Chapter 3: Religion, tradition and law in Somalia – a historical sketch
3.6 Al-Shabaab’s state and province administration
Analysts agree that al-Shabaab is not a fully homogenous organization. Michael Taarnby and Lars Hallundbaek for instance claim that by late 2009 the movement consisted of 12 different groups ranging from hardcore Jihadis to less religious and more opportunistic affiliates.71
Although this might be true, al-Shabaab’s territories function today, according to Stig
68Marchal, “A tentative assessment of the Somali Harakat Al-Shabaab”, pp. 386-388; Hansen, “Misspent youth:
Somalia’s Shabab insurgents”, p. 17.
69 Marchal, “A tentative assessment of the Somali Harakat Al-Shabaab”, pp. 390, 392.
70 Ibid, pp. 392-396; Hansen, “Misspent youth: Somalia’s Shabab insurgents”, p. 18; Marchal, The Rise of a Jihadi Movement in a Country at War: Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujaheddin in Somalia, p. 17, 41-43.
71 Michael Taarnby and Lars Hallundbaek, Al-Shabaab: The Internationalization of Militant Islamism in Somalia and the Implications for Radicalisation Processes in Europe, (Report for the Danish Ministry of Justice:
February 2010).
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J. Hansen, more or less as a state in South Central Somalia, with central administrative bodies which control taxation, application and enforcement of law as well as recruitment and
organization of military personnel.72 In order to get an idea of the administrative structures of the al-Shabaab “state”, I have systemized information from Stig J. Hansen73 and Roland Marchal74 as well as from own informants. It must, however, be noted that lack of reliable data makes such an outline only a tentative sketch.
The highest decision-making body of the al-Shabaab organization is the executive shūrā (“consultation”), headed by Ahmed Abdi Godane alias Sheikh Abu Zubeyr, whose title is amīr (“commander” or “prince”). In 2009 this shūrā consisted, according to Hansen, of 8 to 10 members. In addition there is a larger shūrā of up to maybe 45 persons75 who are
summoned when needed.76 The role of the larger shūrā is according to Marchal to discuss all important matters concerning the organization, notably questions regarding ideological, political and military issues, and he assumes that the shūrā’s decisions are based on a principle of consensus.77
Linked to these shūrās are different bodies or ministries called maktabas (“offices”), each headed by a prominent al-Shabaab member from the shūrās, often refered to as amīrs.
According to Marchal the ministries are as follows: Maktabatu Da’wah, the ministry of Religious Affairs and Orientations; Makatabatu Difaa’, the ministry of Defense; Maktabatu Amniyaat, the ministry of Intelligence and Internal Security; Maktabatu I’laam, the ministry of Information; Maktabatu Ḥasba or Ḥisbah; the ministry of the Religious Police; Maktabatu Maaliya, the ministry of Finance; Maktabatu Siyaasada iyo Gobolada, the ministry of Internal Affairs, focusing on local administration, politics and social issues.78
The territory being controlled or partly controlled by al-Shabaab is divided into nine79 provinces, termed wilaayah (“province”) which correspond to the former Somali provinces (see figure). Each wilaayah is governed by a regional administration, but, as Hansen points
72 Hansen, Report for the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, pp. 76-82, 88, 91.
73 Ibid.
74 Marchal, The Rise of a Jihadi Movement in a Country at War: Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujaheddin in Somalia.
75 Marchal (2011) suggests that the number of members of this extended shūrā might have been increased to 53 after the fusion of al-Shabaab and Hisbul Islam, which took place after the defeat of the latter in December 2010.
Whether this means that the inner circle of the executive shūrā also is expanded remains uncertain.
76 Hansen, Report for the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, p. 76.
77 Marchal, The Rise of a Jihadi Movement in a Country at War: Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujaheddin in Somalia, p. 19.
78 Ibid, pp. 20-22.
79 Marchal (2011) asserts that Middle and Lower Jubba is governed as one wilaayah, while my informant
“Hassan”, claims they constitute two distinct wilaayas. Thus, there are either nine or ten wilaayahs in total.
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out, the strength and efficiency of these regional administrations vary.80 According to
“Hassan-nor”, a Somali informant, the Hiiraan, Middle Shabelle, Lower Shabelle, Lower Jubba, Bay, Bakool and parts of Galgadud have been the most stable and administratively advanced.81 But even there, Hansen claims, the administrations primarily exercise control over the urban centers, al-Shabaab’s control being very limited or entirely absent in rural areas.82
Every province or wilaayah is headed by a walī (“governor”) who take orders from the Ministry of Internal Affairs,83 or according to “Hassan-nor”, directly from the Amīr Abu Zubeyr himself.84 Like the Ministries or Maktabas of the extended shūrā, there are equivalent offices linked to the central provincial administration, each office headed by a senior leader or commander, an amīr.85 The exact organization of the provincial administration is not certain, but according to Hansen, there is, in theory at least, an Office of Social Affairs, an Office of Tiqtisadi/Finance, an Office of the Qudhaa/Justice and an Office of the Ḥasba (or
80 Hansen, Report for the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, pp. 81-82.
81 Report from “Hassan-nor” received in November 2010.
82 Ibid, p. 83.
83Hansen, Report for the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, p. 86.
84Report from “Hassan-nor” received in November 2010.
85 The term “amīr” seems to be used to describe commanders without referring to any specific level within the al-Shabaab hierarchy. Thus, there may be central amīrs as well as provincial and local amīrs.
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Ḥesbah/Ḥisbah).86 According to “Hassan-nor”, the wilaayah administration is also
coordinating construction and maintenance work, charity works, teaching of sharī’a in the mosques and organizing of religious-political seminars termed uluumul Muslim ummah (“teaching of the Muslim Ummah”) which are held in the towns of the province in order to create awarenesss of al-Shabaab’s policy and ideology. Additionally, the provincial
administrations, “Hassan-nor” claims, run religious-legal courses for qāḍīs and imāms.87 Outside of the civil wilaayah structure, there is a military structure governed by the top commanders of al-Shabaab, such as the grand amīr, Abu Zubeyr, Abu Muqhtar Robow and Sheikh Fu’ad Mohamed Khalaif Shangole. Somali soldiers are recruited locally and trained in the many military training facilities that are scattered throughout South Central Somalia. The al-Shabaab army, the Jaysh al-‘Ushrah (“Army of Hardship”),88 deals with internal as well as external matters: minor clashes in the wilayaahs, as well as major offensives against AMISOM and TFG forces in Mogadishu.89 In addition to the proper combat units there are also, according to several of my Somali informants, mobile military tribunals or courts that move along with the armed forces wherever they operate.