Definitions of a system

SYSTEM AS A SET OF RELATED ELEMENTS

When speaking of groups of elements, Bertalanffy makes three distinctions: first, concerning the number of elements; second, concerning their species; and third, concerning their relations. Bertalanffy calls the characteristics of the first two groups summative, and the characteristics of the third group constitutive. The constitutive characteristics “are those which are dependent on the specific relations within the complex; for understanding such characteristics we therefore must know not only the parts, but also relations” (Bertalanffy 1968: 54). The characteristics cannot be derived from a set of isolated elements, but they are an effect of a whole group of

interacting elements (the complex). System here is defined as an assembly of such related elements.

If one assumed that a building is a system, then each of its elements should be a ‘constitutive’ element. Because the elements are purposefully composed, they are related to each other and to the whole building and their characteristics come from these relations.

SYSTEM AS AN ORGANISED COMPLEXITY

Weinberg (2001: 19) proposes another definition. He divides objects of examination into three groups, or regions. The first region (‘organised simplicity’) contains objects that he calls machines – they are organised in a way that is accessible to analytical procedures (the so-called scientific method initiated by Galileo and Descartes). Representatives of this group are artefacts or objects created by humans, such as a car, a mobile phone,¹⁵ or models of some natural phenomena (e.g., a model of the solar system).

The second region (‘unorganised complexity’) contains objects or phenomena that are relatively unorganised and that include a vast number of elements (aggregates), like unorganized group of people. This property makes them very intricate subjects for examination, and they cannot be examined with analytical procedures, but with statistical methods.

Lastly, and most importantly, there is an intermediary region (‘organised complexity’), which consists of number of objects that are organised, but whose organisation is too complex for analytical procedures. Weinberg calls

15 The problem is more complicated. A car for example, cannot be reduced to an object, which can be examined only through analytical procedures. It consists of both quantitative characteristics (consumption of fuel, power of engine and the like) and qualitative characteristics (level of comfort, visual quality). The latter characteristics are relative to the car’s purpose and to some extend they depend on human judgment.

these objects systems and they include for example the atmosphere or the living organisms (figure 2).

Figure 2. Weinberg’s classification of objects and phenomena. The vertical axis (randomness) reflects the number of relations between objects – the more random an object, the less relations between its elements. The horizontal axis reflects the complexity of relations (after Weinberg, 2001).

In Weinberg’s classification, the interdisciplinary character of the systems theory is apparent. When it comes to the first region, the machines are products of combined knowledge from different disciplines. Similarly, the representatives of the second region, the aggregates, can be found both in the social sciences and in the natural sciences.

The difference between Bertalanffy’s and Weinberg’s definitions of a system is evident. Bertalanffy’s definition is broader, because the only criterion for a system is that its elements are related. For Bertalanffy, a system is everything that makes a whole including objects from Weinberg’s first region, i.e. machines and mechanisms. Weinberg’s systems include only objects that are too complex for the analytical procedures. The examples of Weinberg’s systems include natural systems (such as the atmosphere), biological systems (such as living organisms), or men-made conceptual systems (such as economic systems or legal systems).

Weinberg emphasizes the potential lack of procedures applicable to systems. The application of the acknowledged methods, such as statistical and analytical procedures is inadequate to organized complexities. In the statistical procedures, simplicity is achieved by operating on averages, while in analytical procedures, the number of relevant parts of the system is purposefully lessened. Both procedures result in oversimplification of the examined phenomenon.

The lack of a relevant approach to complex systems was a major reason for initiating systems research. The careful examination of systems gave rise to the development of new methods, which are alternative to the traditional, analytical procedures of natural science. This thesis assumes, that a building model is such an organized complexity (a system in Weinberg terms) and thus, methods developed by systems research find application in the generative design system.

SYSTEM AS A WHOLE

Laszlo (1996) differentiates between two fundamental modes of thinking in the European tradition: atomistic (rigorous) and holistic (speculative). In the early scientific thinking, holistic thinking prevailed. The holistic thinking then gave way to more rigorous, empirically testable knowledge. But the latter, though rigorous, were fragmentary (atomistic) and it lost its original coherence. The two modes of thinking alternated in the past and eventually transformed into today’s mode of thinking which is “rigorous, yet holistic”.

In this context, Laszlo mentions an early definition of systems as conceptual entities, which we used to organise our knowledge about the world. According to Laszlo, a system used to be something that exists in our mind and not in the world, such as a ‘theological system’ or a ‘system of logic’. Nowadays we call systems many things whose existence is independent of our thinking – a political system, an economic system, a social system, an ecological system, a biological system, an astronomical system or a computer system.

Laszlo defines systems by distinguishing ‘wholes’ and ‘heaps’.

‘Wholes’ and ‘heaps’ are not mysterious metaphysical notions but clearly, even mathematically, definable states of complex entities. The decisive difference is that wholes are not the simple sum of their parts, and heaps are. Take, for example, a pile of rubbish. Adding another can or removing a pop bottle makes only a

quantitative difference to the pile – it becomes that much bigger or smaller. No other characteristic of it changes. (Laszlo, 1996: 25)

In contrast to a heap, a whole is a structured relation between two or more elements. The characteristics of the whole cannot be derived from the characteristics of its parts. The characteristics of the whole come about with a particular and exact relation (organisation) between the parts. Laszlo gives examples of wholes:

- Friendship, were the relation of two persons is something more than the sum of their separate relations;

- An atom, which properties are not reducible to the sum of the properties of its constituents.

Unlike the whole, the heap is an assembly or mass of unrelated elements.

The heaps are similar to the objects from Weinberg’s second region – unorganised complexities, or aggregates. Referring to the Bertalanffy’s distinction into the summative and the constitutive characteristics, a stone taken away from a pile of stones would not change the constitutive

characteristic of a pile, because it was not ‘in relation’ with other stones and had no ‘function’. It would change the summative characteristic of the pile – its weight, but it would not change its constitutive characteristic – the pile would still be a mass of unrelated stones.

SYSTEM AS A MODEL

Bertalanffy offers also a definition of a system that is narrower that

“elements in relation”. According to this alternative definition, a system may be understood as a model – a representation of some universal traits of a class of natural phenomena (Bertalanffy, 1968: 251). Such a system would be a conceptual construct, serving either as an explanation of a phenomenon (e.g., a model of a small community) or as a method of predicting the ‘behaviour’

of a phenomenon (e.g. a model of a hurricane, a model of a solar system).

Compared to the earlier definitions, this one narrows down the range of potential systems. Firstly, it limits systems to conceptual constructs – especially those that are defined by the scientific method. Secondly, this approach excludes artefacts, such as cars, washing machines or computers, which Weinberg calls machines.

For Bertalanffy, a model involves an act of abstraction (selective removal of irrelevant elements or factors), and an act of interpretation (situating elements of observed phenomena into a network of known phenomena). For example, a model of an atom is meant to be a representation of a real

phenomenon. But it is as well a construction, which is apparent when one considers the development of the model of atom. Bohr’s model depicts an atom as consisting of electrons circulating around the nucleus. In this model, the reference to the conventional model of a solar system is apparent, and the only difference is that the gravitational forces were replaced by electrostatic forces. The conventional model of a phenomenon (the solar system) has been applied to another phenomenon (the atom).

Models of artefacts are not considered by Bertalanffy. But they too combine abstraction (as they consist of generic building elements) with construction (as they combine these elements in new ways). A new design of a car is a new configuration of the generic components, such as elements of engine, wheels, bumper, seats, doors, windshield, radiator, which in turn are assemblies of smaller, more basic elements. Nonetheless, there is a

fundamental difference between the models of artefacts and the scientific models. The models of artefacts do not serve as an explanation of a

phenomenon or as a method of predicting the ‘behaviour’ of a phenomenon.

They are creations, not representations – they are meant to guide making of a new physical object, not to represent an existing one. A building model is an example of such an artefact. It consists of building elements, that are representations of real entities, but their configuration is new.

SYSTEM AS A GOAL-DIRECTED IDENTITY

A teleological definition of a system focuses on two aspects: the preservation of the system’s identity (despite transformations), and its goal-directedness (Mitchell, 2009: 297). Weinberg (2009: 251) also claims that

“the permanence of the relations among component parts”, is an essential feature of a system. The identity of biological organisms is protected by sophisticated mechanisms, specifically “the elaborate arrangements are made to protect the germ plasm from such change [mutation] and to nullify its effect if it does occur” (Weinberg, 2009: 251).

The evolution of organisms can be understood as a progressive change, where each subsequent state of the organism is an effect of all the previous, less successful states. Such understood evolution implies continuity of an organism and thus, preservation of its identity.

A design process, as a rule, is a goal-oriented process. The goal is specified at the outset of the design process by design objectives. The design objectives, as long as they are relevant and followed, define design’s identity.

Each modification of a form of developed building model is a record, or a memory, of a series of earlier states, in a general development tendency towards the design objectives.