Beliefs versus knowledge

Richardson (1996) claimed there to be a considerable congruence among anthropologists, social psychologists and philosophers concerning the definition of beliefs and that they “are thought of as psychologically held understandings, premises, or propositions about the world that are held to be true” (p.103). Although there may be a common understanding of the nature of beliefs, many different words are being used that are closely related if not synonymous, and this may lead to confusion. Pajares (1992, 2003) accounted for several words like attitudes, values, judgment, opinions, perception, ideology, preconceptions etc., and that they can be beliefs in disguise. He also pointed to the confusion between beliefs and knowledge, a claim previously made by Clandinin and Connelly (1987). There are few clear distinctions made between knowledge and beliefs with the possible exception of work concerning mathematics and science education (Woolfolk Hoy et al., 2006). Nespore (1987) delineated four structural features of beliefs, and by doing so tried to distinguish them from other forms of knowledge. These are

‘existential presumption’, ‘alternativity’, ‘affective and evaluative loading’,

and ‘episodic structure’. He also used two other features ‘non-consensuality’

and ‘unboundedness’ to characterize the way beliefs are organised as systems (p. 318).

Drawing upon Abelson, Nespore (1987) described these belief systems more in detail and called attention to the propositions and assumptions that belief systems often contain about the existence or non-existence of entities. In the case of existential presumption, this may also occur “in less obvious ways and at much more mundane levels of thought” (p. 318). Such entities may be seen as immutable and according to Nespor, beyond the teacher’s control and influence. Teachers may hold strong beliefs about their students and what their students are capable of in terms of learning achievement possibilities (Milner, 2005). These beliefs may not only be descriptive, but can also become labels for entities attributed to the child or student, which in turn may enhance or limit learning possibilities (Løge & Thorsen, 2005).

Nespor goes on to describe the essence of alternativity as “conceptualizations of ideal situations differing significantly from present realities. In this respect, beliefs serve as means of defining goals and tasks, whereas knowledge systems come into play where goals and the paths to their attainment are well defined.”(p. 319).

Belief systems rely more heavily on affective and evaluative components than knowledge systems, but knowledge of a domain can be conceptually distinguished from feelings about that same domain (Nespor, 1987, p. 319). Our knowledge about disruptive behavior is different from our feelings, likes or dislikes about children displaying it and how we meet the challenge, although the affective and evaluative aspects may influence how we go to the task and the amount of energy we put into the activity.

The fourth structural feature is called episodic storage. Nespor (1987), referring to Abelson, pointed out “that information in knowledge systems is stored primarily in semantic networks, while belief systems are composed of

‘episodically’-stored material derived from personal experience or from cultural or institutional sources of knowledge transmission (e.g., folklore)” (p.

320). Episodic storage provides a weak basis for distinguishing beliefs from knowledge, according to Nespor, but he claimed: “beliefs derive their

subjective power, authority, and legitimacy from particular episodes or events” (p. 320). These special episodes may continue to influence the understanding of events at a later time. An example of this could be how teachers comprehend their own experiences from being a child or student in daycare or school, and how this may continue to affect their views and performances later on as teachers. Some of these episodic memories may serve as an inspiration or pattern for future teaching practices.

Non-consensuality is defined by Nespor (1987) as belief systems consisting of

“propositions, concepts, arguments, or whatever that are recognized – by those who hold them or by outsiders – as being in dispute or as in principle disputable” (p. 321). Beliefs are relatively static and less dynamic compared to knowledge systems that can accumulate and change through well-grounded arguments. When beliefs change, according to Nespor, “it is more likely to be a matter of a conversion or gestalt shift than the result of argumentation or a marshalling of evidence” (p. 321). Knowledge systems can easier be judged, evaluated and agreed upon compared to belief systems, where there often is a lack of agreement on how beliefs are to be evaluated. Belief systems consist of affective feelings and evaluations, significant memories from personal experiences, thoughts about the existence of entities and alternative worlds.

Nespor (1987) pointed to the fact that these beliefs are not open to critical examination or outside evaluation in the same way that knowledge systems are.

The last feature that Nespor used to distinguish belief systems from knowledge systems is unboundedness being described as “ people read belief-based meanings into situations where others would not see their relevance” (p. 321). This is one of the reasons why we see things from different points of view.

Richardson (1996) called attention to the ‘truth condition’ knowledge depends on in traditional philosophical literature, where a community of people agree upon a proposition as being true, and there is some evidence to claim this.

Beliefs on the other hand do not require a truth condition (p. 104).

Not all differentiate as much between knowledge and beliefs and, according to Fenstermacher (1994), ‘knowledge’ can be used as a grouping term.

Alexander, Schallert and Hare (1991) gave us an example of this by suggesting “knowledge encompasses all that a person knows or believes to be true, whether or not it is verified as true in some sort of objective or external way (p. 317).

Although knowledge and beliefs have been studied separately through varying theoretical framework, it has often been difficult to distinguish what one researcher means by knowledge and what another means as beliefs (Murphy

& Mason, 2006, p. 319). Knowledge and beliefs seem deeply intertwined and give us a filter by which new information, experience and phenomenon are perceived and interpreted (Nespor, 1987; Pajares, 1992). Teachers with their own personal history, educational background, teaching experiences, with updated or outdated knowledge of current curricula, meet children in day- care and school. Background, knowledge and beliefs play an important part in the interaction between teachers and children, and therefore it is significant to be conscious of these matters and possible consequences they may lead to.