes and lack thereof in security, governance, and development, including the persistent militarized presence of Tatmadaw in the war zones, a significant expansion of civilian government structures into ethnic Karen areas, and an increase in economic development activities in Kawthoolei (Jolliffe, 2016). This prompts a number of questions. What does it mean for the quest for peace that the core conflict issue, i.e. federalism, struggles to be addressed in negotiation while realities on the ground are fast-changing in many areas and ways? Do they support the process of peacebuilding, risk prolonging the conflict, or hold neutral effects?

The local level of peacebuilding is generally understudied in Myanmar. While there are multiple analyses of the national level peace negotiations (Kipgen, 2015; Thawnghmung, 2017), there are few if any substantial assessments of peacebuilding at the local level since the ceasefire negotiations in 2012 and onwards. This might have to do with the lack of access to local communities and poor communication due to lack of language competence among researchers.

With local language knowledge, I consider myself, therefore, as uniquely positioned to fil the gap in knowledge about peacebuilding at this local level.

Theory Development/Refinement

The case of peacebuilding in Myanmar also represents an opportunity to engage with debates about peacebuilding in general. Since the 1990s, the literature on peacebuilding has been dominated by the so-called liberal peace, which involves joint international efforts to help bring about peace in war-torn countries (Chandler, 2017). The dominance of this form of peacebuilding has neglected the emergence of other alternatives, including domestic peacebuilding where the main actors are local rather than international (de Oliveira, 2011). Although it is important to acknowledge the significant role of international actors, the peace process in Myanmar is mainly a domestic one.

Therefore, in addition to studying in its own right, it is also interesting to link it to more general debates about the conditions and ways in which peace can be made by differently situated actors.

Academic works on peacebuilding in Myanmar, as previously mentioned, are limited and few have studied the case with explicit reference to the broader peacebuilding literature. In fact,

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the article by McCarthy & Farrelly (2020) titled ‘Peri-Conflict Peace: Brokerage, Development, and Illiberal Ceasefires in Myanmar’s Borderlands’, published as part of a special issue on illiberal peacebuilding in Conflict, Security & Development, is to my knowledge the only work of that kind. While rich in empirical details from which this thesis will partly draw, other works on peace dynamics in Myanmar (Brenner, 2019; Kyed, 2021; Lall and South, 2014) have made little if any reference to the general peacebuilding literature. Thus, building on the existing empirical studies and on the emerging literatures on domestically led peacebuilding, I join a debate on how domestic actors in conflict affected Kawthoolei have attempted to build peace on their own terms.

Research Problem and Questions

To address the above-mentioned knowledge gaps, this thesis is guided by the following research problem statement: The characteristics of local peacebuilding in Kawthoolei during the 2012-2020 period. It seeks to address questions about the form of peace evident on the ground, and the locally embedded strategies, processes, and actors that have combined to produce it. Moreover, as peace is inherently normative, it is important to question the transformative power, or lack thereof, the peacebuilding model has for the creation of a sustainable peace. To break apart the research problem, I have formulated the following research questions (RQs):

1. What are the peacebuilding strategies of the involved actors?

2. What characterizes the form of peace that has been achieved so far?

3. What is the sustainability of the peacebuilding model observed?

These questions are purposefully asked in order to establish factual statements about the strategies involved, the forms of peace achieved, and the sustainability of the form of peacebuilding in Kawthoolei. A predominant focus will be given to the first question. This is because, as the process has yet to be concluded, the outcome remains open-ended and must be understood as the direction towards which it goes. The first and second questions (strategies and outcomes) are closely linked and will be sought answered with reference to theoretical concepts, e.g. whether they are liberal, hybrid, or illiberal in form. The third RQ (sustainability), in contrast, is somewhat normative. It is,

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however, important to ask and the answer to it will be based on an overall assessment of the empirical evidence that are generated and of the research participants perceptions about it.

The questions will be answered by looking into local dynamics of peacebuilding in the three key sectors, namely security, governance, and development, which constitute the arenas where the proximate causes of conflict are being battled, renegotiated, and reorganized by the conflict actors. While looking at all three sectors undoubtedly makes this project an ambitious one, I see this brevity not only as feasible but appropriate and even necessary to obtain complete answers to the questions asked. This is because these sectors are intrinsically linked to one another.

The construction of a road for development in a Kawthoolei area during the ceasefire, for instance, would inevitably also have important implication for territorial control and population governance.

Moreover, instead of seeking in-depth knowledge of, for example, one specific area within governance (e.g. education) or within development (e.g. agriculture), the goal is rather to identify and make sense of patterns of events and changes on the ground within all three sectors in order to draw conclusions about peacebuilding strategies, outcomes, and sustainability. Finally, although the focus is on the local level peacebuilding between KNU and the state in the 2012-2020 period, the case cannot be studied in isolation. Important factors such as pre-2012 history, national level politics, other local factors (e.g. other armed Karen actors), the role/impact of international actors, and the recent coup situation will be brought up along the way where relevant.

1.2 Theory, Methods, and Limitations

The research project is designed as a theory-informed qualitative case study which entails an in- depth investigation of the phenomena in question. Key concepts within the peacebuilding literature will be used to inform the analysis of the empirical evidence.

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7 Theory

Theoretically, I approach the case mainly through the currently emerging literature on illiberal peacebuilding (Smith et al., 2020; Lewis et al., 2018). Illiberal peacebuilding means such as predation, clientelism, cronyism and corruption, though neglected in the literature, have been used by many actors in in conflict affected societies (de Oliveira, 2011; Lewis & Sagnayeva, 2020). In Myanmar as a whole, ceasefires and violent counterinsurgency strategies of the state have historically existed together and continues to do so (Kramer, 2009; Ruzza, 2015). Moreover, the significant increase in economic activities in the region since the 2012 ceasefire calls for a need to study how economic means are combined with military and political strategies in order to contain or resolve armed conflicts. In seeking to understand peacebuilding strategies in Kawthoolei, I examine whether and how violent and economic means have been employed by the state.

In addition, I also draw to a lesser extent on the literature on hybrid peacebuilding (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013). Although hybrid peace literature emerged as critique of and an alternative approach to peacebuilding, I consider the concept of hybridity as transferable to study domestically led peace processes. It is relevant in this study because local attempts to solve the proximate causes of conflict in Kawthoolei – through hybridization of different interests, institutions, practices, etc. - have so far resulted in some forms of hybrid arrangements in the security, governance, and development sectors. This literature has been used to answer questions about strategies and outcomes by tracing the hybridization processes that have produced the outcomes, and by examining how the factors producing the current form of peace are opening or closing the opportunities for the creation of a more positive form of peace (Galtung, 1964). Chapter 3 provides a more detailed presentation of these theoretical approaches as well as how peace research has been approached by human geographers.

Methods

Methodologically, the case has been approached through a retroductive research strategy that seeks to identify the relations and mechanisms behind observable patterns in the chosen case. Qualitative methods have been most suitable to approach the research questions which concern complex social

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processes. I have conducted 13 online semi-structured interviews with key informants, who include top- and local-level KNU and KNLA leaders, civil society organizations, and expert observers, in the period between August 2020 and January 2021. Five additional semi-structured interviews conducted by a PhD candidate have also been used. The length of the interviews varies between 45 and 120 minutes. Additionally, I have used detailed existing document sources which include not only academic works, reports, journalistic articles, but also unique data (e.g. YouTube data) in Karen language which has not previously been made available to international research.

In terms of analysis strategies, I have used process tracing and thematic analysis to analyze the different parts of the data intended to answer different questions. All data have been treated through latent analysis, which involves interpretation beyond what is explicit in the data (Braun &

Clarke, 2006). To make sense of the data intended to answer RQ1 and RQ2, process tracing has been an appropriate analytical strategy (Beach & Pedersen, 2013). Through identification of strategies and outcomes, and through the construction of causal mechanisms between them, a set of theoretically and empirically grounded explanations – of what happened, how it happened, and what it has led to – has been possible. To analyze the data intended to answer RQ3, I used thematic analysis to look for latent themes in particular aspects of the data and present them as a coherent story (Cope, 2016).

Although the initial plan of conducting fieldwork turned out to be impossible due to Covid- 19, the primary interview data and the extensive use of existing data have provided me with a fairly good understanding of the situation. Chapter 4 provides a more detailed presentation and justification of my methodological choices and critically reflect on their strengths and weaknesses.

Limitations

While constantly making sure that the research design and implementation is as rigorous as possible, I also acknowledge important limitations of this thesis research. First, studying the case from a distance without having been to the site necessarily limits the degree of knowledge and understanding I have been able to gain of the complex events and processes that have been taking place on the ground. Second, since the peace process in Myanmar is a broader one, my exclusive

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focus on Kawthoolei areas cannot and is not intended to be generalizable about how the peace process has been embodied in other parts of the world. I hope, however, that insights into dynamics of local peacebuilding in this region can shed light on peace processes as a broader phenomenon.

Third, it is a limitation that this study is “Karen-centric” in that perspectives from the government have not been incorporated. Since I at an early stage realized that it would be difficult, if not impossible, for a student researcher from afar to collect primary data from Burmese state officials, I purposely designed this research with a focus on ethnic Karen perceptions and experiences. It is thus a limitation that the state officials have not been given an opportunity to explain and justify their policies and actions. Nevertheless, it remains important to listen to the voices and concerns related to the peace process of Karen actors and civilians on the ground. I should also note that my shared ethnic background with the studied group may have implications for the findings. A critical account of my researcher’s role is given in chapter 4.

1.3 Structure

The next chapter present a background analysis of the conflict between the State of Myanmar and KNU, focusing particularly on the cause, emergence, and developments of the conflict since its inception. Chapter 3 presents a review of the peacebuilding literature and the theoretical concepts that will be used to inform the analysis chapters. Three major approaches to peacebuilding, namely the dominant liberal peacebuilding, the recent turn to hybrid peacebuilding, and the emerging illiberal peacebuilding, will be presented. Chapter 4 presents and justifies the methodological choices made throughout the research design and accounts for their strengths and weaknesses. In addition, I also reflect on my role and my own experiences in the research process.

The next five chapters are analytical. Respectively, chapter 5, 6, and 7 critically analyse the peacebuilding strategies of the involved actors in security, governance, and development sectors. Depending on suitability, each of these chapters are organized differently, with the main aim of answering question about strategies. Next, follows chapter 8, which discusses the outcomes of the peace in each sector and the sustainability of the form of peacebuilding. Chapter 9 returns to the literature and discusses the theoretical lessons that can be extracted from the case of at hand.

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It discusses how the form of peacebuilding seen in Kawthoolei during the past decade can contribute to our understandings of the conditions under which peace can or cannot be created.

Finally, chapter 10 gives a summary of the thesis and answers to the RQs.

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2 War and Peace in Kawthoolei

This chapter presents a background analysis of the case in question. I start by briefly presenting Myanmar’s post-independence political trajectories. Next, I contextualize the Karen conflict within the broader civil war and describe roughly how the now 72-year long struggle has evolved throughout the decades. Finally, I present an account of the changing post-2012 relations between KNU and the government of Myanmar.

2.1 Myanmar’s Post-Colonial Politics

Myanmar, formerly named Burma, has been at war with itself since independence from Britain in 1948, making it one of the world’s longest ongoing wars (South, 2011). The Southeast Asian country is diverse in terms of religion, ethnicity, linguistics, and culture. While Bamar is the majority ethnic group, a large number of minority ethnic nationalities groups exists. The largest of these are the Shan, Karen, Kayah, Kachin, Mon, Chin and Arakan people, making up about 1/3 of the 53 million populations (Charney, 2009). Karen is the third largest ethnic group in the country.

Administratively, the country is divided in 7 Bamar-dominated regions and 7 ethnic-based states, with an administrative hierarchy that goes from central government, down to the regional/sub-state government, townships, village tracts, and villages.

To fully grasp the modern politics of Myanmar, it is of crucial importance to understand its experience of colonialism, especially in relation to the British employed divide and rule strategy. As noted by Selth (1986, in Garbani & Walton, 2019), it is difficult to overstate how colonialism, including the World War II (WWII), exacerbated interethnic tensions between the Bamar and Karen. Ever since the colonization of Burma in 1885, Karen and other ethnic groups had been made to serve in the colonial administration (including police) and in suppressing Bamar nationalist resistance against British colonial rule (Smith, 1991). The interethnic tensions and intercommunal violence were exacerbated during WWII when the anti-colonial Bamar nationalists for a while sided with the Japanese while Karen fought alongside the British colonial masters.

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The periods before prior to and after independence in 1948 were characterized by political instability, and disagreements about how and by whom the country should be governed (Smith, 1991). For instance, while there were opposing communist vs. liberal forces within the Bamar nationalists, within and between the minority ethnic groups, there were differing opinions whether or not independent statehood or federalism should be pursued. In the case of the Karen, the struggle started well before independence. Contrary to popular beliefs, despite different opinions about federalism vs. independence, there was indeed an initial dominant openness to federalism (Garbagni & Walton, 2020). It was only after the escalating intercommunal violence and the massacres committed by Bamar nationalists, which fueled the Karen fear of being marginalized in a future independent Burma, that the Karen leaders leaned more towards independent statehood.

The event of independence in 1948 was shortly after followed by the armed outbreaks by the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) and the Karen National Union (KNU) (Lintner, 1991). The move to take up arms, according to popular Karen understanding, was because there were no other alternatives (Garbagni & Walton, 2020). The CPB and KNU, both of whom used to exercise significant influence in the urban power center though in different ways, were now waging a post- colonial war against the central government. By the 1950s, both were forced to retreat to the peripheries. CPB retreated to the northeastern region, while KNU to the southeastern region of the country (Lintner, 1990). For KNU, southeastern Myanmar served in the coming decades as its

‘liberated zones’ and later the central point for the broader inter-ethnic democracy movement.

The military coup in 1962 marked another dramatic shift in the country’s political history.

According to the military, also known as the Tatmadaw, the most important reason for the coup was to avoid chaos of potential federalism (Smith, 1991). The 1950s saw growing unrest also by other ethnic groups because the earlier promise of federalism was not honoured as agreed upon in the 1947 Panglong agreement. Several EAOs were formed after the coup in 1962, including the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO). The self-perception of the military, which remains well alive today, is that a centralized state and strong military is needed in order to guard the country against disintegration of the union, disintegration of the national unity, and to ensure perpetuation of sovereignty (Callahan, 2003). The complete military rule that followed led to military capture of the state, economy, and all spheres of life.

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Led by dictator Ne Win, the military’s isolated the country and introduced the so-called Burmese Way to Socialism which entailed the nationalization of the economy was nationalized and isolationist policies. However, despite claiming that it intervened in politics to maintain the sovereignty and integrity, Bertil Lintner, a long-time observer of Myanmar’s politics, argues that:

Rather than fighting the rebels, Ne Win and his 4^th Burma Rifles spent the latter part of the 1950s building up a power base – and a business empire that in many ways endures today – centered around his regiment … Thus, the power structure that emerged in Myanmar after 1962 had more to do with preserving an order that hugely privileged the military in an otherwise collapsing society than the fact that the officers had seen fierce combat.

(Lintner, 2021).

The emergence of the military into politics – soon followed by a repressive economic system, heavy militarization and “Bamarnization” the state, and forced assimilation of ethnic nationalities – had the opposite effect in that it led to increased ethnic grievances about self-determination (Smith, 1991). A number of new ethnic armed organizations emerged, and war intensified in Myanmar’s borderlands. There is thus a dialectical relation between the centralized, majoritarian, and militarized state and the emergence of armed movements in the country.

The rule of Ne Win continued until 1988 when Bamar student-led popular uprisings began, triggered by an oppressive economic system and a desire for democracy. These events later led to a “self-coup” within the military and marked a new period (Jones, 2014).

Than Shwe, the new dictator serving as a head of state reform from 1992 to 2011, introduced a partial liberalization of the economy. In addition, the military secured ceasefires with most of the EAOs in the north, which materialized due to constant military offensives and economic development incentives (Sadan, 2016). This also coincided with post-cold war geopolitical changes that led China and Thailand to promote economic cooperation with the regime in Yangon. Avoiding political dialogue, the new regime instead promoted clientelist economic relations with the leaders of the northern EAOs in a process referred to as ceasefire capitalism (Woods, 2011), which involved joint resource extraction between the military, military-cronies, Chinese business actors, and leaders of the EAOs (Kramer, 2009). Through this system which they

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created and led, the Tatmadaw further strengthened its military capacities and economic power and enabled the commanders to enrich themselves.

It is from this position of strength and dominance that the military initiated the political changes in the early 2010s through its so-called ‘discipline-flourishing democracy’ road map, with its self-penned 2008 Constitution as the backbone (Jones, 2014a). The institutionalization of the hybrid political regime that emerged meant that, despite some positive democratic reforms, the military regime continued to enjoy political and economic dominance. The 2008 Constitution guarantees it 25 % of the seats on parliament and control the three most important ministries – Border, Defense, and Home Affairs – regardless of election outcomes (Stokke et al., 2017).

Furthermore, the requirement that any constitutional amendments need more than 75 % of the votes ultimately gave the military veto power and meant that they intended to stay in power, politically and economically.

In short, politics in Myanmar has since 1962 been dominated by the military. Creating the image that it is the “savior” of the country’s sovereignty while ignoring ethnic minority groups’

call for autonomy, the military has hold onto power and gradually become the dominant political and economic force in the country. The country has seen important changes in 1998 and 2011, in relation to partial economic and political liberalization. Yet, the following periods also saw continuity in military dominance of politics and economy. Finally, it should be noted that there are in principle two kinds of conflict in Myanmar, one over state form (central/federal) and one over government form (democracy/authoritarianism), which are closely interwoven.

2.2 The Never-Ending War in Kawthoolei

Starting in 1949, the war in Kawthoolei is Myanmar’s longest running war. Karen people number between 3 to 7 million and reside mainly in the southeastern part of the country, but a significant number of them also live in the urban areas like Yangon (Charney, 2009). The group is internally diverse and differs in religion, linguistics, dialectics, education, class, and political convictions.

Although the movement’s leaders initially called for independence, the call was shortly after changed to autonomy in a federal democratic union (Garbagni & Walton, 2020). The movement

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is led by Karen Nation Union (KNU) and its armed wing Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA). Geographically, Kawthoolei is used to refer to southeastern Myanmar (see map 3).

72 years after it was started by an educated Karen elite who emerged out of the colonial administration, the Karen movement continues to call for self-rule. Although the movement had been driven out of the urban post-colonial power center by the 1950s, KNU remained a politically and militarily strong opponent to the state. It established a sophisticated governance system, including education, health, and justice line departments. With relatively firm territorial control over Southeastern Myanmar, it operated as a de facto government in the decades that followed independence. In the context of the isolationist economy introduced by Ne Win’s regime in 1962, KNU’s control of the informal Thai-Myanmar border trade enabled it to finance its movement.

Tho Doo, a former KNLA leader, now in diaspora, recalled the 1970-1980s as follows:

In those days, KNU was at its prime of life, economically and militarily strong. Mining, logging, and taxation made it economically strong. Neighboring Thailand also treated KNU with respect. Arms brokers also supplied KNU with surplus arms and ammunitions from the Vietnam and Cambodia civil wars. Strongholds were built along the Moei river and caused a big challenge to the Tatmadaw. (Tho Doo, Interview).

In addition to the relative power, the Karen movement was also at the political forefront in advocating democracy. Particularly after the 1988 uprisings, KNU allied with the ethnic Bamar democracy movement that emerged out of it. KNU’s long-time headquarter, Manerplaw, became their operational center. However, this was short-lived as the period was also paralleled by the beginning of a steep decline in the strength of KNU. First, the constant military offensives that had begun in the mid-1980s had weakened the movement militarily (Tho Doo, interview). KNU suffered significantly in this period because the Tatmadaw had had ceasefire agreements with most EAOs by the 1990s and concentrated its attacks on KNU, its arch enemy, who remained as the only sizeable EAO that rejected ceasefire with the military regime (Brenner, 2018).

Second, the simultaneous partial liberalization of the national economy dismantled its smuggling operations and taxation of the border trade, weakening the movement economically.

Third, KNU experienced its first mutiny when the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA) was

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formed in 1994, amidst the continuous military defeats of movement, due to grievances that its leaders and members felt towards the Christian-dominated KNU leadership (Charney, 2009). A number of other splits, discussed more in chapter 5, have also taken place since then. The Tatmadaw was quick in taking advantage of this situation and co-opted the DKBA in its fight against KNU. This led to joint attacks against KNU which soon after led to the fall of the movement’s long-time headquarters. Describing the fall of Manerplaw as something that was

“turning everything upside down”, Tho Doo elaborated:

It was indeed a big blow to Karen Revolution, and the impacts were so huge that KNU was weakened politically, financially, and militarily. KNU lost the headquarter, the territories, the soldiers, and most of all the morale of every individual. The refugee problem and the uprising DKBA problem are not easily subsided. It was causing the KNU a nerve and it was not easily resolved. It also affected the strength and activities of KNU’s close allies.

(Tho Doo, interview).

Since the fall of Manerplaw, KNU has become significantly weakened in terms of territorial control and military and economic strength. Despite decline in its military strength, KNU remains the dominant non-state political actor and enjoys significant legitimacy among Karen populations in the region (Saferworld & KPSN, 2019). Though varying in degree, it has both civilian and military presence in all seven KNU administrative districts, which together make up Kawthoolei.

A general distinction can be made between the northern and southern districts. Whereas the former is more autonomous and military stronger, the latter has since the 1990s lost significant territories and been weakened militarily. I present this in more detail through the analysis.

In short, KNU has travelled a long way since it went underground in 1949. The goal of the movement has been and continues to be autonomy within a federal democratic union of Myanmar.

Moreover, KNU has fought the Tatmadaw-allied DKBA and has had a combination of alliance and tension with another EAO, New Mon State Party (NMSP), but the conflict line has always been state-centered.

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2.3 Reforms, Ceasefires and Negotiations

The reforms initiated by the military in the early 2010s was enthusiastically welcomed by domestic and well as international actors, with some seeing it as the best opportunity in many decades to achieve peace (South, 2011). The military held elections in 2010 which was won by its own Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP). The elections were largely seen as undemocratic as the main opposition party, National League for Myanmar (NLD), boycotted it. However, in the 2015 elections, NLD won a landslide victory, leading to the formation a quasi-civilian government that existed with the military. The reforms have been early supported by the international community who believed that Myanmar was moving towards a full-fledged democratic, peaceful, and prosperous country. Yet, others were more cautious, pointing to the resumption of large-scale fighting in the north between Tatmadaw and KIO (Sadan, 2016).

Within KNU, different opinions have existed between its leaders about the pace and character of negotiations with the government (Gravers, 2016). A general but oversimplified distinction is made between a critical faction and a pro-ceasefire faction. The former faction, led by leaders like General Baw Kyaw Heh and Padoh Zipporah Sein, related more cautiously to the reforms, favored an incremental approach, and collective political bargaining with all EAOs. The latter faction, led by General Mutu Say Poe and Padoh Kwe Htoo Win, has showed more trust in the potential of the reforms, adopted a pragmatic approach, as exemplified by its choice to leave the United Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC), an EAO-based alliance that initially sought to negotiate with the government collectively. The latter is more open to economic development during the ceasefire. I elaborate on these differences in chapter 7 (development).

It suffices here to say that the movement has since 2012 been led by the pro-ceasefire faction who gained power after the 2012 KNU elections and further consolidated its power in the 2017 elections (Brenner, 2018). Led by General Mutu Say Poe, a KNU negotiation team signed a bilateral ceasefire in 2012. Although the agreement was signed without mandate and was therefore subject to much criticism, it was accepted by organization’s leadership for the sake of unity (Jolliffe, 2016). Following the ceasefire, both bilateral and multilateral negotiations was held between KNU, other EAOs, and the government. The negotiations resulted in the so-called Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) in 2015, which was signed by KNU and seven others

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EAOs (Thawnghmung, 2017). Two more EAOs followed suit in 2018. Since 2015, four rounds of high-level negotiations, called Union Peace Conferences (UPC) has been held between these.

The negotiations have taken place during the NLD period. There is much continuity in the approach to peace from USDP and NLD governments, especially in relation to the importance of securing ceasefires with EAOs, but the introduction of political negotiations during the NLD period was a novelty. That said, however, it is generally accepted that the negotiations have gone slow and made little political progress since its inceptions due to military resistance and constitutional obstacles (Nyein, 2020). Moreover, the peace process has not been inclusive as most of the other major EAOs, making up approximately 80 % of the non-state fighting forces, remained outside the negotiations. Though important, the national level peace process has not succeeded in addressing the cause of conflict. KNU leaders generally acknowledged that no political gains have been achieved since 2012 (Tha Taw; Dah Ler; Tee Kaw; interview).

2.4 Summary

Since independence, the conflict abouts the form of rule (unitary/federal) and form of government (democracy/authoritarianism) has evolved and changed in significant ways, as have the conflict in Kawthoolei. They are highly complex, involving a wide range of actors, but center generally on the state, which has since the 1962 coup been led by the Tatmadaw.

Before proceeding, I shall clarify some terms. First, although distinguishing between the NLD and the military/USDP governments is important at the national level politics, in my study of local peacebuilding, my use of the term the state refers mainly to and used interchangeably with the military/Tatmadaw. This is i) because the military is also the dominant actor at local level politics and ii) because little changes of relevance for this study has taken place on the ground since NLD’s coming into power in 2016. Second, my use of Karen actors refers to all actors in the nationalist movement, including KNU leaders, its line department workers, and the Karen CSOs.

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3 Theories of Peacebuilding

This chapters reviews the peacebuilding theories and concepts that will be used to inform the analysis of peacebuilding in Kawthoolei. Selective by necessity due to the vast size of the literature, the review sketches what I identify as the most important approaches to peacebuilding since the 1990s, namely liberal, hybrid, and illiberal peacebuilding. The importance of these approaches lies neither in their normative value nor in nature of their impacts, but primarily in the distinctiveness they each contain. In my review, I draw particular emphasis to the primary actors involved, the main strategies adopted, and the general outcomes achieved in each approach. I also consider critiques against the approaches in order to demonstrate how they, despite being distinctive, together form one and the same debate about peacebuilding.

I start the section below by briefly clarifying some key concepts and reviewing the limited human geographic research on peace. I then present and discuss liberal peacebuilding, which is the dominant form of peacebuilding and around which other bodies of the literature development or contrast. Next, I discuss the recent emergence of hybrid peacebuilding that emerged as a critique of and an alternative to address the limitations of liberal peacebuilding. Finally, I present the currently emerging literature on illiberal forms of peacebuilding, which in fundamental ways break with the two other literatures. I point along the way to the relevance of these literatures to understand the case of Kawthoolei.

Understandings of Peace and Peacebuilding

Peacebuilding refers in general to the resolution of conflict between individuals, groups, and states (Mac Ginty, 2006). In difference to peacemaking and peacekeeping, which respectively seek to change the attitudes and behaviors of parties in a conflict, peacebuilding is more comprehensive in that it seeks to also address and revolve the underlying causes that have led to a conflict in the first place. A general understanding of peace is the classical distinction between negative and positive peace (Galtung, 1964). Whereas the former refers to the mere absence of violence, the

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latter refers to a situation where violence is ceased, and the underlying causes of a conflict are resolved. Despite sustained critiques, this definition remains an influential one.

Building on Galtung (1964) to better capture the diverse forms of peace that emerge in post-settlement societies, Höglund and Kovacs (2010) suggests the ‘peace triangle’, in which peace is measured in the following indicators: the extent to which underlying issues behind a conflict, hostile attitudes held by, and violent behaviors of antagonists are changed. For instance, a peace settlement may cease direct violence, but structural causes and hostile attitudes may remain largely unchanged. Similarly, there can also be situations of ‘no war, no peace’, which may result from i) geographic containment, ii) ceasefire without peace, and iii) non-implementation of peace agreement (Mac Ginty, 2006). A central point in these conceptualizations is that forms of peace may exist somewhere between war and positive peace. In seeking to identify the form of peace in Kawthoolei, Galtung (1964) and Mac Ginty’s (2006) conceptualizations will be used.

It is important to note that actors’ understanding of peace not only influence but also determine their choice of peacebuilding actors, strategies, and targeted peace outcomes. That is, the various approaches to peacebuilding may differ in views about the appropriate means and sequences, or strategies, through which peace may be made possible. For instance, an authoritarian leader who adopt the meaning of peace as the mere absence of violence or negative peace would normally not seek to address the conflict issues (Lewis et al., 2018). Moreover, differences also exist with regard to who the primary actors and what the outcomes of peacebuilding should be.

Actors, strategies, and outcomes are therefore intrinsically linked. However, it should be noted that there may be combination of different actors and strategies in peacebuilding and things do not always go as planned due to unintended consequences and path dependencies.

Human Geography on Peace and Peacebuilding

Human Geography has made relatively few contributions to the empirical and theoretical literature on peace and peacebuilding. While there is a long tradition for geographical studies of war, including research on the geopolitics of war and security, quantitative research on civil war, and natural resources in war economies (Le Billon, 2012) there are relatively few publications by

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geographers that focus explicitly on peace (Koopman, 2018; Megoran, McConnell, & Williams, 2016). Consequently, interdisciplinary peace studies have not paid much attention to the work of geographers. There are, however, a few anthologies that address questions of geography and peace, including contributions to the interdisciplinary critique of liberal peacebuilding (Kobayashi, 2012;

Megoran et al., 2016; Stokke & Uyangoda, 2011). There are relatively few publications by geographers on post-liberal forms of peace and peacebuilding, except Megoran’s work on illiberal peacebuilding in the form of authoritarian conflict management, which is also an important source of inspiration for this thesis (Lewis, Heathershaw, & Megoran, 2018).

The literature that exists on geography and peace emphasizes that: “Peace is always shaped by the spaces in which it is made, as it too shapes those spaces. Peace means different things to different groups and in different times, spaces, places, and scales. Peace can be created at individual, family, community, national, and other scales, and using the term can foster seeing these scales as intertwined. Peace is a located and spatial process—and as such is necessarily plural” (Koopman, 2018, no page numbers). This resonates well with the aim of the present thesis, to provide a contextual examination of strategies of peacebuilding and its peace outcomes in the case of Kawthoolei. Given the relatively thin literature on geographies of peace, however, the thesis draws more on interdisciplinary theories of peace than peace studies in human geography.

But the case study will form a basis for reflecting on theoretical lessons, which also includes how the state uses geographical strategies to contain armed conflicts.

3.1 Liberal Peacebuilding: Rise and Fall

What is known as ‘liberal peacebuilding’ has dominated the practice of peacebuilding since the 1990s and, consequently, attracted most attention in the academic literature on the topic. Rooted in the ideological thoughts of liberalism, its immediate origins trace back to the end of the Cold War, after which the ‘End of History’ was declared by Fukuyama (1992). The argument was that human political and ideological development had reached the teleological end-point of history, and that time was ripe for liberalism to be exported. At about the same time, UN introduced An

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Agenda for Peace, a comprehensive document calling for the need and laying out the way to strengthen international peacebuilding to go beyond mere peacekeeping (Chandler, 2017).

Beyond this moment of Western triumph, there was also pressing global issues that triggered the emergence of liberal peace, particularly the protracted intra-state conflicts, the unfolding genocides in Rwanda and Srebrenica, and mass human rights abuses committed by domestic actors elsewhere (Mac Ginty, 2011). Consequently, renegotiations of state sovereignty and non-interventions principles took place, leading shortly after to the first of many international peacebuilding interventions (Chandler, 2017). It was in this context and for these reasons that liberal peacebuilding emerged; full of political confidence, material resources, assumed competence, and optimism about a better world characterized by liberal order.

Actors and Strategies

Liberal peacebuilding was a project led by international actors, mainly leading western states, including the US, UK, Germany, Canada, and Australia, and international organizations and financial organizations, including UN, World Bank, and IMF (Paris, 2004). Though relatively less powerful as they were funded by the states and international organizations, international non- governmental organization (INGOs) were important implementers of liberal peace policies. In contrast, local actors in the intervened countries were largely excluded (Hughes et al., 2015). Local elites were seen as illegitimate and barriers rather than part of solution to peace, making liberal peace a project that was mainly top-down in character and led by external actors.

The liberal project sought to achieve peace through the reconstruction and transformation of the states, societies, and economies of the intervened countries, all of which were seen as technical tasks that follow linear processes (Paris, 2004). It is deeply influenced by the so-called

“democratic peace” and “capitalist peace” which assume democratic and capitalist societies are inherently peaceful (Selby, 2015). Therefore, the assumption was that by crafting democratic states and neoliberal economies, peace would inevitably follow (Herring, 2011).

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The first major arena in need of transformation was that of the state, which needed capable and democratic institutions. Three specific components of state reconstruction have, albeit with different weight throughout the 1990s and 2000s, been prioritized: statebuilding, democracy, and civil society promotion (Paris, 2004). Firstly, the troubled societies needed functional states that mirror the Weberian state, characterized by state monopoly of violence, if it was to achieve stability. The social order was to be established through processes that include ceasefire agreements, demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration (DDR), security sector reform (SSR), and the promotion of rule of law. Additionally, it was also important to make the state accountable to the citizens, among other ways, by promoting effective public administration that could deliver services to the deprived populations (Selby, 2011).

Secondly, it was important to promote democracy. In line with the democratic peace, the idea was that by promoting free and fair elections, civil and political freedoms, and power-sharing arrangements, peaceful societies would emerge. However, while political liberalization of this kind was highly prioritized in the 1990s, the decade that followed saw a major shift in liberal peacebuilding which is entailed a much greater emphasized on the statebuilding component (Chandler, 2017). Peacebuilding became close to synonymous with statebuilding. This shift resulted from the argument that without effective state institutions to control it, too early liberalization like elections was dangerous and destabilizing for the intervened states. This argument was championed among others by Paris (2004), whose influential “Institutionalization Before Liberalization” (IBL) thesis became the norm of the 2000s.

Thirdly, for democracy to consolidate, civil society promotion was seen as important (Chandler, 2017). The task of civil society was to work between the informal spheres of life, including the family and economy, and the formal sphere of state and government. Through such a mechanism, it would help deepen democracies. It is noted that because it generates diverse interests, civil society was thought to “mitigate polarities of political conflict and develop and democratic culture of tolerance, moderation and compromise” (Diamond, 1994, in Chandler, 2017, p. 96). Beyond deepening democratic institutions and values, civil society, e.g. through local NGOs, was also expected to make the government accountable by voicing societal concerns from below the state level. Last but not least, promotion of civil society was also a way of countering the local elites who were usually seen as illegitimate.

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The second major arena in need of transformation was that of the economy. Influenced by the capitalist peace, the idea was that the promotion of neoliberal economic governance – which is characterized by market-led, open economy, small role of state in the economy, and a large private sector – would be in support of peace. An underlying assumption for some liberal actors, influenced by the greed-based understandings of conflict, was that when a society is wealthy there will be little motivations for citizens to take up arms (e.g. Collier & Hoeffler, 2004). Moreover, the period of the 1990s was characterized by the global rise of neoliberalism, which was strongly supported by the US, UK, and the international financial institutions, which make it seem as if there was really no other option (Pugh, 2005).

Outcomes of Peace and Critiques

Two decades after the end of the Cold War, it became widely acknowledged that the outcomes of liberal peace are not what were promised (Höglund and Kovacs, 2012). A significant achievement is the reduction of direct violence in the intervened societies. However, rather than democratic, wealthy, and peaceful societies as those known in the West, the forms of peace achieved are mainly of hybrid character. Some have even seen recurrence of violence. Democracies achieved are hybrid character in the “grey zone” (Carothers, 2015), while peace achieved are of “no war, no peace”

situations where “peace is poverty, insecurity, and excludes true reconciliation with former antagonists”. In response to the “end of history” thesis, a “return of history” is now observed where authoritarian regimes like Russia and China are on the rise and human rights issues that characterized the world order in the 1990s persist (Welsh, 2016).

Widespread critiques of various kinds have been directed at the liberal peacebuilding for its poor performance. Chandler (2017) distinguishes between the ‘political’ and ‘pragmatist’

critiques, both of which has two variants within it.

The political critiques argue that liberal peacebuilders have acted in self-interests.

Influenced by a neo-Marxist perspective, the first political critique focuses on the neoliberal component of liberal peace and argues that it serves the interests of the powerful western states and institutions. Because it reproduces power hierarchies and inequalities, these critics argue,

The Quest for Peace in Kawthoolei: