Environmental and Forest Policies in Latin America

Recent and emerging trends in environmental governance in Latin America are embedded in a multifaceted and changing multi-scale context. These trends include issues such as

environmental citizenship, the ‘return of the state’, as well as new global geopolitical relations (Baud et al., 2011).The cases discussed in this dissertation should be understood in a context shaped by three interconnected factors, related to the role Latin American countries and actors, have played in global debates about natural resource governance, the environment and climate change (Baud et al., 2011; De Castro et al., 2016). In this section, I highlight how the renewed focus on natural resource and environmental governance in Latin America in the 2000s coincided with what has been known as the “pink-tide” (Bull and Aguilar-Støen, 2015).

Second, I emphasize the strengthened position of indigenous peoples and grassroots movements, demanding redistribution, recognition and participation in environmental governance. Third, I draw attention to the unclear and contradictory environmental and resource policies.

The ascendance to power of left-wing governments in Latin America in the 1990s and 2000s was to a large degree supported by large grassroots mobilisations which emerged as a reaction to neoliberal policy reforms and their socio-economic consequences (Perreault, 2008;

Haarstad, 2012a; Bull and Aguilar-Støen, 2015; De Castro et al., 2016). Social movements have, especially since the 1990s, played a particularly important role in Latin America, seeking to change existing systems or challenge injustice, inequality and development models (Bebbington and Bury, 2013). Furthermore, a massive commodity boom based on the expansion of mining, oil exploitation and agro-industrial development provided these

governments with substantial revenues (McNeish and Logan, 2012; Haarstad, 2012a; Bull and

Aguilar-Støen, 2015). These revenues have, for example, sponsored generous welfare programmes which have, along with higher employment rates, led to falling poverty rates and even improved inequality in many Latin America countries (Webber, 2017). However, Latin American left-wing governments have been criticised for not challenging underlying class structures and failing to implement tax reforms. When commodity prices fell new conflicts emerged, many of which were related to the extraction of natural resources such as minerals, oil and hydrocarbons, as well as the agro-industry (McNeish and Logan, 2012; Bull and Aguilar-Støen, 2015). Contestations regarding neo-extractivism in Latin America (Gudynas, 2009) have included reactions to uncertainty and risk perception related to capital

accumulation and land dispossession (Harvey, 2004); demands for benefits and redistribution of land and resources; rights-based demands for consultations and participation in decision-making; or a combination of them all (Peet and Watts, 2004; Haarstad, 2012a; Bebbington and Bebbington, 2012, p.33). However, the conflicts and contestation that have occurred, have also created new possibilities for cooperation (Haarstad and Campero, 2011; Bebbington and Bebbington, 2012; Bull and Aguilar-Støen, 2015).

As a result of decades of mobilisations and pressure from indigenous peoples and their allies, many countries in Latin America ratified the International Labour Organisation 169

Convention on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples (ILO 169) (Van Cott, 2000) in the 1990s². The ILO 169 convention recognises the cultural identity of indigenous people, affirms indigenous land rights and recognises the term “territory” to refer to indigenous lands³. Constitutional reforms in various countries, including Bolivia, Colombia, Nicaragua and Guatemala, have recognised multicultural and multi-ethnic nations and included indigenous rights to land (Sieder, 2002). Several Latin American countries embarked on a series of legal reforms to guarantee indigenous groups and communities’ land rights, access and use rights to natural resources, including forest areas. These reforms, however, have been criticised for not challenging structural inequalities (Sieder, 2002; Hale, 2005). Following the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 (The

2 Indigenous peoples can be distinguished by their history, marginality, customary institutions, territoriality, cultural distinction, language and self-identification. In many Latin American countries “indigenous” is a specific legal and cultural category. According to the ILO convention 169 the term “indigenous” signifies the descendants of the original inhabitants before colonisation, who continue to identify themselves as a community and maintain traditional institutions.

3 Article 13 of the ILO 169 convention states: “The use of the term lands in Articles 15 and 16 shall include the concept of territories, which covers the total environment of the areas, which the peoples concerned occupy or otherwise use.”

Earth Summit), several changes to environmental policies were also proposed across the region. The idea of “community conservation” gained currency and local communities were seen as central actors for protecting natural resources (Ribot and Larson, 2005). These ideas also resonated with ideas regarding the privatisation of nature conservation (Vogel, 1992).

Forest conservation initiatives were promoted through “sustainable management” models which included Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), local communities, private companies, local governments and donor support.

The governance of forest areas in Latin America went through significant changes as a result of privatisation and decentralisation policies in the 1990s and 2000s (Larson et al., 2006;

Larson et al., 2007). Neoliberal reforms in Latin America entailed free trade agreements, privatisation of public utilities, the titling and privatisation of property titles and resources, flexible environmental and labour regulations, as well as cuts in public expenditure (Brannstrøm, 2004; Liverman and Vilas, 2006). Institutional conditions were improved for private investments and private participation in the forest sector, which were viewed as essential for development and economic growth. Concurrently, an increased formal emphasis on rights-based development led to improved local participation in resource governance and community forestry (Larson et al., 2008). Consequently, new reforms were introduced, shifting forest governance from being largely controlled by the state to being managed by local governments, communities, non-governmental organisations and private actors, supported by international and bilateral donors (Larson et al., 2007). The system for private forest concessions was expanded and new economic and market-based mechanisms were introduced, such as forest certification. With private forest concessions, logging companies gained extraction rights for commercially valuable forests. Both decentralisation and privatisation policies brought about new challenges (Larson et al., 2007; Larson et al., 2008).

Local elites involved in agriculture, forest extraction or cattle ranching activities were, in many cases, strengthened by the reforms. The reforms merely improved conditions for private investments and did not include adequate institutional arrangements for the participation of local communities (Larson and Ferroukhi, 2003; Larson et al., 2006). Practices excluding local people from access to forest resources, forest areas and economic benefits prevailed and were, in some cases, exacerbated by the reforms (Larson et al., 2006).

In many Latin American countries the state apparatus was left weakened as a result of neoliberal policies from the 1990s and 2000s, coupled with little political will to protect forest

areas and intrusive commercial activities in forest areas with little public control (Larson, 2008; Pacheco et al., 2011). The expanding presence of private and non-governmental actors in areas with little state presence, such as indigenous territories, has challenged marginalised actors and fostered mistrust, though has also opened possibilities for new alliances (Haarstad, 2012a; Hindery, 2013; McNeish and Logan, 2012; Bull and Aguilar-Støen, 2015; McNeish et al., 2015). In the 2000s indigenous organisations were at the forefront of many conflicts over natural resource governance (Van Cott, 2005; Dangl, 2007; Perreault, 2008). They demanded consultations, autonomy, benefits and access to land and resources, and in many cases the mobilisations had impact on policy reforms with regard to land use and resource extraction.

Coalition-building across indigenous peoples and environmental organisations opened up new opportunities for indigenous peoples to influence legislative agendas and national and international processes.

With the left-wing governments coming to power in the 2000s, there were clear hopes connected to equitable and sustainable natural resource use (Baud et al., 2011; Bull and Aguilar-Støen, 2015; De Castro et al., 2016), strengthening indigenous and community rights and climate justice (Chatterton et al., 2013). In 2007, the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2007) was passed as law in Bolivia. At the United Nations (UN) Climate Change Conference of the Parties (COP) in Copenhagen in 2009, several Latin American delegates voiced firm positions about the ‘ecological debt’ of Northern countries towards the South (Baud et al., 2011), and the Bolivian president Evo Morales invited the world to the World People’s Conference on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth in April in Cochabamba 2010. Later the same year, Bolivia passed a Law for the Defense of Mother Earth (2010), which formed the basis for the Universal Declaration for the Rights of Mother Earth. Twenty years after the first Rio conference, at the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development, Rio+20 in 2012, Bolivia’s government discursively challenged the green economy discourse, and later the same year, launched an alternative to a marked-oriented REDD model.

As I will discuss later, contrasting interests and a lack of overall implementation of these ideas has resulted in frustration and conflict. In the following section I present the development of REDD and REDD+ in global climate change policy debates.

2.2 From RED to REDD+

The importance of protecting forests in climate change policies has gained increased attention in the last decade. The UNFCCC contains two strategies to address climate change, mitigation and adaptation, both of which are relevant to the governance of forest areas. Mitigation refers to reducing GHG emissions and enhancing sink opportunities to stop global warming, whilst adaptation entails coping with what is already occurring as a result of climate change and reducing the adverse impact of and vulnerability to climate change (IPCC, 2007). The UNFCCC (1992) has established principles of common but differentiated responsibility: the precautionary principle, the right to sustainable development and an open economic system.

The world’s first GHG emissions reduction treaty, the Kyoto Protocol, was adopted in 1997 and later ratified in 2001. The Kyoto Protocol reflects the dominant principles in global environmental governance, including flexibility, market mechanisms and economic

incentives. The Protocol led to the formation of solutions such as pricing mechanisms, carbon markets and offsets (Bridge and Perreault, 2009; Liverman, 2015). The term “carbon

markets” refers to CO2 equivalent (CO2e) emission trading whereby a price per ton is set, and emission permits can be bought and sold. By pricing GHG emissions, carbon markets are viewed as a means of fostering economic growth while mitigating GHG production (Meckling, 2011). When carbon trading was first introduced it was rendered in purely technical terms and presented as the only means to create the flexibility needed to limit carbon emissions at the lowest possible economic costs (Stephan and Lane, 2015). In reality, carbon trading has proven to be political andwidely contested (Bumpus, 2011; Lohman, 2012; Corbera and Martin, 2015; Corbera, 2017a) and has been criticised for serving powerful business interests (Bailey, 2007; Bumpus and Liveman, 2011). With carbon offsets, a new commodity has been created that links the North and South through complex sets of technologies, institutions and discourses (Bumpus and Liverman, 2011).

The roots of REDD extend back to the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol. Article 2 of the Kyoto Protocol (UNFCCC, 1998) refers to the protection and enhancement of sinks and reservoirs of GHGs, afforestation and reforestation activities and sustainable forest management practices.

Reducing deforestation and forest degradation was not high on the agenda until 2005. Led by Papa New Guinea and Costa Rica, the Coalition for Rainforest Nations (CRN) was formed, aiming to reconcile forest stewardship with economic development and to be included as part

of carbon markets under the Kyoto Protocol. In 2005, the CRN requested that Reducing Emissions from Deforestation (RED) in developing countries as well as approaches to stimulate appropriate action be included in the agenda. The CRN argued that by generating credits from RED activities, tropical forest countries could gain access to carbon markets and in so doing, create incentives for the protection of forests. The idea was to provide financial rewards to tropical forest countries to preserve forests (with their store of carbon) and compensate for lost forest-related income. This was to be done through the pricing of environmental services and the assignation of property rights to carbon (Bumpus and Liverman, 2011).

In 2007 the Central African Forest Commission (Commission des Forets d’Afrique Centrale – COMIFAC) suggested that also emission reductions from forest degradation be included, and Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD) was born. Pressure from a range of forest countries, academics and NGOs motivated by an emphasis on conservation and sustainable forest management resulted in the transition from REDD to REDD+ in 2008 (Angelsen, 2009). The recognition of the value of conservation and sustainable forest management fostered progress towards REDD+ and the potential to increase co-benefits (e.g., protection of ecosystem services, poverty alleviation, improved governance and biodiversity conservation) was also improved. The Cancun Agreements (UNFCCC, 2010, p.12) confirmed REDD+ and encouraged developing country parties to “contribute to mitigation actions in the forest sector by undertaking the following activities (….): (a) reducing emissions from deforestation; (b) reducing emissions from forest degradation; (c) conservation of forest carbon stocks; (d) sustainable management of forests; and (e) enhancement of forest carbon stocks”.

The Cancun Agreement (UNFCCC, 2010) further suggested that developing country parties develop a) a national strategy or action plan; b) a national forest reference emission level; c) a national and transparent national forest monitoring system; and d) a system providing information on how safeguards are addressed. Between 2010 and 2015 REDD+ was intensely debated in international negotiations, regarding financing options, safeguards for participation of indigenous and forest-based communities, as well as reference levels, result-based

financing and measurement, reporting and verification (MRV) (Angelsen et al., 2012;

Angelsen, 2013; Angelsen et al., 2018). In 2014 the topic of non-market approaches was raised and Bolivia, concerned with integral forest governance, introduced a proposal on Joint

Mitigation and Adaptation (JMA) efforts. In 2015 a decision was made at COP21 in Paris to encourage alternative policy approaches, such as “joint mitigation and adaptation approaches for the integral and sustainable management of forests” (Decision 16/CP.21).

However, despite significant progress, discussions continue about the content of a REDD+

mechanism. Substantial funding is needed for a full-scale implementation of REDD+ and both market-based and non-market-based mechanisms are being discussed (Angelsen et al., 2018). Up to 2019, willing states and multilateral institutions have financed REDD efforts, and the future inclusion of REDD in carbon markets remains uncertain (Angelsen, 2013;

Angelsen et al., 2018). Multilateral channels for REDD financing include the UN-REDD programme, the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF), the Green Climate Fund (GCF), and the Forest Investment Programme (FIP). In addition, there are bilateral initiatives and pilot projects run by NGOs or private actors. REDD’s evolution from 2005 to 2015 is summarised in Figure 2.

Figure 2 REDD Developments from 2005 to 2015

Year Conference of the Parties (COP)/Commission/Accord/Plan

2005 COP 11, Montreal: The Coalition of Rainforest Nations proposed that “Reducing Emissions from Deforestation” (RED) be included in activities that generate carbon credits.

2007 The Central African Forest Commission (COMIFAC): COMIFAC proposed that emission reductions from forest degradation also be included.

2007 COP 13, Reducing emissions from deforestation in developing countries: approaches to stimulate action (Decision 2/CP.13).

2008 COP 14, Poznan: The role of conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in reducing emissions was recognised.

2009 COP 15, The Copenhagen Accord: Important discussions on financial resources, drivers of deforestation and forest degradation, monitoring, safeguards and measurement, reporting and verification (MRV) took place. Decision 4/CP.15 regarding “Methodological guidance”.

2010 COP 16, Cancun Agreements: REDD was expanded to REDD+ and the phased-approach was introduced. Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention.

2011 COP 17, Durban: Financing options, safeguards and reference levels were discussed.

Guidance on information systems on safeguards and forest reference levels, Decision 1/CP.16.

2012 COP 18, Doha: Measurement, reporting and verification (MRV) procedures and financing were outlined. Agreed outcome pursuant to the Bali Action Plan.

2013 COP 19, Warsaw: Decision of work programme for results-based finance, in order to scale up and improve the effectiveness of financing for REDD+ activities was made. Modalities for national forest monitoring system, and measuring, reporting and verifying.

2014 COP 20, Lima: Non-market approaches were considered. The government of Bolivia presented a proposal on Joint Mitigation and Adaptation (JMA) efforts.

2015 COP 21, Paris: A non-binding decision was made to encourage action to implement and support policy and incentives for REDD+, as well as for alternative policy approaches, such as joint mitigation and adaptation approaches for the integral and sustainable management of forests.

Decision 16/CP.21.

Source: UNFCCC secretariat (2016)

2.3 REDD+ Contestations

Initially, REDD was largely presented as a “technical fix” and a triple “win” for climate, biodiversity conservation and sustainable development (Stern, 2006). Since its introduction REDD has, however, been the subject of discussions across a range of ideological,

institutional and financial perspectives (Corbera and Schroeder, 2011; Angelsen et al., 2018).

Scholars have problematised REDD from different perspectives and focus areas (Angelsen and McNeill, 2012), including governance structures for REDD (Vatn and Vedeld, 2011), the political economy of REDD (Brockhaus and Angelsen, 2012), REDD as ecosystem services (Corbera, 2012), land tenure and REDD (Cronkleton et al., 2011; Larson, 2011; Dokken et al., 2014), social dimensions of REDD (Hall, 2012); local implications (Sunderlin et al., 2014), and rights-based and pro-poor perspectives (Myers, 2007; Larson, 2011; Nasi et al., 2011; van Dam, 2011; Brown, 2013; de Jong et al., 2014; Aguilar-Støen, 2015).

The inclusion of REDD as part of the global carbon market has been criticised by both academics and developing countries’ governments for allowing polluters to continue with business as usual and for encouraging a net-sum game for global emissions (Bumpus and Liverman, 2011). How and whether REDD+ should include goals for economic and social development, livelihoods and rights of forest dwelling and indigenous communities, has been debated both within and outside the formal negotiations. Environmental and indigenous organisations have pushed for safeguards and participation in decision-making, rights to consultation, negotiations and benefit-sharing (Schroder, 2010; Wallbott, 2014; Osborne et al., 2014; Aguilar-Støen, 2017; Osborne, 2018). Carbon rights are disputed, particularly whether rights should be tied to the state or land titles or be considered as separate rights (Corbera et al., 2010; Bumpus and Liverman, 2011; Osborne, 2015). The question of scale has been debated: whether to implement efforts at a project scale or employ a national programme-based approach (Angelsen, 2009; Forsyth, 2009; Vatn and Vedeld, 2011). In practice, the national programme-based view has gained prominence in the official negotiations, whereas the former exists as NGOs and private initiatives implement pilot projects and seek connection with the voluntary carbon markets (Madeira et al., 2010;

Angelsen et al., 2018).

REDD+ efforts have been introduced in many tropical forest countries. REDD preparations and pilot projects have included different focus areas, such as changes in tenure regimes,

providing economic returns for locals, monitoring activities, local forest management and capacity building (Haong et al., 2013; Sunderlin et al., 2014; Maraseni et al., 2014; Angelsen et al., 2018). Some reports have demonstrated that REDD+ can be beneficial for local communities, whilst other projects have fostered social inequalities and ignored local

problems (Blom et al., 2010; Cronkleton et al., 2011; Leggett and Lovell, 2012; Dokken et al., 2014; Sunderlin et al., 2014; Angelsen et al., 2018). Concerns have been expressed regarding the lack of law enforcement capacity in many countries, weak regulatory frameworks, corruption, illegal wood trade, unequal land distribution, lack of respect for indigenous territories and fears that powerful elites will capture REDD funds (Myers, 2007; Pacheco et al., 2010; Larson, 2011; Larson et al., 2010; Larson et al., 2011; Nasi et al., 2011; van Dam, 2011; Hall, 2011; Hall, 2012; de Jong et al., 2014; Aguilar-Støen, 2017). Others have pointed to risks of misconduct in carbon accounting and monitoring, poorly designed policies, as well as the over simplification of socio-ecological contexts, and the causes and solutions about deforestation and degradation of forests (Brown, 2013; Corbera, 2017b). The critique of REDD+ by several developing countries, NGOs and indigenous organisations has been connected to “climate justice”, along with demands for benefits and participation (Schroeder, 2010; Chatterton et al., 2013). Furthermore, criticismis related to the so called new carbon economy, where new forms of expertise and consultancy in the development of carbon projects and monitoring, measurement, reporting and verification, have emerged (Bumpus and Liverman, 2011).

In the following chapter I will introduce the analytical framework.

3. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

In this study I aim to understand how both socio-environmental interactions and geopolitical

In this study I aim to understand how both socio-environmental interactions and geopolitical