Analytical Framework for Forest Law Compliance
4. Analytical Framework for Forest Rule Compliance
4.1. Advantages and limitations of the analytical framework
The analytical compliance framework developed in this paper advances the forest law compli-ance discourse by providing an interdisciplinary tool for academic studies, and complements existing frameworks designed for fisheries (eg. Kuperan and Sutinen 1999; Nielsen 2003). Its primary advance lies in its ability to shift between different levels of aggregation, recognizing that variables must align at multiple levels including the individual, community, state, and ultimately the globe to adequately conserve forest resources. Studies that investigate individual-level behaviour will emphasize motivations and the static external context that serves to activate or crowd-out different motivations. At higher levels of aggregation, scholars may compare different regions or states to examine how changes in context influence compliance behaviour. Finally, the framework is an important device to help scholars overcome the twin analytical traps that either propose panacea solutions, or proclaim that each case is so unique that any generalizations are futile (Basurto and Ostrom 2009).
It must be noted that a major limitation of the framework in its present form is the lack of operationalized indicators of key constructs which are beyond the scope of this paper.
Moreover, this limitation is paradoxically useful by allowing research to incorporate and explain emergent findings. Nevertheless, the proposed analytical framework may benefit from further elaboration of potential indicators that could be useful when scaling-up from small to large-n studies (Poteete, Janssen, and Ostrom 2010). Undoubtedly some variables like benefits and costs are better suited to standardization than their normative counterparts.
Therefore in applying the framework, scholars must carefully manage measurement issues to avoid potential issues with both external and internal validity. Finally, further theoretical developments and analytical experiments are needed to disentangle the relevance and impact of different factors on individual compliance with forestry rules. One issue that seems particularly ripe for future study is the relationship between legitimacy and compliance.
Whereas the framework and the vast majority of the literature propose a direct relationship between the two, it seems equally plausible that the variables that define legitimacy provide a context that activates latent normative motivations. While this suggestion is a mere conjecture at this point, it demonstrates how the framework can be used to generate testable hypotheses.
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Institutional Analysis of Intermediaries in Payments for Ecosystem Services
Augustin Berghöfer♣, Sonny Mumbunan♦, Marcela Muñoz*
♣ Department of Economics, Helmholtz Centre for Environmental Research, UFZ.
Leipzig, Germany.
♦ Research Centre for Climate Change, University of Indonesia, RCCC UI, Indonesia.
* Institute for Infrastructure and Resources Management, Leipzig University, Germany.
1. Introduction
Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) are mostly referred to as an instrument where buyers and sellers voluntarily agree on a payment for the provision of a specific ecosystem service, or for an activity that is believed to ensure such provision, that would otherwise not take place (Wunder 2007). For example: national governments paying other governments for reducing emissions from deforestation; coastal cities paying protected areas for maintaining dunes and mangroves that protect against floods; farmers paying their upstream neighbours for erosion control in the watershed.
PES hold different promises to different people. That is why this instrument has made a remarkable career in conservation policy, practice and research. Donors and conservation practitioners can see in it the extension of nature conservation opportunities onto private lands and a means to enhance cost-effective spending (Nelson 2009). For many policy makers, the supposedly direct linkages between investment and output are attractive, while for industry there are strong potential benefits from increased options to offset (residual) environmental damage (TEEB 2010). Local communities, in turn, engage in PES where this becomes attractive within their respective livelihood strategies. Whether such different expectations can be satisfied depends on how a PES scheme works on the ground.
Judging by the vast number of policy documents, initiatives and projects, we see a clear policy-driven demand for mainstreaming PES. Perhaps with the exception of REDD (Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation), we note a great emphasis on advancing PES instruments, rather than sharpening skills and strategies for identifying and fostering sound PES conditions. In the case of REDD, the prospects for effective implementation are nevertheless mixed despite much readiness planning (Sunderlin and Atmadja 2009).
PES schemes faces demanding governance requirements. An OECD report on conditions for cost-effective PES emphasizes inter alia policy context (e.g. removal of perverse subsidies, clarification of land tenure rights), and process-related features (e.g. involvement of stakeholders) (OECD 2010). How can governments initiate or foster PES under sub-optimal
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conditions? For many settings, successful strategies will likely comprise stakeholder involve-ment, coordination of interests and actions, and integration of policies in addition to sorting out land tenure issues and overlapping governmental responsibilities – all of this at and across multiple government levels.
One starting point to this task is to invest in the capacity of intermediaries, i.e. in agencies and organisations that facilitate the establishment and running of PES schemes. They typically and in varying degrees support with information, capacity building, dissemination, baseline setting, contract options, negotiation, monitoring, money transfer, networking and adjudication in case of contract breaches. Vatn et al. (2009) observe that PES schemes leave much power with the intermediaries.
In this article we explore the role and functioning of intermediaries from three different PES schemes, in order to develop a first characterisation of PES intermediaries from an institutional perspective. In Section 2, we delimit and define our object of analysis and formulate questions of enquiry. In Section 3 we present the three PES schemes and features of each intermediary. In Section 4 we compare the cases according to various institutional aspects: organisational structure, accountability, costs and position of the intermediary. On this basis, we conclude with emphasizing policy implications for investing in intermediaries for PES.