Current Threats and Challenges in the Forest Sector

Bolivia has an extensive network of more than 66 protected areas, many of which contain vast forest areas. In addition, medium and large-scale landowners hold 47 million hectares of these forested areas. In 2011, 23 million hectares of forest were within indigenous territories and 3.8 million hectares were recently colonised lands. As such as 8.8 million hectares were under forest management, including both state land and private land, of which 5 million hectares were concessions (Morales et al., 2013).

Between 2010 and 2015 the net loss of forests in Bolivia was 289,000 hectares per year (FAO, 2015). Threats to the forest areas include the expansion of the agricultural sector (such as cultivation of soya, sugarcane, rice and coca), cattle grazing, colonisation and new settlers (both legal and illegal), illegal logging, forest fires, unsustainable management of forest resources, infrastructure development and preparations for extractive industries (Müller et al., 2014). The state’s weak implementation of environmental regulations has left indigenous territories, forests and the environment at risk (Pacheco, 2007; Nasi et al., 2011; Redo et al., 2011). The threats to forest areas also reflect unequal access to land and resources, as well as the pre-eminence of economic interests over alternative forms of land use. In certain areas, particularly in Santa Cruz, permanent forestland has slowly been transformed for agricultural use (Pacheco, 2006). Cattle ranching, timber logging and agro-industry, in addition to oil and gas extraction, are the most crucial components of the lowland economy (Hecht, 2013; Müller et al., 2014; Høiby and Zenteno Hopp, 2015.) These sectors are largely controlled by a limited number of powerful families, many of whom are organised in the so-called Civic Committees (Comités Cívicos). Additionally, foreign actors increasingly hold land in Bolivia (Urioste, 2012). Foreign ownership of land is not new in Bolivia, however, more recently Brazilian and Argentinian actors have been taking over lands in the Bolivian lowlands through land ownership or rental.

Forest degradation persists, both in legal and illegal forms. This is, on the one hand, a result of poor follow-up from the state and company practices, but it is also due to problems inherent in the 1996 Forest Law. For example, the 20-year rotation system stipulated by logging regulation is not properly adapted to the Bolivian ecosystems where many species require more than 20 years for regrowth (Pers.com; Jaime Villanueva, La Paz 2012). Logging companies have, in many instances, failed to protect the areas they operate in, cutting down

valuable seedling trees or extracting more trees than allowed. The forest management framework has created a patron-client system between forest communities and forest companies who have control over the value chains and communication with public bodies, or between communities and forest technicians who are responsible for management plans. State land, defined as permanent forest areas, has been redistributed to small-scale farmers but without proper programmes for the management of forest protection. Abandoned forest concession areas on state land have also been colonised by farmers (either permanently or seasonally), and in certain instances, forest areas within large indigenous communities have been rented out or fallen victim to illegal resource extraction. National protected areas have been opened up to mining, gas and oil activities. At the same time, non-governmental organisations have in some areas had considerable impact on management and control.

Finally, I will shortly introduce how REDD has been introduced to Bolivia.

4.9.1 Climate Change Policies and REDD in Bolivia

I identify three phases in the climate change policies of the MAS government: first, the transition phase (2006-2009); second, the opposition phase (2009-2011); and lastly, the proposition phase (2011-present).

The transition phase was characterised by new political actors entering the arena and the formation of new institutions, as well as the legacy of the previous administration. The responsibility for climate change policies was placed on the National Programme for Climate Change (Programa Nacional de Cambio Climático) and on the Ministry of Sustainable Development, later renamed to the Ministry of Environment and Water. In 2006, there were several Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects in Bolivia, and in 2008 Bolivia expressed interest in becoming part of the UN-REDD programme. Bolivia was accepted in the programme as a pilot country later that year. Bolivia is also famous for having had the first REDD-like project globally, in the Noel Kempffnational park. The Noel Kempff Climate Action Project was initiated in 1997. The project established direct relations with US energy companies, who were willing to pay for the conservation of the Noel Kempff Park, and in return were given the possibility of receiving future carbon.

In 2009 a national UN-REDD team was established in coordination with the World Bank Forest Carbon Facility Partnership and Germany, and in 2010 the five largest peasant and indigenous organisations formed the National Environmental Policy Support Group.¹⁵ However, after the Copenhagen COP15 in 2009, Bolivia’s critical position towards REDD was strengthened. The Bolivian government demanded public funding for REDD, national sovereignty and meaningful participation of indigenous peoples and local communities.

The opposition phase of Bolivian climate change policies was characterised by opposition to carbon markets and REDD. In 2008 Bolivia left the Coalition for Rainforest Nations.

Furthermore, in response to the failure of negotiations in Copenhagen in 2009, the Bolivian president, Evo Morales, announced that Bolivia would organise and host an alternative climate conference, the Peoples Conference on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth, in Cochabamba in April 2010. The resulting Declaration on Forests (the Peoples Agreement, 2010) rejected REDD and carbon markets and called for a new mechanism that

“respects the sovereignty of States and the right of the peoples to free, prior and informed consent”. Other concerns raised included the dispossession of local people, reduction of forests to “mere carbon sequestration” and inclusion of plantations in the definition of forests.

In November 2010, the government brought the Cochabamba declaration to the climate negotiations in Cancun and, in the final moments, refused to sign the agreement among nations. Despite the Cochabamba declaration, the Bolivian government signed a contract with the UN-REDD programme in November 2010, creating confusion among many civil society organisations and donors. In 2011 the government closed the Noel Kempff Climate Action Project and the CDM projects.

Finally, the proposition phase of Bolivian climate change policies has been characterised by the development of an alternative to REDD (Pacheco, 2014). In 2011 a project to develop an alternative mechanism to REDD was initiated in Bolivia, both for domestic issues and as an example of a global mechanism. In 2011 the Bolivian delegation in Durban proposed the new forest and climate change mechanism, which was to be based on public funding, “integral”

forests management and a combination of mitigation and adaptation efforts. The project was re-launched in 2012 as the Joint Mechanism for Mitigation and Adaptation and Sustainable

15 CONAMAQ, the Syndicalist Confederation of Intercultural Communities of Bolivia (CSCIB), the Unified Syndical Confederation of Rural Workers of Bolivia (CSUTCB), the woman indigenous peasant organization (CBMCIOB-BS) and the eastern lowland Confederation of Indigenous Peoples of Bolivia (CIDOB).

Management of Forests and Mother Earth (the Joint Mechanism). At the same time, the UN-REDD project was put on hold in Bolivia after two years of inactivity. I explore the discussions about REDD in Bolivia and present more details regarding the process of policy change in environmental governance, as well as how the politics of scale shaped the outcomes, in Paper III.

In the following chapter, I present the methodology employed in this dissertation.