Gender biases in delegation

(1)

Faculty of Economics and Business Final Degree Report

Gender biases in delegation.

Marina Sagrera Coll

Business Administration Degree

Academic year 2019-20

Student’s ID: 43171985L

Report supervised by Lara Ezquerra Guerra Department of Business Economics

The University is authorized to include this work in the Institutional Repository for consultation in open access and online dissemination, for exclusively academic and research purposes.

Author Tutor Sí No Sí No

X X

Keywords of the report: Gender, Delegation, Resources allocation.

(2)

1 INDEX

Executive Summary ... 3

Resumen del trabajo ... 3

1. Introduction ... 3

2. Literature Review ... 4

2.1. Gender Differences ... 4

2.1.1. The concept of gender ... 4

2.1.2. Gender differences through history ... 5

2.1.3. Gender differences through history ... 5

2.1.4. Gender biases in the job market ... 5

2.2. Delegation of decisions ... 7

2.2.1. The concept of delegation ... 7

2.2.2. Causes of delegation ... 7

2.2.3. Delegation and responsibility ... 7

3. Subject of the work ... 8

4. Experimental Design ... 8

4.1. Baseline Treatment ... 8

4.2. Compulsory Delegation ... 9

5. Results ... 10

5.1. Baseline treatment ... 10

5.2. Compulsory Delegation treatment ... 13

5.2.1 From the Principal’s point of view ... 13

5.2.2 From the Agent’s point of view... 14

6. Treatment comparison ... 16

7. Extrapolation to Business Environment ... 17

8. Conclusions ... 18

9. References ... 20

10. Appendix I: BL Treatment development by sessions ... 22

11. Appendix II: CD Treatment development by sessions ... 26

11.1. Principal’s point of view ... 26

11.2. Agent’s point of view ... 29

(3)

2 ILLUSTRATION INDEX

Illustration 1. Baseline Treatment ... 8

Illustration 2. Compulsory Delegation Treatment ... 9

TABLE INDEX Table 1. Role Assignment in Baseline Treatment. ... 9

Table 2. Role Assignment in Compulsory Delegation Treatment. ... 10

Table 3. Average amount earned by Principals ... 16

Table 4. Role Assignment in BL at first session. ... 22

Table 5. Role Assignment in BL at second session. ... 23

Table 6. Role Assignment in BL at third session. ... 23

Table 7. Role Assignment in BL at fourth session. ... 24

Table 8. Role Assignment in CD at first session. ... 26

Table 9. Role Assignment in CD at second session. ... 27

Table 10. Role Assignment in CD at third session. ... 27

Table 11. Role Assignment in CD at fourth session. ... 28

FIGURES INDEX Figure 1. BL: Average amount earned by Female Principals. ... 11

Figure 2. BL: Average amount earned by Male Principals. ... 11

Figure 3. BL: Average amount earned by Principals. ... 12

Figure 4. BL: Percentage allocated by Principals to Recipients. ... 12

Figure 5. BL: Average amount earned by Principals per session. ... 13

Figure 6. CD: Average amount earned by Principals per period. ... 13

Figure 7. CD: Times that each gender agent is selected per session. ... 14

Figure 8. CD: Average amount earned by Principals. ... 15

Figure 9. CD: Percentage of amount allocated by Agents to Principals. ... 15

Figure 10. BL vs CD: Average amount earned by Female Principals. ... 16

Figure 11. BL vs CD: Average amount earned by Male Principals. ... 17

Figure 12. BL: Average amount earned by Principals in session 1. ... 22

Figure 16. CD: Average amount earned by Principals in session 1. ... 26

Figure 20. CD: Average amount returned by Agents in session 1. ... 29

(4)

3 Executive Summary

The objective of this report is to study if gender biases occur in delegation of decisions. First, there will be an analysis of previous research in the area. Second there will be an analysis of data coming from an experiment run by other authors.

This data consists on two games where delegation occurs. After analysis this data, we find that there are gender biases in delegation and that these biases benefit males.

Finally, once the results obtained have been analysed, will consist of extrapolating the results to the business environment: recent studies that support the relationship of the current business world with the results obtained in the first part of the report will be compared. This extrapolation aims to delve into the possibility that gender could be a guarantee to get decision maker positions in a company.

Resumen del trabajo

El objetivo de este trabajo de fin de grado es estudiar si se producen sesgos de género en la delegación de decisiones. Para ello, primero se realizará un análisis de investigaciones previas en este campo. En segundo lugar, se analizarán los datos procedentes de un experimento realizado por otros autores: estos datos consisten en dos juegos donde existe delegación. Tras analizar estos datos, encontramos que existen sesgos de género en la delegación y que éstos benefician al género masculino.

Finalmente, una vez analizados los resultados obtenidos, consistirá en extrapolar los resultados al ambiente empresarial: se pondrán en conocimiento estudios recientes que respalden, o no, la relación del mundo laboral actual con los resultados obtenidos en la primera parte del trabajo. Esta extrapolación pretende ahondar en la posibilidad de que el género sea un elemento de garantía para conseguir puestos decisivos en una empresa.

1. Introduction

Decision making can be an indicator of internal evolution within a company. Since one person alone is unable to make all decision within an organization most need to implement delegation of decision. Delegation consists on selecting other people to make decision on behalf of the organization. Since those on whom decision are delegated learn more they tend to have priority to ascend in their career. For that reason, it is important to know if belonging to one of the two genders can be an advantage or a disadvantage and this if delegation is a gender bias generator in the labour markets.

(5)

4 Previous literature (Azmat & Petrongolo, 2014) finds gender differences in the labour markets. These differences usually favour males and it is important to know the origins of these biases in order to solve them.

This report will first include a brief literature review on delegation and gender biases. Second this study will analyse the data from an already existing experiment conducted by Ezquerra & Kujal (2019) will be used in the development of this paper. The experiment consists of two treatments that are repeated by sessions: baseline and compulsory delegation. The difference between these treatments is that in the first one the principal (male or female) makes an allocation decision between them and a recipient and in the second one the principal choose an agent (male or female) who makes the allocation decision on behalf of the principal. We find that for the baseline treatment women's allocation decision are more constant than men ones. When we introduce delegation in the compulsory delegation treatment men obtain higher benefits in the initial periods but subsequently women are consolidating as more selfish delegation in those agents who report them a higher profit. As Agent women are fairer in their allocation decisions despite it will be detrimental for them at long term (Bottino, García-Muñoz, & Kujal, 2016).

Finally, there will be a section where the results of the experiment are linked to business environment where we found that male behaviour is the one who have more options to success and get promoted in a company due to his better results although in a human resources level female profile could be more interesting due to her fairness.

We conclude that gender biases arise in the presence of delegation because of male agents are selected more times than female agents.

2. Literature Review

2.1. Gender Differences

2.1.1. The concept of gender

The Royal Spanish Academy defines gender as "each group to which the human depending on their sex belong, understood from a sociocultural point of view rather than exclusively biological. From this definition we understand that gender does not only exist in human’s anatomy.

The culture, not biology, is the responsible of the differences that we can appreciate between men and women (Lamas, 2007). This author exemplifies that what is valued as "feminine" or "masculine" varies according to whether it is a Scandinavian, Latin American, Muslim or Eastern culture.

(6)

5 The existence of two genders implies, by definition, differences between them. This report does not try to analyse the obvious physical differences between both genders, because genders goes beyond what we know as sex.

2.1.2. Gender differences through history

Gender differences have existed throughout history in all fields but this work will focus on the economic one: culturally, women have been relegated to tasks related to home and child care, tasks for which no compensation is received. This fact forced women to depend of an income source from male gender.

During the First World War women had the opportunity to participate in the industry because of the need of human resources in the industry while men were on battlefield. During the last century and more in recent years, society has made an important (but not sufficient) effort to recognize the place on women should be: next to men, neither above nor below.

Nowadays this equality is still not a reality and this become evident in concept such as the “wage gap” or the “glass ceiling” (Contreras Torres, Pedraza Ortiz, & Mejía Restrepo, 2012).

2.1.3. Gender differences in behaviour

As it is known, women and men do not behave the same way in many aspects. Women are generally more risk averse than men, their social preferences are more specific and they tend to be more resistant to competition (Croson & Gneezy, 2009).

The behaviour of persons also depends on culture and customs; while in patriarchal societies women are less competitive than men, in matrilineal societies women are more competitive. Even more than men in patriarchal societies (Gneezy, Leonard, & List, 2009).

2.1.4. Gender biases in the job market

Is known as wage gap the difference between the salary that men or women receives by doing the same job. In a study carried on by the CEOE and presented in March 2019 (Comisión de Igualdad y Diversidad de CEOE;, 2019), it is indicated that, in Spain, despite having substantially reduced the salary difference, in 2014 (latest INE data) women perceived a 12,2% less than men.

(7)

6 The expression “glass ceiling” (term attributed to Marilyn Loden, who used it for the first time in 1978 during a speech) is used to refer to the limitations that the female gender has when ascending vertically in a company. This is due to the belief that women have less capabilities than men in the management of positions of high responsibility. Another cause of glass ceiling is the difficulties that exist today to conciliation of family and work live that still seems to be more linked to the female gender than male.

This is related with the opportunities of promotion. Once a company only offers promotions when there exist other offers, women will have less opportunities of promotion due to they do not reach this exterior offers (Booth, Francesconi, & Frank, 2003). These authors also create a promotion model that distinguishes between the initial salary increase of the promotion and the subsequent salary increases and conclude that women will not reach men in the promotion processes ant the salary difference between both gender could be enlarged.

Gender differences in labour market outcomes are symmetric gender differences in household roles and it may shape labour market choices. There are not evidence sufficient to understand gender inequalities in the household and labour market (Azmat & Petrongolo, 2014).

The household roles are associated to the “sticky floor” concept. The difference between the “glass ceiling” and this one is that the difficulties women face to access to higher positions depend on the preference of them.

There are women that renounce or does not aspire to a higher position because of the responsibilities they have at home. There are sectors in Spain, such as advertising, which despite being highly feminized, the positions of greatest responsibility are occupied mainly by men (Martín Llaguno, 2007).

To avoid having to choose between household and work responsibilities, work-life balance is created: it consists in measures that seek to combine family and work as much as possible to make that a person can attend both sectors. It is important to avoid thinking that work-life balance affects only women. Although that, the 53,8% of the human resources managers surveyed by Albert López-Ibor, Escot Mangas, Fernández Cornejo,

& Palomo Vadillo (2010) on their papers are quite or totally agree with the follow statement: “Although men were increasingly involved in the care of their children, it is unlikely that we reach a situation in which men use work-life measures as much as women”.

In the search of the equality in the labour market, transparent policies are necessary to avoid wage discrimination in addition to incorporating the female gender in all levels and sectors inside and outside companies. All of this reinforced with other measures in other parameters that we do not analyse in this paper such as education, politics or the cultural landscape (Buedo Martínez, 2015).

(8)

7 2.2. Delegation of decisions

This paper analyses gender differences in a very specific area: the delegation of tasks. Do individuals act differently if they make decision themselves than if they delegate this responsibility to another?

2.2.1. The concept of delegation

The meaning of “delegation” is the opportunity to give another the task that should perform instead of doing it oneself. This concept is related with the idea of hierarchical relationships as it is assumed that those who are more efficient when they are delegated are the ones who have more options to grow vertically within the organization of the company.

2.2.2. Causes of delegation

Delegation can be due to several reasons: it may be considered that another person is more prepared to take a certain type of decision or simply gives this impression. The incorporation of a new figure in which to delegate an action changes the perception of the players about the game (Fershtman

& Gneezy, 2001).

Decision making could be influenced by social aspects and, in this case, women are more sensitive than men, so their behaviour is less predictable (Croson & Gneezy, 2009). In competitive environments, the same study indicates that women are less competitive and this difference is supported both by entrenched and acquired knowledge (Croson & Gneezy, 2009).

2.2.3. Delegation and responsibility

To delegate a task also means to delegate the responsibility of it and this can be an advantage for the one who delegate and the one on whom the task is delegated. The first individual could feel itself less responsible of an action if he or she delegates it to another individual instead of making the decision directly while the second individual also does not feel responsible because he or she only “follow directions” (Hamman, Loewenstein, & Weber, 2010).

On their papers Choy, Hamman, King, & Weber (2016) advice that it is important to take into account the ties of the person whom the task is delegated with the purpose. They conclude that if there are not explicit financial ties with the result of the allocation, the intermediate will not be favourable to the one who delegate the task on him/her. Quite the contrary, the allocation will be favourable to the recipient.

(9)

8 Furthermore, of the responsibility of take a decision (or delegated it), there exist the responsibility of communicate it. The recipients will receive the news worse if there is the decision maker instead of the spokespersons the one who communicate it: that is because the last ones uses an emotional regret (Garofalo & Rott, 2018).

This report aims to join the concepts of “gender difference” and

“delegation of tasks” to identify if men and women face the delegation process in the same way.

3. Subject of the work

The final aim of this report is to analyse whether the gender influences the possibility to become part of the management team of a large company.

The report tries to obtain conclusions that allow us to affirm that men and women face decision-making in different ways using the data of the sampling provided by the tutor. For this purpose, the report uses two delegation games proposed by other authors. The final aim is to extrapolate the results obtained to the access to promotion in the private company.

4. Experimental Design

The data analysed in this report are those obtained after a field research among the students of Middlesex University London (United Kingdom) (Ezquerra

& Kujal, 2019).

This report carries out the study of gender differences in delegation of task (Hamman, Loewenstein, & Weber, 2010) following a base report that presents two games: the dictator game (or baseline) and the compulsory delegation game (Bottino, García-Muñoz, & Kujal, 2016).

4.1. Baseline Treatment

In the dictator game (or Baseline) subject A (principal) must divide £10 between himself and a subject B (recipient). Analysing the results of this game the report aims to see if in the absence of delegation gender biases occur.

Illustration 1. Baseline Treatment

(10)

9 The experiment (Ezquerra & Kujal, 2019) takes place in 4 sessions of 12 rounds each. In the first session 6 people participate, in the second and the third one the number of participants is up to 8. The fourth (and last) round is been done by 18 people. The treatment had 40 participants in total.

The roles are randomly assigned at the beginning of the experiment. There will be the same number of principals and receivers and they will be rematch in pairs each round. As we commented in the methodology section, each principal must divide £10 between themselves and their recipient.

In the following table one can see the result of the role assignment:

Female Male Total

Players 21 19 40

Principals 11 9 20

Recipients 10 10 20

Table 1. Role Assignment in Baseline Treatment.

Source: Middlesex University. Own elaboration.

4.2. Compulsory Delegation

In the second delegation game, Compulsory Delegation, we introduce the figure of the "Agent" (player C) in order to relate the decision making with the avoidance of responsibility (Hamman, Loewenstein, & Weber, 2010).

This second game consist in that player A (Principal) delegates to player C (Agent, there is one men and one female in each session) the decision to divide £10 between players A and B (recipient). This report will analyse the decision of both Principal and Agent.

The game (Ezquerra & Kujal, 2019) is carried out on 4 sessions of 12 rounds but the number of participants in each of them varies. In the two first sessions there are 10 people participating and on the third and fourth session the number of participants is reduced to 8.

In each session, the roles are randomly assigned: there will be the same number of Principals and Recipients and only two agents play each

Illustration 2. Compulsory Delegation Treatment

(11)

10 session: one man and one woman. On the compulsory delegation game, the Principal must delegate the decision of distributing £10 to one of the two agents without knowing their gender. Once the Agent is selected, he or she must distribute this amount between the principal who has chosen him/her and the assigned recipient.

The profit of the Agent, as Bottino, García-Muñoz, & Kujal (2016) said on their papers, is related to the following function:

πi= -0,45 + 0,15*nj

where nj represents the number of principals that choose agent i.

This function was interpreted by Hamman, Lowewnstein, & Weber (2010) assuming that agents face a fixed cost of £0,45 and a marginal benefit of

£0,15 when they make a decision.

The Agent's profit depends only of the number of times he or she is chosen by the Principal. This leads us to suppose that Agents will distribute a higher amount to the Principal than to the Agent in order to the Principal continues electing them.

In the following table one can see the result of the assignment of roles by gender for the Compulsory Dictator game:

Players 21 15 36

Agents 4 4 8

Table 2. Role Assignment in Compulsory Delegation Treatment.

Source: Middlesex University. Own elaboration

5. Results

5.1. Baseline treatment¹

Our analysis during the 4 sessions of the Baseline treatment (BL) leads us to observe that the behaviour of female gender is more constant, women acts similar between them. The masculine gender, on the other way around, coincides in the alternation of their assignments: they never assign the same amount but they coincide in this methodology of allocation.

1 In Appendix I there is the development of Baseline (BL) game by sessions: the assigned roles and the average earnings by gender of the Principals.

(12)

11

Figure 1. BL: Average amount earned by Female Principals.

Figure 2. BL: Average amount earned by Male Principals.

By joining all sessions of the experiment and dividing the results by gender, one can see that the average earning by principal is £6,43 per round: £6,97 for women and £7,78 for men.

As a general conclusion, women prove to be more consistent in their distribution decision and less altruistic than their counterparts. Men do not seem to follow a constant pattern of distribution, but this leads them, in general, to be more altruistic.

- 2,00 4,00 6,00 8,00 10,00 12,00

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

Female Principal Earnings

Periods

- 2,00 4,00 6,00 8,00 10,00 12,00

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

Male principals earnings

Period

(13)

12

Figure 3. BL: Average amount earned by Principals.

These results, in which the female earns more than the male, coincide with those presented by Bottino, García-Muñoz, & Kujal (2016).

The following chart shows the percentages of resources that men and women allocate to their recipients in each round.

Figure 4. BL: Percentage allocated by Principals to Recipients.

Considering the average earnings for men and women throughout the sessions, as shown in the following graph, there is a clear tendency for the male gender to be more generous as the experiment goes on. It is opposed to gender female who varies her assignment irregularly but always allocating herself more than her counterpart after the second round.

- 2,00 4,00 6,00 8,00 10,00

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

Average amount earned by principals

Periods

Female Male

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

% allocated to Recipients

Periods Female Male

(14)

13

Figure 5. BL: Average amount earned by Principals per session.

5.2. Compulsory Delegation treatment 5.2.1 From the Principal’s point of view²

In the Compulsory Delegation game, both genders obtain similar profits as Principals. Although in the initial periods it is the male gender who obtains greater benefits, throughout the rounds the woman is consolidated by choosing agents that report a greater benefit to her.

Figure 6. CD: Average amount earned by Principals per period.

2 In Appendix II there is the development of Compulsory Delegation (CD) game by sessions: the assigned roles and the average earnings by gender of the Principals.

- 2,00 4,00 6,00 8,00 10,00

Sesion 1 Sesion 2 Sesion 3 Sesion 4

FEMALE MALE

- 2,00 4,00 6,00 8,00 10,00

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

Aveage amount earned by Principals

Periods

Female Male

(15)

14 Female, as Bottino, García-Muñoz, & Kujal (2016) comment in their paper, is more selfish as a Principal when she does not have to take the allocation decision and that is due to the evasion of responsibility in the decision-making.

5.2.2 From the Agent’s point of view

As the Agents, with the passing of the rounds, see that if they return a greater benefit to the Principal, they are chosen again, allocations to recipients decrease over time.

In order to understand this analysis, it is important to consider that there is only one male and one female agent per session. Furthermore, Agents do not know the gender of Principals (Bottino, García-Muñoz, & Kujal, 2016), so the allocation they do is not biased by gender.

Notice that agent’s profit depends exclusively of the times that he or she is chosen by the Principal.

In the following pie charts, we can see how many times each Agent has been chosen per session. In general male agents are selected more often than females.

Figure 7. CD: Times that each gender agent is selected per session.

As an agent, female allocate more equal resources even if it could be a disadvantage for her in long term.

Session 1

Female Agent Male Agent

Session 2

Session 3

Session 4

(16)

15

Figure 8. CD: Average amount earned by Principals.

In relation to the results of the agents, this report show in the following graph, that on average the female agents return to their principal 59.61% of the initial amount while the male agents return 82.82%.

Figure 9. CD: Percentage of amount allocated by Agents to Principals.

Therefore, these results affirm as they Bottino, García-Muñoz, &

Kujal (2016) that female agents are more equitable in the distribution although this, in the long term, is a disadvantage for them as they will be chosen less times by the Principal and consequently obtaining lower profits.

- 2,00 4,00 6,00 8,00 10,00

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

Periods

Female Male

0,00%

20,00%

40,00%

60,00%

80,00%

100,00%

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

% returned from Agents to Principals

Periods Females Males

(17)

16 6. Treatment comparison

This section will only analyse the results of the Principal, since it is the figure that is repeated in both treatments.

First, we will see in the following table the profit averages for the Principals in each game:

Baseline Compulsory Delegation

Females 6,97 7,84

Males 5,78 7,31

Both 6,43 7,69

Table 3. Average amount earned by Principals

On average, women earn more in both treatments, although as Bottino, García-Muñoz, & Kujal (2016) conclude: women act differently if they are Agents or Principals. As agents they are more equitable while as principals, they do not think so much in the distribution of resources with the recipients.

See on the next figure the profits that men and women get as Principals in each treatment.

Figure 10. BL vs CD: Average amount earned by Female Principals.

As previously advanced, women earn a constant amount of money with the Baseline treatment. By incorporating the delegation of responsibility, the female gender becomes more selfish in recent periods by choosing as Agent who reports the greatest benefit.

- 2,00 4,00 6,00 8,00 10,00 12,00

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

Average amount earned by Female Principals

Periods

Baseline Compulsory Delegation

(18)

17 For the male gender:

Figure 11. BL vs CD: Average amount earned by Male Principals.

Male at all times receive greater profits with the mandatory delegation: this confirms that the fact of avoiding responsibility leads them to be selfish and choose from the outset those agents that offer them the greatest benefit.

7. Extrapolation to Business Environment

This sections aim is to better understand the implications of these findings in real life labour markets.

One important phenomena in labour market is the “glass ceiling”, which prevents women from accessing to the high positions of a company for the social belief of their lower capacities for doing it (Contreras Torres, Pedraza Ortiz, &

Mejía Restrepo, 2012).

In order to propose the adaptation of our study to the business environment, we will assume that those people who represent a greater return to those who delegate to them ascend vertically in a company.

Thus, considering the previous results, the agents that return a greater benefit to the Principals are the male ones. A less equitable view of the allocation of resources would lead them to have options to be part of the decision-making positions.

It has also been observed in the results, that men get better results for themselves when they delegate the tasks instead of performing them themselves.

For this reason, we could assume that a male Agent who ascends in the company for his good decisions, will later stop taking them and delegate them to others.

- 1,00 2,00 3,00 4,00 5,00 6,00 7,00 8,00 9,00

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

Average amount earned by Male Principals

Periods

Baseline Compulsory Delegation

(19)

18 This could lead to raise another concept: boss vs. leader. In our society, the figure of the authoritarian boss is increasingly disappearing to become someone who cares not only for profit figures but also for the resources that help to obtain these figures (mainly human resources).

Extrapolating this premise to the intermediate levels of a company where we could place the Principals of this experiment, wouldn't it be convenient that the possibility to rise in the company would be for those people who care that the allocation of resources is equitable? This profile, unlike the previous case, coincides more with the female agent.

8. Conclusions

As a result of all the premises set above, it can be concluded that, indeed, men and women have different behaviours when making decisions.

If they must make the distribution decision themselves, males decide to be more egalitarian with the receiving party while the women are less egalitarian.

By contrast, when they have to delegate, both genders are more selfish and choose the agent who reports a greater benefit. The only difference is that while men act like this from the start, women take a few more rounds to choose the most selfish agent. Delegation is therefore an effective tool to generate inequalities.

Analysing the subjects as agents, women are more equitable and make more fair allocations. This finding corroborates the previous literature that warns that female agents make fairer allocations despite the fact that this suppose less benefit to them because they are chosen fewer times (Bottino, García-Muñoz, &

Kujal, 2016). Male agents, make decisions that favour their principal and thus guarantee them a greater benefit by being chosen more times.

Regarding the application of these results to the business environment, we can conclude that depending on the business model, promotion options will vary:

in a company that wants to boast of the figure of “leader” concerned with the welfare of those who takes part, the female figure is more likely to ascend. Her concern for equitable allocations can make her an ideal candidate for promotion.

On the other hand, in companies where the figure of the authoritarian boss persists, concerned about the reported profit and not so much for those who make it possible, it is likely that the male gender has more options for promotional success. His ability to report greater profits to those who have delegated on him will be what makes you climb positions.

As a final conclusion, in a changing and modern business environment that seeks to adapt to social needs and where the authoritarian figures are less

(20)

19 and less likely, it is expected that the options of assuming leadership positions of women grows. Not surpassing male but reaching the same level.

Furthermore, the social environment increasingly concerned with gender equality and this is an important factor to change how female is projected in all environments.

(21)

20 9. References

Albert López-Ibor, R., Escot Mangas, L., Fernández Cornejo, J. A., & Palomo Vadillo, M. T. (2010). ¿Tienen las políticas de conciliación un sesgo femenino? El caso de las empresas familiarmente responsables. CLM.

Economía. Revista Económica de Castilla La Mancha, (17), 141-168.

Azmat, G., & Petrongolo, B. (2014). Gender and the Labor Market: What Have We Learned from Field and Lab Experiments? Labour Economics, 30, 32-40.

Booth, A. L., Francesconi, M., & Frank, J. (2003). A sticky floors model of

promotion, pay and gender. European Economic Review 47(2), 295-322.

Bottino, E., García-Muñoz, T., & Kujal, P. (2016). Gender Biases in Delegation.

Buedo Martínez, S. (2015). Mujeres y mercado laboral en la actualidad, un análisis desde la perspectiva de género: genéricamente empobrecidas, patriarcalmente desiguales. RES, Revista de Educación Social.

Choy, A. K., Hamman, J. R., King, R. R., & Weber, R. A. (2016). Delegated bargaining in a competitive agent market: an experimental study. Journal of the Economic Science Association, 2(1), 22-35.

Comisión de Igualdad y Diversidad de CEOE;. (2019). Análisis de la brecha salarial de género en España. España: PricewaterhouseCoopers Asesores de Negocios, S.l.

Contreras Torres, F., Pedraza Ortiz, J. E., & Mejía Restrepo, X. (2012). La mujer y el liderazgo empresarial. Diversitas: Perspectivas en Psicología, 8(1), 183-194.

Croson, R., & Gneezy, U. (2009). Gender Differences in Preferences. Journal of Economic Literature, 47(2), 448-74.

Ezquerra, L., & Kujal, P. (2019). Deciding to Delegate: On Distributional

Consequences of Endogenous Delegation. ESI Working Papers, 19-22.

Fershtman, C., & Gneezy, U. (2001, Summer). Strategic delegation: An experiment. RAND Journal of Economics Vol. 32, No. 2, pp. 352-368.

Garofalo, O., & Rott, C. (2018). Shifting Blame? Experimental Evidence of Delegating Communication. Management Science, 64(8), 3911-3925.

Gneezy, U., Leonard, K. L., & List, J. A. (2009). Gender differences in competition: Evidence from a matrilineal and a patriarchal society.

Econometrica, 77(5), 1637-1664.

(22)

21 Hamman, J. R., Loewenstein, G., & Weber, R. A. (2010). Self-interest through

delegation: An additional rationale for the principal-agent relationship.

American Economic Review 100(4), 1826-46.

Lamas, M. (2007). El género es cultura. Retrieved from V Campus de Cooperación Cultural.

http://www.oei.es/historico/euroamericano/ponencias_derechos_genero.

php:

http://www.oei.es/historico/euroamericano/ponencias_derechos_genero.

php

Martín Llaguno, M. (2007). La mujer en la industria publicitaria. La segregación vertical en la comunicación comercial: techo de cristal y suelo pegajoso.

(23)

22 10. Appendix I: BL Treatment development by sessions

In the first session of Baseline only one of the three Principal players are a man. Analysing the average allocation of the twelve rounds we can affirm that women have not share, on average, the 61,25% of the amount that must be distributed while men have not shared the 68,07%. In the next table one can see the roles assignment for the first session and in the following figure the average earning for principals by gender.

Session 1

Players 5 1 6

Table 4. Role Assignment in BL at first session.

Figure 12. BL: Average amount earned by Principals in session 1.

During the first session, while female gender allocates a more or less constant amount of resources to its recipient, the male gender decides to share alternately none resources or half part of them to its recipients in each round.

For the second session, randomly the same number of men and women participate as a Principals. The following table shows the role assignment.

- 2,00 4,00 6,00 8,00 10,00

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

Periods

Female Male

(24)

23 Session 2

Players 4 4 8

Table 5. Role Assignment in BL at second session.

The results of this session shows that this time is women who decides to allocate themselves a higher percentage of resources (67,78%) while men keeps themselves the 60,62%.

In this second session both gender carry out a more equitable distribution of resources. Although women have been more selfish in the thrd period compensating the altruism of the firs one. Men have shown their altruism on the eleventh period.

The role assignment for the third session is shown on the next table.

Session 3

Players 2 6 8

Table 6. Role Assignment in BL at third session.

Three of the four participants are men and there is only one women in the group. Female, on average, have been more selfish on this session and keep for

- 2,00 4,00 6,00 8,00 10,00

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

Periods

Female Male

(25)

24 herself the 62,39% of the resources. On the other hand, men have maintained in their pockets the 56,78% of the amount.

In this third session the decision of allocation of men and women are more equated; in all rounds both genders distribute with more equality their resources between themselves and their recipients. Although genders act similarly, the distribution is not symmetrical, and they continue allocating less resources that what they assign to themselves.

On the last round (the fourth) the number of participants as Principals increases to 9. In the following table one can see that 6 of this 9 are women. They decide to stay, on average, the 74,33% of the resources, the highest percentage seen until now. On the other part, the men decide to appropriate only the 53,59%

of the import, the lowest percentage of all sessions.

Session 4

Players 10 8 18

Table 7. Role Assignment in BL at fourth session.

Although they demonstrate a certain selfishness, the behaviour of women in this session is more constant than the behaviour of male gender.

- 2,00 4,00 6,00 8,00 10,00

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

Periods

Female Male

(26)

25

- 2,00 4,00 6,00 8,00 10,00

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

Periods

Female Male

(27)

26 11. Appendix II: CD Treatment development by sessions

11.1. Principal’s point of view

On the first session, as seen in the following table, all Principals are women (remember that roles are randomly assigned).

Session 1

Players 7 3 10

Agents 1 1 2

Table 8. Role Assignment in CD at first session.

Figure 16. CD: Average amount earned by Principals in session 1.

Due to the absence of male in this session, we can only conclude that Principals receive on average £7,78 per round back from their agents.

On the next session, the second one, the number of participants and the roles assigned to them are more mixed: Principals are two men and two women.

See the following table:

- 2,00 4,00 6,00 8,00 10,00

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

Periods Female

(28)

27 Session 2

Players 4 6 10

Agents 1 1 2

Table 9. Role Assignment in CD at second session.

The average allocation for Principals does not differs a lot related to gender: men receive from the Agent they chose an average percentage of 64,35% while women receive an average of 64,68% of the amount that Agent distributes.

On the following sessions, the third and the fourth one, the number of participants is reduced to 8. The number of Principals is reduced to 3 and this implies that for sure the number of male and females that are enrolled as Principals cannot be equal.

Session 3

Players 4 4 8

Agents 1 1 2

Table 10. Role Assignment in CD at third session.

- 2,00 4,00 6,00 8,00 10,00

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

Periods

Female Male

(29)

28 On the third session, the agent strategy is to return the maximum to his/her Principals, so the profit they get are almost the 100% of the amount distributed in all rounds. The report will show, when it analyses the Agent's point of view, that this strategy works and only one of the two Agents of session 3 is chosen for all rounds.

On the last session the number of Principals is one more time fully female as indicated in the following table:

Session 4

Players 6 2 8

Agents 1 1 2

Table 11. Role Assignment in CD at fourth session.

On this last session for the first time the report shows that Principals receives no return in one round. The amount on £10 is fully assigned to recipient.

Even so, the rest of rounds the amount assigned by the Agents to the Principals is significant. On average, the earnings for Principals are £7,68 per round.

- 2,00 4,00 6,00 8,00 10,00

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

Periods

Female Male

(30)

29

11.2. Agent’s point of view

The development of the sessions from the point of view of the agent happens as explained below.

In the first session the male agent is choose 28 times while the female agent only 20. In the following graph we can see how much resources each agent assigns (remember they are different genders) to the main ones:

Figure 20. CD: Average amount returned by Agents in session 1.

Although they differ in time, the drawings of both genders are similar.

Perhaps it is necessary to highlight that the female agent remains in constant

- 2,00 4,00 6,00 8,00 10,00

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

Periods Female

- 2,00 4,00 6,00 8,00 10,00

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

Average amount allocated by agents to principals

Periods

Females Males

(31)

30 ranges except in period 6 while the changes in male agent's choices are more aggressive.

On the second round the behaviours of the agents are completely opposite although the numbers of times they have been choose are similar: the female Agent is elected 25 times and the male 23.

In the third session the female agent has no opportunity to allocate resources: Principals are according to the distribution method of the male agent and continue to delegate to him. This is understood, since it allocates practically in all rounds 100% of the amount to its dictator.

- 2,00 4,00 6,00 8,00 10,00

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

Periods

Females Males

- 2,00 4,00 6,00 8,00 10,00

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

Periods

Females Males

(32)

31 On the fourth and final round both agents participate again although the male agent is still chosen over the female agent: 12 times for the female agent against the double, 24, for the male.

The return of the agents to the principal demonstrates the reason for this difference: the constant and significant assignment of the male agent makes him continuously selected in the last rounds of the session.

- 2,00 4,00 6,00 8,00 10,00

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

Periods

Females Males