Climate change adaptation and multi-level governance

Whereas until recently the international community has emphasized mitigation more heavily, adaptation has gained importance in recent years. Although originally considered defeatist, this growing focus recognises that no matter how successful mitigation attempts may be, societies and communities are going to have to respond to changes in the climate and the various impacts this will have. Adaptation as defined by the IPCC is the adjustment in natural

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or human systems in response to actual or expected climatic stimuli or their effects;

adaptation can both moderate harm and exploit beneficial opportunities. Adger et al. (2009) have a similar albeit wider definition where “adaptation describes adjustments made to changed environmental circumstances that take place naturally within biological systems and with some deliberation or intent in social systems” (2009, p. 337). Creating adaptive responses and measures to a changing climate requires decisions and actions cross-cutting local, national and international levels (Biesbroek et al., 2010; Paavola and Adger, 2006). It is argued that this necessitates “environmental governance” that encompasses not only government but also non-state actors such as local communities, NGOs and businesses (Lemos and Agarwal, 2006).

At a conceptual level, Gualini (2010) refers to the multi-actor and multi-level nature of governance with interconnected rather than hierarchical relations. Tackling climate change requires multi-level governance with coordination across multiple scales, a need which is implicit in the very nature of climate change and its impacts. Paavola and Adger point out

“there is no one, right level of decision making for undertaking adaptive actions” (2006, p.597), particularly because adaptation can be required at multiple scales, ranging from the community to the international level. Faced with community-level impacts of climate change, Lemos and Agrawal (2006) argue that nation states are no longer taken as the only actors that can effectively deal with climate change. Instead, Biesbroek et al. (2010) stress the importance of taking action at the appropriate level of scale and argue that bottom-up approaches fit adaptation better due to the existence of multiple variables, context dependencies, and cultural settings. Hobson and Niemeyer (2011) underline the fact that adaptation is a long and continuous process requiring close coordination with stakeholders.

This coordination is needed at multiple levels, but it necessarily requires local engagement rather than just national policy. In sum, climate change adaptation requires multi-level governance poised to address the impacts of climate change at the same scale at which they are experienced to determine appropriate adaptations. In turn, it requires coordinated collective action across these levels.

Despite a clear focus in many studies on the necessity of multi-level governance in relation to climate change adaptation, it is not clearly laid out how multi-level governance should be operationalized. Particularly, what actors are to be “included” at which levels? The previous paragraph suggests that at the local level the public and stakeholders can be engaged in direct participation in deliberation and decision making. This is in line with a move toward decentralization. Lemos and Agrawal (2006) argue that given the complex and multi-scalar nature of most environmental problems, “pure modes of governance” in which states or market actors lead the process are likely to fail. The authors argue that the “latest fashion” of decentralization of government functions is usually justified on three grounds: greater efficiency, bringing decision making closer to those affected by governance, and provision of more precise knowledge for decision-makers. New hybrid modes of governance crosscutting state, market, and community spheres are emerging. Three broad categories for these new innovative hybrid governance instruments are identified by the authors: co-management (between state and community), public-private partnerships (between market and state), and

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social-private partnerships (between market and community). Although these new forms come about with the promise of increased efficiency and greater funding opportunities from the private sector, they are widely contested. In particular, increased reliance on market actors and processes might undermine social goals of stronger democratic participation, equal access to resources, and accountability. New forms of global environmental governance may simply reflect existing power relations rather than democratizing the negotiation processes (Ford, 2003, cited in Lemos and Agrawal, 2006). The nature of participation in these hybrid governance instruments is fundamental to assessing equity, accountability, and legitimacy.

At the local level, participation often means direct participation by stakeholders or members of the public in dialogue and deliberation that influence decision-making. Yet even at the local level, power is not always transferred to local authorities and local publics. Larson and Soto (2008) point out the gaps between the theory and practice of decentralization, especially when incentives for central authorities to transfer powers and resources to lower levels are absent, and local authorities do not see any incentive to take on power in a responsible manner. Their analysis demonstrates that intended outcomes of decentralization – such as greater participation and social justice for marginalized groups - do not necessarily come true in practice. Ostrom (2010) suggests adopting a polycentric approach to the climate change problem. She underlines the importance of experimental efforts at multiple scales with potential multiple benefits and argues that reliance on only one scale is naive. However, this approach does not account for the optimum conditions of how the polycentric system should be set up. Larson and Soto (2008) argue that polycentric governance systems do not have clear answers to two key questions: 1) “how and by whom local rules would be monitored to promote social inclusion as well as sustainability” and 2) “if and how local enforcement failures and the movement of products across jurisdictions would be monitored and controlled” (p. 226). Their first question points to the difficulties of maintaining democratic values (social inclusion) that should be related to participation. The second concern highlights the complications of scale, including questions of who is involved in multi-scalar rule making and enforcement.

In addition, there is no theory for what participation in governance should entail at the national and international levels. Yet there is an assumption that polycentric systems must maintain a role for the state. While delegation of power to the lower levels constitutes an important part of multi-level governance, this does not need to undermine the role and potential of the state as coordinator between different levels – local and sub-national.

Therefore, the state has to be a significant part of the hierarchy (Paavola, 2007; Vatn, 2009).

Further, in order to deal with issues in which redistribution is one of the major concerns – as is the case with climate change adaptation- the state has to assume a large role since neither markets nor hybrid forms of governance can become successful instruments on their own (Lowi, 2002, cited in Lemos and Agrawal, 2006). The increasing popularity of market- and incentives-based policy instruments such as taxes, voluntary agreements, and eco-labelling in developed world continue to expand the possible mechanisms of environmental governance. Nonetheless, Lemos and Agrawal (2006) underline that this does not imply that governance is replacing governments. Governments remain to be an important source of

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credible threat and monitoring authority. Yet there are fewer discussions about the nature of participation in state decisions and actions. The unspoken assumption seems to be that state decisions will be made by elected representatives and experts, without a need for participation by others unless forms of direct democracy like referenda are already in place (e.g.

Stadelmman-Steffen, 2011).

The recognition that governance at the state level is not adequate for tackling global challenges, particularly concerning the environment, has led to a focus on and development of international institutions. In climate change in particular there is the perception that it is this international level which is the most vital in order to galvanise action, fairly spread the costs, and to meaningfully face the challenge of global environmental change within the context of unequal development and unequal responsibility. The annual summits of the UNFCCC receive global attention and critique concerning not only the decisions reached (or not) but the negotiation process itself. At this level the idea of participation moves beyond that of political representation, towards – in rhetoric at least – a more inclusive interpretation that attempts to bring in other actors including underrepresented groups. Civil society groups, international NGOs, and business consortiums are increasingly playing a role at this level. An example of this is the attempt to include indigenous groups as a ‘stakeholder’ in the on-going negotiations for forest mitigation mechanisms such as REDD. The role of such stakeholders, how and who they are supposed to represent, and whether they strengthen or undermine democratic decision-making at this level are questions that still remain unanswered.

Across all scales of multi-level governance, there are concerns about justice, particularly in terms of ensuring fair participation. Participation has to be “fair” in two forms; governing climate change adaptation requires both distributive justice (distribution of costs and benefits) and procedural justice (encompassing recognition, participation and distribution of power).

Adaptation also entails knowledge building as an on-going and iterative process between knowledge producers and users (Dilling and Lemos, 2011). Again, this means that the links between different levels and actors (i.e. between scientists, local community, organizations and decision makers) have to be established to create useful knowledge for adaptation.

Social learning is a particular way that scholars have started to theorize about the goals of participation in adaptive management. Social learning is the learning that occurs through social interaction, as participation cultivates individual and group reflection, trust, and relationships (Stringer et al., 2006). This approach is critical of Arnstein’s initial work on participation, arguing that adaptation requires new forms of social learning for concerted action that require theorizing “meaningful” and “active” participation in new ways (Collins and Ison, 2009). Stringer et al. (2006) argue that maintaining a flexible view of participation is paramount: “diverse stakeholders have changing needs and priorities, and different objectives may require different approaches to participation within the same project. Also different voices may need to come through at different stages of the adaptive cycle for shared understandings to develop. Maintaining a flexible view of participation is, therefore, paramount in creating the conditions for this to take place” (p. 17). In turn, social learning focuses on the process of the co-creation of knowledge, the convergence of goals, and the change of behaviour that comes from understanding something, which together suggest how

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process can transform a situation. To ensure that these conditions are met, we turn to critiques of participation in the development literature and post-political perspective.