The Effect of Temporal Distance on Predictions of Duration

UNIVERSITY OF OSLO

Department of informatics

The Effect of Temporal Distance on Predictions of Duration

Master thesis

30 credits

Thomas Portilla

22 May 2013

Acknowledgements


First
and
foremost
I
would
like
to
thank
Johanna
and
Maria,
for
showing
patience
when
my
 thoughts
have
been
traversing
far
off
mental
landscapes,
only
to
return
to
the
present
for
briefest
of
 moments.
I
would
especially
like
to
thank
my
supervisor
Alf
Børre
Kanten,
for
giving
me
the
 opportunity
to
write
the
thesis
on
such
a
short
notice.
His
perspectives
on
theoretical
implications,
 as
well
as
his
attentive
eye
for
the
smallest
of
details
have
been
of
invaluable
importance
for
the
 progress
of
the
thesis
towards
its
attainment.
I
would
also
like
to
thank
Espen
Moen
Eilertsen
for
 insightful
comments
on
statistical
issues,
and
lastly
I
would
like
to
thank
the
students
who
 participated
in
the
study.

Table of Contents

Abstract...5

Introduction...6

Construal-level theory of psychological distance...8

Level
of
construal...8

Psychological
distance
... 9

Interrelation
of
distances... 9

Psychological
distance
and
level
of
construal...10

Construal-level
and
perception
of
time... 11

Past research on time predictions...12

The
planning
fallacy...12

Cognitive
and
motivational
processes...13

Construal-level
affects
future
predictions... 14

Past research on affective forecasting... 16

Affective
forecasting...16

Immune
neglect... 16

Focalism... 17

Construal-level
and
focalism...18

Construal-level
and
emotional
states...19

Present research... 20

Experiment 1: The effect of temporal distance on task duration estimates in an anchoring paradigm...21

Anchoring...21

Assimilation...21

Selective
accessibility
model...22

Method... 25

Participants... 25

Materials
and
procedure... 25

Results
and
discussion
...26

Experiment 2: Deviations and delays...31

Method... 32

Participants... 32

Materials
and
procedure... 32

Results
and
discussion...33

Experiment 3: Near and distant future affective forecasting...37

Method... 38

Participants... 38

Materials
and
procedure
... 39

Results
and
discussion...40

General discussion... 42

Stimuli
and
sensation... 44

Elasticity
of
time... 45

Time
perception
in
affective
forecasting...47

Accessibility
experiences
and
temporal
biases... 48

The
time,
task
distinction... 49

Downstream
consequences... 51

Conclusion... 52

References...53

Appendix
A...60

Appendix
B... 66

Appendix
C...70

Table of Tables and Figures Table
1...27

Table
2...33

Table
3...34

Table
4...40

Table
5...40

Figure
1... 27

Figure
2... 28

Figure
3... 36

Abstract

Construal-level
theory
(Trope
&
Liberman,
2010)
states
that
people
use
increasingly
higher
 levels
of
abstraction
to
represent
a
mental
object,
as
the
psychological
distance
to
the
object


increases.
Kanten
(2011)
investigated
during
a
series
of
experiments
the
role
of
construal-level
in
 prediction
of
time
needed
to
perform
a
task.
The
results
revealed
an
increase
of
task
duration


estimates
when
moving
up
in
construal-level.
A
time
contraction
mechanism
has
been
proposed
as
a possible
explanation
for
the
observed
increase
of
estimates.
Time
shrinks
when
people
are
moving
 up
in
abstraction,
consequentially
more
time
is
needed
to
cover
the
same
amount
of
work.
The
main
 objective
of
the
present
research
was
to
replicate
Kanten's
findings
of
increasing
task
duration
 estimates
as
a
function
of
moving
up
in
abstraction.
This
was
achieved
by
investigating
whether
the
 findings
would
prevail
for
estimates
of
tolerance
for
delays,
for
affective
durations,
and
for
task
 durations
in
an
anchoring
paradigm.
During
three
experiments,
participants
induced
with
temporal
 distance
were
instructed
to
estimate
task
durations
(experiment
1),
tolerance
for
delays
(experiment
 2),
and
affective
durations
(experiment
3).
The
results
showed
a
consistent
increase
of
the
durations
 estimates
over
temporal
distance.
When
comparing
two
task
durations
in
the
distant
future,
they
 appear
more
similar
as
a
consequence
of
time
contraction
(experiment
2).
The
discussions
centers
 around
the
contraction
of
time
as
a
function
of
psychological
distance,
and
how
changes
in
time
 perception
influence
peoples
predictions
of
duration
estimates.

The Effect of Temporal Distance on Predictions of Duration

Introduction

People
make
predictions
about
future
realities
in
everyday
life,
still
belonging
to
the


imagination,
far
away
from
being
manifested
in
the
present
reality.
The
innate
capacity
to
envision
 distant
places
in
other
times,
to
consider
hypothetical
scenarios,
or
taking
the
perspectives
of
others, represents
intrinsic
human
qualities.
For
instance,
being
able
to
take
the
perspective
of
another
 person
is
essential
to
understand
how
he
or
she
feels.
Conversely,
we
normally
try
to
work
out
how
 we
are
viewed
by
others
by
thinking
about
how
we
see
ourselves,
then
making
a
prediction
from
 that.
Moreover,
probabilities
convey
a
sense
of
distance,
as
well.
A
lot
of
people
are
buying
lottery
 tickets
even
though
only
the
few
can
strike
the
jackpot.
There
is
a
remote
probability
of
winning,
 but
there
are
no
serious
consequences
associated
with
losing
either.
On
the
other
hand,
when
taking
 a
flight,
safety
will
be
paramount,
a
high
likelihood
for
success
must
be
guaranteed.
Furthermore,
 when
planning
for
a
trivial
weekend
trip
in
the
near
future,
or
a
deciding
where
to
move
to
and
 settle
down
in
the
distant
future,
are
choices
that
represent
both
temporal
as
well
as
spatial
distance
 from
the
experienced
self
in
the
here-and-now.

How
do
we
transcend
the
present
moment
to
include
future
as
well
as
past
events,
other
 people's
perspective
or
hypothetical
situations?
According
to
Construal-level
theory
(Trope
&


Liberman,
2003)
we
do
so
by
forming
abstract
mental
construals
of
distal
objects.
Our
ability
to
 remember
the
past,
to
take
the
perspective
of
others,
and
to
confabulate
about
future
possibilities
are
 distinct
from
the
here-and-now.
During
everyday
activities,
people
constantly
transcend
the


immediate
by
thinking
about
distal
objects,
places,
and
events.
The
different
forms
of
distance
have
 the
common
starting
point
in
ongoing
experience.
Thus,
remembering
a
past
holiday
or


contemplating
about
what
a
colleague
might
think
of
you,
represents
distal
experiences
and


imaginations,
introspectively
linked
to
the
egocentric
reference
point
of
the
observer.
Time,
space,
 social
distance
and
hypothetically
therefore
represent
different
dimensions
where
mental
objects
are
 represented
by
construal-level
(Trope
&
Liberman,
2010).
As
psychological
distance
increases,
the
 construal
will
become
increasingly
more
abstract,
and
vice
versa.
Since
the
proposed
dimensions
 have
the
same
subjective
reference
point
within
the
observer,
construals
on
one
dimension
should
 equally
affect
the
other
dimensions.
By
contemplating
about
the
outer
reaches
of
space
the
observer
 transcends
into
an
abstract
high
level
mindset
broadening
the
perspective,
whereas
thinking
about
 relatively
recent
episode,
e.g.,
yesterdays
dinner,
contracts
the
mindset.
The
contraction
and
 expansions
of
ones
mental
horizon
transforms
the
ever-changing
construal-level.

Seen
from
the
egocentric
reference
point
of
the
self,
time
is
perceived
as
an
elastic
construct.

These
conceptions
are
well
known
from
a
layperson's
perspective
too.
The
sense
of
time
floating
by
 as
life
passes
on,
is
perceived
differently
with
age
(Wittmann
&
Lehnhoff,
2005),
when
having
fun,
 as
opposed
to
when
tedious
and
boring
tasks
needs
to
be
fulfilled
(Kellaris
&
Kent,
1992),
or


moments
with
lots
of
activity,
in
comparison
to
the
inertia
of
time
when
doing
nothing
(Ahn,
Liu,
&


Soman,
2009).
The
nature
of
subjective
time
perception
can
therefore
be
seen
as
an
underlying
 factor
for
a
host
of
potential
misjudgments
when
predicting
durations.

Past
research
has
revealed
that
estimations
of
task
durations
will
increase
as
a
function
of
 psychological
distance.
In
a
series
of
studies
this
was
investigated
by
either
priming
participants
 with
high
or
low-level
construals,
before
instructing
them
to
estimate
task
durations
(Kanten,
2011;


study
1-3).
Kanten
suggested
the
observed
increase
in
duration
estimates,
when
moving
up
in
 construal-level,
was
a
result
of
the
contraction
of
time.
Kanten
further
contended
that
the
object
like
 quality
of
the
task
will
shrink
at
a
slower
pace
over
temporal
distance,
than
the
malleable
character
 of
time,
causing
its
perceived
contraction.
When
the
subjective
time
unit
shrinks
as
a
function
of
 temporal
distance,
the
amount
of
units
needed
to
cover
the
task
in
the
future,
as
compared
to
the
 present,
will
subjectively
need
to
increase
in
order
cover
the
same
task.
Furthermore,
to
directly
test the
actual
shrinkage
of
time
across
distance
conditions,
participants
were
instructed
to
measure
the
 length
of
one
hour,
by
drawing
its
length
(Kanten,
2011;
study
4).
As
suspected,
the
results
revealed that
an
hour
was
drawn
to
be
shorter
as
a
consequence
of
moving
up
in
construal
level.
Since
the
 effect
of
time
contraction
operates
outside
people's
awareness,
the
shrinkage
of
time
will
increase
 the
chances
for
obtaining
errors,
when
predicting
duration
estimates
for
future
endeavors.
A
minute
 in
the
present
is
subjectively
treasured
more
than
the
same
amount
of
time
in
a
year.
As
a


consequence,
a
task
will
typically
be
predicted
to
span
for
a
longer
duration
in
the
distant
rather
 than
proximal
future.

The
main
agenda
of
the
present
research
is
to
(1)
replicate
Kanten's
(2011)
studies
on
 temporal
distance
and
task
duration
estimates
in
an
anchoring
paradigm.
Anchoring
has
since
its
 introduction
by
Tversky
and
Kahneman
(1974)
proven
to
be
an
extremely
robust
psychological
 phenomena.
By
adding
anchors
to
the
original
design,
this
study
can
also
be
considered
as
an
 examination
of
the
strength
and
generalizability
of
the
original
findings.
Furthermore,
(2)
the
time
 contraction
mechanism,
contends
that
two
task
duration
estimates
will
look
more
similar
as
a
 function
of
temporal
distance.
The
second
experiment
will
test
out
the
validity
of
this
claim.
Lastly,
 (3)
the
third
experiment
investigates
whether
predictions
of
affect
duration
increase
as
a
function
of
 temporal
distance
as
well.
Affective
forecasting
is
a
major
research
tradition
within
social


psychology.
There
is
a
great
tendency
for
people
to
overestimate
the
intensity
and
duration,
of
both
 positive
and
negative
emotions,
when
predicting
the
influence
they
will
exert
in
the
future
(Wilson


&
Gilbert,
2003).
However,
the
present
research
is
to
the
author's
knowledge
the
first
to
investigate
 the
effect
of
temporal
distance,
in
relation
to
emotional
intensity
and
duration.
Overall,
the
main
 objective
for
the
current
research
is
to
investigate
the
relation
between
how
subjective
time
 contracts
as
a
function
of
temporal
distance
and
level
of
construal,
and
how
this
is
reflected
in
 people's
duration
estimates.
In
the
following,
we
briefly
review
past
research
relating
to
construal- level
theory,
the
planning
fallacy,
and
affective
forecasting.
Chapters
on
affective
forecasting
and
 the
planning
fallacy
will
contain
relevant
material
in
relation
to
construal-level.

Construal-level theory of psychological distance

The
association
between
distance
and
construal
level
has
been
shown
to
play
an
important
 role
in
different
kinds
of
judgments,
more
specifically;
primary
versus
secondary
features
of
choice
 and
evaluation
(Trope
&
Liberman,
2000),
comparisons
(e.g.,
Wakslak
&
Trope,
2009),
pros
and
 cons
(Liberman,
Eyal,
Trope,
&
Walther,
2004),
values
and
moral
principles
(Eyal,
Liberman,
&


Trope,
2008),
and
predictions
(e.g.,
Wilson
&
Gilbert,
2003).
Past
research
pertaining
to
 comparisons
and
predictions,
will
be
of
special
interest
to
the
present
study,
and
in
particular
 evidence
associated
with
these
areas
will
be
given
weight
throughout
the
text.

Level of construal

High
level
construals
are
abstract,
coherent
and
superordinate,
whereas
low
level
construals
 are
concrete,
contextualized
and
subordinate.
As
the
observer
expands
the
mental
horizon
details
 are
omitted,
making
the
construal
more
abstract
and
less
contextualized
(Liberman
&
Trope,
2008).

Since
abstract
superordinate
representations
can
represent
a
myriad
of
concrete
subordinate
 representations,
they
tend
to
leave
out
incidental
details.
Therefore
they
represent
less
complexity,

 and
are
more
prototypical
than
concrete
representations.
Liberman
et
al.
(2002)
hypothesized
that
 people
would
use
fewer
and
broader
categories
to
classify
objects
that
belong
to
distant
future
 situations.
Participants
imagined
themselves
in
various
situations
(e.g.,
having
a
yard
sale)
in
either
 the
near
future
or
the
distant
future
and
classified
the
objects
related
to
each
situation
(e.g.,
clothes,
 books,
CDs)
into
as
many
categories
as
they
thought
appropriate.
When
participants
imagined
a
 distant
future
event,
compared
to
a
near
future
event,
they
found
that
objects
were
categorized
into
 fewer
and
broader
categories.

In
a
subsequent
study,
Liberman
et
al.
(2002)
predicted
that
future
good
or
bad
days,
would
 consist
of
prototypically
positive
or
negative
experiences,
since
prototypic
construals
are
more
 likely
to
be
applied
to
distant
future
experiences.
Moreover,
Liberman
et
al.
instructed
the


participants
to
imagine
a
good
or
a
bad
day
in
the
near
or
distant
future,
and
list
events
happening


that
particular
day.
For
distant
future
days,
the
results
revealed
less
diverse
experiences
within
each
 type
of
day,
such
that
the
good
and
the
bad
days
were
more
prototypical,
extreme,
and
distinct
from
 each
other.
Taken
together,
the
evidence
suggests
that
temporal
distance
systematically
changes
the
 way
objects
and
events
are
represented,
such
that
a
distant
future
is
represented
more
schematic
and coherently.


Psychological distance

As
noted
above,
CLT
states
that
people
use
increasingly
higher
levels
of
construal
to
 represent
an
object
as
the
psychological
distance
to
the
object
increases.
From
a
psychologically
 distant
perspective
it
is
more
useful
to
construe
an
action
in
terms
of
a
high
level
construal.
High
 level
construals
have
evolved
to
represent
distal
objects,
since
distance
conserves
the
invariant
 properties.
Liberman
et
al.
(2002)
found
that
a
set
of
items
were
classified
into
fewer,
broader
and
 more
abstract
categories,
when
the
items
belonged
to
more
future
activities.
On
the
other
hand,
low- level
construals
represent
the
object
in
exact
detail
in
a
particular
time
or
place.
Ledgerwood,
Trope,


&
Chaiken,
2010
and
Ledgerwood,
Trope,
&
Liberman,
2010
have
provided
evidence
for
the
 greater
flexibility
of
proximal
mental
objects,
whereas
distal
objects
support
consistency.
Since
 individuals
construe
near
objects
more
concretely,
these
objects
tend
to
incorporate
context
 dependent
information
unique
for
the
actual
situation.
On
the
other
hand,
since
distal
objects
are
 construed
more
abstractly,
their
evaluations
will
be
more
independent
of
the
surrounding
social
 context.
In
line
with
this
reasoning,
participants
primed
to
adopt
a
concrete
mindset
subsequently
 evaluated
an
issue
(policy)
more
favorably
when
the
interaction
partner
supported
it,
whereas
 participants
primed
to
adopt
an
abstract
mindset,
made
evaluations
that
were
unaffected
by
the
 social
context.
That
is,
when
adopting
a
concrete
mindset
their
evaluations
were
flexibly


incorporating
the
attitudes
of
the
stranger,
while
being
in
an
abstract
mindset,
led
their
evaluations
 to
be
more
resistant
towards
other
peoples
attitudes.
Instead
the
abstract
mindset
reflected
the
 participants
previously
reported
ideological
values.
Seen
from
this
perspective,
high
and
low-level
 construals
will
produce
more
or
less
stability
in
mental
representations.

Interrelation of distances

If
there
is
a
common
dimension
of
psychological
distance
underlying
space,
time,
social
 distance,
and
hypotheticality,
these
dimensions
should
be
mentally
associated.
That
is,
the
outer
 reaches
of
space
should
bring
to
mind
distant
memories
of
the
past,
improbable
situations,
or
 different
others.
Whereas,
thinking
about
your
close
relative
living
nearby,
should
bring
to
mind
 close
places
and
likely
encounters.
Past
research
has
shown
that
the
different
psychological


distances
are
interrelated
to
each
other,
thus
a
certain
psychological
distance
on
one
dimension
 should
affect
the
perceived
distance
on
another
dimension.
Bar-Anan,
Liberman,
Trope,
&
Algom
 (2007)
provided
evidence
for
this
hypothesis
by
testing
automatic
activation
of
words
conveying
 temporal
distance,
spatial
distance,
social
distance
and
hypotheticality.
This
was
achieved
by
 showing
words
on
a
computer
screen
either
close
to
or
further
away
from
the
participant.
When
the
 words
meaning
and
its
spatial
location
on
the
screen
were
congruent,
reaction
times
were


significantly
lower
than
when
they
were
incongruent.
For
instance,
geographically
close
words
were classified
faster
when
it
was
friend,
than
when
in
was
enemy.
For
geographically
distant
words
the
 opposite
were
true.
The
study
provided
support
across
all
four
distance
dimensions,
showing
their
 interrelation
across
psychological
distance
are
accessed
automatically.

Furthermore,
the
interrelation
of
the
psychological
distance
dimensions
was
investigated
by
 exploring
how
temporal
and
spatial
distance
affected
social
distance
(Stephan,
Liberman,
&
Trope,
 2010).
Politeness
has
been
shown
to
regulate
social
distance.
People
usually
show
more
politeness
 towards
strangers
than
friends,
and
polite
language
creates
a
sense
of
social
distance
between
 people.
Thus,
politeness
was
predicted
to
be
related
to
temporal
distance
as
well
as
spatial
distance.


Stephan
et
al.
provided
evidence
for
more
polite
actions
towards
others
when
participants
primed
to
 adopt
a
high
level
mindset.
Moreover,
if
others
were
addressed
in
a
polite
language
the
participants
 inferred
that
they
were
situated
geographically
more
distant,
than
when
addressed
in
colloquial
 terms.
When
testing
for
the
effects
of
politeness
on
temporal
distance,
an
identical
pattern
was
 revealed.
Colloquial
language
decreased
spatial
distance,
while
polite
language
led
participants
to
 believe
that
the
others
were
situated
in
a
remote
location,
supporting
the
claim
of
the
interrelations
 between
the
psychological
distance
dimensions.

Psychological distance and level of construal

Construal
level
theory
has
provided
evidence
for
a
reciprocal
link
between
psychological
 distance
and
level
of
construal.
Psychological
distance
will
induce
high
level
construals,
likewise
 high
level
construals
will
represent
distal
objects.
From
a
perceptual
viewpoint,
people
have
the
 capacity
to
move
closer,
and
get
a
narrow
detailed
view
of
the
object,
or
stepping
back
to
get
an
 overview.
Liberman
and
Förster
(2009)
tested
the
assumption
that
abstract
construals
impacts
 people's
perception
of
spacial
distance.
Across
four
different
experiments,
participants
primed
to
 adopt
a
high
level
mindset,
judged
temporal
distances
to
be
longer,
spatial
distances
to
be
greater,
 social
distance
to
be
larger,
and
distal
events
were
perceived
to
be
less
probable.
Induction
of
a
low
 level
mindset
had
the
opposite
effect.
Psychological
distance
across
all
four
dimensions
was
in
 comparison
judged
to
be
shorter.
These
findings
show
interactions
between
perceptual
stimuli
and


internal
conceptual
representation.

There
has
also
been
collected
evidence
for
the
association
between
distance
and
level
of
 construal
on
a
pure
conceptual
level.
Bar-Anan,
Liberman,
&
Trope
(2006)
accomplished
this
by
 using
an
implicit
association
test
to
demonstrate
associations
between
words
related
to
construal
 level
(low
versus
high),
and
words
related
to
the
four
dimensions
of
distance
(near
versus
distant).


Participants
responded
faster
in
congruent
trials
where
distance
and
construal
represented
a
pairing,
 (e.g.,
tomorrow
(closeness)
and
potato
(exemplar)),
than
in
incongruent
trials
(e.g.,
next
year
and
 potato)).
Automatic
associations
between
distance
and
construal-level
were
achieved
across
all
four
 distance
dimensions
of
space,
time,
social
distance
and
hypotheticality,
without
the
need
for


conscious
thought,
providing
evidence
for
the
reciprocal
link
between
psychological
distance
and
 level
of
construal.

Construal-level and perception of time

A
high-level
construal
conveys
more
distance
than
a
low
level
construal,
thereby
imposing
a
 broader
perspective.
An
abstraction
of
objects,
places
and
events
will
provide
them
with
stable
 properties
across
a
wide
array
of
times,
situations,
and
individuals
(Trope
&
Liberman,
2010).
A
 parrot
living
in
the
wild
refers
to
a
concrete
exemplar
of
bird,
constrained
to
certain
habitats
around
 the
world.
On
the
contrary,
a
bird,
irrespective
of
species,
can
be
found
on
every
part
of
the
globe.
A
 high
level
construal
is
therefore
associated
with
taking
a
distant
perspective,
focusing
on
the
big
 picture.
In
accordance
with
these
assumptions
Liberman
and
Förster
(2009)
investigated
the
effect
 of
psychological
distance
on
the
level
of
perceptual
construal
using
a
Navon
paradigm
(global
 letters
composed
of
local
letters)
(Navon,
1977).
Thinking
of
more
distant
events,
either
temporally,
 spatially,
or
socially,
made
participants
respond
faster
to
global
letters
and
respond
slower
to
local
 letters.
Thinking
of
more
proximal
events
had
the
opposite
effect.

When
adopting
a
broad
perspective
the
details
are
less
relevant,
while
a
close
up
view
would
 obscure
the
broad
perspective.
The
relation
between
construal-level
and
level
of
detail
will
need
to
 be
on
par
for
accurate
time
perception.
Maglio
and
Trope
(2011)
found
that
larger
unit
of


measurement
arises
as
a
consequence
of
greater
spatial
distance
from
a
given
target
to
the
observer.


When
two
points
on
a
map
were
described
distant
rather
than
near,
this
invoked
a
larger
unit
of
 measurement
for
the
participants.
In
relation
to
temporal
distance,
this
signifies
that
the
vast
time
 horizon
of
a
year's
time
associated
with
a
high-level
construal,
will
impose
a
larger
preferred
unit
of
 measurement
when
perceiving
time,
whereas
low-level
construal
will
impose
a
smaller
time
unit
in
 comparison.
This
has
implications
for
people's
time
perception.
When
time
is
viewed
within
a
 narrow
horizon
–
how
long
until
lunch
hour,
minutes
would
represent
a
good
fit.
On
the
other
hand,


viewed
within
a
broad
timeframe
–
a
countdown
to
the
next
year's
holiday
trip
would
demand
 weeks
or
months
as
the
sensible
unit
of
measurement.
To
measure
a
years
time
in
the
order
of
 minutes
would
not
provide
a
satisfying
understanding
for
the
perceiver,
just
an
annoyingly
large
 number
devoid
of
meaning.
However,
at
a
high
level
of
abstraction,
weeks
would
provide
time
 intervals
better
suited
to
cope
with
the
vastness
of
a
year's
time.
To
conclude,
if
the
unit
of
 measurement
is
too
detached
from
the
perceiver's
current
timeframe,
it
would
be
rendered


conceptually
irrelevant.
The
act
of
zooming
in
or
out
as
a
consequence
of
construal-level,
alters
the
 preferred
unit
of
measurement,
such
that
it
grows
or
shrinks
as
a
function
of
temporal
distance.


Since
subjective
time
alters
across
psychological
distance,
this
has
implications
for
how
 people
estimate
task
durations.
Writing
a
summary
of
a
chapter,
or
renovating
a
house
will


objectively
need
the
same
amount
of
time
in
the
present
as
in
a
year
from
now.
Off
course
the
length
 of
one
clock
hour
spans
the
same
interval
now
as
in
the
future,
but
time
is
more
exposed
to


subjective
changes
in
perception.
Kanten
(2011)
conducted
a
series
of
studies
revealing
that
task
 duration
estimates
increased
as
a
function
of
temporal
distance.
As
a
possible
explanation
for
the
 discrepancy
between
the
estimates
in
the
near
and
distant
future,
a
time
contraction
mechanism
was
 proposed.
Kanten
theorized
that
from
an
observer's
standpoint
–
even
though
both
task
and
time
 will
be
subject
to
alteration
over
temporal
distance,
the
perception
of
the
object
like
quality
of
a
task
 will
be
relatively
static,
whereas
the
perception
of
time
is
more
malleable.
The
task
will
preserve
its
 constitution
to
a
greater
extent,
compared
to
the
time
horizon
embracing
the
task.
Kanten
further
 contended
that
the
contraction
or
expansion
of
time
in
relation
to
the
task
cannot
be
perceived
in
an
 absolute
sense.
Instead,
it
is
a
relative
process;
time
shrinks
at
a
quicker
pace
as
function
of
distance
 and
construal-level,
compared
to
tasks.
Moreover,
direct
evidence
for
the
contraction
of
time
were
 gathered,
by
asking
people
to
draw
the
length
of
one
hour,
showing
significant
differences
between
 construal-level
manipulations
(Kanten,
2011;
study
4).

Past research on time predictions The planning fallacy

People's
tendency
to
underestimate
how
much
time
they
need
to
complete
a
future
task
is
 often
referred
to
as
the
planning
fallacy.
Even
for
tasks
executed
numerous
times
in
the
past,
a
large
 margin
of
error
exists,
due
to
the
unpredictability
of
future
events.
The
underestimation
of
task
 completion
times
has
been
found
when
predicting
a
wide
variety
of
tasks,
such
as
furniture


assembly
(Byram,
1997),
academic
projects
(Sanna,
Parks,
Chang,
&
Carter,
2005),
and
large
scale
 software
projects
(Moløkken-Østvold
et
al.,
2004).
The
examples
of
costly
overruns
are
abundant
in
 the
scientific
literature.
Peoples
overly
optimistic
outlook
about
their
future
activities
were
captured


in
a
study
conducted
by
Buehler,
Griffin,
&
Peetz
(2010).
In
this
study,
Canadian
tax
payers


submitted
the
tax
returns
a
week
later
than
previously
predicted.
They
had
no
misconceptions
about
 their
past
record
of
late
deliveries,
but
expected
to
improve
by
delivering
the
tax
form
more
quickly
 next
time.
The
recurring
theme
of
the
planning
fallacy
is
therefore
people's
acknowledgement
of
 past
mistakes,
while
at
the
same
time
exhibiting
optimism
for
future
tasks
equal
in
nature.

Several
factors
contribute
to
this
phenomenon.
Buehler,
Griffin,
&
Ross
(1994)
identified
 two
important
factors:
A
motivational
one,
were
people
engage
in
wishful
thinking,
failing
to
see
 the
obstacles
lying
ahead
of
the
solution.
A
cognitive
one,
whereby
people
not
emphasize


sufficiently
past
experience
of
similar
tasks,
and
instead
focusing
too
much
on
simple
step-by-step
 plans
for
successful
task
completion
(Buehler,
Griffin,
&
MacDonald,
1997).

Cognitive and motivational processes

Past
research
on
the
planning
fallacy
reveals
that
when
people
think
about
when
they
will
 accomplish
a
future
task,
they
fail
to
incorporate
their
past
experiences
on
similar
tasks.
For
 instance,
when
people
are
trying
to
figure
out
task
completion
times,
they
often
engage
in
wishful
 thinking,
failing
to
consider
past
experience
is
a
contributing
source
for
mispredictions.
For
 instance,
Buehler
et
al.
(1997)
examined
the
impact
of
motivation
on
predicted
and
actual


completion
times
for
completing
income
tax
forms.
They
reasoned
that
those
individuals
expecting
 refund
presumably
have
relatively
strong
motive
to
submit
their
forms
early
and
receive
an
early
 payment.
Buehler
et
al.
expected
that
this
motive
would
affect
people's
predicted
completion
times,
 leading
to
a
larger
optimistic
bias
for
those
expecting
a
refund,
than
those
not
expecting
a
refund.


Results
revealed
that
the
hopes
of
receiving
an
early
tax
refund,
led
individuals
to
predict
that
they
 would
file
their
tax
forms
hastily.
As
expected,
hopes
of
a
refund
led
to
greater
optimistic
bias.
The
 difference
between
predicted
completion
times
was
greater
for
participants
expecting
a
refund,
than
 for
those
not
expecting
a
refund.
Thus,
instead
of
remembering
how
long
similar
tasks
took
to
 complete,
people
have
a
tendency
to
think
about
when
they
intend
and
prefer
to
complete
a
task
 (Buehler
et
al.,
1994;
Buehler
et
al.,
1997).
A
way
of
reducing
the
planning
fallacy
is
therefore
to
 explicitly
ask
people
about
completion
times
on
similar
tasks,
and
how
past
tasks
bear
similarities
 with
the
future
tasks
(Buehler
et
al.,
2010).

However,
remembering
past
experience
will
not
necessarily
suffice
to
improve
estimation
 accuracy,
since
both
remembered
and
predicted
task
duration
are
known
causes
for
mispredictions
 (see
Roy,
Christenfeld,
&
McKenzie,
2005
for
review).
Past
research
has
mainly
cited
the
cause
for
 the
memory
bias
being
due
to
memory
not
being
used
correctly,
resulting
in
peoples
overly


optimistic
outlook.
The
general
trend
of
underestimating
past
task
durations,
will
create
biased


memories
of
the
durations,
that
in
turn
may
influence
future
planning.
Roy
et
al.
(2005)
listed
some
 important
findings
for
peoples
underestimation
of
task
completion
pointing
towards
a
memory
bias
 as
the
important
cause.
In
particular,
there
is
a
similar
tendency
to
underestimate
both
past
as
well
 as
future
durations.
Moreover,
the
tendency
for
underestimation
is
greater
for
familiar
tasks,
than
 for
novel
tasks.
Finally,
factors
that
influence
memory
of
duration,
affect
predictions
of
duration
in
 the
same
way.
Therefore,
when
people
are
basing
their
predictions
of
future
task
durations,
they
use
 their
memories
of
how
long
past
durations
have
been,
but
their
memories
are
systematic


underestimations
of
past
duration.
According
to
Roy
et
al.,
people
seems
to
underestimate
future
 task
durations
because
they
underestimate
past
task
durations.

Another
cause
for
mispredictions
are
peoples
tendency
to
put
too
much
emphasis
on
salient
 aspects
of
the
task,
thereby
forgetting
to
consider
other
relevant
aspects
influencing
on
how
long
the
 task
will
take
to
complete.
By
forgetting
to
unpack
a
multifaceted
main
task
into
its
constituents,
 people
fail
to
see
the
overall
complexity
of
the
task.
In
turn,
this
will
lead
to
optimistic
task


durations.
Kruger
and
Evans
(2004)
asked
participants
for
how
long
it
would
take
them
to
complete
 several
tasks,
such
as
holiday
shopping,
getting
ready
for
a
date,
formatting
dictionary
definitions
 etc.
Participants
prompted
to
unpack
the
task
into
its
subcomponents
provided
longer,
and
less
 biased
estimates
of
how
long
the
task
would
take,
than
did
participants
who
did
not.
By
thinking
 through
relevant,
but
smaller
aspects
of
the
task,
instead
of
focusing
solely
on
the
dominant
parts,
 served
as
debiasing
and
provided
more
accurate
estimates.
Moreover,
when
Kruger
and
Evans
 varied
the
complexity
of
the
task,
they
found
that
unpacking
was
greater
for
participants


undertaking
a
complex
task,
than
for
participants
undertaking
a
simpler
and
less
multifaceted
task.


Forsyth
and
Burt
(2008)
provided
further
evidence
for
the
discrepancy
between
treating
the
task
as
 a
whole,
or
by
its
parts.
This
was
achieved
by
comparing
estimated
task
duration
for
a
single
task,
 with
the
aggregated
durations
of
the
subtasks
constituting
the
single
task.
Estimated
time
for
a
 single
task
was
significantly
smaller
than
the
aggregated
time
of
the
individual
subtasks,
bearing
 proof
of
the
effectiveness
of
unpacking
as
a
debiasing
technique.

Construal-level affects future predictions

High
level
construals
might
contribute
to
several
biases
known
to
produce
the
planning
 fallacy.
The
very
act
of
future
thinking
necessary
for
predicting
future
task
durations,
may
influence
 on
the
accuracy
of
the
prediction.
Trope
and
Liberman
(2000)
has
shown
that
people
represent
 future
events
more
abstractly
and
prototypical
than
they
do
represent
the
proximal
future,
even
if
 the
amount
of
information
pertaining
to
the
task
is
held
constant.
Trope
and
Liberman
therefore
 contends
that
this
association
is
overgeneralized,
making
people
inclined
to
use
high-level


construals
when
thinking
of
distal
objects,
and
low-level
construals
when
thinking
of
proximal
 objects,
regardless
of
available
information.


When
people
plan
for
future
events,
they
tend
to
overlook
constraints
and
possible
obstacles, reflecting
a
“less
concerned”
high
level
mindset.
Liberman
and
Trope
(1998)
showed
that
the
value
 associated
with
a
high
level
construal
is
enhanced
over
time
while
the
opposite
is
true
for
a
low
 level
construal.
In
goal
directed
activities
desirability
of
the
goals
state
maps
onto
high-level
 construals,
whereas
feasibility
of
reaching
this
end
state
represents
low-level
construals.
Liberman
 and
Trope
showed
that
decisions
regarding
future
activities
were
to
a
higher
degree
influenced
by
 the
desirability
of
the
end
state,
while
proximal
activities
were
concerned
the
about
feasibility.


Participants
prioritized
interesting
assignments
in
the
distant
future
condition,
whereas
in
the
 proximal
future
condition
they
placed
more
weight
on
the
difficulty
of
the
task.
Therefore,
distant
 future
plans
were
related
to
the
desirability
of
activities,
rather
than
to
time
constrains
and
obstacles.

Conceptualizing
a
task
in
a
high
level
construal
will
make
people
more
inclined
to
infer
that
 the
results
are
a
consequence
of
their
own
abilities,
as
opposed
to
contextual
factors.
Since
high- level
construals
represent
represents
the
gist
and
central
meaning
of
the
task,
hypothetical
tasks
 should
motivate
for
unrealistic
optimism,
as
compared
to
concrete,
real
tasks.
When
it
comes
to
 predictions
of
performance,
Armor
and
Sackett
(2006)
argued
that
when
the
task
was
presented
 hypothetically,
the
results
revealed
overestimation
of
how
well
participants
would
perform,
 displaying
less
correlation
between
real
and
predicted
performance.
In
short,
they
were
overly
 optimistic
compared
to
the
accuracy
obtained
when
predicting
a
real
task
(presented
as
actually
 doing
the
task
later
on).
Armor
and
Sackett
found
that
people
predicted
to
solve
more
questions
 than
they
did
on
a
GRE
test
when
it
was
presented
as
hypothetical
rather
than
real.
The
participants
 saw
the
test
as
more
meaningful
and
remembered
fewer
particular
details
about
it.
When
listing
 factors
that
possibly
could
influence
their
performance,
they
tended
to
mention
fewer
and
more
 stable
ones.
Participants
also
judged
the
test
to
be
more
indicative
of
their
own
abilities.
In
sum,
the
 evidence
suggests
peoples
conceptualization
of
the
task
to
be
based
on
a
more
prototypical
high- level
representations.

The
very
act
of
planning
for
a
distant
future
creates
a
simplified,
abstract
mental
object,
 more
concerned
about
the
essential
qualities
of
the
task
than
of
its
underlying
constituents.
To
the
 contrary,
as
one
gets
closer
to
an
object,
the
perception
of
it
becomes
more
fine
grained,
and
 therefore
more
exposed
to
contextual
factors.
Peetz,
Buehler,
&
Wilson
(2010)
investigated
how
 temporal
proximity
affected
optimism
on
predictions
of
task
completion.
Temporal
proximity
 increased
attention
towards
either;
step-by-step
plans,
or
potential
obstacles
in
the
environment.


Interestingly,
the
situation
specific
differences
produced
an
opposite
effect
on
predictions.
The
tasks


(e.g.,
Christmas
shopping,
school
assignment,
writing
task)
were
either
presented
as
hypothetical
or
 real.
In
the
near
future,
real
tasks
elicited
a
focus
on
obstacles.
This
is
according
to
Peetz
et
al.
due
 to
peoples
enhanced
awareness
of
potential
other
real
life
obstacles
that
might
interfere,
producing
 less
optimistic
predictions.
To
the
contrary,
a
hypothetical
task
generated
a
more
optimistic


prediction
in
the
near
future
condition,
because
they
led
people
to
focus
on
their
plans.
Thus,
an
 increased
focus
on
plans
led
to
earlier
predictions
for
close
than
distant
projects,
whereas
an
 increased
focus
on
obstacles
led
to
later
predictions,
for
close
than
for
distant
projects.
This
shows
 that
temporal
proximity
can
lead
people
to
become
vulnerable
to
contextual
factors
in
the


environment.
A
high-level
mindset
did
not
respond
to
the
details
in
the
situation
to
the
same
extent
 as
a
low-level
mindset,
but
were
instead
more
attentive
towards
the
overall
objective.

Past research on affective forecasting Affective forecasting

There
is
a
great
tendency
for
people
to
overestimate
the
impact
and
duration,
of
both
 positive
and
negative
emotions,
when
predicting
the
influence
they
will
exert
in
the
future,
 compared
to
the
present
(Wilson
&
Gilbert,
2003).
Most
people
are
wrong
about
how
they
feel
 about
the
future,
by
thinking
that
their
current
feelings
will
prevail
and
matter
more,
than
what
they
 end
up
doing.
The
impact
bias
refers
to
the
discrepancy
between
the
predicted
emotional
reaction
to
 an
event,
and
the
actual
emotional
impact
of
that
event.
The
impact
bias
covers
both
the
intensity
 and
the
duration
of
the
emotional
reaction,
whereas
durability
bias
only
addresses
duration.
Humans have
a
remarkable
ability
to
adjust
and
adapt
to
almost
any
emotional
situation,
but
fail
to


acknowledge
this
fact.

A
wealth
of
explanations
have
been
suggested
for
people's
mispredictions
of
future
 emotional
states,
whereof
immune
neglect
–
not
taking
your
emotional
coping
strategies
into
 consideration
when
experiencing
negative
upheaval
(Hoerger,
2012)
and
focalism
–
overestimating
 the
importance
of
dominant
aspects
of
a
situation,
forgetting
to
take
other
important
nuances
into
 consideration
(Wilson
et
al.,
2000),
are
cited
among
the
most
frequent.
Time
contraction
could
also
 provide
an
alternative
explanation
for
the
observed
inaccuracies
in
affective
forecasting,
and
will
 serve
as
an
interesting
new
perspective
to
an
already
immense
area
within
social
cognition.

Immune neglect

A
well-known
cause
for
the
durability
bias
is
the
failure
to
take
into
account
how
much
one's
 emotional
immune
system
will
alleviate
the
negative
impact
of
distressing
events.
When
a
painful
 event
occurs,
reconstruing
the
event
in
various
ways,
and
such
making
it
appear
less
painful
is
a


viable
strategy.
Since
the
psychological
immune
system
operates
outside
of
consciousness,
the
 improvement
of
negative
reactions
will
not
be
taken
into
consideration,
when
people
predict
their
 emotional
responses.
As
a
consequence,
peoples
subconscious
coping
strategies
for
handling
 negative
reactions,
and
thereby
lessening
their
emotional
impact,
will
fail
to
be
taken
into
account
 (Hoerger,
2012).


People
continually
make
inaccurate
forecasts
because
they
fail
to
take
into
consideration
 their
ability
to
adopt,
cope
and
overcome
negative
emotions.
People
have
a
remarkable
capacity
for
 rationalization.
Before
you
have
been
struck
by
misfortune,
it
is
difficult
to
imagine
how
you
 manage
to
trivialize
the
importance
of
it.
Hoerger,
Quirk,
Lucas,
&
Carr
(2009)
found
that


American
footballers
overestimated
their
reactions
to
wins
and
losses.
Footballers
reporting
greater
 use
of
emotional
processing
coping
strategies
recovered
more
effectively
from
losses,
but
failed
to
 see
this
when
making
predictions
of
future
emotional
states.
Rationalization
helps
people
find
ways
 to
see
the
event
as
both
accurate
and
pleasant.
Since
almost
anything
can
be
seen
in
multiple
ways,
 from
a
good
view
to
a
bad
view,
coping
processes
helps
people
find
and
settle
on
the
most
positive
 approach
to
the
misfortunate
event.


Moreover,
Hoerger
(2012)
also
investigated
peoples
tendency
to
disregard
coping
strategies
 when
they
were
predicting
distressful
life
events.
The
participants
were
instructed
to
supply


predicted,
and
actual
emotional
reactions
to
Valentine’s
Day,
considered
to
be
a
stressful
life
event.


On
the
actual
day,
the
participants
responded
to
an
open-ended
question
asking
them
to
describe
the
 events
that
had
occurred.
The
results
revealed
a
discrepancy
between
predicted
and
actual
emotional
 ratings.
The
participants
had
overpredicted
how
positive
they
would
feel,
indicating
the
presence
of
 immune
neglect.
Moreover,
Hoerger
also
looked
at
the
correlation
between
coping
strategies
and
 participants
predicted,
and
actual
emotional
reactions.
In
line
with
the
immune
neglect
hypothesis,
 coping
was
more
highly
correlated
with
actual
emotional
reactions
than
predicted
emotional
 reactions.
This
is
points
towards
the
fact
that
most
people
do
not
realize
the
impact
that
coping
 strategies
can
have
on
their
feelings,
following
an
emotionally
evocative
event.


Since
the
psychological
immune
system
works
to
alleviate
negative
but
not
positive
affect,
 immune
neglect
only
explains
mispredictions
about
the
duration
of
negative
events.
Since
there
is
a
 tendency
to
overestimate
positive
emotional
reactions
as
well,
other
mechanisms
must
also
play
a
 role
in
causing
the
impact
bias.

Focalism

Another
cause
for
the
impact
bias
is
people's
tendency
to
focus
too
much
on
the
event
at
 hand,
thereby
failing
to
see
the
consequences
of
other
probable
events.
People
tend
to
see
the
focal


event
in
a
vacuum,
failing
to
see
that
their
lives
are
filled
with
a
lot
of
different
activities
 (Kahneman,
Krueger,
Schkade,
Schwarz,
&
Stone,
2006).


People's
beliefs
about
how
they
will
feel
in
response
to
future
emotional
events,
often
 neglect
similar
emotional
episodes
from
the
past.
Even
when
people
have
repeated
experiences
with resembling
emotions,
they
reveal
limited
learning
from
past
emotional
reactions.
People
overweight
 the
focal
emotions,
and
underweight
the
non-focal,
but
nevertheless
relevant
emotions.
Wilson,
et
 al.
(2000)
asked
college
football
fans
how
long
a
football
game
would
influence
their
happiness.


Before
the
game,
some
of
the
participants
were
in
addition
given
a
prospective
diary
questionnaire,
 on
which
they
rated
how
much
time
they
would
spend
on
a
variety
of
daily
activities,
in
the
days
 after
the
football
game.
As
predicted,
people
in
the
diary
condition
reported
the
to
be
less
influenced
 by
the
outcome
of
the
game,
as
well
as
thinking
less
about
it.
By
asking
people
to
consider
the
 occurrence
of
non-focal
events,
the
durability
bias
was
reduced.
This
was
achieved
by
guiding
 people's
attention
towards
the
realistic
details
of
the
future
event,
and
away
from
the
prototypes.


One
could
speculate
that
the
focus
on
certain
aspects,
while
not
taking
other
relevant
events
into
 consideration,
can
be
further
enhanced
by
an
abstract
mindset.
Thus,
construal-level
might
 constitute
a
significant
source
for
mispredictions
in
affective
forecasting.

Construal-level and focalism

An
abstract
high
level
mindset
conceptualizes
events
more
abstractly
and
general,
than
a
low
 level
mindset.
As
a
consequence,
the
lack
of
concrete
details
leads
forecasters
to
rely
on
more
 prototypical
representations.
People
have
a
tendency
of
underweighting
the
situational
aspects
of
 close
events,
and
overweight
the
prototypical
aspects
of
distal
events.
By
not
taking
the
situational
 factors
sufficiently
into
consideration,
this
can
easily
lead
to
prediction
biases
(Kahneman
et
al.,
 2006;
Wesp,
Sandry,
Prisco,
&
Sarte,
2009;
Wilson
et
al.,
2003).
These
biases
could
in
addition
be
 intensified
by
temporal
distance,
since
high
level
construals
direct
focus
towards
the
essential
and
 schematic
features
of
the
event,
and
away
from
the
contextual
details.


When
forecasters
imagine
how
their
lives
will
be
in
the
upcoming
days,
they
will
think
of
 current
activities
they
are
preoccupied
with.
However,
when
thinking
about
how
their
lives
will
be
 in
a
year
from
now,
activities
easily
withdraws
to
the
background,
becoming
less
significant.
As
a
 result,
their
lives
seems
to
takes
place
in
an
uninterrupted
vacuum.
In
support
for
this
claim,

 Liberman,
Sagristano,
&
Trope
(2002)
asked
people
to
imagine
what
a
day
in
the
near
future
would
 be
like,
they
tended
to
describe
both
positive
and
negative
events.
On
the
contrary,
when
describing
 what
a
day
into
the
distant
future
would
be
like,
they
were
represented
as
more
uniform
and


schematic,
in
either
positive
or
negative
terms.
Furthermore,
they
also
revealed
that
preferences
for


events
and
activities
that
were
expected
in
the
distant
future,
were
organized
around
simpler
 structures
than
preferences
for
the
same
events
in
the
near
future.
In
sum,
this
can
turn
out
to
be
 problematic,
since
the
simpler
and
coherent
representation
could
lack
important
information,
crucial
 for
the
affective
forecaster
to
rely
on
when
making
accurate
future
predictions.

Concrete
construals
will
not
be
subject
to
the
same
problems
as
mentioned
above,
on
the
 contrary,
they
could
counteract
focalism.
A
low-level
mindset
will
be
preoccupied
with
variety
and
 incidental
specific
details
pertaining
to
the
situation.
Wesp
et
al.
(2009)
examined
the
influence
of
 thinking
either
concretely
or
abstractly
on
ratings
of
anticipated
enjoyment
of
a
positive
future
 activity.
In
the
first
study
participants
were
primed
by
a
low
level
construal,
whereas
in
the
second
 they
were
given
details
of
the
events.
Consistent
with
the
hypothesis,
participants
primed
to
adopt
a
 low-level
construal
rated
anticipated
enjoyment
to
be
lower
on
the
upcoming
activity,
since
they
 more
readily
examined
the
details,
and
were
less
concerned
about
the
overall
gist
of
the
positive
 event.
In
the
second
study,
evidence
showed
that
also
explicit
consideration
for
details
influenced
 ratings
similarly
to
the
construal
level
priming
used
in
the
first
study.
These
findings
emphasize
 low-level
construals,
and
details
as
a
debiasing
techniques
against
future
optimism.

Construal-level and emotional states

Spatial
distance
is
inextricably
linked
to
affective
states.
Embedded
deep
within
our
human
 biology
distance
equals
safety.
Campbell
(1960)
suggested
that
visions
itself
was
an
adaptation,
 enabling
us
with
safer
exploration
of
the
environment
at
a
safe
distance,
by
removing
the
need
for
 close
contact
with
potential
dangers.
For
the
infants
survival,
it
is
also
crucial
to
keep
close
to
the
 caregiver
for
food
and
protection.
It
is
therefore
a
common
assumption
among
people
that
the
 psychological
distance
to
the
emotional
object
or
situation
will
influence
its
impact.
A
temporal
 distant
perspective
will
diminish
the
strength
of
the
emotion,
making
the
impact
less
potent
in
 comparison
to
the
proximal
future.


Moreover,
when
people
distance
themselves
from
an
event,
they
are
more
inclined
to
reflect
 on
the
episode
rather
than
ruminating,
enhancing
the
capacity
to
recover.
Recent
research
by
Ayduk
 and
Kross
(2010)
supports
this
notion.
Participants
were
instructed
to
reflect
upon
a
previous
 episode
they
felt
rejected.
When
the
individuals
contemplated
upon
the
episode
from
the
 perspective
of
someone
else,
experiencing
a
sense
of
distance,
they
recovered
more
effectively.


Distance
from
the
episode
lead
participants
to
reconstruct
instead
of
reliving
the
experience,
and
 made
them
less
inclined
to
experience
negative
emotions
or
intrusive
memories
while


contemplating.
Therefore,
if
individuals
adopts
a
high
level
mindset
through
the
perspective
of
a
 mediator,
reflection
predominates
and
coping
improves.
On
the
other
hand,
if
individuals
feel


immersed
in
the
event
as
they
remember
it,
rumination
predominates
and
coping
is
inhibited.


Abstract
construals
has
also
been
shown
to
inhibit
anger.
Ray,
Wilhelm,
&
Gross
(2008) contrasted
rumination
and
reappraisal
by
having
participants
to
either
ruminate
or
reappraise
recent
 autobiographical
events
that
elicited
anger.
The
participant
identified
an
unresolved
event
from
the
 last
two
weeks
in
which
he/she
had
become
very
angry
with
another
person.
The
participant
then
 rated
how
unresolved
the
event
was,
and
the
amount
of
anger
felt.
Subsequently
the
participants
 were
instructed
to
write
about
the
anger
provoking
conflict.
The
results
revealed
that
despite
 spending
equal
amounts
of
time
thinking
about
the
events,
participants
who
ruminated
about
it
felt
 angrier
when
they
recalled
the
event.
Furthermore,
they
had
a
high
probability
of
continuing
to
 think
about
the
event,
and
feel
angry,
even
when
they
were
told
they
could
stop.
This
is
presumably
 because
writing
the
story
from
a
first
person
perspective
(rumination),
made
participants
relive
the
 emotional
episode,
whereas
writing
the
story
from
a
third
person
perspective
(reappraisal),
made
the
 participants
see
through
the
eyes
of
an
observer.
When
individuals
considered
an
event
from
the
 perspective
of
a
mediator,
they
adopted
a
high-level
mindset,
and
were
less
likely
to
experience
 anger.
The
evidence
suggests
that
distance
has
a
soothing
effect
on
how
people
perceive
their
 negative
emotions.

Present research

The
main
agenda
of
the
present
study
is
to
investigate
how
temporal
distance
affects
 predictions
of
duration.
To
be
able
to
achieve
this
goal,
construal
level
theory
was
utilized
as
a
 unifying
framework
for
investigating
people's
predictions
of
durations,
in
relation
to
such
diverse
 predictions
as
performance
time
and
affective
reactions.
Evidence
were
collected
during
three
 experiments
spanning
across
two
time
condition
manipulations;
predicting
duration
estimates
either
 tomorrow,
or
in
the
distant
future
a
year
from
now.

To
what
extent
temporal
distance
influence
participants
predictions
of
time
estimates,
was
 tested.
The
first
experiment
investigates
the
effect
of
the
temporal
distance
on
task
duration
 estimates
in
an
anchoring
paradigm.
This
was
achieved
by
asking
participants
to
estimate
task
 durations
that
was
either
to
be
performed
in
the
proximal
future
or
the
distant
future.
The
main
 objective
of
the
second
experiment
was
to
test
out
a
logical
consequence
of
time
contraction.


Specifically,
two
task
duration
estimates
should
be
perceived
as
more
similar
in
the
distant
future,
 than
in
the
present.
In
addition,
we
sought
to
gain
evidence
to
what
extent
people
tolerated
delays
in
 the
near
compared
to
the
distant
future,
by
investigating
if
estimates
of
tolerance
for
delays
would
 increase
as
a
function
of
time.
The
third
experiment
investigated
how
construal
level
would
impact
 the
duration
of
emotionally
negative
events.
By
manipulating
temporal
distance,
the
reported


intensity
of
emotions
as
well
as
their
duration,
was
measured
in
both
proximal
and
distant
future.

Experiment 1: The effect of temporal distance on task duration estimates in an anchoring paradigm

The
first
experiment
is
a
replication
of
Kanten's
(2011)
design
within
an
anchoring
 paradigm,
thus
a
short
description
of
anchoring
research
will
first
be
presented
before
the
actual
 experiment.
Furthermore,
Mussweiler
(2003)
theory
of
selective
accessibility,
will
have


implications
in
relation
to
anchoring
–
for
both
predictions
and
interpretations
of
the
results,
and
 will
therefore
be
mentioned
briefly.

Anchoring

People's
tendency
to
rely
heavily
on
the
first
piece
of
information
offered
when
making
 decisions
is
referred
to
as
anchoring.
Once
the
initial
anchor
attribute
is
established,
it
will
influence
 the
subsequent
judgements
and
guide
the
final
answer
in
the
direction
of
the
anchor.
Tversky
and
 Kahneman
(1974)
investigated
the
assimilation
of
estimates
towards
a
previously
given
standard.


This
was
achieved
by
spinning
a
wheel
of
fortune
in
the
presence
of
the
participants,
and
letting
the
 wheel
stop
at
either
ten
or
sixty
five.
Subsequently,
the
participants
were
to
decide
if
the
percentage
 of
African
Nations
in
the
United
Nations,
were
lower
or
higher
than
the
anchor
value.
The


participants
who
had
watched
the
wheel
stop
at
ten,
estimated
in
average
lower
values
(25%),
than
 participants
who
had
watched
the
wheel
stop
at
sixty
five
(45%).
The
comparison
with
the
standard
 had
raised
the
estimates
in
the
low-anchor
condition,
and
lowered
them
in
the
high-anchor


condition.

The
anchoring
effect
has
proved
to
be
a
ubiquitous
and
robust
psychological
phenomena,
 difficult
to
account
for
when
making
judgements,
even
when
judges
intentionally
tries
to
avoid
 being
influenced
by
the
anchor
attributes
(Wilson,
Houston,
Etling,
&
Brekke,
1996)
or
have
 expertise
in
the
domain
in
question
(Wright,
1989).
In
particular,
it
has
been
observed
in
a
broad
 array
of
different
judgmental
domains,
such
as
general
knowledge
questions
(e.g.,
Tversky
&


Kahneman,
1974),
estimates
of
self
efficacy
(Switzer
&
Sniezek,
1991),
evaluations
of
lotteries
and
 gambles
(e.g.,
Chapman
&
Johnson,
1994),
and
probability
assessment
(e.g.,
Tversky
&
Kahneman,
 1974),
and
estimating
duration
estimates
(Thomas,
Handley,
&
Newstead,
2007;
Thomas
&


Handley,
2008).

Assimilation

Three
different
mechanisms
have
been
described
that
may
contribute
to
assimilation


anchoring;
insufficient
adjustment
from
a
starting
point
(Tversky
&
Kahneman,
1974),
 conversational
inferences,
and
numeric
priming
(Strack
&
Mussweiler,
1997).

In
numeric
priming
directing
attention
to
the
anchor
value
increases
its
accessibility,
so
that
 it
comes
to
mind
easily
when
the
final
estimate
is
produced.
As
a
result,
it
will
lead
to
assimilation,

 including
the
value
in
the
final
judgement.
This
variant
of
priming
focuses
exclusively
on
the
 numeric
component
of
the
anchor
value,
while
the
semantic
context
in
which
the
value
is
presented
 is
ignored.
However,
this
implies
that
the
anchor
value
should
remain
uninfluenced
by
contextual
 changes.
Wilson
et
al.
(1996)
tested
this
assumption
by
changing
judgmental
dimension,
such
that
 the
comparison
was
to
another
entity,
other
than
the
one
previously
used.
In
the
relevant
condition,
 people
were
asked
to
judge
whether
their
number
was
less
than,
equal
to,
or
greater
than
the
number
 of
countries
in
the
United
Nations.
In
the
irrelevant
condition,
people
were
asked
to
judge
whether
 their
number
was
less
than,
equal
to,
or
greater
than
an
unrelated
question;
how
many
physicians
 and
surgeons
there
were
in
the
local
phone
book.
The
estimates
for
the
number
of
African
nations
in
 the
UN
were
influenced
more
strongly
by
an
anchor
compared
to
the
same
entity
(the
number
of
 African
nations
in
the
UN),
than
to
another
entity
(the
number
of
local
physicians
in
the
phone
 book).
A
change
of
basis
for
comparison
decreased
the
accessibility.
Numeric
anchoring
fails
to
 explain
these
results.
To
remedy
for
this
deficiency
Strack
and
Mussweiler
proposed
the
selective
 accessibility
model.

Selective accessibility model

Mussweiler
and
Strack
(1999)
claims
anchoring
is
a
form
of
semantic
priming.
As
 previously
mentioned,
numeric
information
is
activated
by
the
anchor
to
be
included
in
a
 comparative
anchoring
task,
it
will
subsequently
be
more
accessible.
A
link
between
the
anchor
 value
to
the
target
object
has
to
be
established,
enabling
the
generation
of
semantic
knowledge
 about
the
target
object.
When
evaluating
a
new
hypothesis,
the
individual
looks
for
attributes
 similar
to
the
anchor,
producing
the
anchoring
effect.
For
instance,
Wilson
et
al.
(1996)
instructed
 participants
take
part
in
a
comparative
anchor
task,
indicating
whether
the
target
object
were
larger
 or
smaller
than
the
anchor
value
(e.g.,
the
river
Elbe
is
longer
than
890
km,
or
shorter
than
590
km).


Subsequently
they
were
asked
to
indicate
the
length
of
the
river
Elbe.
The
result
revealed
that
the
 absolute
estimates
were
higher
in
the
high
anchor
condition,
than
in
the
low
anchor
condition.


According
to
Mussweiler
and
Strack,
in
a
standard
comparative
task
people
are
first
testing
for
the
 possibility
that
the
target
is
equal
to
the
anchor
value.
Judges
selectively
generate
semantic


knowledge
that
is
consistent
with
the
notion
that
the
target’s
value
is
equal
to
the
anchor
value.


Mussweiler
and
Strack
further
contended
to
solve
the
subsequent
absolute
task,
participants