Strategies of de-growth : the role of eco-communities in politics of change

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Master’s Thesis 2019 30 ECTS Faculty of Landscape and Sociey

Strategies of De-growth: The Role of Eco-communities in Politics of Change

Greta Juskaite

MSc International Relations

Department of International Environment and Development

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The Department of International Environment and Development Studies, Noragric, is the international gateway for the Norwegian University of Life Sciences (NMBU). Established in 1986, Noragric’s contribution to international development lies in the interface between research, education (Bachelor, Master and PhD programmes) and assignments.

The Noragric Master’s theses are the final theses submitted by students in order to fulfil the requirements under the Noragric Master’s programmes ‘International Environmental Studies’,

‘International Development Studies’ and ‘International Relations’.

The findings in this thesis do not necessarily reflect the views of Noragric. Extracts from this publication may only be reproduced after prior consultation with the author and on condition that the source is indicated. For rights of reproduction or translation contact Noragric.

Noragric

Department of International Environment and Development Studies The Faculty of Landscape and Society

P.O. Box 5003 N-1432 Ås Norway

Tel.: +47 67 23 00 00

Internet: https://www.nmbu.no/fakultet/landsam/institutt/noragric

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Declaration

I, Greta Juskaite, declare that this thesis is a result of my research investigations and findings.

Sources of information other than my own have been acknowledged and a reference list has been appended. This work has not been previously submitted to any other university for award of any type of academic degree.

Signature………

Date………

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Acknowledgments

This thesis would not have become the product seen before you had it not been for input, guidance and support I received along the way. While there are many people deserving a mention, in the following I would like to credit a special few.

First, I would like to express my deep gratitude to Suderbyn Ecovillage and its residents of February 2019. This thesis would not have been possible without your participation and contribution. Thank you for showing interest in my project, for answering all of my questions, for your warm welcome, openness and kindness. I admire your determination to live in accordance to your own values despite social pressures to do otherwise. What you created in Suderbyn is truly special.

Second, I would like to thank Katharina Glaab who guided me throughout this process.

I am forever grateful for your motivating support and encouragement. This thesis would not have taken the shape it has without your insightful comments and suggestions. I would also like to thank Tor A. Benjaminsen for his guidance and feedback in the last leg of this process. Your attention to detail and quick responses have helped me immensely.

Third, I would like to thank my friends and peers that have been working with me in U402. The collective struggle has made this process easier to indulge. Thank you all for the creative atmosphere in ‘the office’, for indulging in countless talks about methods and theory, for listening to my complaints and for those well-deserved coffee breaks.

Last but not least, I would like to thank my family for their endless support in my endeavors. Ačiū.

Any errors are mine alone

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Abstract

In the age of climate change, political efforts to ensure sustainability for future generations have manifested in the rise of the ‘green growth’ objective and the green economy model. However, critics have argued that instead of reacting to a visible problem, structural change through a creation of a system that would no longer yield them, is needed. From here, the target to address the global environmental crisis ought to be the hyper-consumerist culture that solidifies the growth imperative, as opposed to the practices borne from it. One such critique is identified in the idea of de-growth, which seeks to question the use and misuse of capital by drawing public attention to the damaging effects of the global growth imperative on the environment and, in effect, broader social relations. Here, de-growth suggests a structural change based on simplicity and need rather than desire and accumulation. From here, the focus of this study is on why societies function the way they do, examining primarily the ideologies that govern them and, most importantly, exploring the possibility of change. To do that, this study argues that individual eco-communities can be considered to offer a foundation on which de-growth may be grounded and realized in practice to then be able to spread more globally.

This study appropriates Gramscian conceptual framework as both the theoretical inquiry that problematizes the issue area and a tool to analyze the de-growth movement as a bottom-bottom approach led by eco-communities. Further, this thesis adopts an interpretivist research design and, thus, uses empirical findings to illustrate theoretical reasonings. From here, this study builds its theoretical argumentation based on empirical evidence collected through semi- structured interviews and participant observation in Suderbyn Ecovillage, an eco-community chosen as a study site, to determine the broader role of eco-communities in the de-growth movement, and further, the overall potential of de-growth as a Gramscian counter-hegemonic strategy to inflict structural change.

Keywords: Gramsci, ideational power, hyper-consumerism, de-growth, eco-communities, voluntary simplicity, ecovillage movement, environmental resistance.

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Acronyms and Abbreviations

ECOLISE Network for grassroots initiatives for climate change and sustainability EVS European Voluntary Service

GDP Gross Domestic Product

GEN Global Ecovillage Network

IR International Relations (academic field) NGO Non-governmental organization

NSD Norwegian Center for Research Data

OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Rio+20 Summit United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development SCI Service Civic International

TNCs Transnational corporations

UN United Nations

UNCED United Nation Conference on Environment and Development UN-ECOSOC United Nations Economic and Social Council

UNEP United Nations Environment Programme

WCED The World Commission on Environment and Development

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Chapter 1: Introduction

In October 2018, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) released a report yet again warning about the tragic effects of climate change and calling for politicians to take action (IPCC, 2018). With the recognition of greenhouse gas-based irreversible environmental damage, and the growing warning narratives fostering societal awareness, climate change, and the search for solutions to it, has become a leading issue on the international politics arena in recent decades. Here, efforts to minimize negative effects and ensure sustainability for future generations have manifested in the shift towards ‘green economy’

politics, i.e. restructuring the economic system from one based on industrial growth into one based on green growth (Dryzek, 2013). However, scholars have argued that climate change is a result of a much larger structural problem based on a cycle of extraction, production, consumption and disposal that drives the growth of Western economies and, in effect, environmental degradation (Leonard, Fox & Sachs, 2007). To accommodate the wasteful consumption of Western societies, we are using 70% more natural resources than the Earth can regenerate in a timely manner, meaning that the system is on a verge of collapse (Global Footprint Network, 2019). Thus, one could argue that green production will change little in a hyper-consumerist culture, thereby leading to a more radical questioning of the very foundation that drives consumerism and productionism in the first place (Newell, 2012).

To address environmental degradation, but arguably continue accommodating Western consumption and production patterns, green growth imperatives have become the dominant political answer to climate change. Here, the solutions to environmental crisis are sought through, most notably, development of environmentally sound technologies and greening the production within the same profit-driven system (Dryzek, 2013). However, even in light of green growth, environmental activism that departs from the green growth narrative has risen significantly in recent years, further raising societal awareness about the urgency of environmental issues. Activists, grassroots initiatives and non-governmental organizations continue working on clean production, protection of forests and oceans, fare trade, waste management, etc. It has been argued, however, that for the crisis to be successfully addressed, a connection between all of these points of intervention, as well as an abandonment of the green growth narrative, must be made (Leonard, Fox & Sachs, 2007). De-growth is one of the movements that challenges the economic growth model and argues for the importance of a

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structural change in order to achieve sustainability (Kallis, Demaria & D’Alisa, 2015). Here, the focus is not merely on changing the way goods are produced but changing the system of production and consumption as a whole, encompassing closed-loop, zero waste, renewable energy, equity, labor rights and local living economies as joint essential elements to sustainability. Further, de-growth does not only question and criticize the economic growth objective but proposes restructuring the economy altogether with a focus on simpler way of life, thus addressing precisely the consumerist culture as the main issue rather than only the over-production of goods that support it. As such, this research will focus on a de-growth transition as a grassroots-led structural change, considering alternative social attitudes as the first order of inquiry.

1.1. Research problem

While there are different ways of conceptualizing change and ways of bringing about change, voluntary simplicity movement could be considered as one. Voluntary simplicity, as a lifestyle that propagates non-materialist pursuit of human well-being, has been practiced for years but often met with ignorance by the society at large (Alexander, 2015). While in the past, communities and individuals have often been compelled to pursue simple living based on religious and spiritual beliefs, more recently voluntary simplicity became an objective of environmental, anti-consumerist movements. Simple living advocacy, directly opposing the culture of hyper-consumerism, has been growing in recent years and manifesting itself in the rise of eco-communities such as ecovillages, transition towns, permaculture communities, urban gardens, etc. (Alexander, 2015). However, prescribing such communities to agents of change in global environmental politics is not commonly considered. According to Wapner (2005), “the conventional understanding is that environmental activists are politically effective when they influence state behavior. That is, they bring about change by lobbying states to enact environmental policies. According to this view, widespread human behavior shifts because of states.” (p. 346). Here environmentalist actions are understood as a bottom-up approach to achieve a desirable top-down decision. But a different strategy, bottom-bottom, is rarely considered to hold any power in global politics. A bottom-bottom approach here would mean an organic shift in societal norms thereby leading to a larger structural transition. As consumerism drives the growth-based economy, voluntary simplicity would negate the need to growth and over-production.

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Further, it has been argued that considering de-growth in purely economic terms, as well as considering the simplicity movement in purely social terms, will not be sufficient for a change of any kind to occur (Latouche, 2009). Instead, both must be met under the politics umbrella and prescribed by the society at large as intertwined in order for the broader movement to be successful (Alexander, 2015). From here, a change in societal and political mindset must occur to condition the de-growth transition. Voluntary simplicity communities are thus essential here in creating alternative culture, values and practices that would first and foremost counter hyper-consumerism in ideological terms, which then, in turn, would negate the need for further growth and allow for de-growth to step in, in both political and economic terms (Alexander, 2015).

While many see voluntary simplicity communities as agents of change, it has been argued that such communities run the risk of becoming closed off from the ‘outside’ world, becoming sanctuaries for those seeking to escape the status quo, as opposed to engaging in the spread of questioning the system at large (Wallmeier, 2017). According to Alexander (2015):

“simple living movements must not seek to ‘escape’ the system, but radically ‘transform’ it”

(p. 135). Therefore, a closer examination of an eco-community as an agent in global environmental politics is needed in order to understand whether or not they have the potential to bring about a structural transformation.

This thesis will consider neo-Marxist theorizations, specifically those of Antonio Gramsci, where a change in the system is seen to occur only through a long-term strategy reliant upon the formation of a strong resistance front on a societal level (Cox, 1983). Here, collective action, grouping of people, exercise of autonomy and spread of alternative/radical ideas are all symptoms of the formation of what may be conceptualized as the counter-hegemonic front – one that constitutes the grounds for new meanings of ‘reality’ and therefore challenges the mainstream, or hegemonic, ideology and system (Cox, 1999). The rising climate and economic crisis have potentially contributed to the rapid growth in numbers of eco-communities worldwide and the people that are willing to subscribe to alternative lifestyles, therefore creating an opportunity for the ‘ecovillage movement’ to become a well-tuned counter- hegemonic front (Kallis, Demaria, D’Alisa, 2015). From here, an examination of such a community could help better understand the de-growth agenda, its bottom-bottom approach, and whether or not it can withstand the mainstream pressure.

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1.2. Research objective and research questions

Looking at an eco-community as a practical application of de-growth may offer a better insight into how grassroots actions can be mobilized and used to form and strengthen the counter-hegemonic front, one that opposes mainstream environmentalism based on green growth imperatives. Therefore, this research aims to explore the de-growth strategy by looking at the composition and functions of an eco-community and the motivations behind people that join it in order to understand if eco-communities are systematically functioning revolutionary institutions or reaction-based escapist colonies. The premise behind an in-depth look at such a distinction is the potential it has to lead to a better understanding of transformational power of the counter-hegemonic movement itself. From here, research questions to be answered through the course of this study are:

• To what extent can eco-communities be considered as a Gramscian resistance front? Are they reactionist or revolutionary?

• Given the consideration of eco-communities as practical applications of the de- growth ideology, what is the potential of de-growth as a counter-hegemonic movement?

1.3. Methods

This research is based on an interpretivist research design, meaning that it does not aim to generate universal truths, but to exemplify certain theoretical reasonings (Schwartz-Shea &

Yanow, 2012). From here, this study takes Gramscian theory as the entry point, considering a de-growth transition as a Gramscian resistance strategy. To exemplify such theoretical inquiry, this research used a selected eco-community (Suderbyn Ecovillage) as a study site, considering it as a practical application of de-growth. Further, participant observation and semi-structured interviews with the residents of the community were performed as primary data collection methods. Finally, a thematic analysis of the collected data was performed, and the findings were interpreted using Gramscian conceptual tools in order to answer the research questions.

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1.4. Structure of the thesis

This study is structured into six main chapters. Following the introduction, Chapter 2 presents the theoretical literature. Here, the theoretical framework, which supports this study, is introduced, followed by a discussion about mainstream and alternative ideologies in terms of environmentalism, thus providing the background information and situating the study within existing debates. Further, presenting the methodology of this research, Chapter 3 first explains methodological inquiry of this study. Second, the conceptual tools to be used in this research are explored in detail in this chapter. Lastly, Chapter 3 gives an overview of the data collection methods used in this research, as well as the ethical implications and limitations of this study.

Further, Chapter 4 presents the main findings derived from analyzing the collected data. Here, the chapter provides a detailed presentation of the chosen study site and an exploration of the motivations and opinions of the residents of the chosen eco-community. Chapter 5 uses the conceptual tools of this study to discuss the main findings in accordance to the posed research questions. Finally, Chapter 6 presents concluding thoughts and sums up this thesis.

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Chapter 2: Politics of change and the environment

2.1. Power to change and power to resist change

Classical International Relations (IR) scholarship often deals with the state or non-state actions and the implications of those action on a broader, global society. But what drives actions to be taken in the first place? What are the forces at work that create a particular medium for actors to work, for societies to function and for governments to rule in the ways that they do?

Most importantly, how does power to change and power to resist change work in the face of crisis?

Within the discipline of IR, global environmental crisis is most often addressed through conventional theoretical understandings of world order, and thus, power. Realism, arguably the most prominent IR theory where State is seen as the main actor, argues for every action to be the product of the pursuit of individual interests through the use of power (Barnett & Duvall, 2005). From here, power is understood in material terms and seen as a tool of intimidation, which, if used correctly, leads to opposing actors behaving against their own interests. Here, environmental reform is approached merely through bargaining between states (Newell, 2012).

In contrast to the state-centric, power politics-based realism, liberalism and its branches focuses on cooperation as opposed to competition (Barnett & Duvall, 2005). Here, the focus departs from power as both the means to an end and an end in itself. Instead, liberalism argues for the importance of liberal ideals that guide actions in global politics. In relation to global environmental change, international public arena, as a decision-making sphere, is the primary focus in this line of reasoning (Newell, 2012).

Further, introducing a substantially different view, constructivist scholars argue for the existence of social norms that may legitimize certain actions and condition the context within which they are exercised (Newell, 2012). In this way, power is understood in ideational, as opposed to material, terms, however, it does not challenge the purpose for which it functions.

Constructivists most often focus on the constitution of actors’ identities and interests through the creation of normative structures, but rarely see the normative structure as a power holder in itself (Barnett & Duvall, 2005). This is where a neo-Marxist theory offers a significant insight into the use of power in both material and ideational terms and the power of the structure within which actors operate, in turn contributing to further the understanding of the dynamics of global environmental politics and change.

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Marxism is known as the pioneer critical theory in IR and one of the most influential theories in the discipline to this day. One of the main reasons why Marxism claimed the

‘critical’ position is the unit of analysis. This is so, as differing from mainstream theories, Marxism departs from state or individual-based analysis, and instead focuses on the power of the overarching system that governs them (Cohn, 2016). Here, capitalism, is treated as the focal point and seen as an overarching system – a force that creates hierarchies and inequalities in a given society. Following this train of thought, Marxist and neo-Marxist scholarship treats the system as the main structure within which power, in both material and ideational terms, may be operationalized to construct class-division in a given society (Vogler, 2011). The actors, however, are never acting independently of the system, but always in accordance to its rules and norms, thereby making the system – a power holder in itself. The relevance of Marxist and neo-Marxist scholarship in understanding global environmental change lies in its commencement with identifying root causes of environmental crisis, as opposed to focusing merely on the ways to govern it (Newell, 2012). Here, the conception of the inherent contradiction between capitalism and sustainability, as well as identification of a broader range of actors in both promoting and resisting change, beyond those of states and international institutions, offers a critical account of global environmental politics.

This brief overview of the use of power was provided to reason the theoretical position taken in this study. It is important to note, however, that power and change can be understood in different ways based on the theoretical perspective the conception derives from, as well as different criteria against which power is analyzed (such as actor vs. structure). As this study is concerned with change and the use of ideational power in global environmental politics, a neo- Marxist, specifically Gramscian, theory and central concepts are chosen as the most appropriate to help better understand the way ideas may be used to both serve and resist the system. As such, the following will provide a detailed account of Gramscian theoretical framework in order to set up the following discussion about the ideological power struggle in global environmental politics.

2.1.1. The use of ideas to govern societies: ideational power

Classical Marxism stems from the late 19^th century writings of Karl Marx, who was primarily concerned with hierarchies in a given society that are continuously produced and reproduced by and through the economic system (Cohn, 2016). From here, Marx argued that

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capitalism is in itself designed to create inequalities in a society, where the elite class (bourgeoisie in Marxist terms) profit off of the working class (proletariat). This is so, as capitalism allows for the accumulation of wealth in the hands of the top few, who then are in a position to hold material power over the rest of the society, and thus widen the gap between the rich and the poor (Cohn, 2016). Further, according to Marx, power by the elite is used in two ways to keep the proletariat at bay and the capitalist system stable (Watson, 2017). First, laborers are payed less than what their labor is actually worth in order to keep the labor, as a commodity, profitable in the market place. Second, the laborers are kept as an individualistic group by rejecting their right to form unions in order to prevent the rise of a unified knowledge of mistreatment, which would then threaten the enforcement of lowered wages. ‘False consciousness’ is what Marx called the condition under which the proletariat must be kept in order to continue the capitalist cycle (Watson, 2017). From here, class struggle seen by Marx is not just between the elite and the working class, but between the laborers and the system, which sustains the unequal distribution of wealth and thus – power.

Antonio Gramsci, commonly classified as a neo-Marxist thinker, built upon the fundamental Marxist ideas of systemic production of inequalities, but theorized in broader terms looking at the way power structures work through the use of ideas (Cox, 1981). Instead of focusing on the class struggle in material terms alone, Gramsci’s conceptualization was broader as he recognized the system beyond economics, but saw the role of government, media, education, church, etc. as central elements creating power. Thus, the focus here is on why societies function the way they do, examining primarily the ideologies that govern them.

One of the central concepts in Gramscian thought is that of hegemony. Hegemony can be understood as a form of power, a leadership of one group over another, a state of subordination, but not necessarily direct elite domination (Forgacs, 2000). Here, Gramsci departs from Marxist ‘material determinism’, where power over the lower class is primarily held in terms of material constraints. Instead, Gramsci saw power of the elite to be much more nuanced, where the combination of both coercion (material) and consent (ideological) is needed in order to sustain the system and retain the overall hegemony (Forgacs, 2000). From here, material power is reinforced by the use of ideas that are initiated through the governing institutions, thereby creating behavioral norms in a given society (Cox, 1981). Thus, hegemony is, what Gramsci called, ‘ethico-political’ referring to the “ideological, moral and cultural cements which bond a society together” (Gramsci, 2000, p. 190). From here, hegemony is reinforced through civil society, thus making the process of establishing hegemonic domination,

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and further the larger social order – what Gramsci called historic bloc referring to the structure comprised of state and society – internal rather than external (Cox, 1983) (Mittelman & Chin, 2005). Civil society, here, refers to organizations and institutions that produce and reinforce a particular ideology in a society, which then accepts it voluntarily and slowly makes it a social norm for others to subscribe to (Mittelman & Chin, 2005). Church, family, educational system, media, unions, as well as bigger organizations such as NGOs (non-governmental organizations), all constitute civil society. The use of civil society to exert domination is what Gramsci called ‘power of consent’ – the form of power that eliminates the need for coercion and allows for systemic control by the ruling class (Cox, 1983). However, while hegemony is widely associated merely with ideological use of power, the economic system is still central in this line of reasoning. According to Gramsci (2000): “for though hegemony is ethico-political, it must also be economic, must necessarily be based on the decisive function exercised by the leading group in the decisive nucleus of economic activity” (p. 212). From here, ideology is used to reinforce the economic system which then together constitute hegemony (Forgacs, 2000).

2.1.2. Ideological revolt

Karl Marx argued for revolution as the ultimate goal to escape the exploitative system (Cohn, 2016). Knowledge is at the center of the emancipatory process for Marxists, due to the power of ‘false consciousness’, which ultimately structures and sustains the hierarchal and exploitative system. For Marx, knowledge does not exist in the absence of human activity and it is always interchangeable (Foley, 1986). From here, questioning and sifting through existing knowledge is what gives rise to alternative ideas and power to the proletariat who then are able to revolt against the elite and the system under which they are governed.

Similarly, however powerful the dominant ideology may be, Gramsci saw the rise of alternative ideas – counter hegemonies, as the ultimate goal (Cox, 1983). Here, recognizing the unfair nature of the system within which the society functions may lead to the development of alternative ideologies, which challenge the hegemonic front. Such a challenge is seen to have the potential to change the existing social order – historic bloc (Cox, 1983). However, as establishing hegemony is a participatory and continuous process, the same way that hegemony is constituted, counter-hegemony may be borne through civil society. From here, civil society should be understood as the overall domain where ideas are constructed to form societal

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consent, thereby being central in both hegemonic and counter-hegemonic processes (Forgacs, 2000).

Further, according to Gramsci, there are two possible counter-hegemonic strategies: war of movement and war of position. The former refers to a quick systemic transformation due to weak civil society, leaving the hegemonic front vulnerable to external shocks (Cox, 1983). The latter refers to a long-term strategy, often a transition from a war of movement, where the foundations of a new order are built up and strengthened slowly over time (Cox, 1983).

Resisting the hegemonic pressure, igniting doubt in the existing system, and building strong counter-hegemonic civil society is essential for both of these strategies to bring upon change.

However, a hegemonic cooption of the counter-ideology, or what Gramsci called transformism, is a possible outcome of the hegemonic struggle (Grmasci, 1999). Here, the counter-hegemonic ideology is incorporated in the hegemonic ideology to gain consent from the society that would allow for the ‘business as usual’ by creating an illusion of a systemic shift.

2.2. Environmentalism over time

Following the above provided theoretical reasoning, subsequent sections will identify what this thesis argues to be both the hegemonic and counter-hegemonic fronts, agents within them, and the use of environmental discourses to sustain them. This is done to narrow down the focus of this study and to set up the issue at hand.

2.2.1. Identifying the hegemonic front

Ever since the Industrial Revolution, national development through technological advancement and economic growth has been the leading objective of states across the world.

With changing dominant economic systems (from mercantilism to capitalism) economic growth as an objective has been understood in different terms: either as maximization of state power, or as maximization of societal wellbeing (Watson, 2017). Nevertheless, economic growth has been and continues to be the driving force of every modern economic tradition.

Karl Marx in the early 19^th century identified capitalism as the root cause of social and economic inequalities in a given society. Marx’s critique of capitalism was directly regarded to Adam Smith, the first advocate of fundamental liberal economic ideas, most notably associated with capitalism and free trade (Watson, 2017). Capitalism, as a socio-economic system,

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emerged in 16^th – 17^th century and quickly changed then dominant mercantilism, driven by accumulation of wealth to accumulate power and control over other nation states (Watson, 2017). The main difference between mercantilism and capitalism was the lack of state intervention in the latter, compared to the heavy state control of the economy in the former, as well as the promotion of open international trade. The market here was seen to be the regulating force where capitalist economies may engage to generate profit, thus negating the need for state intervention and control. In short, capitalism can be characterized by accumulation of wealth, labor-wages relationship, ownership of the production of commodities, market exchange and competition, and profit motivation (Andreucci & McDonough, 2015).

The post-1945 period, often remarked as the ‘golden age’, was dominated by the liberal Keynesian economic model, which favored government intervention to facilitate market efficiency (Cohn, 2016). Following the oil crisis in 1973 and increasing political pressure to return to the orthodoxy liberal principles of deregulation, free trade and privatization resulted in the spread of what is known as a neoliberal economic model (Cohn, 2016) (Phillips, 2017).

Here, the capitalist economic system was globalized leading to unprecedented rates of economic growth in the global North through international trade, the rise of Transnational Corporations (TNCs) and foreign direct investments allowing for cross-border free flow of capital (Clapp, 2011) (Phillips, 2017). Smith, along with other liberal theorists that proceeded, advocated for free trade based on comparative advantage principle (Watson, 2017) (Clapp, 2011). Here, the argument followed, states engaging in free international trade may increase their wealth and thus domestic economic growth by specializing their production. In other words, states ought to engage in international trade by producing and exporting goods they have a comparative advantage over, i.e. least opportunity cost, and import goods they have higher opportunity cost for, thereby eliminating competition of production and creating a win-win situation for all parties involved. With neoliberal globalization, the comparative advantage principle justified not only the rise of international trade but international investment enabling TNCs to move their production to countries with lower wages and lower production standards, thus maximizing their profits and ensuring accumulation of wealth (Clapp, 2011). This, in turn, created the foundation for corporate power to rise and dictate self-favoring conditions through political lobbying, thus becoming an actor within the global political economy along with states and non-state international institutions (Phillips, 2017).

Karl Marx saw capitalism as the driving force of material inequality and social injustice.

However, the fundamental Marxist ideas about capitalism could be further reduced to an analysis of the economic growth objective within it. Economic growth, as discussed above,

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manifests itself in every liberal economic model, thereby it could be seen to be the primary driver of the negative capitalist effects. Gill and Law (1993) coined the idea of ‘structural power of capital’ pointing towards the fact that the structure of the economic system allocates power to those who possess wealth and have the ability to move it across borders quickly. This in turn reinforces the power of capital, the power of the structure itself and the power agents within it.

The force that drives this closed circle is thus economic growth. From here, the hegemonic front could be seen to be comprised of a collaboration of different entities that facilitate the production and reproduction of the hegemonic ideology, which here can be identified as economic growth.

2.2.2. Mainstream environmental discourses: forging the hegemony

According to Gramsci (1999), ideas form an ideational structure, which supports and protects the governing system. However, the rise of alternative ideas may lead to the formation of a counter-hegemonic front, one that challenges the existing social order and has the potential to structure a new historic bloc (Gramsci, 1999). While ideational changes may bring about a transformation in the broader material structure, counter-hegemonic ideas may also be coopted by the hegemonic front leading to the reinforcement of the status quo (Gramsci, 1999). From here, the following overview of the changing environmental ideologies over time is meant to provide an insight into how environmentalism, as a counter-hegemonic ideology, has been coopted by the hegemonic front over time to support the growth imperative that defines the governing structure.

Late 1960s – early 1970s mark the beginning of modern environmentalism and mainstream environmental politics, leading to the first modern battle between competing counter-hegemonic environmental discourses (Woodhouse, 2018). Here, a number of local environmental movements arose in the West that had varying focal points: consumer movements, population stabilization, pacifism, action youth movements, anti-industrial pollution protests, among others (Woodhouse, 2018) (Fried, 1998). Further, following a number of publications painting a grim picture of the future, most notably Meadows’ ‘The Limits to Growth’ (1972), the environmentalist reach entered the global scale. Here, the global public attention was brought to the intertwined nature of economics and the environment, as well as the negative realities of industrial growth (Dryzek, 2013). With visible environmental damage caused by heavy industrial activities on a local level, ‘The Limits to Growth’, talking

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about ecological collapse within a century’s time due to continuous industrial growth, caused a discursive shift in the political debates at the time, as well as sparked the rise of anti-Malthusian critical thinking in academia and the emergence of political ecology, as a scholarly field focusing on politically-based, as opposed to planetary, negative environmental effects (Robbins, 2019).

Further, growing public environmentalism was targeting the absence of environmental narratives in politics at the time, sparking politicians to react. On a local level, pollution and clean water control was the primary goal for politicians responding to the new wave of environmentalism, resulting in the establishment of environmental ministries in most Western countries in the early 70s and, thus, marking the beginning of environment as a mainstream political issue (Hajer, 1995). The local and regional political response to the newly arisen environmentalism resulted in the public awareness of the global level consequences of industrialization, as well as the social, environmental and economic effects of a broader system operating on a growth model (Dryzek, 2013). From here, environmentalist ideology for the first time threatened the mainstream discourse of growth through survivalist narratives calling for a systemic change. At the time, de-growth, as a concept encapsulating an alternative system, was first coined by radical thinkers in France (Fournier, 2008) (Kallis, Demaria & D’Alisa, 2015).

Here, neo-liberal economic model was criticized through the increasing attention put towards the ignorance of environmental damage in politics and economics. However, while in the face of pressure, the dominant global environmental discourse did not adopt the proposed anti- capitalist paradigm.

In 1972 environmental politics were put on a global spectrum through the UN Conference on Human Environment (known as the Stockholm Conference) held that year (O’Neill, 2009). Here, a number of environmental issues were discussed and met as a responsibility of the international community to find solutions. According to O’Neill (2009):

“Stockholm also marked the beginning of a debate over the relationship between environmental protection and economic development” (pp. 28). Following this debate, a narrative of ‘eco- development’ was put forward, which allowed for the continuation of global capitalism and later became what is now known as ‘sustainable development’ (Latouche, 2009).

In the wake of the rise of radical environmental movements calling for political and economic change, The World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) was formed in 1983 by the United Nations (Meadowcroft, 2005). WCED was aimed at finding long- term solutions to existing environmental and social issues. In 1987, a report titled ‘Our Common Future’, unofficially known as the ‘Brundtland Report’, was released by the

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Commission, introducing the concept of ‘sustainable development’ as “development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” (Brundtland, 1987, para. 27). The idea of sustainable development quickly gained international attention and became a success as it bridged environmental concerns in the North with development objectives in the South, thereby justifying the continuation of economic growth through sustainable production in the name of development of the world’s poor (Meadowcroft, 2005).

The discourse of sustainable development was further mainstreamed through the 1992 UN Conference on the Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro, where it entered the international politics arena successfully by proposing a win-win strategy – environmental protection coupled with further economic growth (Dryzek, 2013). Thus, environmentalism, as a counter-hegemonic ideology questioning the growth-driven system became coopted by it, as it continued to push the same economic objectives through the ‘green lens’.

A final subtle shift in the hegemonic front could be seen in the rise of market environmentalism and ecological modernization narratives, where the former refers to free market solutions to environmental issues, mainly pricing environmental goods and services, and the latter – technocentric approach to environmental issues, both being practical reinforcements of the sustainable development discourse (Adams, 2009). Further, ecological modernization as a discourse gained popularity following critiques of sustainable development, as it was seen to offer a departure from economic growth as a cause of environmental damage, instead focusing on the positive aspects of the existing economic system and the growth of technology as a source of solution (Barry & Smith, 2005). However, while ecological modernization focuses on innovation and structural change, it does not assume that existing political, social and economic institutions need to undergo a change (Hajer, 1995).

The environmental discursive shifts over time, from ‘sustainable development’ to ecological modernization, have contributed to the formation of the ‘green growth’ imperative (Wanner, 2015). Following the 2009 UN General Assembly adoption of a resolution for the preparation for Rio+20 Summit, the concept of ‘green economy’ emerged and quickly became the focal point in international politics (Kenis & Lievens, 2015). Green economy as a concept encompasses the green growth objective and as a discourse proposes an emancipatory domain for economic actors to engage in green action without the need to wait for top-down decisions.

A number of publications in the following years such as the UNEP report “Towards a Green Economy: Pathway to Sustainable Development and Poverty Eradication” (2011), the OECD

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report “Interim Report of the Green Growth Strategy” (2010), the World Bank report “Inclusive Green Growth” (2012), among others, have all endorsed green economy (Kenis & Lievens, 2015). The timing of the green economy emergence – following the 2008 economic crisis – and four distinguishable factors of this strategy: sustainability, technological innovation, sustainable entrepreneurship and sustainable consumption, was a recipe for success. However, as Kenis and Lievens (2015) have argued, green economy could be seen to be a mere continuation of the sustainable development agenda, as it does not regard economic growth as a strain on planetary resources, it supports international competition as opposed to cooperation in the face of ecological crisis and it fosters free trade. Thus, all of this combined has created a pathway for green economy to become the hegemonic ideology where environmentalism is further being coopted by the economic growth objective.

2.2.3. Critiquing the mainstream

A number of academic critiques arose over the years and were conceptualized as

‘radical’ due to their fundamental rejection of mainstream environmentalism, most notably deep ecology, eco-feminism, eco-anarchism and eco-socialism (Adams, 2009). Collectively, these academic ideas proposed a change in thinking about the human-nature relationship on an individual level by rejecting the principle of human domination over the environment for the sake of human advancement, which is inherent in mainstream environmentalist narratives discussed above.

Deep ecology comes from the writings of Arne Næss, who in the early 1970s critiqued the ‘shallow ecology’ narrative by rejecting the separation between humans and nature (Adams, 2009). He argued for the intrinsic value of nature and the “recognition of the equal rights of organisms to live and blossom” (Adams, 2009, p.190). A number of scholars continued the deep ecology discussion in 1980s challenging the established anthropocentric ideas and inspiring radical environmentalist groups.

In 1980s – 1990s, eco-feminism arose challenging both the mainstream and other alternative environmental ideologies, calling for a specific attention to be put on gender in human and non-human environment relations (Adams, 2009). Here, eco-feminism argued that the capitalist profit maximization results in environmental exploitation and degradation where women, especially marginalized women, are affected the most.

In the late 1970s, eco-anarchist scholarship arose arguing against the structure of domination (Adams, 2009). In short, eco-anarchism viewed the hierarchy within our society to

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be directly translated into the hierarchy between humans and nature, where the former dominates the latter. Therefore, opposing industrialism, bureaucracy and statism was central in eco-anarchist scholarship (Adams, 2009). Fundamental eco-anarchist ideas had been adopted by radical environmentalist groups over the years, inspired protests and boycotts, influenced operations of non-governmental environmental organizations and given roots to broader ideas of decentralization, participatory democracy, self-sufficiency and egalitarianism (Adams, 2009).

Finally, eco-socialism, rooting in Marxist thought, has argued for social concerns such as wealth distribution, quality of life and social justice to be heavily affected by environmental issues, that, in turn, have been induced by social actions (Adams, 2009). While historically Marxism lacked a sufficient account of the environment, in 1970s-onwards socialist critiques of capitalism started to include the environmental dimension by making links between capitalist accumulation and environmental exploitation and degradation. Here, eco-socialist scholarship laid down the foundation for the rise of radical ideas of decentralization, communalism, utopian socialism, among others (Adams, 2009).

In response to the rising growth imperative and the rise of system-challenging ideas in the 1960s and 70s, scholars started proposing green economy models based on ‘simple living’

principle rather than growth. Most notable contributions here can be identified in Daly’s

‘steady-state economics’ and Schumacher’s ‘Buddhist economics’ (Woodhouse, 2018).

Schumacher, in his ‘Small is beautiful’ (1973) publication, called for less focus to be placed on material well-being and instead placing the value on human happiness, which cannot be attained through unsustainable use of resources. The argument goes on to stress the importance of minimizing consumption and situating the economy towards the local. Schumacher advocated for simplicity and moderation, as opposed to wealth accumulation, as a key to well-being and happiness (Woodhouse, 2018). A few years later, Herman Daly put forward his alternative economic model with the publication of ‘Steady state economics’ (1977), further arguing against the growth imperative (Adams, 2009). Daly (1991) defined a steady-state economy as:

“economy with constant stock of people and artifacts, maintained at some desired, sufficient levels by low rates of maintenance ‘throughput’, that is, by lowest feasible flows of matter and energy from the first stage of production to the last stage of consumption” (p. 17). Here, Daly argued that, given that natural resources are finite, reaching a steady-state economy is not only necessary but inevitable. However, to do that, an ideological shift in the society is needed where human happiness is not valued in terms of growth.

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2.2.4. De-growth: forging the counter-hegemony

Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen criticized development and growth-based economic models in the 1970s, and, as a result, laid down the foundations for what later became the idea of de-growth (Bonaiuti, 2015). He argued that development of any kind is inevitably connected to economic growth, and growth, even zero-growth proposed by steady-state theory, will ultimately lead to resource exhaustion. Therefore, a declining economic model, or de-growth, ought to be the ultimate goal and the only viable option for the future (Bonaiuti, 2015).

The initial critique of sustainable growth by Georgescu-Roegen in 1970s marked the first phase of the de-growth debate (Kallis, Demaria & D’Alisa, 2015). Here, Georgescu- Roegen began his theorizations by insisting on the need to relate economics to the biosphere (bioeconomics). This is so, as “the fundamental aim of economic activity, unlimited growth of production and consumption, being based on finite sources of matter/energy, is not compatible with the fundamental laws of nature”, specifically with the law of entropy (i.e. second law of thermodynamics) (Bonaiuti, 2015, p. 26). Here, Goergescu-Roegen argued that scarce resources were being overused and wasted, while at the same time abundant sources of energy, such as solar, were underutilized (Latouche, 2009). Similar ideas were revisited in the early 70s by scholars such as Gorz (1975) and Illich (1973), who are often prescribed to the early pioneers of de-growth (Fournier, 2008). However, with ‘Limits to Growth’ and the rise of sustainable development discourse, the initial idea of a declining economy, while still occasionally echoed in theorizations of critical thinkers at the time, was put aside for the time being.

Early 2000s marked the second phase of de-growth, this time driven by the critique of sustainable development, which took the mainstream position after the first debates about de- growth in the 70s (Kallis, Demaria & D’Alisa, 2015). Here, de-growth positioned itself directly opposing capitalism within the sustainable development and green growth discourses, calling the clean capitalism an ‘oxymoron’ idea (Fournier, 2008). This is so, as capitalism proposes measuring success in terms of growth, which is problematic for de-growthers as the economy may grow through the increase of the consumption of medical services, weapons, insurance, etc. in response to the increase of illness, crime and conflict, accidents, ecological degradation, etc. Therefore, justice, democracy, equality, environment, and other factors are ignored in the economic growth model (Fournier, 2008). From here, the idea of sustainable growth is not seen as a viable option for the proponents of de-growth, as any rise of green production will still ultimately lead to damaging effects on the society, ecological or otherwise. Thus, the issue here is not with the development of green technologies, but the use of them within the growth

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narrative, which propagates the continuous increase of production and consumption (Fournier, 2008). From here, de-growth as an ideology seeks to question the use and misuse of capital, and the distribution of capital within a society, by drawing the public attention to the damaging effects of global capitalism on the environment, as well as broader social relations.

Further, de-growth, in its second phase, first emerged as a slogan for anti-globalization and anti-capitalism social movements in France, Italy and Spain in the early 2000s (Kallis, Demaria & D’Alisa, 2015). At the time, de-growth became an idea under which people propagating a simpler lifestyle could mobilize. The movement grew rapidly gaining following in its practical applications through reusing things, second-hand shops, co-operatives, the sharing principle, public transport, etc. Further, the theoretical ideas of Georescu-Roegen were revisited as de-growth found its way into academia with the establishment of the Institute for Economic and Social Studies on Sustainable Degrowth in Lyon in 2001 and academic collective Research & Degrowth in 2007 (Kallis, Demaria & D’Alisa, 2015). The latter then started promoting international conferences, the first one held in 2008 in Paris, where de-growth was finally started to be used in English and gained international recognition thereafter.

Sergey Latouche (2009), one of the main academic contributors to the second-phase of de-growth, stated that: “It is significant that most environmentalist discourses make no critique of the growth society and confuse the issue with vague talk of sustainable development” (p. 3).

Therefore, de-growth still acts first and foremost as a platform for alternative ideas to arise. By critiquing and questioning economic values, de-growth does not provide a definitive blueprint for an alternative, utopian society, but it does propose steps to be taken that would lead to the escape from growth economy. According to Latouche (2009), eight distinctive steps can

“trigger a process of de-growth that will be serene, convivial and sustainable” (p. 33). These steps are conceptualized as the ‘eight R’s’ by Latouche (2009): re-evaluate – mainly pointing towards the hierarchical human-nature relationship, reconceptualize – pointing towards the need for change in societal values, restructure – “adapting the productive apparatus and social relations to changing values” (p. 36), redistribute – changing distribution patterns both between the North and the South and within each society, relocalize – moving primary production back to the local level, reduce – reducing consumption, production, and travel/transport patterns, and re-use and recycle which would lead to the reduction of waste (Latouche, 2009). From here, the de-growth ideology becomes a radical discourse challenging the global mainstream by, firstly, questioning and criticizing it, secondly, by not proposing distinct alternative but suggesting steps to be made that could lead to one, and finally, by implying societal resistance.

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2.3. Environmental resistance in practice

Since 1960s grassroots environmental movements have entered the global arena due to the increasing awareness about the connection between globalization and environmental degradation, as well as the increasing politicization of environmental issues on a global scale (Ford, 2011). However, it was not until the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) that environmental organizations and movements mobilized and entered the transnational politics arena. The number of grassroots engagements in global environmental politics has risen since and continues to rise today (Ford, 2011). From here, the following sections will explore environmentalism in practice, identifying possible agents of the counter-hegemonic movement and its practical manifestation.

Social movements, while contested in academic literature, could be defined as “networks of informal relationships between a multiplicity of individuals and organizations, who share a distinctive collective identity, and mobilize resources on conflictual issues” (Diani, 2000, p.

387). Social movements may vary in size and space upon which they operate – from local, acting within certain borders and focusing on a specific local issue area, to global, transcending national boundaries and making connections between the local and the global. Due to the increasing social awareness of the connection between globalization and environmental degradation, social environmental movements today often act on a global scale targeting the global root causes of local issues (Ford, 2011).

Further, environmental movements often engage with a broad set of issues as they make connections between environment, economy, human rights, politics, etc. In so doing, environmental movements blur the boundaries between strictly environmental and other social issues, challenging the system as a whole, as opposed to a particular factor within it (Ford, 2011). Further, according to Amoore (2005), when studying resistance politics, it is important to understand that resistance may manifest itself in varying forms. While the most common association when describing a social movement would correspond to protests, demonstrations and public declarations, resistance may be manifested subtly through everyday life practices and may not be as visible as loud militant gatherings (Amoore, 2005). Thus, it is noteworthy to distinguish environmental movements, composed in NGOs and pressure organizations that engage in challenging top-down actions, from grassroots movements, that work on a bottom- up strategy by engaging in the pursuit of alternatives through ‘living the solution’ (Ford, 2011).

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An example of the latter strategy can be identified in the ‘ecovillage movement’, which, as per the focus of this study, is going to be discussed in detail in the sections below.

2.3.1. Eco-communities: counter-hegemonic front in practice

Eco-communities are communities comprised of a group of people living together and practicing sustainable lifestyle with sharing principles and, therefore, can be considered as a practical application of de-growth ideology (Cattaneo, 2015). A diverse list of institutions may fall under the description of an eco-community, such as ecovillages, communes, colonies, urban gardens, etc. Eco-communities vary in their functions and ideologies: educational centers, spiritual retreats, urban eco-gardens, rural ecovillages, etc. (Litfin, 2009). All of them, nonetheless, practice environmentally sound living and, while not always openly prescribing to the de-growth ideology, sharing, as opposed to growth-based economy, is a central principle of such communities. Sustainable practices performed in eco-communities range from organic agriculture and permaculture, crafts, energy conservation, local economy, and many more.

Ecovillage, a form of an eco-community, was defined by Robert Gilman (1991) as a

“human-scale, full-featured settlement in which human activities are harmlessly integrated into the natural world in a way that is supportive of healthy human development and can be successfully continued into the indefinite future” (p. 10). Such a definition has been contested over the years for being too idealistic and utopian and thus not representative of an ecovillage in reality (Van Schyndel Kasper, 2008). While Gilman’s definition describes an ideal ecovillage and thus does not characterize ecovillages today, it does, however, depict an overall objective that ecovillages are guided by.

Further, the formation of ecovillages can be traced back to the Western ‘back to the land’

movement of the late 1960s (commonly known as the ‘Hippie movement’) (Dawson, 2006).

The ‘back to the land’ movement arose with the changing environmentalist discourse and the rising societal environmental consciousness. Thus, the premise behind the movement was to escape the productivist and consumerist system by returning back to the nature, forging sustainable and self-sufficient lifestyles (Calvario & Otero, 2015). Further, ‘back to the landers’

propagated autonomy, ecology, simplicity and self-sufficiency as their core values, and critiqued the mainstream materialist culture and the system of capitalism. Alternative lifestyle forged by the movement involved not only ecological farming, but community living and alternative localized economy that allowed them to escape the capitalist wage labor and market place, thus making them a de-growth society (Calvario & Otero, 2015).

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Today, ecovillages strive for a maximum quality of life through minimal environmental impact. This is achieved in a multitude of ways, as ecovillages often differ in terms of their primary objectives, be that spiritual, ecological, social, or otherwise, as mentioned above (Litfin, 2009). However, most ecovillages engage in finding ways to minimize their ecological footprint through low-impact settlement designs, promoting sustainable local economies and organic and local food production and processing (Dawson, 2006). Further, ecovillages promote participatory, community-scale governance and social inclusion. This is not to say that ecovillages are always self-sufficient or are able to be fully isolated from the outside society (Van Schyndel Kasper, 2008). However, by engaging in organic agriculture, promoting

‘voluntary simplicity’ principle and implementing a form of a ‘sharing economy’ (to a stronger or lesser extent), as well as, by “promoting a culture of trust and compassion” (Dawson, 2006, p. 54), ecovillages create an alternative society where happiness of the people, in social terms, does not come at the expense of the natural environment to the same extent as it does in the

‘modern society’.

2.3.2. The global dimension of eco-communities

Eco-communities, specifically ecovillages, today differ from their predecessors of the ‘back to the land’ movement, which resulted in the composition of communities that were not offering a broader alternative to the outside modern society, apart from that of escaping it (Wallmeier, 2017). In contrast, eco-communities today forge networks and relationships with the outside, thus, they do not disconnect from neither one another nor the larger social and political environment (Litfin, 2009).

The Global Ecovillage Network (GEN) was established in 1995, connecting hundreds of ecovillages worldwide and spreading the ideology of sustainable living (Litfin, 2009).

Currently, GEN lists around 10,000 communities all around the world, however, there are many more communities not part of the GEN network that practice the simpler lifestyle (Global Ecovillage Network, 2019a) (Litfin, 2014). Internet is used as a tool for such communities to connect, share their experiences and practices, and spread the ideology worldwide. Thus, according to Litfin (2009), ecovillages can be classified as a movement as they “address the interrelated problems of social alienation and ecological degradation by building sustainable communities locally from the ground up while simultaneously consulting a global network for education and social change” (p. 126-127). Further, globalized society enables activism to spread across the borders and thus inflict more pressure beyond that of a local level (Adams,

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2009). This is visible in the ecovillage movement, which increasingly gains power on the transnational politics arena due to the GEN network being able to present an organized presence in the UN conferences and other events (Litfin, 2009). Thus, while alternative actions of an individual community may be insufficient, a network of communities, such as GEN, offer the spread of the alternative in ideological and material terms.

Further, individual people and small groups may be considered as agents of change in global terms. According to Escobar (2005): “when people “practice” their everyday lives, they are thus reproducing or creating culture” (p. 302). From here, individual ecovillages may be considered to offer a foundation on which alternative ideologies, such as that of de-growth, may be grounded and realized in practice to then be able to spread more globally, precisely through the people that adopt and reproduce it. Thus, every eco-community could be considered to give grounds for the rise of collective identity among its residents, which manifests in collective abandonment of the system (Cattaneo, 2015). As such, the global dimension of eco- communities may be reduced to their local-level role, as individual communities have emancipatory properties due to their constant reproduction of counter-hegemonic ideas, which then, in theory, can shrink the portion of society governed by the hegemonic front.

2.4. Conclusion: de-growth strategy and eco-communities as environmental resistance front

As discussed above, de-growth first and foremost serves as a basis under which alternative ideas may rise and challenge the mainstream social order (Latouche, 2009). What de-growth looks like in practice, therefore, may be everything that can be considered non-capitalist practices and institutions (Kallis, Demaria & D’Alisa, 2015). From here, ecovillages, the same as other types of eco-communities, can be seen as de-growth practices and institutions to a larger or smaller extent. This is so, as they all share the same principles of sharing, simplicity, and commons.

Further, capitalism is central in the de-growth critique, as it argues against the proposed conception of ‘green capitalism’ (Andreucci & McDonough, 2015). This is so as capitalism is inherently growth-driven, and growth, even ‘green growth’, is never fully sustainable as it does not reduce consumption levels but merely changes the goods to be consumed, thereby retaining the hyper-consumerist culture. While de-growth is seen as problematic under capitalism, the proponents of the former do not reject the possibility of coexistence completely (Andreucci &

Strategies of de-growth : the role of eco-communities in politics of change