This dissertation argues that in spite of Nuri’s reassurances to Troutbeck, the British Chiefs of Staff took precautions when they re-evaluated their strategy in December. Firstly, they regarded the intifada to be serious. ‘The riots of 22nd–24th November, instigated by Communist agitators, had an anti-UK/US flavour and it is possible that trouble may again occur in Baghdad particularly in the period from now until such time as the new elections take place.’444 If new revolts broke out in Iraq, it was likely to ‘quickly assume’ anti-British tones, and therefore lead to attacks on British lives and property in Iraq.445 ‘Although the Iraqi government would not condone such attacks they might […] find themselves unable to deal with widespread trouble.’446 This could lead to a change of government and leave Britain alone in Iraq without the support from the Regent, Nuri or the rest of the old gang. It was in fear of this scenario that the Chiefs of Staff prepared a ‘new operational instruction’ where
440 Iraq's Democratic Moment, 170.
441 Iraq's Democratic Moment, 169. Hadid refers to and cites from FO 371/98736/EQ16/78, Sir J. Troutbeck, Baghdad, 28 November 1952.
442 Iraq's Democratic Moment, 170.
443 Dawisha, Iraq: A Political History, 132.
444 DEFE 6/22/149, J.P.(52)149, COS Committee, Joint Planning staff, report ‘Protection of U.K. interests in Iraq’, 22 December 1952.
445 Ibid.
446 Ibid.
87 their objective was to ‘send reinforcements for the protection of British lives and interests’.447 They also considered how their reinforcement troops would deal with Iraqi unrest:
Whilst the Iraqi government might not actively oppose the entry of British troops, it is possible that their arrival might aggravate […] [d]isturbances amounting to Civil War causing a state of general chaos in the country. This in turn […] might lead to […] [a]ttacks on British lives and property condoned by an extremist Iraqi government as a means of forcing an unfavourable revision of the Treaty and oil nationalisation upon us. In this case the Iraqi Army and Civil Security forces might well oppose an operation to safeguard British interests.448
In other words, British troops were going to be participants in a hypothetical civil war situation. The COS conclusively stated that Britain ‘must be prepared for active opposition and that the size of our forces should be adjusted accordingly.’449 By acknowledging that British troops could trigger more internal unrest in Iraq, and deciding on adjusting their forces to strike back against potential resistance from the Iraqi military and civil services, the COS revealed how closely committed Britain’s defence officials had become to feel towards Iraq and the pro-British regime, who maintained Britain’s position in Iraq.
What made the COS worry about resistance from the Iraqi armed forces on 22 December?
Considering the most recent information they could possibly have got – which was Nuri’s reassurances to Troutbeck and Troutbeck’s following reassurances to the rest of Whitehall that the intifada was not as dangerous as it might look – it is puzzling. However, it is what the British administration believed that was formative for their policy. If they believed Nuri when he said he was in control, they had less or no reason to fear that they would lose Iraq. If they thought Nuri overestimated his own control, they had reasons to be careful. What the British administration knew in December 1952 was that Regent Abdul’Illah had looked to the army to restore order and that the army apparently had served his bidding in doing so.
The COS also knew that General Robertson and Air Marshal Baker was in the midst of a process where they had imprinted on Nuri and Regent Abdul’Illah the necessity of replacing the officers in the Iraqi High Command. The British sources considered in this study reveals nothing but that Robertson wanted new officers in the High Command to make the Iraqi army more efficient, and that efficiency was measured against British equipment supplies and the army’s use of these.450 There is nothing in the source material previously considered in this
447 Ibid.
448 Ibid.
449 Ibid.
450 FO 371/91657/EQ1193/3, telegram no.58 from Baghdad to Foreign Office, 24 January 1951.
88
study that reveals who the officers in the High Command were, whether they were challenging the pro-British Iraqi regime, or reasons why Robertson and Baker disliked them.
According to Al-Marashi and Salama, there had been a generation shift within the Iraqi armed forces that had nothing to do with Britain. Most of the old officers who had been trained in Ottoman military academies were dead or retired, but those who were not, remained among
‘Iraq’s first officers’ meaning for example the High Command.451 By 1953, most soldiers were younger and had entered the armed forces after Iraq gained independence in 1932, but they rarely held officer roles above the rank of brigadiers.452 Among the younger officers, there were nationalist who began to form groupings in the 1950s ‘inspired by the Egyptian officers who overthrew the pro-British monarch Faruq and then the Syrian officers who overturned the pro-French government in Syria. The Iraqis sought to follow these […]
military men who assumed power as officer politicians’.453 Meanwhile, Al-Marashi and Salama does not elaborate if these tendencies had come to surface by the time of 22 November 1952.454 The Iraqi armed forces’ actual ambitions and ability to seize political power by this time is disagreed upon by scholars and is in need of further research.
The British probably knew very little about the political awareness among Iraqi officers at the time. When General Robertson sought to increase effectiveness by replacing the few old officers within the Iraqi High Command, he either was unaware that many young officers opposed to the British connection, or he believed it would be possible to find someone both young and pro-British. It is uncertain whether Nuri found suitable younger officers and if he promoted them to the High Command, except for the one incident where the British Military Attaché was expressing enthusiastic consent in his report about the Iraqi military activity since the ‘present CGS [Commander of General Staff] took over’ in his report from 23 June 1952.455 It is also possible that in the midst of this process, both Nuri and the British commanders became aware of eventual anti-British sentiments in the ranks of the Iraqi armed forces, and that they initiated no further replacements. Nevertheless, the British strategists were indeed reacting to the Iraqi intifada. The Chiefs of Staff were taking precautions in their December 1952 assessment on defence. The COS were planning for a worst-case scenario where the Royal Palace and Nuri would lose their political power and the British troops
451 Al-Marashi and Salama, Iraq’s Armed Forces: An Analytical History, 69-70.
452 Iraq’s Armed Forces: An Analytical History, 70.
453 Iraq’s Armed Forces: An Analytical History, 69.
454 Iraq’s Armed Forces: An Analytical History, 68-79.
455 FO 624/213/10112/1, letter from Brigadier A. Boyce, Military Attaché to Troutbeck, Baghdad, 23 June 1952.
89 would be standing alone against Iraqi revolutionaries. The COS were not necessarily expecting this to happen but they prepared for it.