4 The effects of tax havens
5.5 Tax havens and institutional quality
Potentially the most serious consequence of tax havens is that they can contribute to weakening the quality of institutions and the political system in developing countries. This is because tax ha
vens help to give politicians in these countries a self-interest in weakening the existing institu
tions. The lack of effective enforcement bodies means that politicians can make greater use of the opportunities offered by tax havens to conceal the proceeds of economic crime and rent-seeking.
Tax havens represent a problem for politicians in countries with strong institutions and well-func
tioning political systems – they cause economic damage and limit government revenues. Howev
er, institutional and political changes can restrict these harmful effects. In well-functioning coun
tries, it will therefore be natural to respond to the challenges represented by tax havens with specif
ic measures which reduce their damaging impact.
The opposite responses may occur in developing countries. Secrecy jurisdictions could represent not only a problem to politicians in countries with weak institutions and political systems but also an
Box 5.1 The case against the Suharto family1
President Suharto topped Transparency Inter- the payment from the BNP account. The Indone
national’s list of the world’s most corrupt leaders sian government charged Suharto with corrup
(confer Transparency International Global Cor- tion and demanded the repayment of USD 400 ruption Report 2004). It is estimated that he and million. The authorities lost this case in Febru
his family misappropriated USD 15-35 billion. ary 2009, and Suharto may recover control of Time’s issue of 24 May 1999 presented esti- the funds in Guernsey.
mates that the Suharto family’s collective assets Former president Suharto sued Time over totalled more than USD 70 billion. the article on corruption, and claimed USD 93 Suharto resigned as president in 1998. He million in damages. The magazine won this case was placed under house arrest in 2000 while al- in April 2009 on the grounds that Suharto was legations of corruption were investigated. He given a right to respond.
was later charged, but the case did not come to All in all, this means that Suharto is suspect-trial because Suharto allegedly suffered from ed of having misappropriated more money than brain disease. He died in 2008. anyone else in history. However, nobody has
The legal inquiry has largely focused on Su- been found guilty of these conditions and no harto’s family and particularly his son Tommy. money has been repaid.
The Guernsey branch of the BNP Paribas bank Of the examples of large-scale corruption cit
notified the regulators in 1998 that it suspected ed in this report, the Suharto case is the only illegal behaviour associated with a deposit from one where the rules on money laundering ap-Garnet Investments Ltd. This company was reg- pear to have played a role in initiating the inves
istered in the Virgin Islands. It has subsequently tigation and the legal process.
emerged that Tommy Suharto was behind the
company. The authorities in Guernsey blocked 1 This presentation is based primarily on an unpublished paper by British lawyer Tim Daniel.
Box 5.2 The case against Arif Ali Zardari1 Zardari is now the president of Pakistan. He was
previously married to Benazir Bhutto, who was Pakistan’s prime minister for two electoral peri
ods. Zardari has been tried and found guilty of corruption in Pakistan and has been charged with money laundering in Switzerland and the Isle of Man. He has been found guilty of corrup
tion by courts in both of these jurisdictions, but has appealed, and Pakistan has now dropped its charges against him.
The charges against Zardari alleged that he had exploited his position to secure payments from two companies in exchange for contracts related to the inspection of commodity imports to Pakistan. These payments were allegedly channelled partly via three companies in the Vir
gin Islands to an account in Dubai and then to Switzerland, and partly via a foundation in Liech
tenstein which owned a trust in the Isle of Man.
This trust owned three companies on the Isle of Man, which in turn owned a large property in the UK.
Pakistani investigators had strong indica
tions that both the bank accounts in Switzerland and the UK property were actually controlled and owned by Zardari. According to Tim Daniel,
the lawyer who represented the Pakistani gov
ernment in connection with the charges against Zardari in the UK, it would have been virtually impossible to trace ownership back through the chain from the property in Britain without the material provided from Pakistan. Despite exten
sive documentation concerning Zardari’s owner
ship of the accounts and the property, the ap
peals process meant delays in securing a final judgement. Eventually, Bhutto and Zardari re
turned to a position of power, Pakistan dropped the case and the funds which had been frozen in Europe were released.
Some commentators claim that the roughly USD 100 million covered by the two cases named above represent only a small part of the funds illegally acquired by Zardari while his wife was prime minister. Estimates of the total amount vary widely, but USD 500 million is among the lowest (confer, for instance, Gordon 2009). It is suspected that proceeds from corrup
tion were paid to shell companies established by Zardari in various tax havens.
1 This presentation is based primarily on an unpublished paper by British lawyer Tim Daniel.
opportunity. Tax havens provide an opportunity to conceal the proceeds of corruption and illegal ac
tivities, or income which politicians have dishon
estly acquired from development assistance, natu
ral resources and the public purse. In this way, the growth of tax havens also provides political incen
tives to tear down rather than build up institutions and to weaken rather than strengthen the political system. Many examples exist of institutions sup
posed to prevent illegal money transfers being de
liberately destroyed by governments,3 and of peo
ple associated with such institutions being pres
sured to neglect their duty or even being killed.
An example of the way resource wealth can lead to a weakening of democratic mechanisms is documented by Ross (2001a). Ross shows that the presence of extensive rain forests in the Philip
pines, Indonesia and Malaysia contributed to the conscious destruction of state institutions by poli
ticians. The rain forest assets gave many players
See Ross (2001a).
big opportunities to enrich themselves – but, in order to do so, they had first to undermine the state institutions which were specifically intended to combat misuse and excessive exploitation.
Rather than building institutions, the politicians were given incentives to destroy them. Ross (2001b) also finds that countries with large oil de
posits become less democratic. In such nations, democracy can carry a cost for politicians be
cause it prevents them from using large govern
ment revenues as they please. Income opportuni
ties provided for politicians by tax havens weaken the incentives to introduce democratic reforms or even strengthen incentives to reduce democratic controls over those in power.
Collier and Hoeffler (2008) demonstrate how checks and balances (institutional rules which limit the abuse of and balance political power) pro
mote growth. They find that countries where such rules are important – because of large govern
ment revenues from natural resources, for exam
ple – are precisely where the rules often get un
3
Box 5.3 Oil money from Congo In its report Undue Diligence, Global Witness
presents the story of how Denis Christel Sassou-Nguesso – son of the president of Congo-Brazza
ville – mixed up government and private finan
cial interests. He did this through his role in state oil exports, and concealed it with the aid of companies registered in Anguilla and the Bank of East Asia in Hong Kong.
Global Witness demonstrates that Sassou-Nguesso has used government funds to pay his personal bills. The documented scope of these irregularities is modest compared with the Abacha case (see box 8.3 below) and a number of other known instances involving government leaders in developing countries. The case con
cerning Sassou-Nguesso is nevertheless inter
esting, in part because it is suitable for illustrat
ing weaknesses in the systems intended to com
bat money laundering.
Global Witness documents that both the Bank of East Asia and the facilitators of the com
pany structures in Anguilla have been in posses
sion of information which clearly indicates that the relevant transactions could involve money laundering. However, there are no indications that anyone in these jurisdictions has initiated
any process to expose illegalities and to take possible further legal steps. Failing to act on re
porting suspicious transactions is a crime. Noth
ing suggests that the private players with a duty to report suspicious transactions have been sub
ject to any criminal investigation for possible breaches of their reporting duty.
The matter became known because a private player purchased claims on the government of Congo-Brazzaville in the secondary market.
They then sought to obtain payment of the debt by securing the right to part of the country’s oil revenues. Through the legal process following the private player’s claim, information became known about Sassou-Nguesso’s ownership of companies involved and his use of company funds to pay for his own private consumption.
Global Witness raises the question in its report of whether the banks could have complied with the money laundering regulations in handling the funds from Congo. Questions can also be asked about whether the governments of the countries where the banks are located should have pursued a criminal investigation into breaches of the money laundering regulations.
dermined by both politicians and the commercial players who bribe them. The analogy with tax ha
vens is once again obvious. The growth of tax ha
vens can give dishonest politicians incentives to reduce institutional rules which promote growth.
It becomes in the politicians’ interest to invest in a social model where secrecy and opportunities for personal abuse of power are tolerated.
The impact which tax havens can have on in
stitutional quality in poor countries may cause great damage. During the past decade, it has be
come clear that institutional quality is perhaps the most important driver for economic prosperity
and growth. Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) provide the best-known analysis of the ef
fect of institutions on national income. They esti
mate that, if a country located initially in the 25 per cent percentile for institutional quality could improve its institutions so that it moved into the 75 per cent percentile, national income would be increased sevenfold. Few factors have such a strong impact on growth as improved institutions.
This is precisely why the damaging effects of tax havens can be so great for developing countries – the tax havens contribute not only to preserving weak institutions, but also to making them worse.
Chapter 6
The scale of tax havens and illegal money flows from developing countries
The Commission’s mandate encompasses a dis
cussion of both legal and illegal money flows from developing countries to tax havens. A number of estimates of such flows have been made. Since the illegal flows by definition embrace funds which either have been acquired though crime or represent breaches of the law per se, they will be largely channelled outside official systems or con
cealed in other ways. Partly because of rules on the burden of proof and limited investigatory re
sources, statistics of crime revealed through the justice system will only represent a small fraction of the actual level of criminal activity. Given this, therefore, no direct measurements of such flows exist.
Tax havens publish few statistics which help to estimate the scale of illegal money flows and the holdings of various forms of assets.
This chapter presents various data and analy
sis which can throw light on the scale of illegal money flows from developing countries and on the size and distinguishing features of tax haven economies.
Tax havens are characterised by the fact that a large part of their activity is pure pass-through – in other words, the operations are owned and managed in other countries. In addition, the finan
cial industry often has a disproportionate signifi
cance. This is illustrated in this chapter through various statistical indicators.
6.1 Scale of illegal money flows
6.1.1 Methods – highlights
For natural reasons, the scale of illegal money flows cannot be measured precisely. Instead, they must be estimated by methods which involve a substantial degree of uncertainty. It is even more difficult to estimate illegal money flows from de
veloping countries and how large a proportion of these go to or pass through tax havens.
The weaknesses of the various measurement methods mean that it is advantageous to avoid re
lying on any one method and, instead, compare estimates produced by different approaches in or
der to draw conclusions on the basis of a variety of indicators.
In the main, two methods are relevant:
1. combining an estimate of the scale of illegal transfer pricing with one covering other flows based on figures from national accounts 2. measuring the amount of capital placed in tax
havens and calculating income from these hol
dings.
A number of the methods reviewed below are lim
ited in their ability to identify opportunities for manipulation within multinational companies, var
iations between gross and net figures for foreign trade in the national accounts, and so forth. In the Commission’s view, this suggests that these meth
ods will often underestimate the scope of capital flight and illegal money flows. The following methods for estimating capital flight will be pre
sented by the Commission:
1. direct estimates of proceeds from crime and tax evasion
2. use of national accounts data to estimate unre
gistered capital flight
3. methods for measuring manipulated transfer pricing
4. measuring the value of assets in tax havens and using the results to estimate unregistered income.
Below, the Commission refers to studies which use these methods to estimate either capital flight from developing countries or the scope of finan
cial activity in developing countries.
A weakness with some of these methods in re
lation to the Commission’s mandate is that they are unsuitable for estimating total illegal money flows. Direct estimates (item 1 above) aim to as
sess income from all types of illegal activity. The methods in item 2 could be suitable for estimating all unregistered capital flows other than those which occur through manipulated transfer prices.
As a result, the methods under item 2 are usually supplemented by separate estimates for transac
tions concealed through transfer pricing (item 3).
The method in item 4 has been used to estimate concealed income through the return on the as
sets of individuals placed in tax havens. This can detect unregistered income from assets in tax ha
vens and can be interpreted as an expression of accumulated illegal flows over a period, but not as an estimate of current income other than the re
turn on holdings in tax havens or additions from other illegal activity.
6.1.2 Estimates – main points
Despite the uncertainties noted above, the Com
mission believes it can conclude that the scale of illegal money flows from developing countries to tax havens is very large, particularly viewed in re
lation to the size of developing country economies and tax bases. The most complete estimates indi
cate that the combined illegal capital flight from developing countries represents between six and 8.7 per cent of their GDP. By comparison, tax rev
enues for the poorest countries amount to about 13 per cent of GDP.
Income transfers through manipulated transfer prices probably account for the largest part of the illegal money flows from developing countries.
Analyses carried out through the DOTS method (see section 6.1.6) on the basis of trade statistics in
dicate that the scale of manipulated transfer pricing in trade to and from developing countries amount
ed to roughly USD 500 billion in 2006. This corre
sponded to 6.5 per cent of foreign trade for these countries. Weaknesses in the method suggest that it yields an underestimate of the real scale.
Gross registered capital flows to developing countries totalled USD 571 billion in 2006 (World Bank 2007). Donor grants accounted for USD 70 billion of this. Estimates from Kar and Cartwright-Smith (2008) indicate that illegal money flows from these countries totalled USD 641-979 billion in 2006. Even the lowest estimate indicates that the illicit capital outflow is larger than the gross le
gal inflow. Illicit capital outflows correspond to about 10 times the total development assistance going to these countries.
The estimates above apply to all illegal money flows from developing countries. Not all of these
go to tax havens. No estimates are available for the proportion of illegal money flows from devel
oping countries which go to tax havens specifical
ly.
Nor are any estimates available for all illegal money flows to tax havens. However, it has been documented that placements by private individu
als in such jurisdictions are very large, and that a big proportion of the capital placed there is not declared for tax. TJN (2005) estimates that place
ments by affluent individuals in tax havens amounted to NOK 10-12 000 billion in 2004. Offi
cial statistics indicate that the scale of such place
ments increased strongly in subsequent years, but the financial crisis has probably led to a reduc
tion over the past year. Few data are available for estimating how large a share of these placements derive from developing countries. Cobham (2005) has assumed that 20 per cent of placements derive from developing countries. If so, this would mean that USD 2 200-2 400 billion has been transferred from developing countries to tax havens. This rep
resents four years of gross capital inflow or more than 30 times the amount that the developing countries receive in the form of assistance. How
ever, this estimate of illegal money flows does not include flows to tax havens from such activities as manipulation of transfer prices. These flows are probably significantly larger than the amount of income tax evaded on capital placements by pri
vate individuals.
6.1.3 More on different methods for
estimating the scale of capital outflows In this section, the Commission will discuss in greater detail the four methods mentioned in the introduction to this chapter for estimating the scale of illegal money flows between tax havens and other countries. The subsequent section sums up various efforts to quantify such money flows.
6.1.4 Direct estimates of proceeds from crime and tax evasion
Directly estimating the proceeds from crime and tax evasion is a simple method in principle, but one which involves considerable difficulties in practice relating to the identification of suitable data. The method involves using statistics and ex
perience to answer the following questions:
– how extensive are various types of criminal
– how extensive are various types of criminal