Despite this underlying power balance between Nuri as Minister of Defence and the British strategists in Whitehall, Nuri had shown agreement on one important point, which was Anglo-Iraqi cooperation over the RAF base at Habbaniya. As this was in both countries’ mutual interests, it was the strongest connection in their friendship. At this point, it was also within the frameworks of defence, as Nuri no longer needed to take the same cautions as he had done while he was Prime Minister. In March, Foreign Secretary Eden explicitly approved of the British government’s intention to base defence on Iraq and its Hashemite sister country, Jordan, rather than on Egypt.510
Anglo-Iraqi cooperation over Habbaniya was the only topic discussed during the talks between Nuri, Regent Abdul’Illah and General Robertson on 2 March 1953. The War Office had set out their preferred military requirements and a list of British equipment to be given to
508 FO 371/104236/E1197/2, telegram no.119 from Foreign Office to Baghdad, 25 February 1953, attached copy of COS(ME)793, telegram from Ministry of Defence to G.H.Q. MELF, 25 February 1953.
509 Elliot, ‘Independent Iraq’ the Monarchy and British Influence, 1941–1958, 166.
510 Lucas, Divided We Stand: Britain, the Us and the Suez Crisis, 31.
103 Iraq in advance of General Robertson’s visit.511 General Robertson opened the meeting by reassuring Nuri and the Regent of Iraq’s importance to Britain in the new strategy.512 In return for this, General Robertson expected access to Iraqi facilities as outlined in the list of requirements given to him from the WO. During the meeting, Nuri agreed to establish ‘a very short political agreement in which there would be provision for military liaison’ rather than a formal agreement, namely revision of the Anglo-Iraqi treaty.513 In other words, he would prefer a military agreement as additional to the treaty and not revision of the treaty itself.
Even though the British ideally wanted the new agreement with Iraq to be as formal as possible, so as to make it difficult for any eventual new Iraqi government to abrogate the agreement, they trusted Nuri and the Regent in their analysis that it was reckless to revise the treaty at this stage.514 Mr Rhodes, who was in charge of the Levant area and worked in the Eastern Department in the FO, reported in his minute after the meeting that it was important for Britain to concentrate on what the achievements were, and that they were actually good:
Sir John Troutbeck has advised that we should concentrate on achieving a large measure of military co-operation between the forces of our two countries. In this way he feels that we would be more likely to secure a large proportion of our military requirements than by insisting on a formal agreement which might not last and which the Iraqis would have great difficulty in explaining to their people.515
The result of the meeting on 2 March was a mutual beneficial trade. Britain promised that Iraq was to be defended in the new strategical concept, and Iraq promised Britain continued access to the Habbaniya base in return.516
In spite of the successful meeting, the Joint Planning Staff was not consent with the standing Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of Alliance of 1930. Two days after the meeting, they summarised the state of the arts. Firstly, they acknowledged that the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930 was long overdue and that their dependence on continued access to the RAF bases in Iraq was essential in the Outer Ring strategy. In their view, Britain might need to place these vital facilities on a new footing ‘on short notice.’517 As opposed to what had happened in 1948, it was the British Chiefs of Staff Committee and Joint Planning Staff rather than the Iraqi Minister of Defence
511 DEFE 5/44/89, COS memoranda (1953), attached note by the War Office, Appendix A: ‘list of equipment’, 11 February 1953.
512 FO 371/104236/E1197/6G, FO minutes by P.A. Rhodes, ‘Iraqi policy in Middle East Defence’, 6 March 1953.
513 Ibid.
514 Ibid.
515 Ibid.
516 Ibid.
517 DEFE 6/23/41, report by the COS Joint Planning Staff, 4 March 1953.
104
or the Foreign Office who in 1953 wanted treaty revision. Secondly, the JPS emphasised the close cooperation between British, Iraqi and Arab Legion forces that had been agreed upon as a long-term plan as part of the Outer Ring strategy. ‘To implement our plans for the defence of the Passes it will be necessary to co-ordinate our plans with those of the Iraqis.’518 Underneath this statement was an acknowledgement of how heavily Britain depended on Iraq – both its government and armed forces.
Meanwhile, the third aspect that the Joint Planning Staff emphasised was regarding British domestic economy, which was a prevailing issue in Whitehall but alienated from the talks in Baghdad:
We appreciate that it will almost certainly be necessary to indicate to the Iraqis the nature of our long-term plans. We see no objection to this provided we do not reveal our inability to implement these plans in the foreseeable future.519
Britain could not afford to pursue its goals. It seemed as though Britain intended to cooperate with Iraq without giving sufficient guarantees that Britain could keep her own side of the deal.
British economic limitations collided massively with Britain’s defence strategy. David Devereux emphasises that
[t]he need for economy in defence expenditure forced a major re-evaluation of British priorities in 1952–53, and although the Middle East remained important, its garrison was steadily reduced, and in wartime priorities, gradually gave way to the defence of Europe and the nuclear deterrent.520
Regarding the Anglo-Iraqi bilateral military cooperation, Britain’s economic limitations were expressed in the JPS’s emphasise on the necessity of drawing firm lines between the cooperating parties:
[I]t is important that Iraq should also (b) Agree that the joint use of Habbaniya and Shaibah is arranged on the basis of completely separate and independent domestic, administrative and maintenance arrangements with each Government accepting responsibility for the cost of their own forces. (c) Agree that the Royal Air Force Levies should continue to be employed on security duties at Habbaniya and Shaibah.521
Britain needed to make sure Nuri would take responsibility for Iraq’s internal situation. If Britain’s long-term strategy should succeed, it was important for the JPS that the British did not take more responsibilities than they could bear. If Nuri, as Minister of Defence, proved
518 Ibid.
519 Ibid.
520 Devereux, "Britain, the Commonwealth and the Defence of the Middle East 1948-56," 343.
521 DEFE 6/23/41, report by the COS Joint Planning Staff, 4 March 1953. My italics.
105 incapable of either financing or controlling the Iraqi army, this should not be a British concern.